CONTRIBUTIONS ON TIBETAN AND BUDDHIST RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Edited by
ERNST STEINKELLNER AND
HELMUT TAUSCHER

Proceedings of the Csoma De Körös Symposium
Held at Velm-Vienna, Austria, 13-19 September 1981

VOL-II

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VOL. 2

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THE IMPORTANCE OF LOVE AND COMPASSION IN BUDDHISM

by

ACHOK RIMPOCHE (Vienna)

I am really happy that a Tibetan *geshe* is given the opportunity to talk during this conference about how Tibetans maintain their religious and cultural tradition. I am grateful to the Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies of the University of Vienna organizing the conference and giving me this opportunity.

Tibetan culture and the Buddhist religion are so interwoven in Tibet that it is difficult to separate them. Since the 7th century Tibetan culture has directly or indirectly supported the Buddhist religion, as well as serving and benefitting the Tibetan people. There have always been many different views about Buddhism, but I am going to give you my view, which is that of a monk who had studied in the traditional way up to the level of *geshe*.

The doctrine of Buddhism is basically established on love and compassion for all sentient beings and is actually a way of transforming one's thoughts and actions in whatever situation of life. Since Buddhism is based on love and compassion, and as these are qualities which are specially important for everyone in this 20th century, I am going to talk about love and compassion.

The Nature of Loving Concern and Compassion

Love and Compassion are warm feelings wishing that everyone may be happy and free from any suffering, or, in other words, regarding everyone as valuable, and caring if anyone suffers. Love and compassion are the sharpest opponents of neglecting other people or using them for one's own benefit. There are many different degrees of love and compassion, starting with the simplest type which ordinary people feel for their own children and parents. A little wider is that kind of love and compassion

one has for the people of one's own country. Greater than that is feeling it for all sentient beings, including even the smallest insect. The highest form of compassion is reached when one is willing to undergo any suffering for countless aeons, even giving one's own life, if it is of the slightest benefit to any single being, even an ant. There is an example given in the second chapter of *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā*, where it is said that the love and compassion of a Buddha is the same towards a man who is cutting his arm as it is for one who is anointing him with perfume.

Compassion includes the Six Perfections, because a compassionate person practices generosity by being willing to give whatever he has or whatever is needed. Out of compassion he does not harm others but, has the morality and discipline which enables him to help others, as well as the patience of never being discouraged. Due to enthusiastic perseverance he never loses interest in the welfare of others, but works with one-pointed concentration for their benefit, having the wisdom which knows the best way to help any sentient being.

The Value of Love and Compassion in the World

In recent times there has been great scientific and technological progress, and this will doubtlessly continue for some time in the future. Most countries and political leaders think that material progress is the best method for achieving happiness. In fact so much importance is given to it, that science and technology have become almost a common religion. Paradoxically, those countries which have made the greatest material progress have also inevitably and rapidly been driven into great fear, such as has never been known before. They have become economically and militarily powerful, due to advanced science and technology, but don't seem to realize that the feat under which they now live is due to their having been careless about the needs of others. In fact they even believe that it is right to put one's own progress and welfare first. Out of a need to protect themselves they design and make weapons which can distroy enemies, and enable them to win wars, but after accumulating these weapons they are afraid of what the result might be if those have to be used, or if similar weapons are used against them. This increases fear, insecurity and confusion, and leads to the aggression that sparks off a war.

The source of fear and suffering for all human beings is exaggerated self-concern, or self-cherishing, and therefore a lack of concern for

others. You can not cure this suffering with medicine or weapons. The only cure or opponent is changing one's attitude from self-concern to concern for others or, in other words, to care more about others than about oneself.

Some people may argue that, if I care about others and don't think about myself, than I will suffer, because people will think I am weak and will exploit me. In short term this may seem to be so, but the long-term benefit is far greater than any immediate loss or hardship. If one is thinking only in terms of happiness for oneself, even at the cost of others, this may result in enjoyment or having what one wants now, whereas the long-term result from cherishing others more than oneself is to be free from suffering and, therefore, to have enduring happiness and peace of mind.

As long as there is self-cherishing and lack of concern for others, there will be no end to great conflict between countries and small conflict between individuals. If you think about this, you will understand it logically and you will also see that whatever short-term benefit you gain from caring only about yourself is limited, whilst the benefit that comes in long term from helping or being kind to others is not only limitless, but always continuously increasing.

Therefore self-cherishing, or lack of concern for the well-being of others is, and always has been, a source of suffering, whereas love and compassion, which are the opposites, are always a source of happiness now and in the future. No one can say that love and compassion were only useful in the past, but are no longer of value. Anyone who feels this is completely illogical and hasn't thought deeply. Isn't it true that material progress is mostly based on self-concern? Someone may ask: if we remove selfish concern, than how can we still have material progress, which is undoubtedly useful for man. I am going to answer this way: In the beginning we were concerned only about oursleves and careless about other people, so it was mostly for our own benefit that we built schools to give education, which has lead to great advance in scientific and technological development. But why can't we have the same advance and benefit based on concern for others instead of only for ourselves? Not only is such a development of benefit for everyone, but it can also be used for the benefit of all sentient beings.

In the sūtras it is said that someone who has achieved a high state of love and compassion can take advantage even of desire in order to have a child who can be educated to help others. It is also said that,

in the same way as the manure from the city of Serkya was of benefit for the field of sugar cane, the manure of a Bodhisattva's delusions can be beneficial for himself and others to achieve enlightenment.

Moreover, if you have love and compassion very deeply and extensively, in order to serve others, you can belong to any system - be it democratic, social or communist - and this need not contradict religion but can be in harmony with it. With love and compassion you can benefit others through any system or religion, or you can use any system or religion to help others.

The Connection between Buddhism and Love and Compassion

Generally speaking all religions are based on love and compassion, but according to what I know, Buddhism is even more specially connected. When Buddha turned the Wheel of Dharma he taught Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna according to the disciples' ability or comprehension. In Hīnayāna it doesn't specially say how to develop love and compassion, and doesn't teach how to practice the bodhisattva deeds, but out of love and compassion for others, it teaches that it is wrong to do any harm, like even raising one's arm to strike, or to steal anything though it may cost only one penny, or to say harsh words and cause dissensions between people. In short, harmful actions or thoughts are not allowed, whereas doing things to help others is clearly taught, like giving food and shelter to any uninvited guest or traveller, providing food when there is famine, caring for sick people and giving medicine, building temples, libraries and schools, etc. The Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka teaches morality, concentration, wisdom as a means of removing the cause of suffering, which is the second of the Four Noble Truths; and the removal of the root of suffering implies love and compassion.

Unlike Hīnayāna, which chiefly teaches how to cease from harming others, Mahāyāna goes further and states that one should use all means to benefit others, even by sacrificing one's own life if necessary. As it is said in chapter 3 of Śāntideva's *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*:

> "May I be the doctor and the medicine
>   and may I be the nurse
>   for all sick beings in the world
>   until everyone is healed."

Against self-cherishing the same text teaches how to dedicate one's body for the welfars of others, for in chapter 3 Śāntideva also says:

> "Having given this body up
>   for the pleasure of all living beings
>   by killing, abusing and beating it
>   may they always do as they please."

and:

> "May all who say bad things to me
>   or cause me any other harm,
>   and those who mock and insult me
>   have the fortune to fully awaken."

Of course, there is no need to mention to wish to help our relatives and friends, but we should also wish our enemies - those who do us harm - to achieve enlightment quickly. The opposites of being careless about the welfare of others is to be able to care even for your enemies. Śāntideva continues:

> "May I be a protector for those without one,
>   a guide for all travellers on the way;
>   may I be a bridge, a boat and a ship
>   for all who wish to cross (the water)."

In his homage to compassion, in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Chandrakīrti says:

> "Mercy alone is seen as the seed
>   of a Conqueror's rich harvest,
>   as water for development, and as
>   ripening in a state of long enjoyment;
>   therefore at the start I praise compassion."

In the same way, Tantrayāna also depends on love and compassion, since good practitioners, who cannot bear the suffering of others, try to find the quickest way to be able to benefit them, which is to become enlightened. According to Buddhism there is only one quick way to achieve enlightenment, even within three years, and that is Tantrayāna, but if one engages in Tantra without this supreme motivation and does it for one's own benefit, then one will be disappointed and may say that Tantra is not true and can not help to attain enlightenment quickly.

How the Tibetans Preserved Buddhism

In the introduction to his spiritual autobiography, *The Well Arranged Stepping Stones - A Personal Narration of the Omniscient Lord*, Je Tsong kha pa says:

"In the beginning I searched again and again for compre-
    hensive learning.
In the middle I had all the discourses arise as a guidance.
In the end I put them into practice throughout day and
    night and dedicated all to the dissemination of the
    doctrines.
Keeping in mind this procedure is a well arranged stepping
    stone - most gracious is the venerated treasure of
    knowledge."

In brief, this is how the Tibetan monks studied, practised and main-
tained Buddhism. Now I will explain this little more detailed.

Normally we study, under the guidance of a qualified teacher, begin-
ning with the alphabet and continuing up to all the sūtras and Tantras.
There is not even one text in sūtra and Tantra that you don't have to
study.

These texts were brought to Tibet from India in the 7th century. As
the Tibetan people wanted to have them translated into Tibetan, King
Srong btsan sgam po sent Thon mi Sambhoṭa to India to invent a script
for the Tibetan language. This was done under great difficulties, and
after that Indian and Tibetan scholars translated the texts, with much
effort and care, under the guidance first of King Srong btsan sgam po
and later of King Khri srong lde brtsan. These translations had to be
exactly in accordance with the original Sanskrit, even having the same
number of syllables, and nothing was added or altered. They were checked
by many other scholars and translators before publication, to make sure
they adhered strictly to the original texts.

Later on the Tibetan monks studied these translations, and many became
learned scholars who meditated on and practised what they had learnt,
and thus gained realization. Then they themselves wrote commentaries on
the texts, based on their own understanding, and their disciples studied
these commentaries, which is how the Nyingmapa, Sakyapa, Kagyupa and
Gelugpa traditions developed. They all teach the same principles of Bud-
dhism, but with some differences in the methods of meditation. The way
of studying the texts or commentaries is similar, but since I belong to

the Gelugpa tradition I will explain how we study.

Around the 14th century Tsong kha pa established the Gelugpa tradi-
tion, which gradually became famous and is the largest tradition now.
There were numerous Gelugpa monasteries in Amdo, Kham and Lhasa, where
one could study, but the most famous were Gaden (established by Tsong
kha pa himself), Drepung and Sera, known as the "Three Great Pillars".
Sometimes Thashilhunpo in Shigatse is added as the fourth. In 1958, at
the time, when His Holiness the Dalai Lama took the *geshe* examination,
there were 5.000 monks in Gaden, about 10.000 in Drepung and some 7.000
in Sera. Although some of these monks worked in the administration or as
cooks the majority were students.

Most of the students were from Amdo, Kham and Tsang. Those from Am-
do and Kham, the furthest provinces from Lhasa, came on foot, carrying
their provisions on their back. The journey took 3-4 months, and when
they had no food left, they begged for it. Because it was very cold and
an arduous journey, many died on the way. It wasn't because they were
poor that they travelled on foot; some were from rather rich families,
but they felt this way was the best way to come to Lhasa, as pilgrims,
and therefore they did so voluntarily. Many students also came from Mon-
golia on camels, and as they didn't even know Tibetan, they had to learn
the language first. On reaching Lhasa the new arrivals would first of
all go to see the Śākyamuni-statue and pray for whatever they wanted.
Some wanted to study until they were *geshes*, others only for a few years.
Although some travelled alone, most of them came in groups and were usu-
ally aged between 17 to 21. They joined whichever of the three great mon-
asteries was usual for people from their regions.

On joining a monastery a teacher would be allocated to each student,
who would then have to offer tea for all the monks in the hostel to which
he was admitted. Although they were very poor after such a difficult
journey, they offered tea even if it meant borrowing money from their
teachers or others. The new students also had to do manual work of var-
ious kind when required. All lived in very simple conditions, but did
so willingly because they felt they were very fortunate to be able to
study in these great monasteries and turn away from worldly life. They
studied through many classes on the following subjects:
Pramāṇa (Logic), Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom), Madhyamaka (the
Middle Path), Abidharma (Metaphysics) and Vinaya (Discipline). The texts
studied were the relevant sūtras and their Indian and Tibetan commentar-
ies. These studies took about 20-30 years, after which the students were

examined for the *geshe* degree. Each year from the final class of each college the two best students would take the *lharampa geshe* examination, so some of the best students might have to wait another 10 years before getting the *lharampa* degree. Those with less ability got other *geshe* degrees called *dhorampa* and *lingseb*.

Students didn't receive any scholarships or money; all they got was whatever offerings were made by lamas or sponsors, and from this they should buy food, but sometimes they also had to offer tea for the monks in their college. They usually wore very poor robes which were patched and repatched and used for all seasons of the year. They studied and debated day and night, and when they returned to their rooms, they recited whatever they had memorized. Often they would go to bed without even undressing, so that they could rise quickly and go to the main temple where they would have tea. Some of them didn't even have any food to eat, but others would share what they had. They would then go to the *choera* (debating ground) and debate on what they had studied all morning, after which they would have lunch and continue debating for 2-3 hours, as well as studying and debating in the evening. While in the Prajñā and Madhyamaka classes, in Serejey college for instance, the monks debated throughout the entire night.

The reason for debating - still an important feature in traditional Tibetan education - is the fact that all the monks had individual teachers with diverging ideas, so that although the subject is the same, there might be many different points of view. Debating is a way of understanding other views and checking whether their or another's point of view is correct. So debating on a subject means to listen to some other person's opinion and, then, either to refute it by logical argument, or see that one's own view is lacking. Debating also sharpens one's mind, because one has to formulate the own opinion clearly in order to refute wrong views or to convince the other person of one's own view being more logical. This is specially important when there are many different schools of thought on one subject, *śūnyatā* for instance.

Before going in for the *geshe* examination, monks had to make offerings in their monasteries, colleges and hostels for all the monks. Rich people usually came forward and offered to pay the expenses, so that the *geshe* could give food, tea and money to all the monks, according to the custom. Even though a sponsor was willing to bear the costs, the *geshe* himself would prefer to sell whatever he had to pay for them, and only after his own resources were used, he would accept help from others. The reason for this is, that by practicing giving he creates merit that will

benefit others.

From the time of the 13th Dalai Lama onwards, the *lharmapa geshes* examined extensively in front of the Dalai Lama, his two Tutors and religious assistants, prior to which they had been examined in the temple in Lhasa by learned *geshes* from Gaden, Drepung and Sera. During the "Great Prayer Festival", which was founded by Tsong kha pa and is held in the first month of every Tibetan new year, the *geshes* were examined by the abbots of all the colleges of the three great monasteries. When people knew that famous students were being examined, the temple would be crowded with *geshes* and monks, as everybody wanted to hear them. During the examinations great *geshes* and scholars put really sharp questions and arguments, which they had prepared during the year. Each *geshe* was examined for one full day during *Monlam*, and at the end he would be awarded an official degree, so there would be much interest and excitement as to who received first place.

After attaining the *geshe* degree some would join one of the two Tantric Colleges to study Tantra for many years and also take an examination. Thereafter they could become Chief Disciplinarian (*dge bskos*), Prior (*bla ma dbu mdzad*) or abbot of the tantric colleges. From this position they could rise to representatives of rGyal tshab rje or mKhas grub rje, and then to *Gaden tipa*, representative of Tsong kha pa, which is the highest position *geshes* can attain. They could also become regent during the time of minority of the Dalai Lama. Students say that the position of the *Gaden tipa* is not reserved for anyone in particular but it is open for everyone who has the ability. All the great *Gaden tipas* have studied like ordinary monks for many years with great difficulties and often without proper food.

Such is the way that Buddhism was developed, studied, practised and preserved in Tibet. Though I have spoken in the past tense, this same tradition of studies is still carried on by the monks nowadays, even though the conditions in exile in India are quite limited compared to what they used to be in Tibet.

How Love and Compassion Benefit Sentient Beings

Once, before Buddha became enlightened, he was a bodhisattva called Mahāsattva, the son of a great king, Mahāratha. One day, when the prince and his two elder brothers, Mahādeva and Mahāpranāda, went to the forest, they saw a female tiger with five cubs, who were all hungry, and the

mother tiger was about to eat her cubs. But the youngest prince couldn't bear it and wanted to feed them with his own body and blood, so he sent his brothers away on the pretext of looking for food and then lay down so that the tiger could eat him. But the tiger was so weak that she couldn't do so, and the prince, out of his great compassion, took a sharp branch and cut his flesh so that the blood came and then fed the tiger with his body. He did this to prevent the mother from eating her cubs and the cubs from starving, and he dedicated the merit of his generosity so that he could help the tiger and cubs not only in that life, but in all future lifetimes. Later, when Buddha had become enlightened, he first turned the Wheel of Dharma for the tiger and cubs, who were then human beings, and they became his disciples and reached arhatship in that very life. This is one of many similar incidents in the life of Buddha given in the Jātaka tales, telling of the compassionate deeds which led to Buddha's enlightenment.

In Tibet, as I've already mentioned, there were many monasteries where people could study, and every year new students made long and difficult journeys to join them. In the beginning they didn't know who were going to be their teachers, and also the the teacher didn't know who his students would be. They were not chosen personally but the names were drawn from a container and students assigned to particular teachers by such means of selections. The teacher would then be responsible for the students and had not only to educate, but also feed and clothe them. Nobody paid the teacher for doing so or thanked him, but the teacher undertook this task out of love and compassion, and he helped the students in whatever way they needed. We can easily understand that it would be natural to do this, if the students were relatives or friends of the teacher, but they were not. Yet he looked after them with great kindness, and when the students learnt well the teacher was happy and he worried when anything adverse happened to them. Whatever all the great *lamas* and *geshes* have achieved, is due to their teachers, and this is why the utmost reverence is paid to one's teachers, not only when one is a student, but throughout one's entire life.

In this century the great Indian leader, Mahātma Gandhi, went through many difficult situations for the sake of helping the people in his country. Even though there was opposition when he worked for India's independence, he never gave up his ideal and always tried to achieve it by peaceful means for the sake of his own people as well as others.

Mother Theresa is another example of a person who has devoted her life to serving the old, poor and abandoned out of love and compassion.

She began this work not in her own country, but for people of different race and nation, and she continues to help people in many different countries. Though she receives riches and awards, she never uses them for herself, but only for the welfare of others.

For the last 25 years there has been the most difficult situation ever experienced in Tibetan history. All the culture achievements of many centuries have been destroyed, and especially religion - which is the foundation of Tibetan culture - has suffered greatly. The people and religious practitioners have endured unimaginable misery, even though they were living peacefully and not harming others.

Out of great concern and compassion, His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, has given all his time and effort to helping his suffering people, even undergoing exile, abuse and misunderstanding, as well as hardship and loss, solely to benefit others. In the beginning he tried to cooperate with the Chinese when they overran his country, believing they had good intentions, and when obliged finally to leave his land to prevent further suffering of his people, he has worked ceaselessly not only for the Tibetans but for everyone. His love and compassion are for all people, including the Chinese. He has never abused them, in fact has referred to any good things they have done, and he always asks his people not to have any harmful thoughts, even towards enemies.

In short, no true Tibetan *lama* or *geshe* wishes harm to the Chinese or any other person, but, on the contrary, feels compassion for anyone who is undergoing suffering or causing suffering to others. If the Tibetans had cared more for material progress than for the benefits of religion, and had made themselves militarily powerful, they would probably have had greater suffering and also would have caused much harm to others.

Love and compassion are not only of help to others, they also benefit those who practice them. The Buddha reached enlightenment due to his compassionate deeds throughout many lifetimes. Parents and teachers also benefit by feeling happy when they can help their children and students. In fact anyone who sincerely helps others becomes an object of respect and admiration and feels happy, so he also benefits from love and compassion, even though he may not be thinking about himself at all. Therefore love and compassion are the main foundation of happiness and benefit for others as well as for oneself, so why don't reasonable people try to develop and practise love and compassion?

How to Develop Love and Compassion

There are two causes of suffering, one is self-cherishing and the other is ignorance of the way in which things actually exist. These two causes are linked, because if you don't have the wrong view, then self-cherishing won't cause much suffering. The purpose of studying Madhyamaka is to establish the correct view, in order to eliminate the wrong view, which is one of the causes of suffering. The other cause of suffering, self-cherishing, has to be eliminated by love and compassion for others.

In Buddhism the first of these two methods is called *zab mo lta rgyud* the "Lineage of the wisdom understanding emptiness", which came from Mañjuśri to Nāgārjuna to Āryadeva. The second method is called *rgya chen spyod rgyud*, the "Extensive practice of love and compassion", which has two lineages. The first came through Maitreya Buddha to Asaṅga to gSer ling pa and gives the 7-point method of developing love and compassion through equanimity by (1) recognizing everybody as having been your mother, (2) recognizing that thus everyone has been kind to you, (3), wishing to repay their kindness, (4) immaculate love, (5) great compassion, (6) exceptional compassion, and (7) *bodhicitta* (wishing to reach the state of enlightenment, in order to benefit others. The second lineage came from Mañjuśrī to Śāntideva to gSer ling pa. Starting with equanimity, one exchanges oneself with others by thinking of the faults of self-cherishing, the advantages of cherishing others, and regarding all sentient beings as more precious than a wish-fulling gem. From gSer ling pa these two lineages passed on to Atiśa and merged into one. In this form they have continued to this time.

Conclusion

The purpose of all the long years of studying so many texts, which monks undergo, is to be able to recognize the root cause of suffering and, knowing the antidotes, to apply them and bring about a transformation in one's mind from selfishness to selflessness. Some people may think that this is just idealism and that it isn't possible to actually develop love and compassion in this way. But if you follow the methods of mind-transformation correctly, there is no doubt whatsoever that love and compassion can be developed - it is only a matter of time and effort.

Up to now hundreds of *lamas* have come through the lineages from Maitreya Buddha and Mañjuśrī. They all had the same experiences and difficulties that we have, but they practiced love and compassion for years, and finally developed it. You can know about these experiences from their biographies, and you also can see what they accomplished from the examples of the compassionate beings living amongst us.

Many people think the best method to be happy is to have material progress, but when they have material well-being they find it doesn't make them completely happy, in fact it is often accomplished by or leads to mental problems and dissatisfaction. Other people, however, without any material well-being at all, have great peace of mind and happiness. So why doesn't material progress give people happiness and peace of mind? Because very often this has been developed, acquired or used for selfish reasons. Therefore, if we want to be happy now and in the future, we should try to use material progress to benefit others and not achieve our own well-being through neglecting or making others suffer. In order to do that, we need to have developed love and compassion. There are the two methods in Buddhism which I have mentioned, and there may be many other methods, so we should find out what suits us best. It is very important to consider w h y love and compassion are beneficial to others, w h e t h e r they can bring ourselves and others happiness and peace of mind, and then, h o w they can be developed.

In conclusion, as Thogs med bzang po taught in *The Thirty-Seven Practices of all Buddha's Sons*:

> "All of our sufferings without an exception,
> derive from the with to please only ourselves;
> while the thoughts and the actions that benefit others
> conceive and give birth to supreme Buddhahood."

BSHAD THABS: SOME TIBETAN METHODS OF EXPLAINING THE TANTRAS*

by

M.BROIDO (Oxford)

1. Introduction and summary

Since the Tibetan for "tantra" is *rgyud* and since the whole corpus of works on tantra explains the tantras, those works may be called *rgyud kyi bshad pa*. Among them, those which deal systematically with m e t h o d s for explaining the tantras are said to be on *rgyud kyi bshad thabs* or *bshad thabs* for short. This paper is about *bshad thabs* as developed in Tibet and represented by works *A - J* of the bibliography.

In our Symposium this year Dr.Katz has given a useful review of Buddhist hermeneutics,[1] and it would be pointless to repeat that here. In any case, the term *bshad thabs* covers a wide range of notions, as we see from Table 1, and it is not clear to me whether all of them fall under the English word "hermeneutics". So I will continue to use the simple phrase "methods of explaining the tantras".

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[1] N.Katz, *Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yāna controversy* (see pp.107-130 of this volume).

TABLE 1:   SOME KINDS OF *BSHAD THABS* [2]

Canonical source	Mainly linguistic	Mainly non-linguistic
Guhyasamājatantra		*rgyud gsum*[3]
GST literature	*gleng bslang ba'i rgyan*[4]	*rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*[5]
especially	*mtha' drug gi rgyan*[6]	*gang zag lnga'i rgyan*[9]
PPD and *JVS*	*bshad tshul bzhi'i rgyan*[7]	*bden gnyis nges pa'i rgyan*[10]
	nyan pa po la bshad tshul	
	gnyis kyi rgyan[8]	
Nam mkha dang	*gdams ngag drug*[11]	*bdag nyid can gsum*[12]
mnyam pa'i rgyud		*gnas bzhi*[13]
Hevajratantra		*dag pa gsum*[14]
		rim pa gnyis[15]
Samputa		*gsang ba bdun*[16] /*brgyad*[17]
?		*phyi/nang/gsang/de kho na*
		nyid[18]
?		*yan lag lnga*[19]

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[2] Table 1 lists every distinct kind of *bshad thabs* identified as such in the texts *A - J*. Doubtless there will be other methods discussed in other texts. None of our texts gives an explicit definition of *bshad thabs*, so the literal translation by "methods of explanation" (of the tantras) can, if one wishes, be supplemented by the observation that the phrase is used, in these texts, of just these methods.

[3] The *rgyud gsum* are: *rang bzhin, gzhi* and *mi 'phrogs pa 'i rgyud*, or *rgyu'i, thabs kyi* and *'bras bu 'i rgyud: GST* XVIII, 33-34; *A* 67b4; *E* 13a4. Very common are the phrases *gzhi'i, lam gyi* and *'bras bu'i rgyud*. Both in Sa skya pa and bKa brgyud pa works, what these sets of three phrases stand for is described by such phrases as *dngos po'i gnas lugs* (or *dngos po'i gnas tshul*), *lam* and *'bras bu skye ba'i rim pa*. See H.V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Nāropa*. Oxford 1963, 114 ff., and my The term *dngos-po'i gnas lugs* in Padma dKar po's *gZhung- 'grel. Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson. Proceedings of the International Seminar on Tibetan Studies, Oxford 1979*, ed. Aris and Kyi, 61f., and numerous Tibetan works quoted in those references.
    The *rgyud gsum* occupy a most central place in Vajrayāna thought. They are often described simply as the content *(bryod bya)* of tantra (e.g. *A* 62a4). It would not be too much to say that for many Tibetan authors on vajrayāna, their view of *rgyud gsum* is the key to their view of vajrayāna as a whole.

[4] *B* 21a7; *D* 216b3; *E* 9a1; *F* 32b5; *J* 38a5

[5] *B* 22b4; *D* 218a7; *E* 9a5; *F* 34a4; *J* 38b4

[6] *B* 24a4; *E* 9b5; *F* 35b5; *G* 10b6; *H* 15b4; *J* 38b7. In *D* the *mtha' drug* materials are rather scattered; see more detailed references below, also table 3.

[7] *B* 25b3; *D* 175a-206b; *E* 10b3; *F* 37a1; *H* 17a3; *J* 39b2; table 4.

[8] *B* 27b5; *D* 220a6; *E* 11a2; *F* 37b5; *J* 39b5

[9] *B* 28a6; *D* 222a1; *E* 11a7; *F* 38a3; *J* 40a1

[10] *B* 29b4; *D* 223a7; *E* 12a5; *F* 38b6; *J* 40b3

[11] *A* 62b5-67b4; *E* 12a7. See table 2.

What is listed in Table 1 are not names of individual techniques of *bshad thabs*, but standard names of g r o u p s of such techniques. The non-linguistic ones are extremely important, but there will not be room to deal with them properly here; some very bare facts may be found in the footnotes. Here I shall deal properly only with the linguistic techniques.[20]

Though distinguished Tibetans wrote on *bshad thabs*, it is not easy to find out about it. I know of no Tibetan work specifically devoted to *bshad thabs*. In the bibliography, A is a review of the tantras in general; B and F are about the Guhyasāmaja system in general; D is a commentary on the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya (JVS)*; E and J are commentaries on the *Hevajratantra*; G is a work on Madhyamaka, and H is on phonetics and similar matters. Bu ston did start to write a work *(C)* on *bshad thabs*, but what has come down to us is only the introduction and colophons.

The main linguistic devices of *bshad thabs* are found in the three groups called g d a m s n g a g d r u g, m t h a ' d r u g and b s h a d t s h u l b z h i (almost always called *tshul bzhi* for short, in spite of the ambiguity). For ease of reference, these three groups are listed in tables 2 – 4.

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[12] *A* 68a6; *E* 12b5 (here quoting the *sGyu 'phrul chen po*) The three are *dbyibs* and *sngags* and *chos kyi bdag nyid*. The proper way of using this method seems to have been a matter of contention: see *A* 68a4; Padma dkar po, *bSre 'pho'i gzhung 'grel* 179a and *khrid yig* 20a1.

[13] *A* 69a1; *E* 12b7. In this method, the four stages *(gnas pa bzhi)* of development of a foetus (viz. *gong bu, chu, gzugs* and *gzugs las 'das pa*) are made to correspond to the four *buddhakāyas* (in the order: *sambhoga-, dharma-, nirmāṇa-, svabhāvikakāya*).

[14] *A* 69b3. They are: *de bzhin nyid kyi dag pa, lha so so'i dag pa,* and *rang rig pa'i dag pa*.

[15] *E* 13b3. They are the usual *bskyed rim* and *rdzogs rim*, here based on *Hevajratantra* I.viii, 24-25.

[16] *A* 70a4.

[17] *E* 13a6.

[18] *E* 13b4

[19] *E* 13b4 (sic).

[20] The difference between linguistic and non-linguistic methods in *bshad thabs* can be only a rough-and-ready one.

TABLE 2: *GDAMS NGAG DRUG* [21]

.*rjod byed kyi sgra 'chad lugs kyi man ngag gsum:*

> *yan lag gi don*[22]
> *yi ge'i don*[23]
> *bsdus don or man ngag gi don*[24]

brjod par bya ba'i don 'chad [25] *par byed pa'i man ngag gsum:*

> *spyi'i don*[26]
> *sbas don*[27]
> *mthar thug gi don*[28]

TABLE 3: *MTHA' DRUG* AND BU STON's PRINCIPLE

the distinction of:	is based on differences of:	
	Bu ston[29] bTsong kha pa[30]	Padma dkar po [31]
drang don and *nges don*	*don*	*brjod don*
dgongs bshad or *dgongs pa can* and *dgongs min*	*sgra*	*brjod gzhi (=)* *dgongs gzhi*
sgra ji bzhin and *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*	*sgra* and *don*	*rjod byed*

[21] This division into two groups is that set out at *A* 62b6.

[22] *A* 64b1

[23] *A* 64b4

[24] *A* 65a3

[25] My print of *A* (as also that used for the Japanese reproduction of the Sa skya bKa 'bum; the two seem to have identical pagination) has *bshad par bya ba* which is probably an old misprint.

[26] *A* 63a1

[27] *A* 63a4

[28] *A* 63b4

[29] *B* 24b1

[30] *D* 207b3 and 218a2

[31] *G* 8b5; *H* 15b4

TABLE 4: *TSHUL BZHI*

bshad pa tshul bzhi as found in the *rgyan bdun* system	rougly corresponding terms of the *gdams* *ngag drug* system
yi ge'i don *tshig don* or	*yan lag gi don*
spyi'i don	*spyi'i don*
sbas don	*sbas don*
mthar thug don	*mthar thug don*

These three groups of linguistic devices depend on one single dis-
tinction, roughly that between *r j o d   b y e d   s g r a* and *b r j o d   b y a*
d o n; part of these phrases appear in various places in tables 2 and 3.
It is often said that this distinction is the distinction between   de
Saussure's *signifiant* and *signifié*. This is not wrong, but it is not
clear enough for my purposes. Later I will show that, in the present con-
text, we have the distinction in the form:
    sgra: words, phrases, linguistic conventions, linguistic meaning
    don: propositional content, reference, referent;
        purpose of a speech-act, utterer's intention, etc.
In a slogan: c o n v e n t i o n   and   i n t e n t i o n. But this is o n l y
a slogan, and it works   o n l y   i n   t h i s   c o n t e x t. On the other hand,
as I will show later, the translation of *sgra/don* by "word/meaning" will
not do at all.

    Now as regards method, I propose to   a r g u e   for my interpretations.
My arguments will be drawn from the philosophy of language, especially
from theory of meaning and the theory of speech-acts. Since this paper is
only intended as a general review, I will not press very hard upon any
technical distinctions in those fields. At the same time, however, I
hope that my discussion will be solid enough to serve as the basis for
the treatment of more specialized and difficult topics in this area of
bshad thabs.

    Let me now summarize what I believe is meant by the six terms listed
in table 2 under *g d a m s   n g a g   d r u g*. This is a Sa skya pa method and
bSod nams rtse mo says that *yan lag gi don* is explanatory method based
on what is known in the world and in śāstras - in a word, on normal
linguistic conventions. *Yi ge'i don* is explanation motivated not by the
real point of the passage, but by the separate syllables or parts of the
syllables or by the shapes of the letters. And *bsdus don* is explanation

based on a code, such as the well-known one in the *Hevajratantra*[32] , or some other method not known in the world or in śāstras. From the examples he gives it is clear that *yi ge'i don* and *bsdus don* involve n o n- s t a n d a r d linguistic conventions. Thus these three explanatory methods are all distinguished by their handling of convention, just as in my slogan.

By contrast, the other three methods of the *gdams ngag drug* are all concerned with the subject-matter of the text, the topic or propositional content (*brjod bya*) or purpose (*don, brjod don*) ascribed to the passage by the commentator. *spyi'i don* is explanation ascribing to the passage concern with the *pāramitāyāna* or with the *utpattikrama. sbas don* ascribes a concern with the *sampannakrama. mthar thug don* is concerned with *'od gsal* and *zung 'jug*. This is only rough outline: detail appears below.

The main system of *bshad thabs* used by the bKa brgyud pas, by Bu ston and by bTsong kha pa is called *rgyan bdun*.[33] The most important canonical source for this system is the *Pradīpoddyotanā* (*PPD*) of Candrakīrti. Naturally there are seven *rgyan* (s.table 1) and they contain altogether some 28 methods, all of which will be reviewed in the main portion of the paper. Perhaps the most important are the *mtha' drug* and *tshul bzhi* which are listed in table 3 (left-hand column) and table 4 (left-hand column) respectively; these account for ten out of the 28 methods. However the *mtha' drug/tshul bzhi* system is both more complex and less precise than the *gdams ngag drug*, and I recommended anybody who has all the texts and time to study them, to look first at the *gdams ngag drug*.

If we know what the *gdams ngag drug* are, then the *tshul bzhi* can be (at least roughly) defined just by looking across table 4.

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[32] *Sandhyābhāṣa*, as discussed in *HT* II.iii. The Tibetan for this word here is either *dgongs skad* (4 times) or *gsang skad* (5 times). I am not saying that any of these words literally mean "code"; but just this might well be said of the word *brda skad* which is often used, in Tibetan commentaries, to explain them.

[33] The *rgyan bdun* system has been briefly discussed by E.Steinkellner, Remarks on Tantristic Hermeneutics. *Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Memorial Symposium, held at Mátrafüred, Hungary, 24.-30.September 1976.* Ed. L.Ligeti, 1978. I·was unaware of this useful article until the present paper was completed. It is based mainly on Indian sources, especially on *PPD* (though some use is made of *B* and *D*). The work contains philological information (e.g. on the Sanskrit equivalants of the technical terms of *bshad thabs*), and it relates *bshad thabs* to hermeneutics and spells out some difference between the two. There as here, much of the detailed discussion focusses on the *mtha' drug* and *tshul bzhi*; Steinkellner concentrates his effort of interpretation mainly on the *tshul bzhi*. However he does not touch on the general linguistic basis of the explanatory methods of *bshad thabs*, which is the heart of the present paper. The two papers thus seem to complement one another in a very fortunate way.

Now for the *m t h a' d r u g*. Because of the work of previous researchers these are the best-known terms in this area. I am afraid that they are still among the least-understood. They divide into three pairs, as listed in table 3. The principle enunciated in the second column of table 3 was noticed by Wayman[34] who got it from bTsong kha pa *(D)*. However it appears in Bu ston *(B)* and may be his invention. So I have called it B u s t o n' s p r i n c i p l e. The principle was modified by Padma dKar po, as recorded in the right-hand column of table 3; but the terminology of Padma dKar po's works *G* and *H* is too difficult for this paper. In the form given by Bu ston, the principle is quite accurate for the *drang don/nges don* distinction, but only moderately so for the other two pairs.

As announced by Bu ston and explained by bTsong kha pa, the effect of the principle was roughly this. The *drang don/nges don* distinction is based on differences of intention; the *dgongs bshad/dgongs min* distinction is based on differences of words and linguistic convention; the *sgra ji bzhin/min* distinction is based on differences of both convention and intention. Padma dKar po's version, which is more accurate, says roughly the same for *drang don/nges don*. On *dgongs bshad/dgongs min*, it says that the distinction turns on differences in the relation between the words and their associated conventions, and the general Buddha-intention. On *sgra ji bzhin/min*, it says that the distinction turns on differences of convention (or its absence).

drang don/nges don are here different from the sūtras. Here in the tantras they refer to alternative explanations of o n e a n d t h e s a m e p a s s a g e, while in the sūtras a single author will explain a single passage by either *drang don* or *nges don* but not both. In the tantras, then, where one passage is explained twice, the explanation whose p u r- p o s e is the more elementary is called *drang don*, while that whose purpose is more advanced is called *nges don*. From the lower, *drang don* point of view, the *nges don* point of view is said to be hidden *(sbas te)*.[35] Here, one should not be confused by the fact that the *nges don* interpretation is sometimes the simpler in a l i n g u i s t i c sense. For if the passage, taken in its natural sense, does indeed concern an advanced level of practice or realization, then it may be a linguistically complicated matter to find an interpretation which is more elementary as to its p u r- p o s e . And this is, indeed, very often the case.

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[34] A.Wayman, Twilight language and a tantric song. *The Buddhist Tantras*. London 1973, 128-135.

[35] This term already appears in *PPD*.

sgra ji bzhin is use of language according to normal conventions.Indeed, if *sgra* did literally mean "convention", then *sgra ji bzhin* would mean "according to convention". As bTsong kha pa noted, the use of this term overlaps with that of *yi ge'i don*. If the conventions are not normal, or if the connection between words and sense is *ad hoc*, one speaks of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa*. This remark suggests that there will be two distinct types of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*. As Padma dkar po first pointed out,[36] there are. He described the type with non-standard conventions in terms of *brda* (signs), and the type without conventions in terms of *yi ge* (letters).

dgongs bshad and *dgongs min* are the two most difficult of the *mtha' drug*. They cannot be used of the same passage. If the sense of the words is in opposition to the general purpose of the passage, one speaks of *dgongs bshad* (explanation by intention); otherwise, of *dgongs min*. In discussing the well-known *dgongs bshad* of "killing living beings"[37], Bu ston[38] says that such phrases are only for intelligent persons who will know that they are not to be taken literally. Again, a g e n e r a l account of *dgongs bshad* which really fitted the well-known examples was first provided by Padma dkar po.[39]

Turning aside for a moment from these theoretical difficulties, let us see how the *mtha' drug* were used; our authors are in broad agreement on this. First, if the natural sense of the words is clearly in opposition to the general doctrines of Buddhism, the passage has to be explained *dgongs pas*. Otherwise, the explanation is said to be *dgongs min*; and only in this case can the other four *mtha'* come into the picture at all. Then, if normal linguistic conventions hold, we have *sgra ji bzhin*; if not, *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*. And if two purposes are ascribed to the same passages, the soteriologically more advanced is called *nges don*, the less advanced, *drang don*. As common sense suggests, either one of *sgra ji bzhin/min* may be associated with either one of *drang don/nges don*.

The critical reader might suppose that there is no clear distinction between *dgongs bshad* and *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*. For a passage which, when the words are taken according to standard conventions, has to be ex-

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[36] *G* 9a3; *H* 15b4

[37] *GST* chap.V; cf. *E* 10a3, quoting *HT* II.iii, 29; also *Kālacakratantra* III,97 and *Vimalaprabhā* on it.

[38] *B* 24b5

[39] *G* 9a5; *H* 16a2

plained *intentionally (*dgongs pas*) might instead be explained by ascrib-
ing an unusual sense[40] to the words, using non-standard conventions,
without reference to *intention. (This objection is only strenghthened
if one points out that no means has been specified by which one knows
whether to use standard or non-standard conventions.) But the objection
does not take into account the conventions governing the technical terms
of *bshad thabs*: if the passage has a natural sense[40] and that sense is
inconsistent with the general doctrines of Buddhism, then the passage
must be reconciled with those doctrines by means of *dgongs bshad*. We
(westerners) might be inclined to interpret in a different way; but to
do so is to step outside the *mtha' drug* system.

As an example, let us take the *dgongs skad* or *gsang skad*, the "code"
or "secret language" of the *Hevajratantra*. When this is used[41] there is
no question of the natural sense of the words opposing Buddhist doc-
trine, no question of *dgongs bshad*, therefore. The code itself is said by
the *rgyan bdun*-based authors to fall under *sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa*, and
its applications to fall under *drang don* and *nges don*. None of our au-
thors explains this code or its uses under *dgongs bshad*. In Sanskrit
terms: no author used a technique perhaps called *sandhyābhāṣita* to ex-
plain the passages called *sandhyābhāṣa*. In spite of the similarity be-
tween these Sanskrit words, our texts offer no support to the suggestion
that they have similar meanings.

To finish off this summary, let me give a brief critical review of
the *bshad thabs* sections of the works listed in my bibliography.

By far the best introduction to *bshad thabs* is bSod nams rtse mo's
work *A*. It is written in a smooth and clear style, it makes its points
simply and easily, its examples are well-chosen and well-explained, and
it is philosophically solid. The *gdams ngag drug* system there described
is also the best of its kind, making a good range of distinctions clear-
ly with a minimum of technical terms. *A* also contains the best available
review of a variety of other systems of *bshad thabṣ*.[42]

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[40] "Sense" is used here as a conventional feature of words (so part of *sgra*).

[41] As for instance in the vajra-song at *HT* II.iv, 6-8. This song has been interpreted by
Wayman (see n.34). It has been the subject of much comment in Tibet. Padma dKar po has
devoted a separate work to it: *brTag gnyis nas gsungs pa rdo rje'i glu'i skad gnyis
shan sbyar, gSung 'bum* 21, 1-19. this work contains, in effect, two separate commenta-
ries on the song; one as *drang don* (starting 2a4), the other as *nges don* (starting
6b1).

[42] See references connected with table 1.

The *Pradīpoddyotanā* of Candrakīrti *(PPD)* is the most important In-
dian source for the *rgyan bdun* system, and contains almost the only *bshad
thabs* material presently available in Sanskrit.[43] As a source for *bshad
thabs* it has been dealt with by Steinkellner.[33]

Commenting on the *Pradīpoddyotanā*, Bu ston *(B)* writes to some extent
as a philologist. He worked from a Sanskrit ms. of *PPD*, and has been
through the earlier literature very carefully. This work is important
and serious, and its main conclusion have not been upset by later authors.
However it is also very diffuse, and its organization needlessly complex.
In *F*, Padma dkar po provides us with a short, clear summary of the *bshad
thabs* material, and he also quotes the *PPD* verses fully. This work *F* of
Padma dkar po can be recommended as a preliminary to the study of *B*.

The *Jñānavajrasamuccaya (JVS)* is an *ākhyā*-tantra of Guhyasamāja. Be-
cause of various difficulties which I deal with later, this work has not
the authority of *PPD*, in spite of being *buddhavacana*. The clearest account
which I have seen of relevant parts of *JVS* is found in some almost inci-
dental remarks by bSod nams rtse mo.[44] In *D* bTsong kha pa comments at
length on *JVS*. He is much more quotable than Bu ston, and his examples are
clearer. However, he has to rely on *PPD* for definitions, since *JVS* is
very poor in them; and he seems unable to deal with the inconsistencies
between the *PPD* definitions and the examples in *JVS*, and with the pecul-
iar difficulties of *JVS* generally. For this reason one cannot rely on *D*
in any matter of real difficulty.

The next two works are both bKa brgyud pa works on the *Hevajratantra*.
bKra shis rnam rgyal is not clear enough in *E* to add much in the way of
general argument to Bu ston, but he does give some good examples. Kong
sprul does little more than plagiarize bKra shis rnam rgyal.[45]

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[43] The only other Sanskrit materials on *bshad thabs* known to me are the few verses from
the *Guhyasamāja* and *Hevajratantra* given in the references connected with table 1.

[44] The connection between the *gdams ngag drug* and the *mtha' drug* as given in *JVS* is set
out at *A* 66b5. In that account, the words *drang don* and *nges don* seem to have been
accidentally transposed. The *tshul bzhi* as given in *JVS* are compared with the *gdams
ngag drug* at *A* 67a6. In making use of these passages, it is important to be clear
that bSod nams rtse mo is not committing himself to account for *mtha' drug* and *tshul
bzhi* as given in *PPD*.

[45] It is true that the plagiarization of older works was a fairly common practice in
Tibet. But in Kong sprul's bKa brgyud pa works, the practice reaches extraordinary
lengths. The general scheme of *J* is taken from Padma dkar po's *gZhung 'grel*. The
bshad thabs section is copied word-for-word from bKra shis rnam rgyal. Kong sprul's
commentary on the *rGyud bla ma (Uttaratantra, Ratnagotravibhaga)* is largely copied
from that of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan. With regard to the *zab mo nang gi don*,
I would like to speculate that when Rang 'byung rdo rje's autocommentary turns up,
Kong sprul's commentary will be found to bear a similar relation to it.

My last two works, *G* and *H* are both by Padma dkar po and (as regards *bshad thabs*) seem to express his own views rather than being directly based on any earlier source. They deal only with *mtha' drug* and *tshul bzhi*.[46] These short and rather similar accounts are written in a terse and compressed style quite different from that of *F*, and are very difficult to follow. They also use a special vocabulary (cf. right-hand column of table 3). Philosophically, they are the most penetrating of the materials reviewed here, but because of these difficulties it seems best to deal with them in detail elsewhere.

The remainder of the paper will contain evidence for some of the main points made in this summary. Now, inasmuch I have given already very copious references (especially in connection with tables 1 and 2), the evidence as to what the texts says in Tibetan has already been made indirectly available to the reader, as it were. What still has to be carefully justified is the interpretative scheme which I have used, especially that relating to the distinction between *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don*. I will now do this; and I will start off by setting out those distinctions of English terminology, in terms of which I will discuss the content of the texts. To those readers who find this procedure tedious, I apologize. It is a very important phase of the analysis, and a phase too often neglected.

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[46] On *mtha' drug*, see *G* 10b5; *H* 15b4. On *tshul bzhi*, see *H* 17a3.

2. The utterance of a tantra as a speech-act

The conventions governing the interpretation of the buddha-word by commentators in Tibet were complex and not always obviously consistent. Here I will simply have to pick out those features which seem most important, without attempting a full analysis. According to one kind of rather common convention, the utterance of any particular tantra was taken as a single historical event occuring at a definite time and place and directed towards a definite audience with definite intentions.

To the extent that this convention held (and we shall soon see how it was modified to accomodate varying interpretations), it is natural to discuss the utterance of the tantras in English by means of notions taken from speech-act theory[47] and related topics. Here I shall work with the basic distinction, so much emphasized by Strawson[48] between sentence (S), proposition (P), and occasion and context of utterance (O): That is, a sentence S may be used to assert[49] a proposition P on a particular occasion O [50]; and in analysing a speech-act by means of these notions, we may distinguish between those features of a speech-act which are f u n c t i o n s of S or of P or of O. This results in the following classification of some of the concepts used in talking about speech-acts:

Type S   word, phrase, sentence, utterance-type;
          linguistic convention, linguistic meaning;
          grammatical rule, syntactical rule;

Type P   proposition, question, warning and other illocutionary acts;
          truth, falsity and other logical notions;
          referent, thing referred to;
          fact, situation, state of affairs;
          topic, what ... is about;

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[47] See e.g. J.R.Searle, *Speech-acts*, Cambridge 1969; J.L.Austin, *How to do things with words*, Oxford 1962.

[48] P.F.Strawson, On Referring. *Mind* 1950 (reprinted in *Logico-linguistic papers*, Methuen 1971).

[49] In this area it is conventional to take assertion as the standard type of illocutionary force; the analysis is similar for other types, such as question, warning, command, etc.

[50] The same proposition may be asserted on different occasions by the employment of different sentences. (This is the basic reason why types P and O are different.) Just this possibility is envisaged, according to Bu ston's principle, in Tibetan discussions of *dgongs bshad*. See table 1 and the following discussion.

<u>Type O</u>   occasion, utterance, context òf utterance, audience;

utterer, utterer's intention, intent, purpose of uttering ...;

purport, the point is that ...;

speech-act, performance;

act of referring;

understanding what was said, what was meant, what was in-

tended;

In India and Tibet we sometimes see a tendency to assimilate concepts of Type P to those of type O.[51] For instance, in pramāṇa a proposition (P) is not always sharply distinguished from the evidence used to establish it (O). Truth (P) may be assimilated to the notion of something being veridical (O); similarly falsehood (P) to something being misleading or delusive (*brdzun pa*, O).

Here in *bshad thabs*, the important word *don* is ambiguous between referent (P) and intention or purpose (O). Now the word "meaning" spreads accross all three types S, P and O.[52] The important sense of "linguistic meaning" certainly falls into type S. Noting these facts, we may perhaps feel wary of the translation of *don* by "meaning".

The state of affairs mentioned in connection with *don* is typical. Let us therefore label P/O any concept which falls into type P or type O or both. There are a few important pairs of terms in *bshad thabs* which exhibit a contrast between the two types S and P/O. These are given in table 5.

TABLE 5: A BASIC TYPE-DISTINCTION IN *BSHAD THABS*

<u>Type S</u>	<u>Type P/O</u>
sgra (*śabda*)	*don* (*artha*)
rjod byed (*abhidāna, vācaka*)	*brjod bya* (*abhideya, vācya*)
...*don gyis bshad pa*	...*don du bshad pa*

The earlier, simpler analysis of the phrases *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don* may be replaced by the following more precise claim; where, in *bshad thabs*, any of these three pairs of terms is systematically contrasted, the contrast exemplifies the type-distinction set out in table 5.

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[51] Similarly, Austin (see n.47) noted a tendency to assimilate illocutionary to perlocutionary acts.

[52] "Meaning" is usually held to be ambiguous, but some people have held that it simply resists the distinction.

The main reason for devoting so much attention to bSod nams rtse mo is precisely that the type-distinction is more clearly set out in *A* than in any of our other sources.

Now for something else. The tantras themselves are *buddhavacana*; let us call them, somewhat arbitrarily, f i r s t i n t e n t i o n s.[53] Then texts explaining the tantras are second intentions, and *bshad thabs* texts are (at least) third intentions. The natural home of the terms *rjod byed* and *brjod bya* is the level of second intention (where they refer to the first-intention text and its content). In *bshad thabs* these terms continue to be used of the first intention;[54] and the term *bshad par bya ba* is also used of the first intention text, with the sense that at the second-intention level the matter in hand was to explain that text. The verb or verbal adjective *'chad par byed pa* is normally used in reference to the second-intention text, with the sense that this was what d i d t h e e x p l a i n-i n g. Sometimes the whole process was lifted by a level, as in table 2 where *'chad par byed pa'i man ngag* refers to the third-intention *(bshad thabs)* text, with the sense that it explains the methods used in second-intention texts. These levels need to be kept well-distinguished.

Such points account for some of the difficulties in using the *Jñāna-vajrasamuccaya*. As a tantra, that text might be thought of as first-intention. But it actually explains the *Guhyasamāja*, and in this sense it is second intention; and the *bshad thabs* material in it is third and even fourth intention. Unfortunately these levels of intention are not always easy to distinguish, nor do the commentaries always distinguish them.

The texts frequently use the phrase *rdo rje'i tshig* of the first-intention text, i.e. of *buddhavacana*, especially of single phrases.

Now I want to draw attention to an important ambiguity in much Buddhist writing, an ambiguity which manifests itself already at the level of second intention, or *rgyud bshad*. When one discusses the tantras, what is undoubtedly available is the text (type S). Scarcely any contextual evidence is in fact available which would enable us to determine more accurately what propositions (type P) were asserted, or to what purpose

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[53] This well-known use of "intention" need not introduce ambiguity, since it is always prefixed by an ordinal.

[54] In translating *brjod bya* by "content", I have deliberately tried to suggest a P/O ambiguity.

(type O) the Buddha asserted[49] them. On doctrinal grounds we may suppose
that the Buddha had a certain very complex general intention, viz. to
bring all sentient beings to enlightenment. But it is really quite ob-
vious that the attribution of more specific intentions to him is a mat-
ter of convention. That there are such intentions is simply a claim made
by the interpreter (*'chad pa po*). In other words, it is the interpreter
who is asserting that the text has a certain content, that a certain
rjod byed is connected with a certain *brjod bya*.[55]

　　Sometimes it will be convenient to draw attention explicitly to the
role of the interpreter. Sometimes it will be simpler to follow tradi-
tion and write as though the intentions mentioned were actually those
of the Buddha, in spite of the ambiguities which result.[56]

3. The *gdams ngag drug*

　　bSod nams rtse mo makes use of all the distinctions given in table
5. Explanations of the *rjod byed* group are often mentioned by such phras-
es as *yan lag gi don gyis bshad pa*[57] where the instrumental case-suffix
on *don* suggests the means b y w h i c h the speech-act (the utterance of
the buddha-word) was effected. In contrast, explanations of the *brjod
bya* group are often mentioned by such phrases as *spyi'i don du bshad pa*
suggesting the purpose t o w a r d s w h i c h[58] the speech-act is directed.
This device is used consistently in A.[59] It will be seen that *don* here
has a full S/P/O ambiguity.

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[55] The problem of formulating the rules governing such claims is perhaps the central
problem of hermeneutics. In some texts the content of the tantra as a whole is said
to be simply *rgyud gsum* (see n.3). This raises the question of the secondary intention
of the Buddha, viz. that the *rgyud gsum* should be realized. The connection of the
brjod bya as content of a text with the realization of that content is sometimes dis-
cussed as a separate topic, not part of *bshad thabs*; this is so especially in connec-
tion with the *Hevajratantra*, where the new topic is called *dgos 'brel* (see A 62b4;
E 15a2; J 15b7; Padma dkar po, *dPal Kye'i rdo rje'i spyi don grub pa'i yid 'phrog*,
5b3). Bu ston (B 21a3) and Sa skya pa Grags pa rgyal mtshan (*bShad thabs kyi man ngag
kun tu spyod pa'i bsdus don*, 92a4) deal with it in other contexts.

[56] This convention is less startling in the Tibetan cultural context that in ours. For in
Tibet the primary case of the *'chad pa po* is one's own *rtsa ba'i bla ma*. And in teach-
ing (especially in the *slob bshad* - see below) he addresses himself primarily to an
audience for whom his intention is identified with *sangs rgyas kyi dgongs pa*.

[57] This exact form is found e.g. at A 63a1, 64b1, 65a7, 66a1 where the device is used to
emphasize the distinction between the *rjod byed* and *brjod bya* groups of methods.

[58] This -*du* is final.

[59] It is less common in the *rgyan bdun* literature. However JVS consistently uses *dgongs
pas bshad pa*. Though Buston's principle would seem to suggest that this -*pas* has
the same force, it is not really so.

Now let us consider in more detail bSod nams rtse mo's explanations of the six *gdams ngag*. Since part of my purpose is to show what *sgra* means here, I will not translate this word.

> "*Yan lag gi don gyis bshad pa* means manifesting the
> point of the text having *sgra* well-known in the world,
> *sgra* known from the śāstras, and etymologies which cause
> *sgra* to become manifest ... for instance the cause for
> *sgra* to become manifest is the fact that the sun has twelve
> stations in the sky, that it causes lotuses to open,
> that it dispels the darkness, defeats the night and so
> forth, and by these many properties it becomes suitable
> to designate *(gdags su rung ba)*."[60]

The first part of this quotation is a description of ordinary lexical or literal interpretation. The second is a description of how it comes about that the use of "sun" is governed by linguistic c o n v e n t i o n.

> "*Yi ge'i don gyis bshad pa* means explanation not
> motivated by the real point of the text, but by taking
> the syllables separately; one may introduce *sgra* based
> on the separate syllables, or *sgra* obtained by taking
> a syllable apart,[61] or explanation in accordance with
> the shapes of the syllables."[62]

bSod nams rtse mo illustrates these three methods with three clear examples;[63] evidently *yi ge'i don* is concerned with conventions, but this time they are non-standard, unusual.

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[60] A 64b1: *yan lag gi don ni│'jig rten las grags pa'i sgra dang bcas│bstan bcos las grags pa'i sgra dang bcas │ sgra 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan nges pa'i tshig dang bcas pas, gzhung dngos kyi don la 'jug pa'o⌈ .... │ sgra 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan yang nyi ma la khyim bcu gnyis yod pas dang│ padmo kha 'gyed pas dang │ mun pa sel ba mtshan mo 'joms pa la sogs pa yon tan du ma yod pas de dang de dag tu gdags su rung bas ...*

[61] *kha phral te* here seems to mean "divided up", "dismembered", as we see from the *hūṃ* example. This is supported by the Skt. *viśliṣṭa* (see Lokesh Chandra, *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *kha phral ba*).

[62] A64b4: *yi ge'i don gyis bshad pa ni, gzhung dngos la rgyu mtshan mi rnyed kyang yi ge so sor byas nas, rgyu mtshan rnyed pa ste, de'ang sgra drangs te bshad pa dang│yi ge kha phral (cf. n.61) -te sgras drangs pas bshad pa dang │ yi ge'i dbyibs mthun pas bshad pa'o │*
The use of *yi ge* here is perhaps best understood by reference to Sanskrit where in a sense each syllable is represented by one letter.

[63] These examples are (a) modifying *nagahāśva* by saying that *na* stands for *nar* "man"; *ga* for *ga vi* "ox", etc. Cf. the explanation of *HT* I.xi, 8 at A 66a2;
(b) taking *hūṃ* apart to yield "having neither subject or nor object";
(c) explaining the claim that *e waṃ māyā* stands for the four *cakra* by saying that the Sanskrit letter *e* is triangular like the navel-*cakra*, etc.

bsDus don gyis bshad pa (or *man ngag gi don gyis bshad pa*) is ex-
plained merely by the phrase "symbol made by the buddhas",[64] and several
examples are given, which are drawn from the *sandhyābhāṣa (dgongs skad)*
of the *Hevajratantra*, which is another type of non-standard linguistic
convention. The use of passwords would appear to fall neatly into this
category.

Let us now consider in more detail the claim that *yi ge'i don* and
bsdus don do really revolve around unusual linguistic conventions. I
would not wish to quarrel over whether the more unusual ones are   l i n -
g u i s t i c   (e.g. the dismemberment of *hūṃ*) but a broad interpretation
of "linguistic" should allow it. If the objection is that *sgra* is nar-
rower than "linguistic convention", I would not wish to suggest that
these passages provide evidence to the contrary. If the objection is that
non-linguistic behaviour is not excluded, I think that *rjod byed* obvi-
ously does exclude concern, say, with gestures or onomatopoeia (and even
these are conventional). If the objection is that *sgra* might be broader
than "convention", what else could it include? Further evidence on this
point will be seen under the related technique of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*.

Now let us pass on to the other group of the *gdams ngag drug*, viz.
(table 2) the *brjod par bya ba'i don 'chad par byed pa'i man ngag*. Obvi-
ously in this phrase, *don* is contrasted with *sgra*. Now, these three *man
ngag* associate sentences of *buddhavacana* with their application to dif-
ferent phases of the processes of meditation. Further, it is possible
for one sentence to receive two quite different interpretations.[65] From
these two facts it follows that here *don* is a term of type P/O (cf. ta-
ble 5). But it is clear from the detailed explanations, especially of
various examples, that this *don* is quite specifically concerned with in-
tent of purpose. For instance, in the passage given in n.65, the last
remark literally says:

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[64] *A* 65a3: *sangs rgyas rnams kyis brda mdzad pa ste.*

[65] bSod nams rtse mo does not make this important point as explicit as one might hope.
It emerges indirectly from the brief quotation from *JVS* at *A* 65b7; the full sentence
in *JVS* runs thus (292a5-7): *nyan thos la sogs pa 'dod chags dang bral ba'i chos spyod
pa'i rnam par rtog pa'i bag chags las ma grol ba rnams rnal 'byor chen po'i rgyud
dag tu btsun mo'i bha ga la bzhugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'dod chags kyi chos gsal
bar byed pa ngo mtshar can gyi rdo rje'i tshig thos nas smod par byed pa de rnams
dang mi 'gal ba'i sgo nas bshad pa de ni spyi'i don du bshad pa gsungs pa'o* | The under-
lined part corresponds to the quotation in *A*.
What this boils down to is that a bowdlerized explanation of the *nidāna* phrase
vajrayosidbhageṣu vijahāra for the benefit of people who would otherwise cast asper-
sions on the *anuttarayogatantra*, counts as *spyi'i don*, while a more literal explana-
tion counts as *sbas don*. (As it happens the same holds in the *rgyan bdun* system.)

"This explanation for the purpose of *(sgo nas)* not con-
tradicting those persons is said to be *spyi'i don du
bshad pa.*"[66]

Similar cases could be quoted for the other two *don*. Let us now give
the varieties of these three *don* rather more fully than in the Introduc-
tion.

spyi'i don du bshad pa relates to the *pāramitāyāna* or to the *uttpa-
ttikrama*.[67] The first includes such matters as the 37 *bodhipakṣadharma*,
the 5 *mārga* and the 10 *bhūmi*, which are part of the content *(brjod bya)*
of both *pāramitāyāna* and *mantrayāna*. The second is concerned with *mahā-
mudrā*.

sbas don du bshad pa relates to the *sampannakrama*.[68] It concernes
what is revealed by the three higher *abhiṣeka*, and not the *kalābhiṣeka*.
Correspondingly there are three *maṇḍala*.[69] The body-*maṇḍala* is devided
into *rang byin rlabs kyi thabs* and *dkyil 'khor lo'i thabs*; the *bhaga-
maṇḍala* into *kun rdzob* and *don dam byang sems*; and the *bodhicitta-maṇḍa-
la* into *rang 'byung* and *lhan skyes ye shes*. The three *abhiṣeka* corre-
spond fairly well to the three *maṇḍala*, but the text is not clear about
the twofold divisions of the three *maṇḍala*. On the face of it we might
expect six divisions to result in all, but there are some indications
that the three pairs are a l t e r n a t i v e methods of division into
two.[70] Finally, *sbas don* also includes *jñānavāyu*.

mthar thug don du bshad pa is directed towards what is not included
when the preceding items are listed individually, viz. buddha-awareness.[71]
It consists of an outer ultimate, viz. the 11th *bhūmi* known from both
yānas, and a hidden ultimate, viz. the 12th and the 13th *bhūmi* known
from the *guhyamantrayāna*. He discusses[72] the controversy as to whether
it makes sense to speak of two ultimates *(mthar thug pa)* in this way.

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[66] The remark here translated corresponds to what is underlined in n.65. The two texts
differ in various small ways, but the form *de rnams la* in A seems better than *de rnams
dang* in the Peking edition of *JVS*.

[67] A 63a1

[68] A 63a4

[69] The three *maṇḍala* are those listed at *GST* XVIII, 99. The correspondence between
mandala and their divisions may seem odd, but there is no doubt that this is what
bSod nams rtse mo says (63b1).

[70] A 63a5. At 66b3 he counts only two types of *sbas don*; and at 66a4 he gives a long
list of examples, all of which fall under *rang byin brlabs sbas pa* or *dkyil 'khor
lo'i sbas pa* only.

[71] *sangs rgyas kyi ye shes* (A 63b4).

[72] A 63b5-64b1

Because of the clear distinction between *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don* in this system, any method in the first group can be conbined with any method in the second group to yield nine combinations altogether. bSod nams rtse mo gives copious and well-chosen examples[73] to illustrate all these nine possibilities.

His discussion of the *gdams ngag drug* concludes with the valuable remarks mentioned in my introduction, on the connection between his system with that in the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya*. See table 6.

TABLE 6: BSOD NAMS RTSE MO'S CORRELATION BETWEEN THE *GDAMS NGAG DRUG* AND THE *MTHA' DRUG*, THE LATTER FROM THE *JÑĀNAVAJRASAMUCCAYA*

Taken from *A* 66b4. References in brackets are to *JVS*.

	yan lag gi don	*yig don* and *man ngag gi don*
spyi'i don	sgra ji bzhin (293a4)	sgra ji bzhin ma yin (293a5)
sbas don	nges don (293a3)	drang don (293a2)
mthar thug don	dgongs pa ma yin (293a1)	dgongs bshad (292b8)

In table 6, the entries are exactly as given in *A*. However there seems to be a misprint; *drang don* and *nges don* should be switched. For according to *JVS* (293a2), *drang don* is the literal use of ("code") words such as *ga bur* and *khrag chen po*, whereas *nges don* is the use of a "code" in which *ga bur* stands for *khu ba*, *khrag chen po* stands for *zla mtshan gyi khrag*, and so forth.

I have spelt these points out in detail and printed the table in full so as to underline the difference between the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya* and the *Pradīpoddyotanā* on *mtha' drug*. For it seems to me that bSod nams rtse mo's table gives an excellent account of what *JVS* actually says (apart from the misprint). On the other hand, the table is quite inconsistent with the use of the *mtha'drug* terms in the *Pradīpoddyotanā*. bTsong kha pa in *D* does not succeed in giving so good an account of these differences.[74]

This concludes my account of the *gdams ngag drug*. I have been at pains to spell out the evidence that, in this system, the terms listed in table 5 are indeed used in the way claimed in that table. When we now turn

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[73] *A* 65a7-66b4

[74] Indeed, the exact connection between the terms in *JVS* and their correlates in *PPD* is a complex matter which I hope to treat elsewhere.

to the *rgyan bdun* system (as set out in works based on the *Pradīpoddyo-tanā*), the evidence for the corresponding points will be less direct. This being so, I propose to adopt the type-distinction of table 5 as a h y p o t h e s i s when discussing the relevant parts of the *rgyan bdun* system. As in any other scientific enquiry, the evidence for the hypo-thesis will be just its explanatory power. And to reinforce the hypo-thesis, I will give examples to illustrate the difficulties encountered by an alternative hypothesis, viz. the translation of *sgra/don* by word/meaning.

4. The "seven ornaments" of *bshad thabs*, the *rgyan bdun* as discussed in *Pradīpoddyotanā*-based texts

4.1. The *gleng bslang ba'i rgyan*[4]

has a function not wholly unlike that of the page of contents of a western book. It consists of five items: the name and type of the tantra; the kind of person for whom it is intended; its originator; its length; its purpose.

4.2. The *sangs rgya ba'i rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*[5]

consists of *rgyud, gleng gzhi, nges tshig* and *rgyu*. These terms are taken separately for the person who acts out of desire, and the person lacking in desire. The interpretations given by our authors seem arbi-trary and irrelevant to the topic of *bshad thabs*; no doubt I have not succeeded in grasping the point of this *rgyan*.[75]

4.3. The *mtha' drug gi rgyan*

has already been reviewed in table 3 and the succeeding portion of the introduction. That review has been further clarified by the subse-quent more detailed explanation of the *sgra/don* distinction. Now I want to make use of this clarification to give bTsong kha pa's account of the *mtha' drug*[76] with some of his examples, based on a more detailed version of Bu ston's principle, together with some remarks of Padma dkar po.

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[75] Even the name *sangs rgya ba rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan* is problematical. This form is used by bKra shis rnam rgyal. Though he suggests that this is the name given in *JVS*, the Peking edition of that work has only *rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*. Bu ston uses *brjod bya rigs pa bzhi'i rgyan*. *Rigs pa* here may stand for Skt. *nyāya* "reasoning".

[76] D 218a2

4.3.1. *d g o n g s   b s h a d* and *d g o n g s   m i n*

The difference here, bTsong kha pa says,[77] is one of words and conventions *(sgra)*, with the main intention the same. If convention *(sgra)*and intention *(don)* are opposed, one speaks of *dgongs pas bshad pa*. If they are in agreement, one speaks of *dgongs pa ma yin pas bshad pa*. This remark is easily related to the *PPD* verse[78]

> |'gal ba'i tshig gi sbyor ba yis|
> |gsungs pa gang de dgongs bshad do|
>
> *viruddhālāpayogena yat tat sandhyābhāṣitam* |

Padma dkar po,[79] commenting on this verse, says that *dgongs pa can* is discourse[80] which contradicts wordly *('jig rten pa)* usage, and is intended for able people, while *dgongs min* passages are very clear and are for people of limited intelligence. (These remarks show up the limitations of Bu ston's principle, at least in its original form.) Both accounts are well-illustrated by an example given by bTsong kha pa[81] whose point is this: the intention of purifying the three poisons *(snang ba gsum)* is to show the radiant light *('od gsal)*. This remark is intended to be taken literally, it is *dgongs min*. Now the remarks[81] *'dod chags ma yin pa* etc. are also intended to show the radiant light; yet literally they c o n t r a d i c t [82] the previous remark - they are not meant to be taken literally. This explanation is *dgongs pas bshad pa*.

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[77] *don de la sgra de 'jug pa 'gal ba'i dgongs pas bshad pa dang | don de la sgra drang thad du bstan pa'i dgongs pa ma yin pas bshad pa gnyis ni, don gyi gtso bo gcig yin pas sgra mtha' la brten pa'o | D 218a2.*

[78] The Tibetan is given as quoted by Padma dKar po (*F* 36a1). The Sanskrit is as given (and modified) by Wayman (see n.34).

[79] *F* 36a2

[80] *tshig gi sbyor ba = ālāpayoga*, lit. "connection of speech".

[81] D 209b7 (expanding *JVS* 292b8): *snang pa gsum rnam par dag pa'i don'od gsal ston pa na | 'dod chags ma yin pa dang | 'dod chags dang bral ba ma yin pa dang | chags pa bar ma nye bar mi dmigs pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa snang pa gsum la sgra 'gal ba'i tshig gis bstan zhing de bkag pas, 'od gsal ston pa la sogs pa'i rdo rje'i tshig rnams ni,dgongs pas bshad pa'o |*

[82] In this context *'gal ba* (*viruddha* etc.) always means something like "opposed, opposing, to oppose"; "contradictory, contradicting, to contradict", as it indeed does in pramāṇa. It n e v e r in either of these contexts means "ambiguous" as is suggested by the translation of the *PPD* verse in ref.n.34. Here indeed bTsong kha pa is exceptionally explicit. By using the word *bkag pas* he says that one assertion r e f u t e s the other. Needless to say, ambiguous discourse cannot refute anything; only by o p p o s i n g something can one refute it.

Let us see in some detail how the translation of *sgra/don* by word/ meaning fails to give us an intelligible account of this example. It is quite obvious that the m e a n i n g s of *snang ba gsum* and of *'dod chags ma yin pa* etc. are not only not the same, but are completely different. What is the same in the two cases is a certain aspect of the i n t e n- t i o n s ascribed by the commentator (or by *JVS*) to the original utterer, the Buddha. What is different in the two cases is of course the words uttered, but also the conventions associated with the two utterances or, more accurately, the way that these conventions are, in each case, to be related to the utterer's intention. In one case, the communication-in- tention is straightforwardly related to the normal linguistic conventions governing the use of the words uttered; in the other case, they are op- posed.

Even the grammatical form of the phrase *dgongs pas bshad pa* points away from the interpretation here of *sgra* by "word(s)", as *dgongs pa* does literally mean "intention"; and the instrumental *-pas* ("by means of") does point to a distinction in the m o d e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n rather than in the material to be interpreted.

Further, let us consider what conditions would have to be satisfied by any two sentences of which it is claimed that they are examples re- spectively of *dgongs bshad* and *dgongs min*. These two modes of explana- tion attribute to the utterer two different modes of language-u s e, as is made very clear by bTsong kha pa's example; but they attribute the same meaning. The passages differ only in words. The difference is not, in- deed, held to c o n s t i t u t e or e n t a i l whatever it is that al- lows one passage to be explained *dgongs pas*, the other *dgongs pa ma yin pas*; but the hermeneutical difference is, according to this interpreta- tion of Bu ston's principle, held to be b a s e d on the difference of words.

But this is quite p a t e n t l y absurd. A mere difference of words, without difference of meaning, cannot be the basis of any but the most trivial difference in modes of language-use.

This counter argument fails when *sgra* is taken to include linguistic convention. Obviously different modes of language-use c a n rest on differences of linguistic convention. But this account of the matter fails to explain the full literal force of the phrase *dgongs pas bshad pa*, explanation by means of i n t e n t i o n. In my opinion, this is a failure of the Bu ston principle itself (as based on the *sgra/don* dis- tinction). Padma dkar po indeed abandons that form of the distinction (table 3) and succeeds in giving a much better explanation. But I will have to deal with this elsewhere.

4.3.2. *d r a n g d o n* and *n g e s d o n*

Here, says bTsong kha pa,[83] where one deals with a single passage to which two different purposes are ascribed, and where a purpose is introduced which is different from the real point of the passage *(dngos zin gyi don)*, one speaks of *drang don*; and when·nothing else is introduced other than that complete purpose, one speaks of *nges don*. Padma dkar po, commenting on the relevant verse of *PPD*,[84] says that persons of little ability are shown the real intention *(rang bzhin gyi don)* of the passage indirectly by being led towards something else. The real intention is hidden *(sbas te)*. *nges don* is for able persons who are to be shown the real way of things *(bden pa de kho na nyid ji lta ba bzhin)* directly; it is also called the indubitable purpose *(gdon mi za ba'i don)*.

These two accounts are obviously not quite consistent; in fact Padma dkar po has in mind a slighty different notion of *nges don* from bTsong kha pa. But we can neglect this different here.[85] Broadly speaking, both authors' version of the distinction is illustrated by an example given by bTsong kha pa.[86] The example revolves about a passage describing the visualization of five different-coloured jewels, small as mustard-seeds, at the end of one's nose. The two different interpretations offered by bTsong kha pa are the following:

|*de la phyag mtshan bsgom pa ni, drang don dang*|

　|*rlung sgom pa ni, yang dag pa'i don nges don no*|

That is, the *drang don* interpretation is that the meditation concerns symbols, *phyag mtshan*, held in the hands of deities. The *nges don* interpretation is that the passage is concerned with meditation on (various kinds of) *rlung/vāyu*.

Needless to say, it is absurd to claim that what is involved here (and said to rest on distinctions of *don*) is a difference of m e a n i n g.

In general, *drang don* and *nges don* are relative to one another, *nges don* being for the more advanced person. Here we must remember that the general purpose *(don)* of the buddha in uttering the tantras was to bring beings to enlightenment *(byang chub)*. So "advanced" here is to be

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[83] *D 218a4:* |*dngos zin gyi don las gzhan du drang du yod pas, drang ba'i don dang* | *gang du drangs pa rdzogs pa de las gzhan du drang du med pas na, nges pa'i don gnyis kyi bshad pa ni, gzhung gcig la 'jug pas don mtha' la brten pa'o* | (What I offer in connection with this is not to be thought of as a t r a n s l a t i o n .)

[84] *F 35b5*

[85] Padma dkar po takes up this difference at *H* 16b4ff.But I will leave it until another occasion, as it concerns his views on the two *satya*.

[86] *D 207b5*

taken in relation to enlightenment, or soteriologically. Thus in relation to *saṃvṛti, paramārtha* is *nges don*, as Padma dkar po stressed in *H*. In relation to the *uttpattikrama*, the *sampannakrama* is *nges don*; bTsong kha pa's example well illustrates this. To say all this is not, of course, to say that the *nges don* interpretation is l i n g u i s t i c a l l y more advanced or sophisticated; for, as Bu ston's principle quite accurately reminds us, the *drang don/nges don* distinction is not a distinction of discourse, of *rjod byed*, at all. A tantra passage may refer quite natur- ally to a soteriologically advanced matter, and we may need some inter- pretative sophistry to extract an elementary u s e   for it.

   This reveals the limitations of my attempt to distinguish linguistic from non-linguistic methods of *bshad thabs*, of explaining the tantras. If "linguistic" is taken narrowly (i.e. in relation to sentences and con- ventions only), then the *drang don/nges don* distinction is not linguis- tic. But if "linguistic" is taken more broadly, as including the whole relation between sentences and what they are used for, then it does cover that distinction.

   Similar problems arise in Dr.Katz' hermeneutical typology. Are we to say that the *drang don/nges don* distinction is one of text-based or of adept-based hermeneutics? Even in the sūtras, this question is less easy to answer than Dr.Katz supposes in his Introduction; and it is obviously more difficult still in the tantras. In my view, the text/adept distinc- tion does not s o l v e   the problem of describing the *drang don/nges don* distinction at all. However, it provides us with another, a different way of talking about it,· and that alone is of value.

4.3.3. *s g r a   j i   b z h i n* and *s g r a   j i   b z h i n   m a   y i n*

   bTsong kha pa explains the difference between these two as follows[87]: There is *sgra ji bzhin pa* when the intention is clearly indicated by the words, without any need to bring in any other intention. However when the *sgra* indicating that intention is not what is known in the world and in treatises on semantics, but is given by adventituous[88] buddha-symbols,[89] one speaks of explanation by *sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa*, and this depends upon differences of both *sgra* and *don*.

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[87] *D* 218a4: | *phal cher don gnyis pa la drang du med cing don gsal bar bsnyan pa'i sgra ji bzhin pa dang* | *'jig rten pa dang sgra'i bstan bcos la sgra de don de la 'jug par ma grags shing* | *sangs rgyas kyis glo bur du brda mdzad pa tsam gyi sgra ji bzhin ma yin par bshad gnyis ni, sgra don gnyis ka'i mtha' la brten pa'o* |

[88] *glo bur* (*D* 218a6).

[89] *sangs rgyas kyis ... brda mdzad pa*; cf.n.64.

As mentioned in the Introduction, *sgra ji bzhin* here means (both literally and according to the explanation) the use of language with normal (linguistic) conventions. bTsong kha pa's explanation of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin* amounts to saying that the connection between the sentence and its content is not governed by convention, but is *ad hoc*, a d v e n - t i t u o u s *(glo bur)*.[90] Bu ston[91] and bTsong kha pa[92] both illustrate this by means of the well-known pseudo-words *koṭakhya* etc. They point out that these pseudo-words appear in various different tantras, in each case with different senses. In *JVS*[93] they are used of senses and sense-objects, whereas in the *Sarvabuddhasamayoga* they are used as names for the ten *vāyu*, while in the *Ngan song sbyong rgyud* they are used as different names for Vajrapāṇi.

The *Pradīpoddyotanā*, and Padma dkar po on it[94] do not add much to this. But in his other *bshad thabs* works[95] Padma dkar po points out that there is another way in which a passage can fail to be *sgra ji bzhin*, viz. the linguistic conventions may be n o n - s t a n d a r d . This case, and the examples of it given by bKa brgyud pa writers[96] fall exactly under what bSod nams rtse mo calls *bsdus don*.[97] It is the case under which the bKa brgyud pas take the "code" of the *Hevajratantra*.

The difference between *sgra ji bzhin ma yin* and *dgongs bshad* is in fact clear enough even in the *Pradīpoddyotanā*, but it is made explicit in a short passage from Kumāra quoted by Padma dkar po:[98]

> "What is the difference between explanation by *dgongs pa*
> and by means of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*? It is the difference
> between opposition *('gal ba)* and (the use of) unknown

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[90] *D* 218a6, also 209b2. Bu ston (*B* 25a7) also uses the word in this context.

[91] *B* 25a4

[92] *D* 211a2

[93] *JVS* 294a5

[94] *F* 36a6

[95] *G* 11a2; *H* 15b5

[96] In both the passages given in ref.n.95, Padma dkar po says that *dgongs skad (sandhyā-bhāṣā)* falls under this case of *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*. For instance in *G: brda zhes bya ba ni, dgongs pa'i skad nyid kyis gsungs pa'i 'jig rten dang bstan bcos phal la ma grags pa'o* |
bKra shis rnam rgyal (*E* 10b2) and Kong sprul (*J* 39a6) explicitly quote examples from the *Hevajratantra* (II.iii, 56 and I.viii, 1). I will deal elsewhere with these bKa brgyud pa authors' rather complex uses of the related terms *dgongs skad, gsang skad* and *brda skad*, and their relation with *sgra ji bzhin ma yin*.

[97] See above under *gdams ngag drug*.

[98] *F* 36b4

symbols *(brda)*.[99] What is the difference between explana-
tion by *dgongs pa* and by means of *sgra ji bzhin*? In the
first case there is opposition (between convention and
intention); in the second case, there is no opposition.[100] "

4.4. The *'chad tshul bzhi'i rgyan*

Enough has already been done to show that the *tshul bzhi* modes of
explanation relate the texts to various different phases of Buddhist
meditation and related practice. The Sanskrit and Tibetan terms for such
phases themselves need much more attention than they have so far re-
ceived. For the moment, it may be enough to say that most of the termi-
nology applying to the stages of Vajrayāna practice derives from the
Guhyasamāja literature. Most of our authors give some account of the re-
lation between the *tshul bzhi* and this Guhyasamāja-based terminology;
table 7 summarizes the views of Bu ston on this relation.

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[99] *F* 36b4: *'gal ba dang grags pa ma yin pa'i brda'i bye brag gis so* |

[100] *F* 36b4: *'gal ba dang 'gal ba ma yin pa'i bye brag gis so* |

TABLE 7: CONNECTION BETWEEN THE *TSHUL BZHI* AND OTHER
NOTIONS ABOUT LEVELS OF PRACTICE, ACCORDING TO BU STON

General level of activity	Name of practice	Pañcakrama stage	Type of *'chad tshul*
"outer sciences" -- grammar etc.	-	-	*yi ge'i don*
lakṣaṇayāna (mtshan nyid theg pa)	*pāramitā (phar phyin)*	-	*spyi'i don*
kriyā, caryā & yoga tantra	irrelevant	-	
anuttarayogatantra: utpattikrama	*kāyavivikta (lus dben)*	-	
sampannakrama	*vagvivikta (ngag dben)*	*vajrajāpa (rdor bzlas)*	*ye shes gsum gyi sbas don*
	cittavivikta (sems dben)	*cittaviśuddhi (sems kyi rnam par dag pa)*	
	māyopāma, māyākāya (sgyu lus)	*svādhiṣṭhāna (rang byin gyis brlabs pa)*	*rang byin brlabs kyi sbas don*
	karmamudrā (las rgya)	-	*'dod chags chos kyi sbas don*
	prabhāsvara ('od gsal)	*abhisambodhi (mngon byang)*	*mthar thug gi don*
-	-	*yuganaddha (zung 'jug)*	

This table may be compared with that given by Steinkellner[33] which
is mainly based on much older sources; there are some very important dif-
ferences.

Bu ston's explanations of the point of these four methods is as fol-
lows. In *yi ge'i don*, the connection between the passage and its content
is established by analysis based on the method of grammar, semantics,
poetics, logic and so forth.[101] The *spyi don* interpretation is for
the benefit of those who have so far practiced only the *pāramitāyāna* or

the three lower classes of tantra and who need to be reassured by giving them an interpretation related to what they understand already. [102] The *s b a s   d o n* interpretation is of three kinds (as in all our authors, see table 7); what they have in common, Bu ston says is that they demonstrate the heart *(snying po)* of the teaching because they bring about a real certainty, which may be compared with that of a man who sees a pregnant woman and realizes that this is indeed the effect of acting out of one's desires. [103]

m t h a r   t h u g   p a ' i   d o n is certainly concerned with *'od gsal* and *zung 'jug*, as laid out in table 7. But the specific point of it, as set out by Bu ston[104] raises a problem which I have not been able to disentangle. For the Sanskrit original *mtha'* in this phrase is *kola*; and this is one of the ten pseudo-words occuring in *JVS*. [105] Unfortunately by telling us that this word is *sgra ji bzhin ma yin pa* and is a tathagāta-symbol,[106] Bu ston does nothing to clarify what, if anything, the word *kola* here conveys. He does continue by telling us that one "reaches the limit, limited away from things"[107] but this remark is hardly less obscure.

Here there may be some help from Padma dkar po, who in *H*[108] gives us an account of the *tshul bzhi* which makes no references to the considerations of table 7 at all and is purely epistemic. Here, each of the four *tshul bzhi* is said to be explanation that the true purpose of the passage is attained by some form of *pramāṇa*. [109]

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[102] *B* 25b7; compare the *JVS* passage quoted in n.65, and the related discussion.

[103] *B* 26a3: | *dper na sbrum ma mthong na 'di ni 'dod chags kyi chos kyis kun tu spyod pa'i 'bras bu'o | zhes nges pa bzhin du.*
On the connection between *bshad thabs* and the varieties of *kun tu spyod pa*, see Grags pa rgyal mtshan, cf.n.55.

[104] *B* 26a7.

[105] *JVS* 293a5. The interpretation of *ko la* given by Bu ston is not, however, apparently found in bTsong kha pa's commentary (e.g. *D* 211a2 ff.). Bu ston's words are (*B* 26b1): *mtha'i skad dod ko la zhes pa, sgra ji bzhin pa ma yin pa, de bzhin gshegs pa'i brda ste, mur thug pa'i tshig ste, mu ni yongs su ste, dngos po thams cad nas thug pa ste, mthar son pa'o |*

[106] *de bzhin gshegs pa'i brda*, see n.105. Cf. also n.64 and 89. If the point is simply that *mtha'/kola* mean *yongs su* "completely", it does not help very much.

[107] See the last part of the remark quoted in n.105.

[108] *H* 17a4.

[109] The general form is: *X-don ni | dngos bstan gyi brjod don P-yis gtan la phab nas bshad pa ste.* Here, X = *spyi'i* etc., while P is the relevant form of *pramāṇa*: roughly, semantics, reasoning, *āgama* and *pratyakṣa* respectively.

In the case of *mthar thug gi don*, this *pramāṇa* is a form of *pratya-kṣa*, i.e. of pure perception.[110] Here one is reminded of the frequent description of *'od gsal* as *yang dag pa'i mtha* by Padma dkar po and others. But even if Bu ston and Padma dkar po are here at bottom trying to say the same thing, this only reduces the problem of Bu ston's use of *mtha'*, *mu*, *kola* etc. - a purely linguistic problem - to the far more difficult and largely non-linguistic problem of *'od gsal* itself. I cannot here take the matter further than this.

4.5. The *nyan pa po la bshad tshul gnyis kyi rgyan*

There are two different styles of teaching; one for the crowd *(tshogs bshad)*, and one for the individual pupil of a *bla ma (slob bshad)*. Our authors differ as to the exact distinction.[111] See table 8.

4.6. The *gang zag lnga'i rgyan*

The *Pradīpoddyotanā* gives five types of pupil, and these are correlated there with the two styles of teaching as recorded in table 8. That table also records the well-known[112] correlation between these five types and the two called *cig car ba*[113] and *rim gyis pa*. The latter distinction is especially important for Bu ston and Padma dkar po, but seems to have been deliberately ignored by bTsong kha pa. On the other hand, the latter has an interesting discussion on the relation between the *nyan pa po'i rgyan* and the *gang zag lnga'i rgyan*.[114]

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[110] *gnas tshul yin lugs mngon sum gyis*, cf.n.108,109. For the force of the term *gnas tshul* (= *gnas lugs*) here, and for some remarks about *yin lugs*, see my paper mentioned in n.3. On *yin lugs*, this phrase is a good example of the point made in n.6.2. of that paper.

[111] See table 1 and footnotes thereto. bTsong kha pa is interesting on this *rgyan* (D 220a6 ff.).

[112] See H.V.Guenther, *Life and Teaching of Nāropa*, 115 n.1.

[113] See section 3 of my paper mentioned in n.3, and many references given in that paper.

[114] D 220b1 ff.

TABLE 8: THE *PRADĪPODDYOTANĀ* ON THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE *NYAN PA PO LA BSHAD TSHUL GNYIS KYI RGYAN* AND OTHER *RGYAN*

	tshogs bshad	*slob bshad*
mtha' drug gi rgyan	*sgra ji bzhin* *dgongs min* *drang don*	*sgra ji bzhin ma yin* *dgongs pa can* *nges don*
'chad tshul bzhi'i rgyan	*yi ge'i don* *spyi'i don*	*sbas don* *mthar thug don*
gang zag lnga'i rgyan	*utpala* *padma dkar po* *padma dmar po* *candan* (all these are *rim gyis pa*)	*rin po che lta bu* (=*cig car ba*)

4.7. The *rdzogs rim bsgrub pa'i rgyan* or *bden gnyis nges pa'i rgyan*

According to Bu ston[115] this is nothing more than the acquisition of certainty about what was done before. Padma dkar po[116] says it is merely another way of dividing the first six *rgyan*. *JVS*[117] and bTsong kha pa[118] are much more detailed, but it is not clear to me how much of this can be called *bshad thabs*.

5. Conclusion and outlook

Most of this paper has been about the linguistic devices used in Tibet to explain the tantras. I have tried to do two things. First, to locate these linguistic devices within the general field of explanatory methods for the tantras *(bshad thabs)*. Second, to identify, define, discuss, interpret and apply that one distinction - the distinction between *rjod byed sgra* and *brjod bya don* - which, in the texts under review, seems to underpin the use of most of these linguistic devices. Many important and interesting problems remain for discussion elsewhere; I shall be more than satisfied if I have provided a firm foundation for such discussion.

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[115] *B* 29b4

[116] *F* 38b6

[117] *JVS* 294a5

[118] *D* 223a-225b

Bibliography

a) C a n o n i c a l   w o r k s :

JVS   *Jñānavajrasamuccaya = Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa.* Peking
        bKa 'gyur, rGyud, Ca 290b-294b.

SRD   Śraddhākāravarman, *Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i rgyud las
        'byung ba'i rgyan bdun rnam par dgrol ba.* Peking bsTan bsgyur,
        rGyud 'grel, Ha 10a-12a.

PPD   *Pradīpoddyotanā* of Candrakīrti. sDe dge bsTan 'gyur, rGyud
        'grel, Ha. Verses from this work are given as quoted by the
        writer commenting on them.

b) T i b e t a n   w o r k s :

A   Sa skya pa bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182), *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam
       bzhag,* esp. 62b5 ff. *(rgyud bshad thabs kyi man ngag)*

B   Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), *dPal gsang ba 'dus pa'i ṭīkka
       sGron ma rab tu gsal ba.* gSung 'bum Ta 20b2 ff. *(rgyan bdun bshad)*

C   Bu ston, *dPal gsang ba 'dus pa'i rgyud 'grel gyi bshad thabs kyi
       yan lag gsang ba'i sgo byed.* gSung 'bum Ta 1aff.

D   bTsong kha pa (1357-1419), *Ye shes rdo rje kun las btus pa'i rgya
       cher 'grel pa.* bKa 'bum Tsa 171b6-227a8 (Otani Vol.160, p.150)

E   sGam po pa bKra shis rnam rgyal (1512-1587), *Kye'i rdo rje'i 'grel
       pa legs bshad nyi ma'i od zer,* esp. 8b5 ff. *(rgyan bdun bshad
       thabs)*

F   Padma dkar po (1527-1592), *gSang ba 'dus pa'i rgyan zhes bya ba
       Mar lugs thun mong ma yin pa'i bshad pa,* esp. 32b1 ff. (gSung 'bum
       16)

G   Padma dkar po, *dBu ma gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa Nges don
       grub pa'i shing rta,* esp. 7b3 ff. (gSung 'bum 9)

H   Padma dkar po, *brJod byed tshig gi rgyud bshad pa mKhas pa'i kha
       rgyan,* esp. 15b2 ff. (gSung 'bum 1)

J   Kong sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899), *brTag gnyis spyi don
       legs bshad gsang ba bla na med pa rdo rje dra ba'i rgyan,* esp.
       38a2 ff. *(rgyud spyi'i 'chad thabs mdor smos)*

THE TRANSMISSION LINEAGE OF THE GCOD TEACHING
ACCORDING TO THE 2ND DALAI-LAMA

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In the first volume of the gSuṅ 'bum of the second Dalai-Lama, in a chapter dedicated to the eulogies of various *bla ma*[1] is found an invocation *(gsol 'debs)*[2] addressed from dGe 'dun rgya mtsho to the masters who in succession transmitted up until his days the teaching of *gCod*.[3] This, as is noted, dates back to the teaching of Ma gcig Labs kyi sgron ma, follower of Dam pa saṅs rgyas, the famous Indian siddha.[4]

Their meeting which took place during the third voyage of Dam pa in Tibet, in the historical period of the second diffusion of Buddhism, had a result destined to endure for a long time if one recalls that in some bKa' brgyud pa monasteries of eastern Tibet, such as rGyu ne and sKabs che,[5] as also in the monastery of Diṅ ri in western Tibet, the doctrine and the practice connected to *gCod* are maintained until the most recent times.

The doctrine of *gCod* was received, even if with adequate adaptations, by the other schools of Buddhism, maintaining however a major individuality in respect to the *źi byed*, a system with which it had common roots, so much so that often the *gCod* was seen as *yan lag* of the *źi byed*.[6]

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[1] The gSuṅ 'bum of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475-1542) is in 3 volumes: the chapter to which I refer is entitled: *rJe btsun thams chad mkhyen pa'i gsuṅ 'bum thor bu las ma'i bstod tshogs* (1a-75a) with a subchapter *gCod yul brgyud pa'i gsol 'debs* (49b-51a) written at Śel brag at the request of *druṅ bZaṅ rgyal* in 1503; see also Tohoku Catalogue 5545.

[2] see *Decleer* 113-123.

[3] For a doctrinal exposition of *gCod* see *Blondeau* 375-76, *Tucci 1973* 126-132.

[4] see n.42.

[5] *Tucci 1973* 131.

[6] *Grub mtha'* 107, *Smith 1970* 66

The *gCod* teaching (*man nags* precepts and *nams len* practice) was accepted by the bKa' brgyud pa, by the Karma pa, a branch of the same school, by the Jo nan pa, by the Sans pa and by some rÑin ma pa traditions,[7] not only, standing by the authority of the source, by the same dGe lugs pa.[8] To cite an example which testifies to this, we find in the vast work of 'Jam mgon sprul sku Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899) *gCod* texts collected from various Karma pa authors, among whom are Ran byun rdo rje (1284-1339), dKon mchog yan lag who is also called Karma Chags med (1525-1583), rGyal dban thog mchog rdo rje (1797-1867), and in the same work gCod texts of Tāranātha (1571-1640?), the famous Jo nan pa master.

The Karma pa[9] masters received the *gCod* teaching from the Gans pa masters,[10] so named from the Sam po or Sam bu'i gans hermitage, and they in their turn had received it from Thod smyon bsam grub, a *gCod* master.[11]

The Sans pa masters not only undoubtedly received the *gCod* doctrine, as is also noted in the *Blue Annals*, in the chapter dedicated to the followers of Khyun rnal 'byor, but some of them such as Sans rgyas ston pa, mKhas grub chos rje and Sans ston pa,[12] figure also in the list of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho as teachers of the principal doctrine of *gCod* (*bstan thog gcig ma*).

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[7] see the introduction in *dDams nag mdzod* vol.9.

[8] I cannot establish what place the gCod had in the spiritual and doctrinal outlook of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho; thus I limit myself to noting that the *gCod* and the *Źi byed* enjoyed a certain devotion among the abbots of 'Bras spuns, as even dGe 'dun grub, predecessor of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho, was received in pilgrimage at Din ri, *Aziz 1978* 25.

[9] *CCK* gives a list of Karma pa masters who transmitted the *gCod* teaching up to the time of Chos kyi sen ge. Many of these are noted in the list of *Richardson* and *Smith 1968*. Chronologically, the last identified is Chos kyi dban phyug (1584-1635). After Karma Chags med the list in *CCK* follows this order: Ñi ma 'gyur med, bSam gtan bzan po, gCod rgod bla ma, dKon mchog bkra śis, Chos skyon pa, rDo lun pa, Śrī bdzra. A list of the Karma pa masters who transmitted the *gCod* is also in *Lauf* 91-92; it ends with Karma Chags med.

[10] On the Gans pa masters see *BA* 987; in *CCK* brief biographies of these masters included in the transmission of the secret mantras are to be found. (p.533); in *BA* the succession ends with Sans bstan srun, in *CCK* it proceeds with the following names: mÑam ñid rdo rje 'jun pa, Gans pa rin po che, Bla ma rdo rje, Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan.

[11] This personage, more frequently called *rje btsun* Zil gnon chen po, is part of the *sras rgyud* transmission, see *CCK* 560, *KGT* 763, *gDams nag mdzod* vol.9, 817. He is further cited in the *don gyi brgyud* tradition, *CCK* 543, the *nams bryud* tradition, *CCK* 544, and then *rtsa ba'i brgyud* tradition, *CCK* 545.

[12] See n.51, 52, 53.

Another point between the *Śaṅs pa* and *gCod* schools which seems im-
portant to me is in Sukasiddhi, in whose teaching, no less than in that
of Niguma, is evident the spiritual lineage of the Śaṅs pa.[13]

The invocation of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho addressed to the *gCod* masters
is twofold: the first concerns the masters of the *zab don brgyud* and the
second those of the *bstan thog gcig ma brgyud*. About these last masters
not only their name, but also the place, hermitage or monastery, where
they transmitted the teaching is given. That makes it possible to trace
a geographical outline of the teaching of *gCod* as was observed in the
16th century. According to this source it was centered above all in
gTsaṅ: we cite sÑe mo, Kha rag, Ri bo dpal of Śaṅs, rTa nag bSam sdiṅs,
Luṅ dmar with the two extremities of Diṅ ri, La stod in the west and
Zaṅs ri, seat of Ma gcig, in the east.

It was thus in these seats that the principle instructions of Ma gcig
were handed down; in fact it is remembered also that from this doctrinal
system flowed diverse teaching traditions, every one of which presents
variants in the list of the masters. From the teaching of Dam pa the
gCod split into two branches, *pho* and *mo*, with respectively sKyo bSod
nams *bla ma*[14] and Ma gcig as leaders. From this then derived the two
traditions of *mo gcod*, called *sras rgyud* and *slob rgyud*;[15] the first de-
scended from rGyal ba don grub[16] and the second from Khu sgom chos kyi
seṅ ge.[17] It seems to be opportune to recall also the other traditions
of the *gCod* teaching: in the list of their masters are cited also some
of the names reported by dGe 'dun rgya mtsho which are not mentioned in
the *Blue Annals*. I refer in particular in the teaching traditions listed
in the text: *Źi byed daṅ gcod yul chos 'byuṅ rin po che'i phreṅ ba thar
pa'i rgyan*, published in the volume *gCod kyi chos 'khor* together with

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[13] See *Kapstein* 143.

[14] This branch continued with sMa ra ser po up until mKhas grub gźon nu, a Śaṅs pa mas-
ter, *BA* 990, *Smith 1970* 539.

[15] *KGT* 763-764.

[16] This personage also took part in the transmission called *zab don* in which we find
him cited as Glaṅ luṅ chos rje, from the place of meditation *(sgrub gnas)* founded
by him at the direction of a prophecy of Ma gcig, his mother. His biography is in
CCK 494-507. He is also called Ra dra grub pe, *BA* 985, and sÑiṅ po grub pa or rKu
bar dgra grub pa, *KGT* 763. A locality Glaṅ luṅ is mentioned in *Tucci I.T.* 4:1, 63,
and it is a place near Shomang on the map.

[17] See n.45.

two other texts. Their originals are preserved as rare books.[18] All three texts are important works relative to the *źi byed* and *gCod* doctrine.

The author of the above-mentioned text is Chos kyi seṅ ge.[19] In the colophon of his works the date never appears. We can, however, affirm that it is not earlier than the 19th century since in the last pages of the text the author cites personages such as 'Jam dbyaṅs mKhyen brtse'i dbaṅ po (1820-1892) and Blo gros mtha' yas.[20]

Chos kyi seṅ ge, in presenting the biographies of the gCod masters, divides the transmission into: *ma rgyud śes rab kyi brgyud pa, pha rgyud thabs kyi brgyud pa,* and *gsaṅ ba sṅags kyi brgyud pa*[21] and he recognizes in the *pha rgyud* transmission the *pho gcod* and in the *ma rgyud* the *mo gcod.*[22]

The traditions of teaching reported by Chos kyi seṅ ge are: *sṅags lugs kyi bka' gter zuṅ 'jug gcod dbaṅ brgya rtsa'i brgyud,*[23] *don gyi brgyud,*[24] *ñams brgyud,*[25] *mdo lugs ñe brgyud* and *rtsa ba'i brgyud.*[26]

The *zab don* tradition seems to regard the teaching of Ma gcig connected with the practice of *ro sñoms skor* of Nāropa and other teachings such as those of Thaṅ rgyal po and of rGod tshaṅ pa;[27] regarding the *zab don* transmission lineage of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho the only names I

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[18] A wood-engraving of the text by Chos kyi seṅ ge is found also in the Tibetan property of Is.M.E.O. in Rome, and in the Toyo Bunko Collection, see *Yamaguchi* no.47-724.

[19] Chos kyi seṅ ge or Dharma seṅ ge is the author of other texts relative to *gCod*, see *Tucci TPS* 257, n.164. In the colophon it says that the text was written by 'Jigs bral Chos kyi seṅ ge in the Chos duṅ hermitage at Yar kluṅ at the request of 'Jigs med gZan phan 'od zer of Chab mdo.

[20] *CCK* 588-589.

[21] This division reflects the classification of tantras divided in father and mother tantras according to which way *(thabs)* or knowledge *(śes rab)* is insisted on in order to reach spiritual realization, *Blondeau* 369. In regard to the third division, that of the secret mantras, it includes, according to *CCK* 535-541, exclusively the tradition of the Gaṅs pa masters.

[22] See *CCK* 477.

[23] This transmission which is led by Khu sgom is the most similar to the *bstan thog gcig ma* of dGe 'dun rgya mtsho and to that of the *BA*. The biographies of its masters are in *CCK* 494-532.

[24] *CCK* 543.

[25] *CCK* 544.

[26] *CCK* 545.

[27] *CCK* 550; in regard to Thaṅ rgyal po and rGod tshaṅ pa see respectively *Gyatso* 111-119 and *Tucci O.M.* 2, 376-382.

could identify, apart from those already noted in the *bstan thog gcig ma brgyud*, are the following: sKal ldan seṅ ge, Glaṅ luṅ chos rje, *dge bśes* gÑal pa Saṅs rgyas ras pa, bSod nams rin chen and the ascetic Chu sgom.

For the identification of the names of the masters, first of all, it was necessary to consult the *Blue Annals*: apart from the initial link, as above mentioned, with the Źi byed pa I found that a) some names are completely new, being not contained in the *Blue Annals*; our source was, in fact, written about 25 years later, in 1503; not all of these masters can be identified, also because some of the names, such as Śa kya bla ma or Chos grags bzaṅ po, are so common that they are hardly identifiable; b) others, such as Khu sgom chos seṅ, Dol pa zaṅ thal, rGya nag gcer bu, follow the order given in the *Blue Annals* in the chapter of *gCod*; c) some names, as above mentioned, are Śaṅs pa masters and their biographies are found in the chapter of the *Blue Annals* dedicated to the disciples of Khyuṅ po rnal 'byor.

The list of the masters of the *zab don brgyud* is the following:

Dus gsum rgyal ba skyed mdzad pa

Yum chen śer phyin

bCom ldan Śa kya thub pa

'Jam dpal smra seṅ

rje btsun sGrol ma

Sukasiddhi

Ma pham mgon po

Thogs med sku mched

Āryadeva

Dam pa saṅs rgyas

bSod nams bla ma

Labs kyi sgron ma

sKal ldan seṅ ge[28]

Glaṅ luṅ chos rje[29]

dge bśes gÑal pa[30]

Grub pa 'ba re

sPad pa kha pa

Śa kya bla ma

Saṅs rgyas ras pa[31]

Rin chen gźon nu

dPal ldan grags pa

'Jam dbyaṅs mgon po[32]

Khyuṅ ston ras pa

bla ma Grags grub

Saṅs rgyas ye śes

bSod nams rin chen[33]

Chos grags bzaṅ po

bya btaṅ Chu sgom[34]

Don yod rgyal mtshan

Kun dga' rgyal mtshan

rtsa ba'i bla ma

[28] He is mentioned in *CCK* 561 and in *Smith 1970* 540. This personage, a native of 'Phan yul, is part of the *sras rgyud* transmission.

[29] See n.16.

[30] He is a native of mChims phu and is a direct disciple of rGyal ba don grub; his short biography is in *CCK* 508; in *BA* 985 he is mentioned only by his other name Gra pa haṅ ston.

[31] He is part of the third transmission of Źi byed, his biography is in *BA* 975.

[32] He is a bKa 'brgyud pa master, see *BA* 676.

[33] He may be Kham bu ya legs; in *CCK* 481 he is also called bSod nams rin chen. On Kham bu ya legs see also *KGT* 764.

[34] He is a master of Źi byed, *BA* 911.

The list of the masters of the *bstan thog gcig ma brgyud* is the following:

Name	Place
Dus gsum rgyal ba skyed mdzad pa	
Yum chen śer phyin	'Og min chos kyi pho braṅ
bCom ldan Śa kya thub pa[35]	Bya rgod phun po'i ri
'Jam dpal smra seṅ[36]	rGya nag ri po rtse lṅa
rje btsun sGrol ma[37]	g.Yu lo bkad pa'i źiṅ khams
Sukasiddhi[38]	'Ja 'od khyil ba'i pho braṅ
Byams pa mgon po[39]	dGa' ldan chos kyi pho braṅ
Thogs med sku mched[40]	Ri bo bya rkaṅ dgon pa
Āryadeva[41]	rGya gar 'jag ma'i spyil bu
Dam pa saṅs rgyas[42]	La stod Diṅ ri glaṅ 'khor
bSod nams *bla ma*[43]	g.Ye yi gaṅs par dgon pa

[35] On Śa kya thub pa and Bya rgod (Gṛdhrakūta) see *Stein* 81b-88b. In this same place according to a narrative of Langkor (gLan 'khor), Dam pa was conceived by his mother when a vulture perched on her shoulder, *Aziz 1979* 28.

[36] He is a form of Mañjuśrī, mentioned in *CCK* 431, 542; see also *Lauf* 94.

[37] She is the *dākinī* who shows her emanation in Tibet in Labs kyi sgron ma; the history of this manifestation is in *CCK* 439-451; her residence, according to *CCK* 494, is found at the base of Potala.

[38] Her history is in *CCK* 425; she is also named in the *sṅags lugs* line of transmission.

[39] Maitreya; under the name Ma pham mgon po he is mentioned in the *sṅags lugs* transmission, *CCK* 542.

[40] Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, see *CCK* 542, *BA* 869, *Lauf* 94.

[41] With regard to Āryadeva and Dam pa, see *BA* 869; in *CCK* he appears in the *sṅags lugs* and in the *mdo lugs* transmissions, 431, 542, 544.

[42] Recent studies on the famous siddha who circulated the *źi byed* system are *AZIZ 1978* and *Aziz 1979*; on the tradition of Dam pa in Tibet see also *Lauf*. A brief biography is in *BA* 869, *Grub mtha'* 107 and in *CCK* 421, where the Indian name Kamalaśīla is mentioned on p.134. This name is not recalled in *BA* and *Grub mtha'* whereas it is in *KGT* 756. A biography of Dam pa is also in *Lalou* 45. On Glaṅ 'khor, Langkor on the map, see *Ferrari* 154.

[43] According to *BA* 982, 984, he transmitted the teaching of the *pho gcod*; his brief biography is in *CCK* 437-439: He was born at sTod gtsaṅ po in the clan of sKyo to which belonged also the *dge bśes* Śa kya ye śes of the *sṅags lugs* transmission; after having spent much time as a hermit, he was received at Diṅ ri Glaṅ 'khor by Dam pa. He taught Ma gcig the practice of *ro sñoms* (indifference to cadavers) and he is considered her *bla ma* root.

Name	Place
Labs kyi sgron ma[44]	Zaṅs ri khaṅ dmar dgon pa
Khu sgom chos seṅ[45]	sÑe mo khu'i dgon pa
Dol pa zaṅ thal[46]	Luṅ dmar lcaṅ gsar dgon pa
rGya nag gcer bu[47]	dBus stod dpal gyi Chu ri
Saṅs rgyas rab ston[48]	inhabited places
Saṅs rgyas dge sloṅ[49]	inhabited places
Sum pa ras pa[50]	Kha rag mon bu dgon pa
Saṅs rgyas ston pa[51]	Ri bo dpal gyi dgon pa
mKhas grub chos rje[52]	bSam gtan sdiṅs hermitage

[44] Her biography is in *BA* 983, *Lalou* 49, *CCK* 451-460; the history of her life is well-known so I will limit myself to reporting the names of her teachers: *dge bśes* dBon ston, mÑon śes, *dge bśes* Śud ba źva dmar can, *dge bśes* Yaṅ rtse ba, bSod nams *bla ma*.

[45] The complete name is Khu sgom chos kyi seṅ ge; his biography is in *BA* 988 and *CCK* 509-512; for sÑe mo, Gnimo on the map, see *Ferrari* 142.

[46] His biography is in *BA* 989 and in *CCK* 512-514; the locality connected to his name is Luṅ smad in *BA* and Luṅ smad byan tshal in *CCK*. Luṅ dmar is Lungma in the area of Ralung and Gobzi, *Tucci I.T.* 4:1, 58.

[47] Disciple of Dol pa; brief biography in *BA* 990 and in *CCK* 514-516. The connection with Chu bo ri is mentioned in both texts. On Chu bo ri see *Ferrari* 163.

[48] Disciple of rGya nag gcer bu, brief biography in *BA* 990 and in *CCK* 517.

[49] Biography in *BA* 990 and in *CCK* 517; disciple of the preceding teacher.

[50] Sum pa ras pa or Sum ston ras pa; see *BA* 990 and *CCK* 518-522, in where he is also called Sum ston źan med or Ras pa; on Kha rag see *Ferrari* 155.

[51] He is a Śaṅs pa master; his biography is in *BA* 746 and in *CCK* 522-526; he was a contemporary of Yaṅ dgon pa (1213-1258). Ri bo is Ri bo dpal in Śaṅs, which was founded by Tsaṅ ma śaṅs ston (1234-1309), see *Kapstein* 143; on the region see also *Wylie* 141. n.239.

[52] He is a Śaṅs pa master; his biography is in *BA* 749 and in *CCK* 526-532; he was a contemporary of gSer gliṅ bKra śis dpal (1242-1315); in *CCK* he is also called rGod phrug of mKhas grub chen po gźon nu grub. Founder of bSam sdiṅs in Myaṅ (gTsaṅ); died in 1319. On bSam sdiṅs see *Wylie* 144, n.271.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Place</u>
Śaṅs pa ston pa[53]	'Jag chuṅ dpal hermitage
Rin chen blo gros[54]	the residence of the 'Jag chuṅ *bla ma*
Tshul khrims mgon po[55]	sTag tshan hermitage
bSod nams bzaṅ po[56]	sTag rtse chos kyi pho braṅ
rTogs ldan ñi ma[57]	inhabitated places
Don yod rgyal mtshan[58]	rTa nag
Kun dga' rgyal mtshan[59]	Chos sku dag pa'i pho braṅ
rtsa ba'i bla ma	

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[53] I believe that he may be the same Tsaṅ ma śaṅs ston pa, head of the Śaṅs pa tradition, called 'Jag pa, on which you can see *Kapstein* and *Smith 1970* 8; his name is connected with a place 'Jag chuṅ; regarding the locality according to a personal communication of Prof.Wang Yao, it would be in gTsaṅ close to Phuṅ tshogs gliṅ.

[54] Unidentified.

[55] Unidentified; in regard to the place, see *Wylie* 146, n.292, *Ferrari* 120.

[56] He may be the chief disciple of Bo doṅ pan chen; his biography is in *BA* 1017 (1341-1433). The locality is Bye ri sTag rtse, Tagste on the map.

[57] Unidentified.

[58] I cannot identify him with certainty, but I recall that a Don yod rgyal mtshan exists, a member of the Sa skya family, who possessed Śaṅs and rTa nag for a long time, *Tucci 1971* 187. Regarding the monastery of rTa nag, it was founded by the second Dalai-Lama's grandfather, Kun dga' bzaṅ po, *Kapstein* 143.

[59] He is the father of the second Dalai-Lama, Sreg ston Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, (1432-1506) who resided in Sreg źiṅ of Śaṅs. According to *Smith 1970* 8 Blo gros mtha' yas received the Śaṅs pa teaching from the traditions of Sreg and 'Jag pa united to those of bSam sdiṅs. Regarding to the *gCod* teaching Kun dga' rgyal mtshan is also connected to the monastery of Rin chen gliṅ, *gDams nag mdzod* 9, 817. There is also a Kun dga' rgyal mtshan, author of a biography of the first Dalai-Lama, *Vostrikov* 192.

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KGT   *mKhas pa'i dga' ston* of dPa'bo gtsug lag. Ed. Lokesh
                   Chandra, part 3, New Delhi 1961, Ba

Grub mtha'   *Grub mtha' thams chad kyi khuṅs daṅ 'dod tshul ston pa*
                   by Thu kvan Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ñi ma. Varanasi 1963

CCK   *gCod kyi chos 'khor,* Three texts on the history and
                   practice of the Źi byed and gCod precepts. New Delhi
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THE AUTHOR OF THE <u>SUHRLLEKHA</u>

by

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Among the ten Buddhist epistles contained in the subdivision *spriṅ yig* of the Tanjur, the *Suhṛllekha (SL)*[1] is the best known, because it has become accessible to a larger public in the form of various translations.[2]

In Tibet this letter has enjoyed a widespread popularity since the time that it was translated by Sarvajñadeva and dPal brtsegs (8/9th cent.). This is evidenced by numerous quotations[3] from and commentaries[4] on it.

For the abbreviations of Sanskrit-texts see F.Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar*. New Haven 1953, XXVI-XXX. For the abbreviations of Pāli-texts see V.Trenckner, *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*. Vol.1, Copenhagen 1924-48, XII-XIX.

[1] Texts in the Tanjur:
  Cone (C), Vol.Ñe (94), 40b3-46a7
  Derge (D), Vol.Ñe (94), 40b4-46b3
  Derge, *Jo bo'i chos chuṅ*, 60a3-65b6
  Narthang [N], Vol.Ñe (94), 279a7-286b3
  Narthang [N²], Vol.Gi (33), 64a5-70b6
  Peking [[P]], Vol.Ñe (94), 282b8-290a4
  Peking [[P²]], Vol.Gi (33), 74a6-81b4

[2] Cf. S.Dietz, *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens. Nach dem tib. Tanjur hrsg., übers. und erläutert*. Diss., Bonn 1980. I, 16-17. A critical edition of the Tibetan text, together with a German translation, and an edition of the canonical commentary *Vyaktapadā Suhṛllekhaṭīkā* of Mahāmati is being prepared for publication by the present author.

[3] The earliest quotations in Tibetan literature are found in *gCes pa bsdus pa'i 'phrin yig (Sārasaṁgrahalekha)* by dPal dbyaṅs. Cf. Dietz, *Briefliteratur*, II, 220-319; III, 169. As an example for later quotations see Guenther, *The Jewel Ornament of Liberation by sGam.po.pa*. London 1959, 47-48, 56-58, 62-63, 68-69, 123-126, 153, 164, 183, 185.

[4] Cf. Dietz, *Briefliteratur*, I, 14-16. For this paper I used the following commentaries: Mahāmati, *Vyaktapadā Suhṛlekhaṭīkā*. P, Vol.Ñe (94), 324b8-376b2, *(SLṬ)*,Brag phug dge bśes dge 'dun rin chen, *bŚes pa'i spriṅ yig ces bya ba'i mchan 'grel*, 1961 *(mChan 'grel)*.
Suhṛllekha by Ācārya Nāgārjuna. Ed. A.S.Shastri, Sarnath-Varanasi 1971.

Although the *SL* was well known in India and in China,[5] a significant in-
fluence on later didactic works can be found only in Tibetan literature.
To date, no Sanskrit quotations from the *SL* are available. Besides the
quotations in the *Cittaratnaviśodhanakramalekha* of Jitāri[6] only one more
quotation is known, namely that in Candrakīrti's *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*.[7]

   Two important reasons might be adduced to explain the great success
which the *SL* had in Tibet:

1. The *SL* contains a concise and comprehensive presentation of the way
   to liberation from saṃsāra for the layman.
2. The *SL* is attributed to Nāgārjuna, the famous philosopher of Madhya-
   maka.

   It is remarkable that the *SL* has few stylistic and philosophical
characteristics in common with those of the indisputably authentic works
of the philosopher of Madhyamaka. Certainly, in the classification of
Nāgārjuna's works in the three categories[8] of *rigs tshogs* "Category of
reasoning", *gtam tshogs* "Category of [didactic] discourses" and *bstod
tshogs* "Category of hymns", the *SL* does not belong to *rigs tshogs* but
to *gtam tshogs*. The *Rājaparikathā Ratnāvalī (RĀ)* "Discourse to a king
[with the title] 'A string of jewels'" belongs to the same category.
However, in the *RĀ* we find many traits which are in accordance with
those of other authentic works of Nāgārjuna. This discrepancy was the
starting point of my investigation of the tradition concerning the au-
thor of the *SL* and its addressee, the metrical and stylistic pecular-
ities, and the use of philosophical terms. I should like to present the
results of this investigation here.

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[5] Three Chinese translations of the *SL* are available in Taishō, Vol.32, 745b-754b:
Taishō 1672, translated by Guṇavarman in 431.
Taishō 1673, translated by Saṃghavarman in 434.
Taishō 1674, translated by I-tsing. This translation was edited together with an
English translation by S.Beal, *Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu. The Suhṛillekha or 'Friendly Let-
ter'. Written by Lung Shu (Nāgārjuna), and Addressed to King Sadvaha*. Transl. from
the Chin. ed. of I-tsing, London 1892.

[6] Cf. Dietz, *Briefliteratur*, II, 14-65 and III, 169.

[7] P, Vol.Ya (98), 113b3-4. There *SL* 43 is cited without reference to the work and its
author. I should like to thank Dr. Ch.Lindtner, København, for this information.

[8] Cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, Le Dharmadhātustava de Nāgārjuna. *Études Tibétaines. Dédiées à
la Mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*. Paris 1971, 448-471.

1. The personality of the author of the *SL* and of its addressee

In the *SL* the author himself hardly appears. Neither his name nor that of the addressee are given. Yet he addresses a layman *(khyim pa)* as his spiritual adviser *(bla ma)*, as is clearly seen from v.118:

> | khyod la de skad gdams pa gaṅ lags de |
> | bas par dge sloṅ gis kyaṅ bgyi bar dka' |
> | 'di las gaṅ źig spyod pa'i ṅo bo de'i |
> | yon tan bsten pas sku tshe don yod mdzod |

> "Even for a monk it would be difficult to accomplish all the counsels given to you. [However], make [your] life meaningful by holding fast to the merit of those [counsels] whose nature is such that you can practise them."

In addressing the addressee only general, honorific, polite formulas are used, e.g. *yon tan raṅ bźin* "[you] whose character is endowed with virtues" (v.1a), *dge 'os* "o one worthy of the merits" (v.1a), *'jig rten mkhyen pa* "you who know the world" (v.29a), *rigs pa'i bdad ñid* "o righteous one" (v.39a) etc. Only *dbaṅ phyug* "Lord" (v.54a) allows one to infer the high social rank of the addressee.

This is contrary to the practice in Nāgārjuna's *RĀ*, where the vocative "king" (skr. *rājan, pārthiva, nṛpa*)[9] is generally used.

The names of the author and of the addressee are mentioned in the colophon of the letter:

> | bśes pa'i phrin yig slob dpon 'phags pa klu sgrub kyis |
> mdza' bo rgyal po bde spoyd la bkur ba rdzogs so ||

> "The *Letter of a Friend (bśes pa'i phrin yig)*,[10] written by Ācārya Nāgārjuna (Klu sgrub) to [his] friend King

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[9] The vocative "king" is used e.g. in *RĀ* I,2, 78; II,26, 76, 78, 91,97; III, 1, 5, 12; IV, 28, 31, 44, 45, 99; the vocative *dpal ldan* "o glorious one" in III, 75. For the text of *RĀ* see: Nāgārjuna, *Rājaparikathāratnāvalī*. [Tib.] *Rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che'i phreṅ ba*. P Vol.Ñe (94), 129a5-152b4; G.Tucci, The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna. *JRAS* 1934, 307-325 and *JRAS* 1936, 237-252 and 423-435, S.Dietz, The Fifth Chapter of Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī. *Journal of the Nepal Research Centre 4*, 1980, 189-220.

[10] Thus the Tatpuruṣa compound of the title *Suhṛllekha* "Letter to a friend" was translated by the Tibetans. That the translation "Letter to a friend" is correct is proven by the explanation of the commentary *SLṬ* (P Vol.Ñe (94), 325 a2), as well as by the analogy to the titles of other letters, where usually the addressee is quoted, e.g. *Gurulekha, Putralekha, Śiṣyalekha* etc.

Śātavāhana *(bDe spyod)*[11] is concluded."

The titles and colophons of the Chinese[12] translations specify the Bodhisattva Lung shu (=Nāgārjuna) as the author of the letter. As the name of the addressee, we read in Guṇavarman's translation Shan t'o chia (745b), in I-tsing's "King of the country Ch'êng shih"[13] ("riding on the scholars" or "borne by the scholars"). The latter is probably the translation of skr. Sadvahana, that is Śātavāhana, while the name given by Guṇavarman, Shan t'o chia, which is the transliteration for Jāntaka, might be another form of Jetaka, the original personal name of the king[14] as is indicated by I-tsing and Bu ston. That the *SL* was addressed to a Śātavāhana king is reported by I-tsing[15] who notes moreover:

"In India students learn this epistle in verse early in
the course of instruction, but the most devout make it
their special object of study throughout their lives."

In the time of I-tsing (end of 7th cent.), the *SL* was very popular as an easily intelligible, concise and comprehensive summary of the Buddhist doctrine and practice.

The friendship of Nāgārjuna with a Śātavāhana ruler is well documented, not only in Tibetan and Chinese references, but also in Indian sources.[16] According to the commentator Ajitamitra,[17] the *RĀ* was written for the same Śātavāhana king. Certainly, the latter does not give a systematic explanation of the teachings of Nāgārjuna; however, it contains, besides moral admonitions and religious advice, also substantial parts devoted to expositions of the Madhyamaka philosophy. Nevertheless, in the *RĀ* author and addressee are also not quoted.

[11] For the translation of the name *bDye spyod* cf. S.Levi, Kniṣka et Śātavāhana, deux figures symboliques de l'Inde au premier siècle. *JA 228*, 61-121, M.Walleser, Die Lebenszeit des Nāgārjuna. *ZB 6*, 1925, 96-99.

[12] Cf. S.Beal, *Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu*, 10, 13 and Taishō. Vol.32, 745b, 748a, 751a, 754b.

[13] Cf. J.Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (a.d. 671-695) by I-tsing*. Oxford 1896, 159, n.1, S.Beal, *Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu*, 13.

[14] Cf. E.Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos ḥbyuṅ) by Bu ston*. 2 vols., transl. from Tib., Heidelberg 1931-1932, II, 125, J.Takakusu, *Record*, 159; S.Beal, *Suh-ki-li-lih-kiu*, 6; M.Walleser, Lebenszeit, 101; S.Dietz, *Briefliteratur*, I, 37, n.47.

[15] J.Takakusu, *Record*, 158f., 162.

[16] Cf. A.K.Warder, The Possible Dates of Parśva, Vasumitra (II), Caraka and Mātṛceṭa. *Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka*. Leiden 1968, 331-333; Bāṇa, *Harṣacaritra*, § 283.

[17] *Ratnāvaliṭīkā*, P Vol.Ṅe (94), 152b7.

Summarizing, we should retain the following: No information on the personalities of the author and the addressee can be extracted from the *SL*; the Chinese and Tibetan tradition agree on Nāgārjuna as the author of the *SL*. This tradition has certainly its root in India, and must have been established already in the 5th cent., since the first Chinese translations date from this time. On the other hand, in evaluating these facts, one should not forget that the growth of legends around Nāgārjuna's life was in full bloom already at that time, as is shown in Kumārajīva's biography of Nāgārjuna.[18] The friendship of Nāgārjuna with a Śātavāhana ruler is well known; and we should not forget that the *RĀ* was also addressed to the latter.

2. Metre and style of the *SL*

Since the *SL* is available only in translations, the possibilities for a philological investigation are rather limited. Nonetheless, the metre of the original Sanskrit text is known, simply because the author himself quotes it in v.1, where he says:

--- *bdag gis* ---

   'phags pa'i dbyaṅs 'di dag |

| *cuṅ zad cig bsdebs khyod gsan pa'i rigs* |

"It is fitting you hear these Āryāgīti [verses][19] which I have composed concisely."

The Āryāgīti belongs to the group of Gaṇachandas, i.e. it is a mora *(mātrā)* counting metre. A stanza consists of two acatalectic hemistichs of 32 morae each, with obligatory caesura after the third foot, i.e. after the 12th mora.[20]

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[18] Cf. É. Lamotte, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa)*. Louvain 1962, 71. The same: *Der Verfasser des Upadeśa und seine Quellen*. Göttingen 1973, 41.

[19] That *'phags pa'i dbyaṅs* is the translation of a metre is corroborated by Mahāmati in *SLṬ* 325a7: |'*phags pa'i dbyaṅs źes bya ba ni tshigs su bcad pa'i miṅ ṅo* | "'Phags pa'i dbyaṅs (Āryāgīti), that is the name of a metre." Cf.Dietz, *Briefliteratur, I*, 45, n.60.

[20] For the Āryāgīti cf. C.Cappeller, *Kleine Schriften und Sanskrit-Gedichte*. Wiesbaden 1977, 58, 79-81, 123-132; H.Jacobi, *Kleine Schriften*. Wiesbaden 1970, I, 157; A.K. Warder, *Pali Metre*. PTS 1967, 141, 143f.

For us it is important that the use of this metre is extremely rare.[21] The earliest known example of Āryāgīti in the Sanskrit literature is the *Nalodaya*, a poem which is attributed, presumably incorrectly, to Kālidāsa. Without any doubt the *SL* is older than this poem, and hence it is the oldest known work in this metre. All the works of Nāgārjuna preserved in Sanskrit are composed in the metres Śloka[22] (Anuṣṭubh) amd Āryā,[23] the most commonly used metres at that time.

The *SL* is written in a clear, pleasing and straightforward style. Canonical similes are used for illustration: e.g. the good result of "diligence" (*apramāda*), even after initial "negligence" (*pramāda*), is illustrated by the fate of Aṅgulimāla, Nanda and Ajātaśatru.

More generally speaking, we see that the style is adapted to the subjects treated in different parts of the *SL*.

In the first part, i.e. vv.4-64, the doctrine of Buddha is taught; correspondingly, it is written in a sermonizing and admonitory style. We find in these verses several lists of Buddhist concepts.[24] In almost every verse an imperative or necessitative is used to request the observance of virtues and the avoidance of vices. Comparing this section with *RĀ* I,8-21, where similarly the pure conduct is explicated, we note the following: the style is certainly as clear and pregnant, but in the *RĀ* the presentation proceeds in terms of dialectic juxtapositions, for instance the verses *RĀ* I,8-10 enunciate virtues, the precise counterparts of which are found in *RĀ* I,12-18. Again in vv.19-21 opposite terms are formulated, this time in one verse.

In the second part (vv.65-103), the *SL* contains a presentation of seven evils of the cycle of birth. Here a narratory, colourful description of these evils prevails. In particular the evils of the hells are traced out in frightful colours.

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[21] Cf. C.Cappeller, *Kleine Schriften*, 58. The lost Mahārāṣṭrī epos *Harivijaya* by Sarvasena (4th cent.) was probably composed in this metre. The Mahārāṣṭrī epos *Setubandha* by Pravarasena (reigned 410-440) is, as far as is known, the earliest available work in this metre. Cf. A.K.Warder, *Indian Kāvya Literature*. 3 vols., Delhi 1972-1977, §§ 1265-1268, 1433. There may well be earlier examples of this metre in Prakrit literature. Cf. A.K.Warder, *Pali Metre*, 144. The Āryā was particularly developed in the Prakrit poetry. Cf. H.Jacobi, *Kleine Schriften*, 150-151, 157, 198.

[22] E.G. the *Madhk*, *Śūnyatāsaptati*, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* and *RĀ* are composed in Śloka.

[23] The *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the seven stanzas of the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya* consist of Āryā-stanzas. Of *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya* v.5 is quoted in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (MadhK 428,11; 551, 14) and v.4cd in Bcṭ 355,14 and 532,5. These stanzas are in Āryā-metre whereas the last, most frequently quoted, v.7 is a Śloka. Cf. L.de La Vallée Poussin, *Théorie des douze causes*. Gand 1913, 122-124. The Āryā is by preference used in didactic literature. Cf. C.Cappeller, *Kleine Schriften*, 54f.

[24] E.g. in the vv.4, 5, 6-8, 10-11, 29, 32, 33 etc.

In comparison with the preceding section, where concise and straight-
forward statements predominate, these evils are described in an epic and
verbose manner. As the author himself mentions,[25] he is fully aware of
the frightening effect of artistical descriptions, pictures or sculp-
tures.

In the third part (vv.104-118), the style of the first part is ta-
ken up again in the presentation of the way to liberation from saṃsāra,
which once more underlines the close correspondence of style and subject
in the *SL*.

3. The philosophy of the *SL*

In the *SL* we find nowhere Nāgārjuna's dialectic, which is based on
the relativity of opposite terms,[26] e.g. on the opposition of "existence"
and "non-existence" in *RĀ* I,57f. From this there results a consistent,
logical deduction as follows: with such a pair of opposites, since the
one is only possible, if the other is given, the existence of one implies
that of the other. From this Nāgārjuna deduces that in reality neither
exists.

There is no trace of this kind of logical deduction in the *SL*. Mere
references to Buddha's[27] teaching are made, together with bald statements
of supposed fact. As an example of this kind of exposition I quote the
vv.49/50:

|gzugs ni bdag ma yin źes gsuṅ ste bdag |
|gzugs daṅ ldan min gzugs la bdag gnas min |
|bdag la gzugs mi gnas te de bźin du |
|phuṅ po lhag ma bźi yaṅ stoṅ rtogs bgyi | [49]

|phuṅ po 'dod rgyal las min dus las min |
|raṅ bźin las min ṅo bo ñid las min |
|dbaṅ phyug las min rgyu med can min te |
|mi śes las daṅ sred las byuṅ rig mdzod | [50]

[49] "Thus it has been said (sc.by Buddha): the form
is not the self, the self does not possess the form,
the self does not dwell in the form; and the form does
not dwell in the self; in this manner understand also
the four remaining 'aggregates' (phuṅ po) as empty."

[50] "Know that the 'aggregates' did not arise by chance
(yadṛcchā), nor from time (kāla), nor from nature (prakṛti),
nor from self-nature (svabhāva), nor from a creator (īśvara),
nor without cause (ahetu), but rather did they arise from
'ignorance' (avidyā), 'deeds' (karma)[28] and 'craving' (tṛṣṇā)."

Ideationally, these two verses spring from canonical Buddhist doc-
trine. We find parallels to v.49 in *SN* III,114 and *SN* III,167.[29] Likewise,
we have quite a few parallels to the list of heterodox[30] views of origin
in v.50, in other works[31] as well as in Nāgārjuna's[32]. It is noteworthy
that, in addition to both canonical causes[33] of worldly personality,
namely "ignorance" and "craving", "deeds" are mentioned.

[28] Another possible translation of the Tibetan text would be: "They arise from deeds
[caused] by ignorance and craving." But also the three Chinese translations mention
these three causes. Cf. Taishō, Vol.32, 746b16 (Guṇavarman), 749b14 (Saṃghavarman),
752b27 (I-tsing). In the commentaries, Mahāmati (*SLṬ,* Vol.Ṅe, 350b1-6), Brag phug
dge bśes dge 'dun rin chen (*mChan 'grel* 43,5-6) and Blo bzaṅ sbyin pa (50,12-14)
comment also on three co-operative causes of existence.

[29] Before Nāgārjuna, in general the five "aggregates" are used for the proof of the
"voidness". Cf. Frauwallner, *Philosophie,* 149, 171.

[30] In the commentaries (*SLṬ* 349a1, *mChan 'grel* 43,1-2) *'dod rgyal las* "by chance" is
explained as *gnam babs so* "fallen from heaven".
dus las "from time": This theory is known as *kālavāda.* Cf. Frauwallner, *Geschichte
der Indischen Philosophie.* Bd. 2, Salzburg 1956, 110; É.Lamotte, *Le Traité de la
Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra).* Vol.1, Louvain 1944,
76; *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya.* Ed. Suali, Calcutta 1905, 10-11.
raṅ bźin las "from nature": This is directed against Sāṃkhya. Cf. *SLṬ* 349a4.
ṅo bo ñid las "from self-nature": As A.L.Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas.*
Repr. Dehli 1981, 226 states, the *svabhāvavāda* was a amall sub-sect of Ājīvikism.
dbaṅ phyug las "from a creator": This is directed against Yoga. Cf. *SLṬ* 349a5 and E.
Frauwallner, *Geschichte,* I,425.
rgyu med can "without cause": This is the *ahetu(ka)vāda.* Cf. *Ja* V,227ff., *SN* III,73,
AbhidhK (La Vallêe Poussin), III,82. This could be directed against the Ājīvikas. Cf.
A.L.Basham, *History,* 227 and *Ja* V,228.

[31] Cf. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* I,2; *Suśruta-saṃhitā* III,1.11; AbhidhK (La Vallêe Poussin),
II,311 and n.1, 2; *Laṅk* 96,18.

[32] Cf. *Akutobhayā,* Vol.Tsa (95), 34a. I would like to thank Dr. Ch.Lindtner, Kobenhavn,
for this information.

[33] Cf. E.Frauwallner, *Geschichte,* I,241.

In verses 4-64 of the *SL*, in which general Buddhist teaching is conveyed, there are some examples that transcend the teaching of the Sūtrapiṭaka, but which are not specific to the fully developed Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna.

The large number of parallels to the Sūtrapiṭaka in the use of simile is remarkable, including rarely cited examples. For example, in v.17, as in *AN* I,283, three groups of human beings are compared with three kinds of designs; in v.18, as in *AN* I,18, three kinds of speech with honey, flowers and filth; in v.20, as in *AN* II,107, human beings with a mango of various degrees of ripeness etc.[34] Here v.53 should be mentioned. There is taught that the 150 *prātimokṣa* precepts[35] are concentrated in the three "instructions" (tib. *bslab pa*, skr. *śikṣā*). A similar combination of these two is found in *AN* I,230.

Similarly the study of particular concepts leads to no definite proof for or against the authorship of Nāgārjuna. Thus in vv.6-7, "liberality" *(sbyin pa)* and "morality" *(tshul khrims)* are held up as special virtues of laymen, as in e.g. *DN* I,11o, I,148. In *RĀ* I,12 Nāgārjuna adds to these two concepts a third virtue "patience" *(bzod pa)*, while in *RĀ* IV,99 we find even a fourth one, "truthfulness" *(satya)*.

In v.8 the six "perfections" *(pāramitā)* are listed. We also encounter these in *RĀ* IV,81-2, V,75, but in *RĀ* IV,80 and V,35-39 a seventh concept, "compassion" *(sñiṅ brtse)*, is added.

The context in which the concept of "absolute truth" *(paramārtha)* is used in v.27a, appears surprising:

|*don dam gzigs par bgyi slad dṅos rnams la* |
|*tshul bźin yid la byed pa de goms mdzod* |

"In order to recognize absolute truth, he must meditate
upon material things in a thoroughly attentive manner."

In this verse "meditative contemplation" *(sgom pa)* is brought forward as the essential preparation for this recognition. However, neither here nor in the commentary *Vyaktapadā* of Mahāmati[36] does the concept of "absolute truth" seem to have been thought to imply that of "conventional truth" *(saṃvṛtisatya)*.

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[34] I would like to thank Dr. Ch.Lindtner, Kobenhavn, for informing me about these Pāli parallels.

[35] These are the 150 precepts which are common to the Vinaya of all schools.Cf. L.Finot, Le Prātimokṣasūtra des Sarvāstivādins. *JA* 1913, 467f.

[36] *SLṬ* 339a3-6.

In the second part of the *SL*, in vv.65-103, seven evils of the cycle of birth are listed, in order to inspire "weariness" *(skyo ba)* of the cycle of rebirth, and, hence, to create the precondition for liberation. Particularly detailed is the representation of suffering in the six forms of existence: thus, in v.102, the suffering of the Asuras *(lha min)* is described. According to Lamotte,[37] in the canonical scriptures,[38] as well as in the texts of certain Buddhist sects,[39] only five forms of existence are mentioned, whereas in those of some other sects[40] there are six forms. For us it is important that Nāgārjuna, the author of the *RĀ* mentions only five *gati* *('gro ba)* (I,23)[41], while the author of the *SL* has six.

In the third part, in vv.105-118, the way to liberation from the cycle of rebirth is expounded. To begin with, some preconditions are explained. "Morality", "meditation" *(bsam gtan)* and "wisdom", i.e. the three "instructions", are the means whereby one attains nirvāṇa. The latter is, in v.105b-d, defined as "a peaceful, subdued, untainted state,[42] without age and death, inexhaustible, devoid of earth, water, fire, air, sun and moon." In *MadhK*, Nāgārjuna describes nirvāṇa as peaceful, without becoming and passing away, not eternal, devoid of the manifold, unimaginable and inexpressible.[43] The phenomenal world and nirvāṇa are one and the same for him.

The *SL* continues: The seven "members of enlightenment" *(byaṅ chub kyi yan lag)* are the virtues, which allow one to attain nirvāṇa (v.106). By means of "wisdom" and "meditation",[44] the ocean of existence becomes a mud hole[45] (v.197). One should not speculate about the 14 "questions that were not answered" by Buddha *(avyākṛta)*. The Sūtrapiṭaka mentions

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[37] *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*. Louvain 1958, 697f.

[38] *DN* III, 234; *MN* I,73; *SN* V,474; *AN* IV,459.

[39] Theravādin, Sarvāstivādin, School of the Śāriputrābhidharma.

[40] Andhaka, Uttarāpathaka, Mahāsāṃghika, Vātsīputrīya and the Ṣaḍgatikārikā.

[41] The references to the five *gati* found in the *MadhK* 269, 304, 323 refer all to Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*.

[42] Cf. *Mv* III,441.4.

[43] Cf. *MadhK* XXV; Frauwallner, *Philosophie*, 174f.; *RĀ* I,40-42, 45-51, 64f.

[44] Cf. *Dhp.* 372.

[45] For this comparison see Mātṛceṭa, *Śatapañcāśatka*, v.35.

only ten questions[46] that cannot be answered, whereas Nāgārjuna has 14[47] of them, and he insists upon the pointlessness of these questions, in view of the identity of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, and the voidness of all phenomena. In vv.109-111 the "origination in dependence" is explicated, while in v.112, we find a paraphrase of the old, oft-cited[48] statement (also quoted by Nāgārjuna in other works): Who knows the "origination in dependence", knows Buddha's teaching and therefore Buddha himself. In order to be calmed, i.e. to attain nirvāṇa, one must practise intensively the eightfold "noble way" (v.113). By realizing the four "noble truths", finally one gaines liberation (vv.114-115b). This part ends with the request to accomplish the counsels given by the author. This is the way to liberation from saṃsāra as it is expounded in the Sūtrapiṭaka and by the Hīnayāna doctrine.[49] The concept of the Bodhisattva is nowhere mentioned in the *SL*, whereas in v.11 the eight "moral commandments" *(sikṣāpada)* of an Upāsaka are called "the morality of an Arhat" *(dgra bcom tshul khrims)*. In the *RĀ*, however, Nāgārjuna states the preference of Mahāyāna to Hīnayāna,[50] and he repeatedly[51] asseverates that his instructions are in accordance with the Mahāyāna doctrine. In *RĀ* IV,94 he even explains why Buddha taught the different doctrines of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna:

> *yathaiva vaiyākaraṇo mātṛkām api pāṭhayet*
> *buddho 'vadat tathā dharmaṃ vineyānāṃ yathākṣamam* ||

> "Just as a grammarian teaches the alphabet [to disciples],
> so Buddha taught [his] doctrine as it may be accessible
> to those to be trained."

The above quoted *SL* v.118 also may be interpreted as an allusion to
the different intellectual and receptive powers of human beings. Since
the addressee of the *SL* is a layman he might be taught the way to liber-
ation appropriate to him, i.e. the way of the Śrāvaka or Hīnayāna.

In the concluding 5 verses of the *SL*, the influence of the Mahāyāna
doctrine is clearly manifest. In those verses the author explains the
way to nirvāṇa after having accomplished the previously taught way.

In v.119 he brings forward the concept of the "rejoicing in the vir-
tues" *(puṇyānumodana)* of all living beings and of the "dedication" *(pari-
ṇāmana)* of the own merit to other beings in order to attain Buddhahood.
In vv.120-121 he continues:
Through the power of virtuous actions, one will be born as Lord of all
Yogins; through the power of one's compassionate actions one will be like
Avalokiteśvara, and hereafter, one will proceed to the Buddha-field
and become the protector of the world like Amitābha. As a Jina, then,
having extinguished fear, birth and death of all living beings, one will
attain nirvāṇa which, once more, is defined as a "transcendental, only
nominal, peaceful state, devoid of fear, age and death." Hence, we find
a description of nirvāṇa at the beginning (v.105) and the end of the e-
lucidation of the way to liberation.

4. Conclusions

The results of this investigation can be summarized as follows. According to tradition, the name of the author of the *SL* is Nāgārjuna, who is unanimously identified with the philosopher of Madhyamaka. The addressee is, traditionally, a Śātavāhana ruler. In the *SL* no clearly convincing evidence for these assertions can be found.

The metre, in which the *SL* was composed, is the very rarely used Āryāgīti. It could well be that therefore the author, being aware of this fact, mentions the name of this metre in v.1. Indeed, the earliest known example of this metre is the *SL*. Those works of Nāgārjuna, preserved in Sanskrit, are written in Śloka (Anuṣṭubh) and Āryā, the most commonly used metres in his time.

The style of the *SL* is straightforward, pleasing and clear, sermonizing in the parts devoted to advice and teaching, colourful in the descriptive parts.

Ideationally, the largest part of the teaching in the *SL* agrees with the Sūtrapiṭaka, and, hence, is *yathāgamam*. Only sporadically, e.g. in the discussion of the "perfections", and in the last verses, does it become clear that the author was well acquainted with Mahāyāna Buddhism. In particular, we find it rather striking that the presentation of the way to liberation from saṃsāra according to Hīnayāna is, after one concluding verse, immediately supplemented by the way to liberation according to the teaching of Mahāyāna. It seems to be merely attached, without being integrated. It is, furthermore, remarkable, that an almost identical definition of the nirvāṇa is given at the beginning of the Hīnayāna way, in v.105b-d, as well as at the end of the Mahāyāna way, in v.123. Judging from the very few typical Mahāyāna concepts and from the rudimentary way in which the Mahāyāna doctrine is advanced, the *SL* gives the impression of an early Mahāyāna work. There are no traces of Nāgārjuna's dialectical method. Similarly, no hints of Madhyamaka philosophy are found in the letter. Certainly, the "origination in dependence" is referred to as the true teaching of Buddha; but it is not defined, as it is in Nāgārjuna's *MadhK*.[52] There it is promulgated as the true essence of the phenomenal world, devoid of all opposite terms and of the manifold, and hence as liberation. In the same way, Nāgārjuna's concept of

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[52] Cf. E.Frauwallner, *Philosophie*, 176.

"voidness" *(śūnyatā)*, *stoṅ pa ñid)* is lacking completely.

Taking these results in consideration, we are led to the conclusion that for the *SL* the authorship of Nāgārjuna, the philosopher of Madhyamaka cannot be ascertained with the same degree of probability as it can be e.g. for *RĀ*. Because of its title "Letter to a friend" one might be tempted to assume that the *SL*, a favourite religious text-book from at least the 5th century onwards, was attributed to the famous Buddhist teacher Nāgārjuna only in a later period.

RGYAL TSHAB RJE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
ASTINĀSTIVYATIKRAMA IN NĀGĀRJUNA'S RATNĀVALĪ

by

M.KALFF (Zollikon)

Today I would like to discuss some aspects of rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*. In particular I like to focus on his interpretation of the notion of "going beyond existence and non-existence" (*astināstivyatikrama*) found in the root text.

The material for this paper is taken from rGyal tshab rje's commentary to the *Ratnāvalī* called *dBu ma rin chen 'phreṅ ba'i sñiṅ po'i don gsal bar byed pa* "Elucidation of the essence of the Jewel Garland of the Middle Way".[1]

The *Ratnāvalī* places a great emphasis on the fact that Buddha's teaching has passed beyond existence and non-existence. This is most clearly expressed in verses 61 and 62 of the first chapter. There the going beyond existence and non-existence is shown to be the distinguishing mark of the genuine Buddhist teaching. It sets it apart from the non-Buddhist schools like the Sāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas and Jainas and even some Buddhist who assert person and aggregates.[2] It is quite significant

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[1] *dBu ma rin chen 'phreṅ ba'i sñiṅ po'i don gsal bar byed pa* (short: *dBu ma rin chen Dar ṭīk*) by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432). *gSuṅ 'bum*, text A: microfiche edition of the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, Ka, 1a-78a (LMpj o21, 031 8/17 - 11/17); text B: bKra śis lhun po edition kept at the Otani University and the Toyo Bunko, Ka, 1a-78b). (Abbreviation: *RĀ Dar ṭīk A, B*).

[2] *RĀ* Skt. verse 61:
   sasāṃkhyaulūkyanirgranthapudgalaskandhavādinam |
   pṛccha lokaṃ yadi vadaty astināstivyatikramam ||

verse 62:
   dharmayautakam ity asmān nāstyastitvavyatikramam |
   viddhi gambhīram ity uktaṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtam ||
                    (Quoted *PP* 275 and *MĀV* 184).
Translation: "Ask the worldly ones along with the Sāṃkhyas, Aulūkyas, Nirgranthas and the proponents of the *pudgala* and the aggregates whether they teach the going beyond existence and non-existence".

that the text uses here the expression "going beyond" (*vyatikrama*) which
indicates a level radically different from that expressed by the terms
"existence" and "non-existence". The question is how this "going beyond"
is to be understood. It is the assertion of a paradox, the simultaneous
denial of two mutually exclusive statements, or is it a process that can
be indicated by a logic that maintains the principle of non-contradic-
tion? In order to see what rGyal tshab rje has to say in answer to these
questions we should examine his interpretation of the most important
statements concerning existence and non-existence in the root-text.

I would like to touch on two different applications, namely one in
which the pair existence/non-existence occurs in a moral context, the
other in which the application is to the phenomenal world.

A. Existence and non-existence in the context of morality

The occurence of the passing beyond existence and non-existence in
a moral context is illustrated by the verses 43-45 of the *Ratnāvalī:*

> "The result of Karma does not exist": that is in short
> the view maintaining non-existence *(nāstitādṛṣṭi)*. This
> is without merit and leads to a low rebirth. It is held
> to be the wrong view *(mithyādṛṣṭi)*.

> "The result of Karma exists": that is in short the view
> maintaining existence *(astitādṛṣṭi)*: this is merit and
> has as its natural consequence a good rebirth. It is
> held to be the right view *(samyagdṛṣṭi)*.

> Therefore, because in higher knowledge *(jñāna)* existence
> and non-existence cease, there is a going beyond

"For this reason you should know that the Ambrosia of the teaching of the Buddhas
which has been said to be profound, the going beyond existence and non-existence,
is the special dowery (or: distinguishing property) of the Dharma."
    The Tibetan translation (N,P,DL) *gaṅ zag phuṅ por smra ba yi 'jig rten graṅs can
'ug phrug daṅ gos med bcas la* (DL: *pa*) .... *dris* ("Ask the worldly ones which propound
the *pudgala* and the aggregates together with the Sāṃkhyas etc./or: ask the worldly
ones which together with the Sāṃkhyas etc. propound the *pudgala* and aggregates ...")
suggests as noted by Poussin (*PP* 275) °*grantham p*°.
    Ajitamitra's commentary states that "along with" includes only Sāṃkhyas, Aulūkyas
and Nirgranthas (*RĀṬ* 170a5: *'di dag daṅ bcas pas na graṅs can 'ug phrug daṅ gos med bcas
pa'o*). This indicates that this commentator whose commentary was originally written
in Sanskrit may have used the textual version presupposed by the Tibetan translation.
This and other observations in his commentary can be counted as an argument in favour
of the originality of the Tibetan version. But that in itself is not enough evidence
to decide the question.

(vyatikrama) evil and merit. It is for this reason that
the wise call this the liberation from both bad and good
rebirth.[3]

The passages imply that both the wrong view as well as the right view
have to be gone beyond if one wants to attain liberation. Here we find
by implication the well-known conception of "no-view" held by the Mādhya-
mikas.[4] Like in verse 61 the expression "going beyond" is used. Here the
reader is told to go beyond evil and merit, beyond believing or not be-
lieving in Karma. It is quite clear that here "going beyond" can not be
taken to invalidate the previously made distinction between right and
wrong view. The belief in Karma is the basis of the Buddhist morality
which is extensively dealt with in this text. Its relationship to wis-
dom has been clearly indicated by Nāgārjuna in the very beginning of his
book where he states (verses 5f.):

> On account of faith one engages in Dharma, on account of
> wisdom one truly knows. Of the two wisdom is the chief,
> faith, however, precedes it.

> The one who does not on account of desire, hatred, fear,
> or ignorance transgress against Dharma should be recog-
> nized as one possessing faith. He is the highest vessel
> for the final happiness.

Here Nāgārjuna compares two essential prerequisites for religious
attainment. Faith is fundamental for the practice of Dharma. As can be
seen from the following verses in this context Dharma mainly means ob-
servance of moral discipline. It leads to mundane happiness consisting

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[3] This and the following translations of the root text are based on RĀ Skt.

[4] Cf. for instance MMK XIII,8:
   śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ |
   yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire ||
   While this passage and others could give the impression that the fault lies with
   having any views at all this is not how these statements have been interpreted in
   the dGe lugs pa tradition. In his Lam rim chen mo Tsoṅ kha pa quotes this passage
   and says:
   rgyal ba rnams kyis stoṅ pa ñid | lta kun ṅes par 'byin par gsuṅs | gaṅ daq stoṅ pa ñid
   lta ba | de drag bsgrub tu med par gsuṅs | źes pa'i stoṅ pa ñid du blta ba bźes pa 'aṅ
   raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa'i stoṅ pa la bden par bzuṅ ba 'am dṅos por lta ba la gsuṅs pa
   yin ... (Reprint of the bKra śis lhun po edition, ed. by Ngawang Gelek, Pa, Delhi 19..?,
   384b3f. [p.207]). For a translation see Alex Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning
   the Real. New York 1978, 249. This quote shows that for Tsoṅ kha pa it is not wrong
   to have views such as for example to think that something is void of inherent exist-
   ence, but that the problem is with having views that regard something as inherently
   existing. In that sense even the view concerning voidness becomes a wrong view if
   it views that very voidness to exist truly or substantially.

in a rebirth in one of the higher realms of existence. It is only wisdom that leads to the final happiness consisting of liberation. Thus it constitutes a going beyond the achievements of faith and morality. It radically transcends any type of existence within the circle of rebirth. But although it is only wisdom that can bring about the liberation, this does not constitute a negation of the validity of faith and moral discipline. From the verses quoted we learn that they have to precede wisdom as a prerequisite and transform the practitioner into the proper vessel for realisation of wisdom.

In the light of these remarks it is evident that the Mādhyamika "no-views" does not mean to have no views at all. To have views, at least in a moral sense, is a condition for the attainment of wisdom.

Let us now examine how rGyal tshab rje understands the "going beyond" the view that maintains Karma and its results without falling into the wrong view that denies it. He makes the following comments concerning verse 44:

> Therefore the existence of Karma and result is merely in
> a conventional way, but they are not inherently estab-
> lished (raṅ bźin gyis grub pa). The reason is that if one
> were to view them in that way (as inherently existing)
> one would maintain the extreme of eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi).[5]

Discussing verse 45 he says:

> On account of knowing the meaning of the mode of abiding
> (gnas lugs kyi don) the view of existence and non-exist-
> ence ceases.[6]

Firstly we see that rGyal tshab rje understands here the extreme of permanence as inherent existence. Then we see how rGyal tshab rje avoids understanding the "going beyond evil and merit" in a sense that would invalidate the moral distinction between the right and wrong dṛṣṭis. He considers it to be valid on the conventional level of existence. The right view of upholding the belief in Karma and its results would turn into the wrong view of śāśvatadṛṣṭi, the view of eternalism, if Karma and its results would be regarded to be self-existent or inherently es-

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[5] RĀ Dar ṭīk A 14a6.

[6] RĀ Dar ṭīk A 14b1.

tablished.[7] Wisdom moreover does not, according to rGyal tshab rje, affect the view that Karma exists, but only affects the way one perceives its mode of being.

B. Existence and non-existence of the phenomenal world and its constituents

I like to divide the discussion of this section into two parts:
1. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence to be refuted as utter non-existence. 2. Cases where he understands the non-existence to be refuted as non-existence that is established inherently.

1. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence to be refuted as utter non-existence

Verse 38 of the *Ratnāvalī* gives a reason for going beyond existence and non-existence that in similar form is already known in the Pāli-Nikāyas:[8]

> Who has in that way seen the origination of cause and result as well as their cessation, does according to reality *(tattvatas)* not maintain existence nor non-existence of the world.

From the context it is made clear that origination of cause and effect refers to the succession of grasping to the ego which leads to the production of Karma that results in rebirth. Cessation refers to the reverse order. Also the reasoning seems to be quite straightforward: On one side the view of nihilism is averted by affirming origination of

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[7] One should note that the expression *yod par lta ba (astitādṛṣṭi)* can have two meanings:
1. The view maintaining Karma and its results. As such it is a correct view *(samyagdṛṣṭi)* (cf. verse 44).
2. The view maintaining (inherent) existence. As such it is a wrong view (cf. verse 41: the root text has *yod pa ñid* which is interpreted by rGyal tshab as *yod lta can ñid* "someone who has the view maintaining existence" (15b1). He also uses the expression *yod med du lta ba* (the view maintaining either existence or non-existence) (15b3).

[8] J.P.Remón translates the relevant passage in the *Samyuttanikāya* as follows: "What is termed 'non-being' in the world is proved not to be for one who by means of the perfect wisdom sees as it really is the origin of the world. What in the world is termed 'being', is proved not to be for one who by means of perfect wisdom sees as it really is the cessation of the world". (J.P.Remón, *Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism*. The Hague 1980, 265. The translation of the given passage is based on *Samyuttanikāya*, Vol. 2, 17, Nidānasamyutta 15 (text of the Nālandā-Devanāgarī-Pāli-Series).

cause and effect and on the other hand eternalism is averted by affirming their cessation. The notion of existence appears to be replaced by a view point that puts the emphasis on arising rather than the static concept of existence.

rGyal tshab rje sees in this verse mainly a statement of the principle of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) that is free of the extremes of "eternalism" and "annihilation".[9] He transforms the expression *tattvatas* ("according to reality") of the root text into a means to qualify *yod pa* (existence) as an extreme: He reads the Tibetan translation of *tattvatas*, *yaṅ dag ñid du*, as *yaṅ dag par grub par ñid du yod pa* "existence by way of real establishment". There is not much doubt that rGyal tshab rje sees in this formulation a synonym for the more current expression *raṅ bźin gyis yod pa ñid* "inherent existence", used in the commentary to verse 46, a verse that exhibits a parallel reasoning to this verse here.[10] Non-existence is qualified as *cuṅ zad kyaṅ med* "not-existing at all", an equivalent for *ye med* or *gtan med* used in other places.[11]

I suggest also to examine rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of verses 50 and 51 which exhibit a similar structure of the argument. There rGyal tshab rje's interpretation is based on a Tibetan version that differs to some extent from the preserved Sanskrit text. The Sanskrit text can be translated as follows:

> Thus seeing the arising of the result from the cause he does not maintain non-existence. One concludes that according to the reality of this world it has arisen from discursive manifestation (*prapañca*).

> Having come to the conclusion that according to reality also the cessation has arisen from discursive manifestation (*prapañca*) one does not maintain existence. There-

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[9] *RĀ Dar ṭīk A* 13a5. Also in the Nidānasamyutta referred to in n.8 the statement concerning the origin and cessation of the world as a refutation of "being and non-being" is followed by an appeal to the fomula of *paṭiccasamuppāda* as the *dhamma* that avoids the two extremes and shows the middle way.

[10] *RĀ Dar ṭīk A* 14b5f. There the extremes to be avoided are given as *med pa ñid*, glossed by rGyal tshab rje as *'khor ba rgyu 'bras med pa ñid du lta ba* (view holding on to the non-existence of cause and effect of cyclic existence), and *yod pa ñid*, glossed as *raṅ bźin gyis yod pa ñid* (inherent existence).

[11] *RĀ Dar ṭīk A* 25b2 (*ye med*) and 25b3 (*gtan med*). The Tibetan of rGyal tshab rje's paraphrase of verse 38 is as follows: *de ltar ('khor ba'i) rgyu 'bras skye ba daṅ | (rgyu 'bras) de dag zad pa ñid mthoṅ nas (dṅos po'i de kho na ñid khoṅ du chud pa rnams ni) 'jig rten la yaṅ dag (par grub pa) ñid du yod (pa daṅ) | (cuṅ zad kyaṅ) med (pa) ñid du mi sems so || (RĀ Dar ṭīk A* 13a4-5, brackets mark rGyal tshab rje's glosses).

fore not relying on duality one is liberated.[12]

Verse 50 uses like verse 38 the origination of cause and result as an argument against those who hold on to non-existence. *prapañca*, the activity of mental differentiation, serves in the same way as the grasping of the ego and aggregates as the starting point for the arising of the world.

The import of verse 51 as it stands is less certain. In analogy to verse 38 we would expect a statement to the effect that cessation comes about by the cessation of discursive manifestation. We find, however, a statement that cessation h a s arisen from the differentiation. There are a variety of possible solutions. Provisionally I propose the interpretation that in these verses the illusory character of both "arising" and "cessation" is emphasized by the fact of their origin in *prapañca*.[13]

Now let us turn again to rGyal tshab rje's interpretation. He reads and glosses the verses as follows:[14]

> We are not maintaining non-existence of cause and result,
> we are not holding the view of non-existence. The reason
> is because we maintain that cause and result exist as de-

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[12] *RĀ Skt.:*
> *evaṃ hetuphalotpādam dṛṣṭvā nopaiti nāstikyaṃ |*
> *abhyupetyāsya lokasya yāthābhūtyaṃ prapañcajaṃ ||*
> *nirodhaṃ ca * prapañcottham yāthābhūtyād upāgataḥ |*
> *nopayāti astitāṃ tasmān mucyate 'dvayaniśritaḥ ||*
* Tib. *'gog pa spros pa las ma byuṅ ba = nirodham na prapañcottham..*
   It is also very possible that following the Tibetan translation we should read na for ca, especially since ca and na can easily be mistaken for each other. Ajitamitra's commentary does not quote that particular line and thus does not help us in establishing the correct reading (see *RĀṬ* 168a6-168b4).
   Reading na for ca, the text would have to be translated as follows: "Having come to the conclusion that according to reality cessation has not arisen from discursive manifestation one does not assert existence ...". The intended meaning would be that cessation does not come about on the basis of the activity of the discursive manifestation *(prapañca)* but rather by its absence. This sense would correspond to *MMK* XVIII,5, where it is indicated that liberation comes about by the destruction of *prapañca* in the voidness:
> *karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ |*
> *te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate ||*
   Moreover a further indication in favour of this reading would be that in verse 50 we find the expression *asya lokasya yāthābhūtyaṃ* which emphazises the point of view of worldly reality, the domain of *prapañca* and the arising of cause and effect. The unqualified *yāthābhūtyād* in the next verse could by contrast be understood to indicate the point of view of absolute reality, the domain free from *prapañca*, the cessation of cause and effect.

[13] See also n.12.

[14] *RĀ Dar ṭīk A* 15a5ff.

signated by conceptual thought (rtog pas btags pa) and
as established by the force of convention (tha sñad kyi
dbaṅ gis bźag pa). This is the case because we see ac-
cording to the conventional norm of cognition the arising
of the result from the cause in analogy to the origina-
tion of the fruit from the seed as arisen from the discur-
sive manifestation of conceptual thought (rtog pa'i spros
pa las byuṅ ba).

The import of rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of the first verse
is that he sees the origination from *prapañca* in close analogy to the
process of mental designation that is responsible for conventional ex-
istence. Thus the extreme of non-existence is averted. He does not give
prapañca in this context the meaning of the mental process that is cha-
racterized by clinging to inherent existence, another interpretation
that can be found in the dGe lugs pa tradition.[15]

When looking at rGyal tshab rje's comments on the following verse
we should know that the Tibetan version of the text he used reads "has
not arisen from discursive manifestation" instead of "the cessation has
arisen from discursive manifestation".[16] He states:

We are also not subscribing to the view that holds on to
existence. The reason is the following: we refute that
cause and result are established in the absolute sense
(don dam par grub pa). We would, however, become asser-

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[15] Similarly Ajitamitra (RĀṬ 168a7f.) emphazises in this context the aspect of *prapañca*
as an extensive activity of conventional designation understood to operate by way of
the verbal expression of conceptual imagination (spros pa ni rnam par rtog pa'i mṅon
par brjod pas rgyas par tha sñad 'dogs pa'o). J.Hopkins goes probably too far when he
renders *spros pa* as "convention" in his translation of verses 50/51, but his inter-
pretation points into the same direction (*The Precious Garland and the Songs of the
Four Mindfulnesses*, London 1975, 24).

An instance for the other current interpretation in the dGe lugs pa school of
prapañca as discursive activity that clings to true or inherent existence can be found
in Tsoṅ kha pa's commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamikakārikā*. Commenting on Candrakīrti's
explanation of MMK XVIII,5 he glosses *spros pa* (Skt. *prapañca*) as *bden par źen pa'i
spros ba (dBu ma tsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa śes rab ces bya ba'i rnam bśad rigs pa'i
rgya mtsho źes bya ba*. (Reprint of the bKra śis lhun po edition, by Ngawang Gelek,
Ba, Delhi 19..?, 189b2 [p.378,2]).

This interpretation by Tsoṅ kha pa is in turn apparently derived from Buddhapā-
lita's commentary on MMK XVIII,5: *'jig rten pa'i rñed pa daṅ ma rñed pa la sogs pa'i
chos rnams la 'di bden no sñam du mṅon par źen pa'i blo can dag de daṅ de la rnam par
rtog par byed pas de'i phyir rnam par rtog pa dag ni spros pa las byuṅ ṅo* ||
/Textedition Ch.Lindtner, Buddhapālita on Emptiness. *Indo Iranian Journal 23*, 1981,
193.

[16] RĀ Dar ṭīk A 15b1ff., cf. n.12.

tors of existence if we were to maintain that they have
not arisen from the discursive manifestation of concep-
tual thought *(rtog pa'i spros pa las ma byuṅ ba)* (and)
that they are in accordance with what is really estab-
lished *(yaṅ dag par ji bźin ñid du gyur pa)*. But this
is not what we maintain.

We see that rGyal tshab rje understands the statement "not arisen
from discursive manifestation" *(spros pa las ma byuṅ ba)* as an equiva-
lent for the extreme of existence. It assumes the same value as the ex-
pression "inherently existing" and entails a negation of the principle
of the mere conventional and just imputed existence of phenomena that
has been stated to be the correct point of view in the commentary on the
previous verse.

While rGyal tshab rje is able to read the Tibetan text in such a way
that "not árisen from discursive manifestation" becomes a circumscrip-
tion of the assertion of existence which has to be denied, the Sanskrit
version does not yield that sense. This is true of the Sanskrit even if
we were to emend Tucci's text in accordance with the Tibetan version to
read "not arisen from discursive manifestation" *(na prapañcotthaṃ* for *ca
prapañcotthaṃ)*. [17]

2. Cases where rGyal tshab rje understands the non-existence as non-exis-
tence that is established inherently

This type of interpretation is illustrated by the way rGyal tshab
rje explains verse 71:

Because it has many sides it is not "one". There is not

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[17] The Tibetan version of rGyal tshab rje's commentary is: *yod par lta ba can ñid du
yaṅ mi 'gyur te | rgyu 'bras don dam par grub pa 'gog pa yin gyi rtog pa'i spros pa
las ma byuṅ ba yaṅ dag par grub pa ji bźin ñid du gyur pa khas len na yod lta can
ñid du 'gyur na yaṅ | de ltar khas mi len pa'i phyir |* (15b1f.)
It presupposes a Tibetan text that reads:
    'gog pa spros las ma byuṅ ba |
    yaṅ dag ji bźin ñid gyur pa |
    khas len yod pa ñid mi 'gyur | ..
The corresponding Skt. version would be:
    nirodhaṃ na prapañcottham yāthābhūtyād upāgataḥ |
    nopayāty astitāṃ ...
rGyal tshab rje must have understood the Tibetan in the following or a similar way:
"There is a refutation (of inherently existing cause and effect) (but) we do not
become (assertors) of existence, maintaining that (they) have not arisen from discur-
sive manifestation (and) that they are in accordance to reality." This meaning can
not be obtained from the Sanskrit version.

anything without sides. Without "one" "many" does not
exist and without "existence" there is also not "non-
existence". (v.71)

The verse explains the dependence of the notion of "many" on "one"
and similarly the dependence of the notion of "non-existence" on the one
of "existence". Thus Nāgārjuna demonstrates that it is not possible to
conceive of these notions as independent entities. In accordance with
this observation rGyal tshab rje qualifies the "one" and "many" to be
refuted as that which is true as "one" or "many". He says:[18]

> The subject of our debate is an entity with form. It
> follows that it is not true as oneness (gcig pu ñid
> du bden pa). The reason is because it is endowed with
> different sides. The fault that the reason is not es-
> tablished does not accrue because there is not anything
> that has form and no sides. If someone would say that
> it is true as "many" we would say that it is not true
> as "many" because there is no "one" that is truly es-
> tablished (bden grub kyi gcig).

rGyal tshab rje moreover points out that in the same way this proof
termed the "proof free from one and many" (gcig dan du bral gyi gtan
tshigs) can be applied to reject the true existence of all phenomena.
Then he introduces someone who raises the question whether that very
void of true existence exists inherently. In answer to that he reads
the rest of the verse in the following way:

> Without the inherent existence (ran bźin gyis yod pa)
> of something with form also the non-inherent existence
> (ran bźin gyis med pa) of something with form is not
> inherently established (ran bźin gyis grub pa med pa).
> The reason is that if there is not the basis also that
> which depends on the basis does not exist.

Thus according to rGyal tshab rje this verse does not merely point
to the interdependent character of existence and non-existence but more
specifically demonstrates the impossibility of both inherent existence
and inherent existence of the negation of inherent existence. That this
is a possible interpretation of Nāgārjuna's thought is indicated by the

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[18] RĀ Dar ṭīk 18b6ff.

immediately following verse which concentrates on demonstrating the non-existence of the antidote to existence. If we understand the antidote to be the voidness, its non-existence could possibly be understood as its non-inherent or non-absolute existence.

That the consequences of *gtan med pa* (utter non-existence) and the consequences of *med pa* understood as inherently existing voidness for rGyal tshab rje are two alternative mistakes that result from a misunderstanding of the conventional nature of existence can be seen in his interpretation of verse 104:

> The Muni has explained that visibles, audibles etc. are neither true nor false *(mṛṣā)*. If from one position *(pakṣa)* its opposite *(pratipakṣa)* arises both do not exist in truth. (v.104)

The verse appeals to what Jaques May has termed the "principe de solidarité des contraires" in order to show that in truth both "true" and "false" do not exist. May points out that in the Madhyamaka theory the position and its opposite are both the same with regard to their existence and non-existence. In that sense they are distinguished from contradictory opposites (contradictoires -*viruddha*, Tib. *'gal ba*) which according to May are radically incompatible.[19] rGyal tshab rje's interpretation is consistent with these observations. He reads the verse as follows:[20]

> There is a reason that the Muni has declared that the six objects, the visibles, audibles etc. are not truly established *(bden par grub pa)* and that they are not false in the sense of being utterly non-existent *(rdzun pa ye med)*: they are both not absolutely *(don du)*, that is truly *(yañ dag par)*, established *(grub pa)*.

After this he introduces an objector who says:

> The negation of true existence *(bden par yod pa = bden par grub pa)* should result in utter non-existence *(gtan med)* or inherently existing non-existence *(med pa rañ bźin gyis grub pa)* because true existence and non-existence *(bden par yod med)* are directly contradictory *(dños 'gal)*.

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[19] J.May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris 1959, 16; 66, n.67,68.

[20] *RĀ Dar ṭīk* 25b2-4.

We see that rGyal tshab rje anticipates here not only the possible conclusion that the negation of inherent existence should be complete non-existence but he introduces again the false view of an inherently existing non-existence of voidness. The opponent holds that *bden par yod pa* (true existence) and *med pa* (non-existence) are directly contradictory. At the same time he understands by *med pa gtan med pa* or *med pa raṅ bźin gyis grub pa*. If that would be correct one would be forced either to accept true existence *(bden par yod pa)* or else utter non-existence or inherently established non-existence. A refutation of true existence would therefore necessitate the acceptance of either utter non-existence or inherently established non-existence. This is clearly not acceptable for a Mādhyamika and therefore from rGyal tshab rje's point of view *bden par yod pa* and *med pa* can not be directly contradictory but are non-contradictory opposites or contrary opposites rather than contradictory opposites. As non-contradictory opposites they either both exist or both not exist. Thus refuting *bden par yod pa* also *med pa (gtan med pa/med pa raṅ bźin gyis grub pa)* is refuted.

On the other hand *bden par yod pa* (true existence) and *bden par med pa* (not true existence) are by the Madhyamaka point of view as represented by rGyal tshab rje understood to be directly contradictory *(dṅos 'gal)*. The negation of *bden par yod pa* establishes not true existence of voidness of true existence.[21]

These considerations should be enough preparation to understand rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of the last part of the verse and refutation contained in it:

> If it is assumed to be necessary that from the position
> of an inherently existing entity *(dṅos po raṅ bźin gyis
> grub pa)* the contrary position *('gal zla mi mthun phyogs)*
> of an inherently existing non-entity *(dṅos med raṅ bźin
> gyis grub pa)* should arise, it follows that both true

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[21] The observation that *bden par yod pa* and *med pa* are wrongly conceived to be *dṅos 'gal* by the opponent and that *bden par yod pa* and *bden par med pa* are *dṅos 'gal* goes back to an oral explanation by Kyab je Zong Rinpoche from Ganden monastery, now rebuilt in the South of India. If we follow this explanation the expression *bden par med pa* should not be understood in analogy to *bden par yod pa* (true existence) as "true non-existence" (=inherently established non-existence) but as not true existence. The expression *bden par yod med* is ambivalent: It can either be read as "true existence and non-existence", according to the Madhyamaka point of view as represented by rGyal tshab rje a statement of two non-contradictory opposites, or as "true existence and (its) non-existence", to be understood as a statement of two mutually exclusive positions.

> existence and non-existence *(bden par yod med)* are
> not inherently established. The reason is that en-
> tities are not inherently established.

rGyal tshab rje keeps to the "principe de solidarité de contraires" already indicated in the root text when he makes the hypothetical state- ment that "from the position of an inherently existing entity the con- trary position of an inherently existing non-entity should arise". From the "solidarity" of the opposites in existence or non-existence the non- existence of an inherently existing non-entity (or non-existence) fol- lows from the non-existence of an inherently existing entity (or exist- ence).[22] The reason is similar to the one rGyal tshab rje has employed earlier: if the basis, here an inherently existing entity, does not ex- ist, also what depends on it, here the inherently existing non-entity or the inherently established negation of true existence, does not ex- ist. rGyal tshab rje does not state a separate reason for the impossibil- ity of utter non-existence. But we can assume that in the same way as the inherently existing non-existence it has to be understood to be a contrary opposite of inherent existence. Thus its hypothetical acceptance necessitates the acceptance of inherent existence. The refutation of in- herent existence in turn implies the refutation of utter non-existence. rGyal tshab rje presupposes here of course the refutation of inherent existence and its equivalents that has been demonstrated in other places of the text by arguments such as the proof "free from one and many".

The paper demonstrates in brief the following traits of rGyal tshab rje's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's "going beyond existence and non-ex-

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[22] The expressions *dṅos po raṅ bźin gyis grub pa* and *dṅos med raṅ bźin gyis grub pa* are apparently used as equivalents to the expressions *bden par yod pa* and *med pa raṅ bźin gyis grub pa,* the pair suggested by the opponent.

rGyal tshab rje states in the title to this section that the topic is the non-in- herent establishment of real existence and non-existence *(dṅos por yod med raṅ bźin gyis ma grub pa) (RÃ Dar ṭīk* 25a4). *dṅos por yod med* is an equivalent to the expres- sion *bden par yod med* used here, and thus *dṅos por yod pa* is a further equivalent of *bden par yod pa* and *dṅos po raṅ bźin gyus grub pa.* In one respect rGyal tshab rje's use of this terminology seems to be somewhat misleading: namely there when he says that both true existence and non-existence do not inherently exist *(bden par yod med de ni gñi ga don du raṅ bźin gyis grub pa min te ..,* cf. *dṅos por yod med raṅ bźin gyis ma grub pa* in the title). It is not very likely that he does intend to say that true existence and non-existence are not inherently established because to say that true existence, an equivalent of inherent existence, is not inherently establi- shed, makes no sense. The context shows that the sense should be that existence and not true existence are both not inherently established. Thus we would have expected *yod pa daṅ bden par med pa* and must conclude that in all probability *bden par yod med* is here used as a synonym of this longer expression.

istence":

a) rGyal tshab rje qualifies the existence and non-existence that have to be transcended. Thus not existence and non-existence have to be gone beyond, but a certain way existence and non-existence wrongly appear to be.

In the passages discussed we found the following qualifications of the type of existence *(yod pa)* that is not to be asserted: *rań bźin gyis yod pa* ("inherent existence", commentary ad verse 71, the Tibetan root text has just *yod pa*), *rań bźin gyis yod pa ñid* ("inherent existence", ad verse 46, root text: *yod pa ñid*), *bden par yod pa* ("true existence", commentary ad verse 104), *dńos por yod pa* ("actual existence", subtitle ad commentary verse 104, see note 22), *yań dag par grub pa ñid du yod pa* ("existence by way of real establishment", ad verse 38, root-text: *yań dag ñid du / tattvatas*).

Instead of compositions with *yod pa* rGyal tshab rje has used also compositions with *grub pa* (established) that have the same meaning: *rań bźin gyis grub pa* ("inherently established", ad verse 44, *bden par grub pa* ("truly established", ad verse 104, root-text: *bden), don dam par grub pa* ("established in the absolute sense", ad verse 51), *don du grub pa* ("absolutely established", ad verse 104, root text *"don du"*), *yań dag par grub pa* ("really established" ad verse 104).

Besides that there have been usages that grew out of elements occuring in the root text which have been interpreted by rGyal tshab rje to convey the same sense of inherent existence as the expressions mentioned before: *rtog pa'i spros pa las ma byuń ba* ("not arisen from the discursive manifestation of conceptual thought", ad verse 51, root text *spros pa las ma byuń ba*) and *yań dag par grub pa ji bźin ñid du gyur pa* ("to be in accordance with what is really established", ad verse 51, root text: *yań dag ji bźin ñid gyur pa / yāthābhūtyād*). We should also mention that rGyal tshab rje has used *dńos po rań bźin gyis grub pa* ("an inherently established entity" as an equivalent to *bden par yod pa* (comm. ad verse 104).

The non-existence not to be asserted has been characterized as follows: *cuń zad kyań med pa ñid* ("not existing at all", ad verse 46, root text: *med pa ñid*), *rdzun pa ye med* ("false in the sense of complete non-existence", ad verse 104, root text: *rdzun pa*), *gtan med* ("utter non-existence", ad verse 104), *med pa rań bźin gyis grub pa* ("inherently established non-existence", ad verse 71, root text: *med pa*; ad verse 104), *bden par med pa rań bźin gyis grub pa* ("inherently established non-existence of

true [existence]", ad verse 104), *dños med rañ bźin gyis grub pa* ("an inherently existing non-entity", ad verse 104).

The type of existence that can still be affirmed after the negation of the extremes of existence and non-existence is indicated in the following way:

rtog pa'i spros pa las byuñ ba ("that what has arisen form discursive manifestation of conceptual thought", ad verse 50, root text: *spros pa las byuñ ba*), *rtogs pas btags pa* ("what is designated by thought"), *tha sñad kyi dbañ gis bźag pa,* ("established by the force of convention", ad verse 104), *yod pa ni tha sñad tsam du yin* ("existence is merely in a conventional way", ad verse 44).

b) rGyal tshab rje's use of qualifications serves in maintaining the conventional validity of the basis of morality.

c) By the use of qualifications he asserts the logical character of the going beyond existence and non-existence. There is no simultaneous denial of two directly contradictory or mutually exclusive statements. There is only a denial of an extreme quality wrongly attributed to both of them.

d) The refutation of inherent existence implies also the refutation of the extreme of non-existence.

Abbreviations

MĀV   *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétaine*. Pub-
          liée par L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-1912

MMK   *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*. Ed. by J.W.de Jong, Madras
          1977

PP   *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commen-
          taire de Candrakīrti*. Publiée par L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-
          Pétersbourg 1903-1913, repr. Osnabrück 1970

RĀ Skt.   *Ratnāvalī,* Tucci's edition of the Sanskrit text with transla-
          tion *JRAS,* 1934, 307-25 (I,1-77); 1936, 237-252 and 423-35 (II,
          1-46, IV,1-100). For chapter V (not quoted in this article)
          see S.Dietz, *Journal of the Nepal Research Centre 4* (Humani-
          ties), 1980, 189-220 (V,1-55b, 79-99b). A new edition of Nā-
          gārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* by Prof.Hahn, Bonn, is forthcoming

RĀ Tib.   Tibetan translation of the *Ratnāvalī:* P (Peking edition) 5658
          (Vol.129) N (sNar thaṅ) sPriṅ yig Ṅe 124a3-146b3. LD (new
          Dharamsala edition based on the Lhasa źol spar khaṅ edition),
          cf. Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan works printed by the Shoparkhang
          of the Potala. *Jñānamuktāvali, Commemoration Volume in Honour
          of Johannes Nobel*. New Delhi 1959, 124, no.14

RĀṬ   *Ratnāvalīṭīkā* by Ajitamitra. P 5659 (vol.129)

RĀ Dar ṭik   rGyal tshab Dharma Rinchen's ṭīka to the *Ratnāvalī*. See n.1

UN TÉMOIGNAGE SUR LE BON FACE AU BOUDDHISME À L'ÉPOQUE DES ROIS TIBÉTAINS*

par

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La religion Bon a été étudiée ces dernières années par plusieurs ti-
bétologues éminents. Tous s'accordent pour dire que l'influence du Bon
sur les croyances religieuses tibétaines en général a été considérable,
comme l'a été celle de la littérature bonpo, par example les cycles ha-
giographiques du maître gŠen rab Mi bo et des *gter ma* dont certains sont
des documents quasi-historiques connus comme *bsgrags pa*.

Les traditions historiques bouddhiques et bonpo s'accordent pour dire
que le Bouddhisme au moment de son introduction au Tibet au septième
siècle ap. J.C. y rencontra une croyance indigène = le Bon. Les opinions
des savants occidentaux varient néanmoins sur la valeur de ces traditions.
La discussion reste ouverte sur la question de l'existence même du Bon,
et sur son interprétation comme religion populaire à l'époque royale,
c'est-à-dire du septième au neuvième siècle ap. J.C. Cependant, je n'ai
pas l'intention d'entrer dans les controverses des tibétologues ni de
défendre la tradition historique tibétaine. Qu'il me soit permis toute-
fois de noter à propos de cette tradition qu'elle ne me paraît pas dénuée
de tout fondement.

Les avis des tibétologues sur le problème peuvent être groupés sous
trois rubriques:

I. Ceux qui considèrent le Bon comme la religion ancienne du Tibet
en acceptant la tradition historique tibétaine.[1]

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[1] H.Hoffmann, *The Religions of Tibet*. London 1961, 14-27, 66-110; M.Lalou, *Les religions
du Tibet*. Paris 1957, 5-14; J.Bacot, *Introduction à l'histoire du Tibet*. Paris 1962,
3, 5-6; E.Haarh, *The Yar-luṅ Dynasty*. Copenhagen 1969, 18, 109; R.A.Stein, *La civili-
sation tibétaine*. Seconde édition, Paris 1981, 200; G.Tucci, W.Heissig, *Les religi-
ons du Tibet et de la Mongolie*. Paris 1973, 271 et seq.

II. Ceux qui maintiennent que certains types de rituels qui ne se trouvent que dans la littérature bonpo sont, certes, d'origine très ancienne, mais qu'à l'époque des rois le mot *bon* désignait des prêtres; selon eux ce serait seulement dans la période tardive que le mot *bon* est devenu le nom d'une religion.[2]

III. Ceux enfin qui sont d'avis que la religion appelée Bon n'existait pas en tant que telle avant le XIe siècle. Selon eux, la religion ancienne du Tibet s'appelle *gTsug* ou *gTsug lag*.[3] Cette thèse est cependant totalement étrangère à la tradition historique tibétaine.

Le scepticisme à l'égard de l'existence de cette croyance pendant la période en question est sans doute dû à l'absence de référence claire et péremptoire dans les inscriptions gravées sur les stèles, dans certains textes des manuscrits de Touen-houang et dans des sources non-tibétaines relatives à la même période au Bon comme religion organisée ayant son propre système philosophique. Les conclusions auxquelles sont arrivés les tibétologues occidentaux sont cependant loin d'être en harmonie, comme nous l'avons déjà constaté. Pourtant les arguments invoqués sont habituellement basés sur des recherches si longues et des connaissances si profondes que l'on ne peut que tomber sous le charme de leur érudition. J'ai donc commencé par accepter pratiquement l'opinion selon laquelle l'existence de la religion Bon à la période royale n'était pas en fin de compte attestée historiquement, mais j'ai eu tort en imaginant naïvement que ceux qui avaient abordé ce sujet avaient parcouru en détail tous les manuscrits de Touen-houang qui sont disponibles. Aussi, ce fut pour moi une grande surprise de lire le manuscrit de Touen-houang que je vous présente dans cette communication, et qui n'a pas été utilisé dans les travaux cités ci-dessus.

Il s'agit du Pelliot tibétain No.972, conservé à la Bibliothèque nationale à Paris comportant trois folios (1a-3b). Ce manuscrit est écrit en vers et il contient 116 vers au total. Le texte ne porte pas de titre au début; mais, à la fin, on lit: "(Le dit) de l'arbre, qui a été pronon-

[2] D.L.Snellgrove, H.Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet.* London 1968, 59.

[3] A.Macdonald, Une lecture des P.T. 1286, 1287, 1038, 1047 et 1290. Essai sur la formation et l'emploi des mythes politiques dans la religion royale de Sron-bcan sgam-po (desormais: *Essai). Etudes tibétaines dédiées à la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou.* Paris 1971, 219, 357, 376. Voir aussi le Compte rendu de J.May dans *Etudes Asiatiques 28.* Berne 1974, 71-73.

cé (par le Buddha)" *(źal nas gsuńs pa'i ljon śiń)*.[4] Bien que le manus-
crit soit décrit comme un "fragment",[5] il est en réalité complet. Il est
écrit en caractères *dbu can;* chaque folio comporte cinq lignes à l'ex-
ception du dernier qui n'en a que quatre. Il n'y a pas de colophon qui
pourrait indiquer l'auteur, celui-ci reste donc inconnu. A l'origine, le
manuscrit a été conservé plié en deux parties égales dans le sens de la
largeur, ce qui a laissé une marque sur chaque folio endommageant légè-
rement le manuscrit, surtout au milieu des lignes 1 et 2 du folio 1a où
un petit morceau est déchiré; en conséquence un mot manque au recto et
deux au verso du même folio dans les lignes 4 et 5; mais au verso les
mots manquants ont été réécrits à côté de la déchirure.

Quant à la question de l'ancienneté de notre texte, tous les manus-
crits de Touen-houang sont considérés comme ayant été cachés vers l'an
1035 ap. J.C.; mais les dates les plus tardives qui ont été constatées
dans les manuscrits chinois de Touen-houang sont des environs de l'an
924 ou de l'an 984.[6] Cela ne nous apprend pas grand-chose quant à la
date de notre manuscrit. Toutefois la langue et le style du texte sug-
gèrent qu'il a été rédigé à une période où le Bouddhisme était bien é-
tabli. Il est possible que le "texte" soit plus ancien que la rédaction
qui nous est parvenue. En effet, il est certain qu'après la reconquête
de Touen-houang par la Chine en 848 ap. J.C. on a continué à recopier
des textes bouddhiques en langue tibétaine; mais il n'est pas sûr que

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[4] Dans le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 842 la même phrase *źal nas gsuńs pa* précède le
titre d'un sūtra: *źal nas gsuńs pa'i mdo* - "Le sūtra prononcé de la bouche (du Bou-
ddha lui-même)". L'auteur de notre texte s'est peut-être inspiré d'un tel exemple
pour donner un titre à son ouvrage. D'ailleurs, dans les textes bouddhiques tardifs
la "parole du Bouddha" *(bka')* est divisée en trois catégories dont la première est
źal nas gsuńs pa'i bka'. Voir, par exemple, mKhas grub rje dGe legs dpal bzań (1385-
1438), *rGud sde spyi rnam (édition Lhasa), 13a.*

[5] M.Lalou, *Inventaire des manuscrits de Touen-houang conservés à la Bibliothèque na-
tionale,* Vol.2,1950: "Fragment qui finit ..... rjogs so // 3f. (8+34) non pag.; tra-
ces de très fines, reg. jaunes, pas de marges". Ce manuscrit n'est pas inclus dans
les deux volumes de reproductions des manuscrits tibétains de Touen-houang: *Choix de
documents tibétains conservés à la Bibliothèque nationale.* Tome I, présentés par A.
Macdonald et Y.Imaeda, Paris 1978; Tome II, présentés par A.Spanien (Macdonald) et
Y.Imaeda, Paris 1979. J'indiquerai desormais ces volumes sous l'abréviation: *Choix.*
Le manuscrit qui fait l'objet de cette étude est reproduit pour sa part à la fin de
cet article avec l'aimable autorisation de la Bibliothèque nationale à Paris.

[6] L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang in the
India Office Library.* London 1962, C 107, C 108. Le manuscrit de Touen-houang Pel-
liot tibétain 849 (J.Hackin, *Le formulaire Sanscrit-Tibétain,* Paris 1924) donne une
liste des rois tibétains où figure le nom de bTsan-po ācārya (alias lHa Bla-ma Ye-
śes-'od). Ce texte peut donc avoir été écrit vers la fin du Xe siècle ap. J.C. Cf.
S.G.Karmay, The Ordinance of lHa Bla-ma Ye-śes-'od. *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh
Richardson.* Warminster 1980, 150-52.

l'on ait également continué à rédiger de nouveaux textes en tibétain à Touen-houang. Aussi est-il difficile d'affirmer si notre texte y a été rédigé ou non. Par ailleurs, ce texte, à ma connaissance, n'est cité dans aucune source tibétaine ancienne ou tardive.

Notre texte traite de théories bouddhiques telles que les lois de l'impermanence des phénomènes et du *karma*. L'objet principal de cet ouvrage, me semble-t-il, a été de promouvoir la conversion au Bouddhisme des non-bouddhistes. La nature transitoire de la vie humaine est fortement soulignée ainsi que l'importance de prendre en considération l'au-delà plutôt que l'existence actuelle. Le lecteur est donc pressé d'adopter la pratique bouddhique par un langage assez alarmant, exprimé en images poétiques qui visent à engendrer une profonde tristesse. De plus, avec une conviction ardente, l'auteur essaie d'effrayer le lecteur en déclarant que la vie arrivera inévitablement à son terme et qu'à ce moment là ni les parents ni les amis ne seront d'aucune utilité. Selon lui seuls "la religion des dieux" (*lha chos*, c'est-à-dire le Bouddhisme),[7] le Bouddha et le Saṃgha peuvent protéger les êtres qui se trouvent dans le *saṃsāra*. L'auteur constate que les gens ordinaires ont foi dans le Bon, la croyance "fausse"[8] et le lecteur est averti du danger que l'on court en suivant cette croyance. Ici le partisan du Bon est assimilé à un insecte pris dans une toile d'araignée. Plus il se débat plus la toile d'araignée se resserre. Ensuite le texte conseille de ne pas accorder confiance aux *Mo bon*. Cette expression, à mon avis, désigne ici le prêtre qui pratique le Bon, lequel est présenté comme opposé au Saṃgha. Nous aurons l'occasion d'en reparler plus loin. Le texte prévient ensuite contre la vénération de certaines catégories d'êtres telles que les

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[7] Dans le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 1284 (*Choix,* II, Pl. 550, II) l'expression *lha chos* est employée avec une nuance particulière. D'abord, elle est distinguée de *bka'*, c'est-à-dire de "la parole du Bouddha" (*lha'i chos daṅ bka' na re*). Quelques vers plus loin elle est reprise en extension *lha la yid ches chos byan (bya) na/* mais ce que recouvre ces deux termes: *lha* et *chos,* n'est pas précisé. Toutefois, il paraît evident que cette expression avant que les Bouddhistes ne l'aient emprunté pour leur compte désignait une croyance comme le Bon. Ce manuscrit 1284 est identique au Pelliot tibétain 126.1 résumé par A.Macdonald, *Essai,* 370-73. Sur l'expression *lha chos,* voir aussi G.Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls.* Vol.II, Roma 1949, 720; R.A.Stein, *La civilisation tibétaine.* Seconde édition, Paris 1981, 144, 168, 204, n.204.

[8] *mu stegs* est une contraction de *mu stegs can* qui traduit le mot Sanscrit *tīrthika* (*Mahāvyutpatti* 3320) et désigne tout d'abord les écoles philosophiques et religieuses non-bouddhiques de l'Inde, mais comme dans notre texte il désigne aussi les croyances non-bouddhiques en général. A mon avis la traduction habituelle de cette expression par "hérésie" ne rend donc pas son sens propre. Pour une définition précise de *mu stegs can,* voir *sGra sbyor* bam po gñis pa. P 5833 (The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, *Peking Edition.* Vol.144, Tokyo 1965, 84-3-2).

'Dre, les *Srin*, les *bDud*, et les *bGegs*. Le fait que ces êtres sont men-
tionnés tout de suite après les *Mo bon* nous amène à penser que ces der-
niers leur rendent un culte.[9] Enfin, le texte s'achève sur une nouvelle
admonestation d'adopter aussitôt que possible la foi bouddhique, car la
vie humaine est tout à fait transitoire et ne nous laisse pas le temps
de nous adonner à une pratique fausse.

La présentation du Bon dans ce document implique que cette croyance
se bornait à s'occuper du bien-être terrestre. Une telle attitude est in-
acceptable pour le Bouddhisme, car elle est totalement incompatible avec
ses doctrines concernant l'impermanence, la renaissance et le *karma*.
L'emploi d'images me semble jouer un rôle important sur le plan des ex-
pressions littéraires aussi bien que sur le plan idéologique. Tandis que
la croyance bonpo est comparée à du poison, le Bouddhisme lui, est com-
paré à un nectar.

Nous avons donc un document de Touen-houang de l'époque royale qui
atteste l'existence de la croyance Bon qualifiée de "fausse" et adver-
saire du Bouddhisme qui est la "vraie religion". Il faut signaler qu'un
autre texte, le manuscrit Pelliot tibétain 1284 s'attaque dans le même
style aux croyances anciennes. De plus, notre manuscrit n'est pas le
seul qui atteste le Bon comme un système de croyances. Le manuscrit Pel-
liot tibétain 239/II, qui est bien connu des tibétologues et qui a été
publié,[10] est également un ouvrage bouddhique traitant des rites funé-
raires. Il me paraît intéressant de citer ici un passage de ce manuscrit
rédigé dans le même esprit combattif, et de souligner le contraste mar-
qué avec lequel les deux systèmes de foi sont dépeints.

D'abord le Bon:

> *myi nag po'i gźuṅ* |
> *śid nag po'i lugs* |
> *bon yas 'dod smraṅ* |

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[9] En effet, ces trois derniers êtres font partie du group des huit êtres connus comme
lha srin sde brgyad et auxquels les Bonpo rendent encore un culte de nos jours, voir
mKha' kloṅ gsaṅ mdos. Delhi 1973, texte No.7, 236-53.

[10] R.A.Stein, Un document ancien relatif aux rites funéraires des Bon-po tibétains.
Journal Asiatique, 1970, 155-185. Mme. Macdonald l'a résumé dans son *Essai*, 373-
376.

"La tradition des hommes noirs,

Les coutumes des rites funéraires noirs,

Le Bon, c'est le récit archétypique des rites qui nécessitent

beaucoup d'objets d'offrandes rituelles".[11]

Ensuite le Bouddhisme:

lha chos dkar po'i gźuṅ |

myi dkar po'i lugs |

śid dkar po'i ches (chos) | [12]

"La tradition de la religion des dieux blancs,

Les coutumes des hommes blancs,

La religion des rites funéraires blancs."

Quant à la question de l'expression *Mo bon* dans notre manuscrit, el-
le est employée dans le sens de ceux qui pratiquent le rituel bonpo,
donc "prêtre". De plus, les *Mo bon* sont présentés comme adversaires du
Saṃgha. Cependant, dans les textes tardifs, l'expression est très souvent
employée dans le sens de "Bon". En revanche, dans certains textes très
anciens, il se trouve à l'envers, *bon mo,* dans le sens d'une sorte de
"prêtresse" *(bon po daṅ bon mo).*[13]

Ce manuscrit ainsi que le Pelliot tibétain 239, II et d'autres,[14]
me semble-t-il, attestent l'existence du Bon comme un système de croy-
ances répandu et déjà enraciné au temps des rois. Cela ne signifie pas
pour autant l'inexistence d'autres croyances indigènes à la même époque.

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[11] Le mot *yas* dans les textes bonpo tardifs est très souvent joint à *stags* et a tou-
jours le sens d'articles d'offrandes, tels que le *rgyaṅ,* le *śiṅ ris* ou le *nam mkha'.*
Pour les illustrations de ces offrandes, voir D.L.Snellgrove, *The Nine Ways of Bon.*
Londres 1967, 308, 294; 301, 310. On trouve aussi la forme *'dod yas,* voir *mKha'
kloṅ gsaṅ mdos.* Delhi 1973, texte No.7, 136.

[12] *Choix* 1, Pl.173, 27-28.

[13] Le Pelliot tibétain 990 (*Choix* 1, Pl.279,15). *dGe sdig rnam par dbye ba'i mdo.* P
1022 (Vol.40, 344-3-4); *'Phags pa legs ñes kyi rgyu daṅ 'bras bu bstan pa.* P 1023
(Vol.40, 340-3-3). Ces deux textes sont presque identiques, mais c'est le second
qui, dans le colophon, précise que c'est 'Gos Chos grub qui l'a traduit. A propos
du traducteur, voir P.Demiéville, Récents travaux sur Touen-houang. *T'oung Pao 56,*
1970, 47.

[14] Par exemple, le Pelliot tibétain 1040 (*Choix,* 2, Pl.314) fait état du Bon qui est
"secret" *(bon 'di gsaṅ ba'i bon ....)* et le Pelliot tibétain 1248 (*Choix,* 2, Pl.
506) dit à propos d'un récit sur "l'origine du Bon du fils de (?).." qu'il a été
copié à partir d'un autre manuscrit trouvé dans un "bureau" *(..pa'i bu tsa bon
rabs* | *phyag sbal na mchis pa la dpe'a blaṅs pa'o).* Le Pelliot tibétain 443 aussi
donne le Bon comme une croyance ancienne parmi d'autres (M.Lalou, Documents de
Touen-houang: "Deux prières de caravaniers tibétains". *Mélanges chinois et Bouddhi-
ques 8,* 1945-1947, 220-21).

Cependant, il est vrai que cette croyance ancienne se définit encore mal
et que nous ne connaissons presque rien quant à l'organisation de sa pen-
sée philosophique ou dogmatique. C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'on parle du "Bon
organisé" à partir du XIe siècle ap.J.C., il s'agit en fait de ce que
les bouddhistes tibétains appelent le "Bon transformé" *(bsgyur bon)*. Ce-
lui-ci serait le "Bon éternel" *(g.yuṅ druṅ bon)*, mais les Bon po appli-
quent ce dernier nom rétrospectivement au Bon du temps des rois. Comme
cette question est très complexe je me bornerai à dire ici que le "Bon
organisé" ne peut pas être entièrement dissocié du Bon du temps des rois,
dont nous venons de parler, car on ne peut pas ignorer les nombreuses
relations entre le "Bon organisé" et la tradition ancienne.[15]

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[15] Cf. A.Macdonald, *Essai*, 210.

Traduction du texte tibétain

[Fol.1a] Comme la gelée, la sécheresse, et l'orage,
détruisent instantanément
les branches, les feuilles, les fleurs et les baies
des bons arbres de l'été.
5   De même cette vie est-elle transitoire: il faut vite la quitter.
Cela, il n'y a pas moyen de l'éviter car elle (la vie) est illusoire
    par nature.
Bien que la grande armée du Seigneur de la mort soit sur leurs talons
les hommes, jeunes et vieux, sans s'en rendre compte espèrent encore
    continuer à vivre.
Comme, depuis un temps infini, ils ont manqué d'énergie
10 errant dans les ravins intolérables du *saṃsāra*,
ils y sont partout tués par les souffrances, les maladies,
et quand ils doivent revenir dans ces vagues,
à nouveau ils ne s'en rendent pas compte: ils sont stupides par na-
    ture.
Puisque même frappés à coups de bâton, ils n'ont pas l'idée de faire
    un effort,
15 ne sont différents en rien de la progéniture des bêtes de somme.
Si l'on se couche et dort sans réflexion,
les mérites (que l'on a gagnés) dans ce monde-ci [fol.1b] disparaî-
    tront par la porte,
et les mérites accumulés auparavant seront proches de l'épuisement.
Si l'on ne se souvient pas de soi-même,
20 qui s'en souviendra?
Les actes vertueux accomplis, pour la plupart,
sont comme des graines semées dans un bon champ:
bien qu'invisibles au printemps, (leurs) fruits sont récoltés en au-
    tomne.
Les actes pécheurs accomplis, pour la plupart,
25 ne tranchent pas immédiatement comme une arme le corps,
mais accompagnent chacun où qu'il aille.
Alors que vous avez le loisir de pratiquer le Dharma maintenant,
que vos actions soient celles du nectar du but suprême.
Prenez garde d'agir rigoureusement avec vertu.
30 Puisque naître dans les mondes supérieurs des dieux et des hommes,
ou dans ceux des *preta*, des bêtes et des enfers,

ceci dépend de soi,

pourquoi se faire du mal à soi-même?

Quel est le nectar et quel est le poison,

35   si on regarde ne le voit-on pas clairement?

Si l'imbécile pense [fol.2a] que cela est facile,

il sera attrapé dans le lacet des *bDud*,

et emmené dans les trois mondes des mauvaises naissances.

Se repentir ensuite ne servira à rien.

40   Même si on a une grande puissance et une nombreuse parenté,

à l'instant de la mort, il n'y a plus ni grand ni petit;

à ce moment là il n'y a plus ni courageux ni lâche.

Bien que l'individu gisant sur sa couche,

soit entouré de nombreux parents et amis,

45   les souffrances intolérables de la mort,

l'individu tout seul les éprouve.

C'est pourquoi parents et amis, en quoi sont-ils utiles?

Si le sage ne pratique pas la sainte religion,

il n'est qu'un singe rusé, insensé.

50   Si l'érudit n'observe pas la discipline,

il n'est qu'un chercheur d'or aux mains vides.

Si le riche ne fait pas d'aumône,

il n'est que le gardien du trésor d'autrui.

Ne vous vous attachez pas à accumuler beaucoup.

55   (Quand) vous vous attachez à accumuler beaucoup,

ce qui a été accumulé deviendra la richesse d'autrui.

Bien que les abeilles travaillent dur [fol.2b] pour accumuler du nectar,

il arrive que le miel soit utilise par d'autres.

Où qu'il naisse, puisque chacun sait qu'il doit manger,

60   il ne refuse pas d'agir (pour se procurer de la nourriture).

Sans effort, à partir des graines,

on n'obtiendra pas de l'huile de sésame.

Par exemple, d'une graine de petit pois

comment le fruit deviendrait-il l'orge?

65   Si l'on agit bien la gloire sera grande.

Si l'on agit mal le mal arrivera.

Les gens ordinaires,

accordent leur foi au Bon, la croyance fausse.

Dans leur activités religieuses ils se délectent dans les "apparen-
ces"(?).

70   Ils sont, par exemple, comme des insectes errants,
      qui se suivent vers la toile d'araignée.[16]
      Plus ils agitent leurs six pattes, plus la toile se resserre.
      N'accordez pas confiance au *Mo bon*.
      Ne rendez pas de culte ni aux *'Dre* ni aux *Srin*.
75   Ne cherchez pas de protection auprès des *bDud* ni des *bGegs*.
      C'est la "religion des dieux" qui est bonne pour protéger de la
          souffrance.
      C'est le Bouddha qui est puissant pour protéger de la naissance
          et de la mort.[17]
      C'est le noble Saṃgha qui est un guide utile.

      [fol.3a] Ecoutez! ô vous, fils de bonne famille.
80   Puisque l'on vous offre un remède qui est le nectar parfaitement
          pur,
      ne buvez pas le poison des vues perverses.
      Dans la vie corporelle de celui qui est né comme un être humain,
      ses bonnes et mauvaises actions le précèdent.
      Les richesses grandes ou petites qu'il a accumulées restent en ar-
          rière.
85   (Même) si les enfants pensent (rester) toujours jeunes,
      comment les enfants resteraient-ils toujours jeunes?
      Comme un prisonnier emmené sur le terrain d'exécution,
      chaque pas que l'on fait rapproche de la mort.
      Qui sait même si on ne mourra pas le lendemain?
90   Il ne convient pas de rester tranquille,
      mais il faut se prosterner dès aujourd'hui.
      Qui sait si l'on ne mourra pas demain ou après demain?
      Quand on est attrapé pas le lacet des *bDud*,
      (à ce moment), dix mille appels, mille appels (des parents et amis),
          les oreilles ne les entendent pas.[18]
95   Pourquoi les *bDud* seraient-ils tendres?
      Les *bGegs* placent des obstacles n'importe où.
      Les *gDon* jouent des tours à n'importe qui.

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[16] Le mot usuel pour la toile d'araignée est *bal thag* ou *sdom thag*.

[17] Sur l'expression *skye śi*, Cf. Y.Imaeda, *Histoire du cycle de la naissance et de la mort*. Genève-Paris 1981, 5-6.

[18] Le même vers se trouve dans le Pelliot tibétain 1284, II (*Choix*, 2, Pl.551,33)

Les richesses et nourritures amassées pendant toute une vie,
les fils, femmes, serviteurs et domaines,
100 il faut les abandonner, [fol.3b] et soi-même partir,
s'il y a une fin dans la compréhension de la religion(?).
Quelles que soient les richesses accumulées pour vivre
aucune n'en paraît au matin de la mort.
Quelles que soient les victuailles accumulées pour vivre,
105 on part affamé au matin de la mort.
Quels que soient les vêtements accumulés pour vivre
on part tout nu au matin de la mort.
Bien que l'on soit entouré par beaucoup de parents et d'amis,
pas un ne paraît au matin de la mort.
110 A celui qui possède une maison, devant lui on la prend.
Que vous soyez intelligent, courageux ou sage,
aussi difficile que ce soit ne renonces pas aux dix actions
    vertueuses.
Ce sont les graines pour renaître comme homme ou dieu.
Les dix mauvaises actions certes sont aisées (à commettre),
115 mais les trois naissances inférieures sont intolérables.
C'est pourquoi, pratique avec assiduité les dix actions vertueuses.

(Le dit) de l'arbre, qui a été prononcé (par le Bouddha).

                                        La fin.

Transcription du texte

[Fol.1a] *ci ltar dbyar gyi[1] ljon śiń bzań po la |*
yal ga lo 'bras me tog 'bras...kyań |
grań lhags than drags dus kyi rluń byuń bas |
de dag skad cig tsam gyis[2] myed pa ltar |
5   *tshe 'di myi rtag myur du 'gro dgos na' |*
cis kyań myi zlog sgyu ma'i rań bźin can |
'chi bdag sde chen rtiń[3] la thug bźin du |
sems can byis pa rgan rgon[4] da duń ma tshor duń du re |
thog ma myed pa'i 'bad thag chad pa na |
10 *'khor ba'i gcoń roń myi bzad kha 'grim[5] bźin |*
de kun dag na sdug bsńal nad rnams kyań |
bsad nas rba[6] kloń der ni 'gro dgos na |
da duń ma tshor glen pa'i[7] rań bźin... |
dbyug pas brgyab kyań 'bad pa'i sems myed na' |
15 *byol soń phyugs[8] kyi bu dań ci ma 'dra |*
bsam pa med pa'i ñal te gñid log na |
'jig rten 'di yi bsod nams sgo ru [fol.1b] nub |
sńun gyi[9] bsod nams ci bsags zad du ñe |
bdag la bdag gis gźen[10] bskul ma btab na |
20 *bdag la gźen bskul 'debs pa su źig 'oń |*
dge ba'i las rnams phal cher spyad pa ni |
źiń rab źiń la sa bon btab pa bźin |
dpyid na snań ba myed kyań lo 'bras ston na btsa'[11] |
sdig pa'i las rnams phal cher spyad pa ni |
25 *'phral du lus la mtshon ltar myi gcod kyań |*
gań ltar 'gro ba'i sa phyogs de na sdod |
da ltar chos spyod khom pa'i[12] tshe |
don mchog bdud rtsi las su byos |
dge spyod myel tshe dam du gyis |
30 *mtho ris skyes pa'i lha dań myi |*
yi dvags[13] byol soń dmyal ba gsum |
gań ...bdag la dbań yod na |
ci phyird bdag la gnod pa byed |

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[1] *gi*   [2] *gis*   [3] *rdiń*   [4] *dgon*   [5] *'drim*   [6] *lva*   [7] *ba*   [8] *pyugs*   [9] *gi*   [10] *bźen*   [11] *rtsa*
[12] *ba*   [13] *dags*

dug daṅ bdud rtsi gaṅ yin pa |

35 bltas na gsal bar myi mṅon nam |

blun po sems [fol.2a] la sla sñam na |

bdud kyi żags pas zin nas su |

ñan soṅ gsum du khrid 'og tu[14] |

de nas 'gyod pas phan pa myed |

40 ci ltar dbaṅ che gñen maṅ yaṅ |

śi ba'i dus na che chuṅ myed |

de yi dus na dpa' sdar myed |

bdag ñid mal na ñal bżin du |

gñen bśes maṅ pos mtha' bskor yaṅ |

45 srog gcod myi bzod sdug bsṅal dag |

bdag ñid gcig pus myoṅ bar 'gyur |

de bas gñen daṅ bśes ci phan |

'dzaṅs pa dam chos myi spyod na |

de ni spre'u gcam don myed yin |

50 mkhas pa tshul khrims[15] myi sruṅ na |

de ni gser pa lag stoṅ yin |

phyug la sbyin pa myi gtoṅ na |

de ni gżan gyi[16] gter sruṅs yin |

ha caṅ[17] bsogs la ma żen cig |

55 ha caṅ[18] bsogs la żen pa ni |

bsags pa gżan gyi[19] nor du 'gyur |

sbraṅ mas 'bad de [fol.2b] rtsi bsags kyaṅ |

sbraṅ rtsi gżan dag spyod par snaṅ |

gar skyes su ni za śes na |

60 raṅ gi rtsol ba dor myi bya |

'bad pa myed par tig dag la |

til mar thob par 'gyur ma yin |

dper na bra sran sa bon las[20] |

'bras bu nas su ga la skye |

65 legs par spyad na dpal du che |

ñes par spyad na byur du 'oṅ |

so so byis pa skye bo rnams |

mu stegs bon la yid ches ste |

las kyi don du mtshan ma spyod |

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[14] du   [15] khrigs   [16] gi   [17] chaṅ   [18] chaṅ   [19] gi   [20] la

70 dper na śbur bu 'gro byed pa' |
    bal sdud²¹ naṅ du śul draṅs nas |
    sug drug bskyod ciṅ phyir phyir dam |
    mo bon dag la srid ma ltos |
    'dre srin dag la yar ma mchod |
75 bdud daṅ bgegs²² la skyabs ma tshol |
    sdug bsṅal skyabs su lha chos bzaṅ |
    skye śi mgon du saṅs rgyas che |
    'phags pa'i dge' 'dun phan ston yin |

    [fol.3a] kye rigs kyi bu rnams dgoṅs su gsol |
80 yaṅ dag bdud rtsi sman blud²³ na |
    log par lta ba'i dug ma 'thuṅ |
    myi cig skyes pa'i tshe lus la |
    bzaṅ byas ṅan byas mdun du thal |
    che bsags chuṅ bsags phyi na lus |
85 bus pa gźon nu rtag sñam na' |
    bus pa gźon nu ga la rtag |
    gsad sar khrid pa'i btson²⁴ bźin du |
    gom re bor źin śi daṅ ñe |
    saṅ tsam 'chi yaṅ sus²⁵ śes kyis |
90 bde bar 'dug par myi rigs ste |
    di riṅ kho na 'dud²⁶ de bya |
    saṅ śi gnaṅs śi sus śes kyis |
    khri 'bod stoṅ 'bod rnas myi thos |
    bdud kyi źags pas zin pa ni |
95 bdud ni ci la bsam pa chuṅ |
    bgegs²⁷ ni ci yi bar tu 'jug |
    gdon ni ci la rkyal ka byed |
    tshe cig bsags pa'i nor zas daṅ |
    bu daṅ chuṅ ma 'khor yul rnams |
100 bor te bdag [fol.3b] ni 'gro dgos na' |
    rtogs pa'i chos la srid yod na' |
    ci tsam 'tsho ba'i nor bsags kyaṅ |
    'chi ba'i naṅ par gcig myi snaṅ |
    ci tsam 'tsho ba'i zas bsags kyaṅ |

²¹ rdud   ²² bgags   ²³ blun   ²⁴ brtson   ²⁵ su   ²⁶ bdud   ²⁷ bgrags

105 'chi ba'i nań par ltogs par 'gro |
     ci tsam 'tsho ba'i gos bsags kyań |
     'chi ba'i nań par gcer bur 'gro |
     gñen bśes mań pos mtha' bskor yań |
     śi ba'i nań par gcig myi snań |
110 ldan pa'i khab khań sñun na khyerd |
     blo ldan dpa' 'dzańs gań yań ruń |
     dge bcu dka'[28] yań ma gtań źig |
     lha dań myir skye sa bon yin |
     myi dge bcu po sla mod kyi |
115 ńan soń gsum po bzod glags myed |
     de bas brtson te dge bcu spyod |

          źal nas gsuńs pa'i ljon śiń || rdzogs so||

Facsimilé du texte (Pelliot tibétain Touen-houang 972)

2a

2b

3a

3b

TIBETAN HERMENEUTICS AND THE YĀNA CONTROVERSY

by

N.KATZ (Williamstown)

This essay is a companion to a piece I'm currently working on, tentatively entitled *Deconstruction and Prasaṅga: The Hermeneutics of Derrida and Candrakīrti.* In the present essay, I freely employ some Derridian terminologies in explicating Tsong kha pa's exegeses, although the foundations for such cross-cultural translation must wait for the next essay to appear. My appreciations to David Langston of the English department and Mark C.Taylor of the Religion department at Williams for suggestive discussions of Jaques Derrida.

I. Introductory

Lecturing at Harvard University this past summer, the Dalai Lama commented on the difficulties involved in such Buddhist hermeneutical principals as whether a given text is definitive (*nītārtha*) or in need of interpretation (*neyārtha*). "Were I to explain the position of the Buddhist schools (*siddhānta*) on this topic," he said, "not only would you become confused, but I would become confused as well."[1] Indeed, these issues are intricate. Whether a given text is definite or interpretable depends, of course, on the views expressed in that text from the perspectives of each of the schools. We also find texts stratified according to tantric classification systems, which themselves vary. Texts are spoken of as belonging to this or that "vehicle" (*yāna*), and this system is compounded by a *yāna* discourse that refers not simply to the texts as such, but to

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[1] From a lecture by the Ven. Tenzin Gyatso, H.H. the XIVth Dalai Lama, at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., August 3, 1981.

attitudes through which the texts are practiced. Moreover, one and the same sūtra seems to propound and negate the entire *yāna* discourse. As one might expect, there is also a highly elaborated system for classifying the attitudes of the practitioner, systems found in the earliest Buddhist texts and modified throughout the long history of Buddhist thought. So it seems that the Dalai Lama's comment reflects more than his characteristic humility: the issues confronting one who wishes to gain an overview of Buddhist hermeneutical principles are vast, complex and relatively uncharted.

Therefore, rather than attempting to gloss even the main controversies in Buddhist hermeneutics, which would be more the task of a book than a brief essay, I intend to present a rather elementary typology. Identifying one particular hermeneutical problem, which is felt to be representative of the sort of issues over which Buddhist hermeneutics have pondered, namely the *yāna* controversies, I will proceed to discuss Buddhist hermeneutics through a twofold typology.

The first type is that which led the Dalai Lama to his comment,which I call text based hermeneutics. From this perspective, a given text may be called definitive (*nītārtha*) or in need of interpretation (*neyārtha*). Or, a given text may be seen in a particular context of other texts: thus it may be said to belonging to this or that class of tantras, or it may be said to belong to one or another *yāna*. Different schools have different reasons for their classifications, and I shall follow some of the debates between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools as representative of these discussions.

The second type of hermeneutical strategy is what I call adept based hermeneutics. Unlike those rooted in the texts themselves, these systems seek to analyze the person who practices a given text. Of course these two types overlap somewhat, but we find quite distinct systems of discourse. In Pāli texts, for example, one finds the language of the four holy persons (*ariyā puggalā*), one finds the Buddha speaking about his teaching as relying upon the dispositions of his audiences, and these dispositions are thoroughly investigated. As Buddhist thought flowered in India and Tibet, one finds further elaborations such as *gotra* and *kula*, the "families" or psychological types of practitioners, with differing texts and practices prescribed for different psychological types, much as a skilled physician prescribes different medicines for his patient, as the traditional metaphor goes. Further elaborations are developed with the rise of tantric Buddhism, as in the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*'s discussions of types of adepts and the *Hevajra Tantra*'s analysis of ar-

chetypal personality types under the heading of the five Buddha families.

Guiding both these typologies is the principle of the "four securities" (*catuḥpratisaraṇa*) wherein exegetical values are placed on the teaching (*dharma*) and not the person who teaches (*pudgala*), on the spirit (*artha*) rather than the letter (*vyañjana*), on definitive (*nītārtha*) rather than interpretable (*neyārtha*) texts, and on intuition (*prajñā*) over dualistic consciousness (*vijñāna*). This topic has been extensively studied by Professors Lamotte and Thurman,[2] so I shall not devote a great deal of this discussion to it, but apply it to these typologies as appropriate.

Finally, I will return to our original *yāna* controversy through the eyes of Tsong kha pa. In his *sNgags rim chen mo*, Tsong kha pa deconstructs *yāna* discourse as referential, yet maintains its use on an everyday level, writing *sous rature* if you will. It is this double movement of deconstruction of referential or logocentric language and a return to everyday language that I find most characteristic of Buddhist hermeneutical methods derived from the Madhyamaka, and nowhere is it more eloquently found than in the *sNgags rim chen mo*. By sorting out one hermeneutical problem it is hoped that a more general sense of the richness of Buddhist hermeneutics might at least be indicated.

Western scholary treatments of Buddhist hermeneutics are very few. In fact, the sum total of western scholarship directly on this question is essentially three journal articles: a pioneering study by Professor Lamotte; a very penetrating study by Professor Thurman who sees the hermeneutical enterprise as the essence of the Buddhist path; and a challenging analyse of tantric hermeneutics revolving around the *alaṃkāraḥ* doctrine by Professor Steinkellner.[3] It is hoped that this present essay might continue along the lines of my respected colleagues, adding to the discussion of this very vital theme within the rich tradition of Buddhist thought.

[2] É.Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme. Bruxelles université libre, Institut de philosophie et d'histoire orientales et slaves, *Annuaire 9*, 1949, 341-361; and R.A.F.Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46:1*, 19-39.

[3] E.Steinkellner, Remarks on Tantristic Hermeneutics. *Proceedings of the Csoma de Kö-rös Memorial Symposium*. Ed. L.Ligeti, Budapest 1978, 445-458.

II. A Hermeneutical Problem: The *yāna* Controversy

By "hermeneutics" I mean the systematic interpretation of texts sa-
cred to a given tradition. As an intellectual discipline, hermeneutics
begins with an awareness of the difficulties in reading sacred texts;
that is, hermeneutics presupposes hermeneutical problems. In our present
context, a problem is a case where differing or even contradictory claims
are canonically given about a key Buddhist doctrinal element, namely of
a *yāna*. A problem entails an estrangement of letter (*vyañjana*) and sense
(*artha*); a confusion resulting, according to such Hindu grammarians as
Kauṇḍabhatta, when a signifer (*vācaka*) has lost its signified (*vācya*);[4]
a problem likened by Śāntarakṣita to a conversation about the colour
and shape of the moon conducted between two people with ophtamalic dis-
ease.[5] Hermeneutical shock is symbolized by fainting: when the Mahāyāna
teachings of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* were first announced, the śrāvakas
in the audience passed out;[6] similarly, when the tantric teachings of the
Guhyasamāja were promulgated, the bodhisattvas fell senseless to the
ground,[7] and the same situation ensued when the *Hevajra* teachings were
promulgated.[8] Hermeneutics, then, begins when the familiar conventions
known as language take on shades of the uncanny; when the signified
seems randomly selected, rather than orderly evoked, as the signifier
is spoken.

As we shall see, how textual claims are reconciled and adjudicated
depends on what our hermeneuticians have in mind, and it is certainly the
case that hermeneutics itself raises further problems, provokes new con-
troversies of a more theoretical nature. However, by focusing on one
particular canonical problem, the *yāna* controversy, I hope to elucidate
some of the fundamentals of Buddhist hermeneutics, which is to say to
point toward some of its fundamental hermeneutical problematics.

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[4]   *Sphoṭavāda*, quoted by K.K.Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning.* 2nd ed. 1969, 137.

[5]   *Tattvasamgraha*, 1211, quoted by Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, 93-94.

[6]   P.L.Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra.* Darbhanga (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 6) 26.

[7]   Bhattacharyya, ed., *Guhyasamāja Tantra or Tathāgataguhyaka.* Baroda 1931, 21.

[8]   D.L.Snellgrove, ed. and trans., *The Hevajra Tantra: A Critical Study.* London 1959,
      vol.2, 37.

It could be and has been argued that, in Buddhism, the problems of hermeneutics, or interpretation generally, are the problems of life itself.[9] Surely it is the case that any aspect of experience which could be interpreted is done so only through the meditation of intellective construction (*savikalpa-pratyakṣa*), and that the actually given is indeterminate and immediate (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*). Therefore, any act of interpretation is a reification (*vikalpa*), and it is precisely this tendency towards reifying which stands in need of analysis and therapy. This is to say that all interpretation is a form of subjectivism bordering on solipsism (*asmimāna* or *ahaṃkāra*), and that the therapy which Buddhism offers is one which removes such subjectivizing tendencies. Such a view has much to offer; but to accept it would lead to holding all of Buddhism as precisely the hermeneutics of awareness of subjectivist domination of experience, thereby turning hermeneutics into everything, reducing discrete fields of enquiry such as psychology or epistemology into hermeneutics. In keeping with the field parameters given by the Buddhist tradition itself, I prefer to use the term "hermeneutics" specifically in the context of textual interpretation and reflection upon the nature of this interpretation.

If hermeneutics begins with the awareness of a hermeneutical problem, my problem is how to interpret the term *yāna*, of which has been said remarkably contradictory things. Generally, *yāna* is a very common teaching device used for systematizing various Buddhist practices and doctrines in terms of two or three, and later as many as nine, discrete *yāna*. The western academic tradition has been very quick, and I would say overlyhasty, in adapting *yāna* discourse and inappropriately referring them to forms of Buddhism found in geographic areas. Thus, the technical term *hīnayāna* has been atrociously misused to refer to southern Buddhism, Mahāyāna to northern Buddhism, and Vajrayāna for certain trends within Indo-Tibetan Buddhism involving magic and sexual symbolism. One might suspect that such a handy designation, readily applied to living religious traditions, is applied inappropiately, and it has been. What I propose is a brief history of the term.

Etymologically, the term derives from the Sanskrit root *yā-*, "to go", and gives the sense of going or proceeding, as well as the means of carriage or vehicle, and is very close in many connotations to *mārga*, the path. The only pre-Buddhist reference to the term which I could locate

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[9] Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics.

is found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*[10] which gives the sense of a way or
path: *pathordeva yānasya pitṛ yānasya ca vyāvartanā*. Dutt[11] distinguish-
es its usages in the sūtras as a "way" or "career" from that found in
the later śāstras as "vehicle". This latter sense is conveyed in Kong
sprul's definition of the term:[12] "Like a vehicle or conveyance by rid-
ing on which one goes beyond suffering, thus it is known as *yāna*."
Thus the term, derived from "to go", carries a range of meanings from a
spiritual career, to a path or way, to a conveyance or vehicle. Oddly,
scholarly convention has been to translate it by this last alternative
only.

Differing senses on a technical term do not in themselves pose her-
meneutical problems; contradictory claims and uncertain signification
do, and we find, on the one hand, a discourse emphasizing radical dis-
tinctions among *yānas*, and on the other hand a discourse claiming, in
the extreme, that there are no *yānas* at all, or the more modest claim
that there really is only one *yāna*.

Of the first discourse, we find in the *Ākāśagarbha Sūtra*[13] the claim
that the *śrāvakayāna* is so dangerous to one practicing the *bodhisattva-
yāna* that it must, at all costs, be strenuously avoided. The *Laṅkāvatāra
Sūtra*[14] says that radically different doctrines are taught in the dif-
ferent *yānas*, and[15] that the *nirvāṇa* of the śrāvakas is really only a cer-
tain stage *(rang gis rig pa)* in the training of the bodhisattva. The
Aṣṭasāhasrikā[16] says that the true meaning of a bodhisattva's detachment
is his or her detachment from the *śrāvakayāna*, and the *Pañcaviṃśatisā-
hasrikā*[17] says that egoism *(ahaṃkāra)* may cause a bodhisattva to fall

[10] *Chandogya Upaniṣad*, 3,2, S.Radhakrishnan, ed. and trans., *The Principal Upaniṣads.*
London 1953, 426

[11] S.Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries in India*. London 1962, 274-275.

[12] Kong sprul, *Theg pa'i sgo kun las btus pa gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod bslab pa
gsum legs par ston pa'i bstan bcos, Shes bya kun khyab*. Lokesh Chandra, ed., *Kong-
trul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture*. New Delhi (Śata-Piṭaka Series 80)
1970 vol.2, 495: *gang la nyon pa ste de la brten nas mya ngan las 'das par 'gro bas
theg pa'am bnyon pa dang 'dra ba'i cha nas theg pa zhes khyang bya'o.*

[13] Quoted by Śāntideva. Bendall, ed., *Śikṣā Samuccaya*. St.Petersbourg 1897, 61.

[14] B.Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. Kyoto 1923, 333.

[15] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 212.

[16] P.L.Vaidya, ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*. Darbhanga 1960,194-195.

[17] E.Conze, trans., *The Large Sūtra on the Perfection of Wisdom (Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā
Prajñāpāramitrā Sūtra)*. Berkeley 1975, 365.

to the level of a śrāvaka. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[18] affirms that the Buddha's teaching is divided into three *yānas*, but that this division is simply a pedagogic expedient (*upāyakauśalya*). Examples of this *yāna* discourse could extend almost indefinitely, as virtually all Mahāyāna sūtras have something to say on the subject.

The *yānas* which are affirmed in these sūtras are generally three, but occasionally two. The division into two, *hīnayāna* and *mahāyāna*, arose out of the Pāṭaliputra schism. The three *yāna* teaching (*triyāna* or *yāna-traya*) often speaks of:

(1) The *śrāvakayāna*, literally the "hearer's way", by which it is said that the disciples of the Buddha were able, upon hearing his teachings, to resolve the multi-lemma of *saṃsāra* utterly. Whether this resolution was final or not, complete or not, or a mistaken assumption, was a question on the Māhayāna hermeneutical table. In the Pāli texts, it is abundantly clear that the *nibbāna* of the sāvakas was final, complete in terms of wisdom and teaching skill, and accurate.[19] Some Māhayāna texts seem to hold that the *nirvāṇa* of the śrāvakas was a self-pacification only, and did not address the goals of others.[20] Other texts posit the śrāvaka's enlightenment as a temporary resting place, an intermediate stage before the bodhisattva practices were begun,[21] while others seem to hold it as an egoistic delusion.[22]

(2) The *pratyekabuddhayāna*, or the way of the solitary buddhas, originally seemed to mean that there were some who could actualize the resolution of *saṃsāra* without having heard the Buddha's teaching, a way of dealing with saints of "other religions".[23] In any case, the pratyeka-buddha, while attaining to full enlightenment, was unable or unwilling to teach others, and not a great deal of interest was invested in this *yāna*.

(3) The *bodhisattvayāna*, the way of those dedicated to *bodhi*, is another name for the *pāramitāyāna*, the way of practicing the "perfections"

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[18] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 23.

[19] N.Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection: The Arahant of the Sutta Piṭaka Compared with the Bodhisattva and the Mahāsiddha*. Delhi 1982, chaps. 3 and 5.

[20] Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics, 37, n.1.

[21] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 94.

[22] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 11.

[23] A.G.T.Kloppenborg, *The Paccekabuddha: A Study of the Paccekabuddha in Pali Canonical and Commentatorial Literature*. Leiden 1974.

(pāramitās) in emulation of the *jātaka* tradition of the former lives of the Buddha; the *hetuyāna,* or causal way in the sense that it is the necessary precedent for Buddhahood;[24] or the Mahāyāna as a whole.

Yāna discourse continued to proliferate. The *Guhyasamāja Tantra*[25] offers a fourfold classification of tantras as: *kriyā* (action), *cārya* (practice), *yoga* (method for union) and *anuttara* (unsurpassed). The *Hevajra Tantra*[26] links this fourfold classification with the four moments of a romantic courtship: glance, smile, embrace and sexual union. When the *Guhyasamāja's* fourfold tantric classification was correlated with the three *yāna* doctrine, a seven *yāna* system ensued, but it was shortlived. The *anuttara* class itself was permuted into three (father, mother and non-dual), and finally the well-known nine *yāna* system emerged.

In contrast with this theme of continuing refinement and distinctions among *yāna* was the negation (or perhaps Derrida's term, soliciting) of *yāna* language, often in the very same texts which asserted it. This negation of *yāna* discourse could take two forms: the simple negation which claims that there are no *yāna* or that *yāna* talk is predicated upon some basic misunderstandings; or a negation of *yāna* discourse which asserts the notion of "one *yāna*", *ekayāna,* as a principle overarching all dicrepancies among *yāna*. Of the first type, we find in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[27] the Buddha telling Kāśyapa that there are no *yāna* but simply people who practice differently, and in the same text it is also said[28] that since all *yāna* talk is due to unreal, reified thought *(vikalpa),* then such notions are the products of dull minds. In the *Laṅkāvatāra* the Buddha says[29] that there are *yānas* only so long as the mind *(citta)* remains moving *(pravartate)* in *saṃsāra,* but when it comes to know itself all thought of a *yāna* ceases. Similarly, Śāntideva[30] cites the *Sarvadharmavaipulyasaṃgraha Sūtra* which says that the Buddha never taught differences among *yānas,* and that such distinctions are mere confusions.

The second type of negation of *yāna* language, that which does so

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[24] Kong sprul, *Shes bya kun khyab.* Vol.3, 493.

[25] Bhattacharyya, ed., *Guhyasamāja Tantra,* 162-163.

[26] Snellgrove, ed., *Hevajra Tantra.* Vol.1, 63-67.

[27] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra,* 90.

[28] *Ibid.,* 65.

[29] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra,* 135-136.

[30] Bendall, ed., *Śikṣā Samuccaya,* 95.

with recourse to the *ekayāna* idea, is found, for example, in the *Laṅkā-vatāra*[31] which says that when the grasping by subjects *(grāhaka)* for objects *(grāhya)* ceases, then the one *yāna* is known as it is *(yathābhūta)*. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* in several places asserts the *ekayāna* teaching. In one place[32] it claims that since the Buddha had only one aim, there could be only one *yāna*; and elsewhere[33] this *ekayāna* is called the *buddhayāna*.

Knowing this unity of teaching was considered no easy matter. Kong sprul[34] says that such knowledge is possible only upon the attainment of the seventh stage *(bhūmi)* of spiritual growth. The *Laṅkāvatāra*[35] speaks of an essence of the teachings of all the Buddhas *(sarvabuddha-pravacanahṛdaya)*, and the Seventh Dalai Lama[36] sees this unity as one of intention behind all texts: "All the extensive teachings spoken by the Jina – for example, the three *yānas*, the four classes of tantras, and so forth – in short, all the sūtras and tantras, are spoken only as a means solely for training our mental continuums *(saṁtāna* or *sems rgyud)*."

This problem of continuity and diversity within the Buddha's teachings causes even the greatest of all Buddhist philosophers, Nāgārjuna, to pause. In his *Ratnāvalī*[37] he says: "It is certainly not easy to know what was intended by the Tathāgata, so therefore guard yourself with equanimity about the one *yāna* and the three *yānas*." In his *Rājaparikathā-ratnamālā*,[38] he succinctly states the problem which I have been discussing: "How could what is taught in the two vehicles be of unequal value for the wise?"

It is precisely this hermeneutical problem which Tsong kha pa addresses in his *sNgags rim chen mo*. Before viewing his findings, however, in order to appreciate the hermeneutical moves he makes it will be necessary

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[31] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 133-134.

[32] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 31.

[33] *Ibid.*, 27.

[34] Kong sprul, *Shes bya kun khyab*. Vol.3, 534.

[35] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 259.

[36] dGe slong bLo bzang bskal bzang rgya mtsho (Dalai Lama VII), *gSang chen rdo rje theg pa'i smin byed kyi dbang rjes gnang sogs kyi dngon 'gro'i chos kyi gtam de bya ba gzhan phan ra ster bzhugs.* Tibetan wood block mss., Library of Tibetan Works & Archives accession no.1081, 8a-8b.

[37] Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī*. G.Tucci, ed. and trans., The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1936*, 251. (My translation).

[38] Nāgārjuna, *Rājaparikathāratnamālā*. J.Hopkins, trans., *The Precious Garland and the Song of the Four Mindfulnesses*. New York 1975, 75.

to survey, by means of typology, various hermeneutical systems within
Buddhism, a task to which I now turn.

III. Text Based Hermeneutics

How to read a text (or an idea, doctrine, etc.), which is to say,
text based hermeneutics, is the very point of departure of Buddhism it-
self. When the Pāli texts were canonized, the redactors placed the
Brahmajāla Sutta[39] at the very beginning, and the import of this sutta is
how to interpret the claims made by other Indian religions. Thus, an a-
bility to interpret texts, to set the Buddha's teachings off against
those of his correligionists, was considered to be paramount.

The *Brahmajāla* itself is one of the most intriguing texts of the ent-
ire Pāli canon. In it, the Buddha employs a psychologizing hermeneutic
to unearth the structures of thought of other teachings. In it, claims
as to the eternality or temporality of the world and the self are exam-
ined; assertions about the destinies of the soul after death are scruti-
nized; cosmogonies are found to be rooted in various psychological ma-
laises; and so forth. While space does not permit an extended discussion
of how these psychologizing hermeneutics of the *Brahmajāla* are employed,
my purpose is served by pointing to the hermeneutical enterprise of Bud-
dhism from its very inception. A recent translation of the *Brahmajāla*
by Bhikku Bodhi is prefaced with philosophic skill, and the reader is
recommended there.[40]

While it might seem that hermeneutics did not play a major role in
early Buddhism, since there were no Buddhist texts prior to the Buddha,
this really is not the case. We find that the Buddha of the Sutta Piṭaka
was well aware of the need for promulgating interpretative principles
to be applied to his own teachings. As Professor Thurman points out,[41]
this raises a very unique case within the history of religions, wherein
the founder of a religion is himself aware of exegetical and hermeneuti-
cal difficulties regarding his own doctrines. For example, in the *Saṃyutta
Nikāya*[42] we find the Buddha discussing his *anattā* (no-self) doctrine with

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[39] T.W.Rhys-Davids and J.E.Carpenter, eds., *Dīgha Nikāya*. London 1889-1910, sutta 1.

[40] Bhikku Bodhi, trans., *All-Embracing Net of Views: The Brahmajāla Sutta and its Com-
mentarial Exegesis*. Kandy 1978.

[41] Thurman, Buddhist Hermeneutics, 22.

[42] M.L.Freer, ed., *Samyutta Nikāya*. London 1884-1898, vol.4, 400-401.

one Vacchagotta. Seeing Vacchagotta's confusion, the Buddha tells him that there is indeed a self – a claim manifestly contrary to what he taught in virtually all other instances. His disciple Ānanda, overhearing this discussion, becomes understandibly perplexed, and the Buddha tells Ānanda about the necessity of clarity regarding the levels at which one is speaking. Thus we get a protrait of the teacher, the Buddha, as one aware of hermeneutical problems about what he teaches, aware that there is no uniformity of letter in what he teaches, but affirming a uniformity of purpose. His teaching is neither agreement *(saṃvadati)* nor disagreement *(vivadati)*, but is skillful employment of everyday language without becoming so infatuated with language that its conventions become the speaker's convictions: *yañ ca loke vuttaṃ tena voharati aparāmasan ti.*[43]

Either agreement or disagreement is understood as mere opinion *(diṭṭhi)*, and opinionatedness is precisely that which prevents one from true seeing *(darsana)*. By the time of the great Pāli commentaries, escape from opinions was itself made into hermeneutical principle. The *Atthasālinī*[44] claims that the entire system of *abhidhamma* was developed in order to prevent the mind of the adept from running to metaphysical extremes: *abhidhamme duppaṭipanno dhammacittam atidhāvanto acinteyyāni pi cinteti, tato cittavikkhepaṃ pāpuṇāti.*

The classification of Buddhist texts as either definitive *(nītārtha)* or indeterminate *(neyārtha)* was accepted by all Buddhist schools except for the Mahāsaṃghikas, who held all texts as *nītārtha.*[45] As might be expected, heated controversies arose as to which texts were *nītārtha*, although all writers held *nītārtha* texts as the most reliable and authoritative. As mentioned above, the *Catuḥpratisaraṇa Sūtra*[46] cautions that one should rely on *nītārtha* sūtras over *neyārtha* ones; similarly, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[47] says that the bodhisattva relies on *nītārtha* sūtras so as not to disgress from Buddhist teaching and discipline.

According to the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa Sūtra*,[48] those texts which deal

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[43] V.Trenckner and Lord Chalmers, eds., *Majjhima Nikāya*. London 1888-1899, vol.1, 500.

[44] E.Muller, ed., *Atthasālinī*. London 1897, 24.

[45] Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation, 348-349.

[46] *Ibid.*, 342.

[47] Asaṅga, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Ed. Wogihara, 257, as discussed by Lamotte, *ibid.*, 355.

[48] Quoted by Candrakīrti, *dBu ma tshig gsal (Prasannapadā)*. Dharamsala 1968, 30.

with the path *(mārgāvatārāya nirdiṣṭa)* are *neyārtha* while those which
deal with the goal *(phalāvatārāya nirdiṣṭa)* are *nītārtha*, and this came
to be accepted in principle by all schools. How to apply this principle,
however, was a matter on which no consensus was ever reached. According
to Candrakīrti, it was just to clear this matter up that Nāgārjuna
wrote his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.[49]

From the Madhyamaka perspective, *nītārtha* sūtras are those which
speak directly about *śūnyatā*. *Śūnyatā*, of course, implies that all fac-
tors of experience *(dharma)* have no independent existence *(svabhāva)*,
so while some sūtras might speak about *skandha, dharma* and the like,
these texts are considered as *neyārtha*. *Nītārtha* sūtras, such as those
of the *prajñāpāramitā* genre, deconstruct these doctrines as a means of
establishing the ultimate *(paramārtha* or *don dam)*.[50] So for the Madhya-
maka school, those texts are *nītārtha* which adopt the deconstructionist
hermeneutical stance of negation on the ultimate level along with the
double movement of reaffirmation on the relative, pragmatic level.

Germinal Yogācāra texts such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra*, on the
other hand, held that this negative dialectic *(prasaṅga)* of the Madhya-
maka, like the naively positivistic statements of the earlier texts, were
neyārtha, and that only texts which, like itself, spoke about the ul-
timate in positive terms could be held as *nītārtha*. Other teachings were
understood by it as based on egoism *(asmimāna* or *nga rgyal)*.[51]

Thus, both the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra hold in principle, along
with the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*, that *nītārtha* texts deal with the ultimate
or the goal *(artha* or *don)*, while *neyārtha* sūtras deal with the relative
(samvṛti or *kun rdzob)* or the path *(mārga* or *lam)*; just what is consid-
ered as ultimate is a matter of contention.

From the perspective of the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, the imputed ultimate
of the Madhyamaka is merely another polarity in the vacillation between
affirmation and negation. Thus it propounds the well-known "three wheels
theory", which holds that the first turning of the wheel was the Buddha's
hīnayāna teachings which consisted of naively positivistic statements,
his second turning was the Madhyamaka which negated the first turning
on an ultimate level, both of which it considered *neyārtha* because they
were extremes, that is, their positions were defined by each other. The

[49] Candrakīrti, *dBu ma tshig gsal*, 28.

[50] Quoted by Candrakīrti, *dBu ma tshig gsal*, 30.

[51] É.Lamotte, ed. and trans., *Saṃhinirmocanasūtra*. Louvain 1935, 50.

third turning, that which proclaims what was really intended in each of
the first two, is the only set of doctrines to be considered as *nītārtha*
and is best exemplified by the *Saṃdhinirmocana* and related texts. This
real intention, or *saṃdhā bhāṣā*, speaks of the ultimate as non-dual, of
one taste, and of having been affirmed by the Buddha.[52]

As syncretic movements between the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra e-
merged, resolutions of this *nītārtha/neyārtha* controversy continue to pro-
liferate. dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po summarizes the position of the Yogā-
cāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school as holding: (1) that *neyārtha* sūtras
are concerned with the basic or the relative *(samvṛti)*, while *nītārtha*
sūtras are concerned with the ultimate; and (2) that of the three wheels
as propounded by the *Saṃdhinirmocana*, the first is *neyārtha* and the last
two contain both *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*. Of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka
school, he says they are in agreement with point (1) above, but see the
three wheels theory differently. According to them, the first and the
third wheel are *neyārtha* while only the second is *nītārtha* because its
teachings are corroborated in the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Sūtra*.[53]

Questions about implicit intentions in the Buddha's teachings, a no-
tion used to promulgate the three wheel theory as well as to locate a
text in terms of *nītārtha/neyārtha* distinctions, bring us to the ques-
tion of what is meant by *saṃdhā bhāṣā* or "intentional language". It seems
that this technical term has been misspelled in several texts as *saṃdhyā
bhāṣā*, which would give us "twilight language", a reading which some
scholars still hold. Understanding how the term *saṃdhā bhāṣā* is used
does not depend on its translation as "intentional" or "twilight" lan-
guage, however. While the "intentional" reading seems etymologically
closer to the original, nevertheless "twilight" is suggestive when it is
understood as opposed to literal sense.

In the poetic text, the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana, a clear dis-
tinction is drawn between literal *(vācya)* and metaphorical *(pratīyamāna)*
usages, the latter being "something like charm in girls which is dis-
tinct from the beauty of the various parts of the body."[54] That this

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[52] *Ibid.*, 52: *don dam de ni tha dad ma yin te/kun tu ro gcig mtshan nyid sangs rgyas
gsung* ||

[53] *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bshag pa rin po che'i 'phreng ba*, 527 and 533, as discus-
sed by Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism*. Tokyo 1980, 36,
48.

[54] Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, 283-284.

distinction is quite familiar within Buddhist texts is clear from the *Lankāvatāra*,[55] where it is said that any attempt at conveying the sense (*artha*) of a text by means of literal exegesis is like feeding uncooked rice to children. The tantric author Nāropa, in his *Sekkodeśaṭīkā*, distinguishes between outer (*bāhya*) and inner (*adhyātmika*) readings, and affirms that his system is based on the latter.[56] Tsong kha pa, in his commentary on the *Jñānavajrasamuccaya*,[57] tells us that there are two alternatives in reading scriptures (*śabda*), namely the intentional and non-intentional modes (*saṃdhā bhāṣā* and *nasaṃdhā bhāsā*). Thus, the distinction between literal, outer and non-intentional readings on the one hand, and metaphorical, inner and intentional on the other, is clearly drawn. What is not so clear in western scholarship is how to fit the *nītārtha/neyārtha* distinction into the scheme. Both Lamotte[58] and V.Bhattacharya[59] take *saṃdhā bhāsā* as *neyārtha*; however, Tsong kha pa tells us that one who is proficient in the most advanced tantras (*anuttara*) employs discourse that is *nītārtha* and *saṃdhā bhāṣā*.[60] This leads me to suspect that Lamotte and Bhattacharya were a bit too hasty. In the *Hevajra Tantra*,[61] Vajragarbha asks the Buddha: "What could be said about intentional language as used by the yoginīs, unknown by the śrāvakas? Please make this clear, Bhagavan." The Buddha replies with a very formalized list of correspondances between intentional and literal discourses. Here it seems that no great mystery is involved, as the intentional language is treated as a rather clear cipher. Thus, following Tsong kha pa, those texts written in *saṃdhā bhāsā* are *nītārtha* texts.

Steinkellner[62] discusses the *Guhyasamāja's* discerning of four types of meanings in texts: the literal meaning (*akṣārthaḥ* or *tshig gi don*), the common meaning (*samastāṅgam* or *spyi'i don*), the hidden or pregnant meaning (*garbhī* or *sbas pa*), and the ultimate meaning (*kolikam* or *mthar thug pa*). Another fourfold meaning classification, and one quite possibly related to this from the *Guhyasamāja*, originated with sGam po pa and

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[55] Nanjo, ed., *Lankāvatārasūtra*, 196.

[56] Nāropa, *Sekkodeśaṭīkā*. Ed. M.E.Carelli, Baroda 1941, 5.

[57] As discussed by G.R.Elder, Problems of Language in Buddhist Tantra. *History of Religions 15, 3*, 1976, 236.

[58] Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation, 355.

[59] Bhattacharya, Sandhābhāṣā. *Indian Historical Quarterly 4*, 1928, 295.

[60] Elder, Problems of Language in Buddhist Tantra, 236-237.

[61] Snellgrove, ed., *Hevajra Tantra*, vol.2, 61. (My translation.)

[62] Steinkellner, Remarks on Tantristic Hermeneutics, 453.

was developed by Klong chen pa. This method involves organizing Buddhist doctrines around four points *(chos bzhi)*. By the fifteenth century when Klong chen pa wrote his *Chos bzhi'i rin po che'i 'phreng ba*,[63] these four points came to be equated with four discernible levels of spiritual practices. These four points of practice are: (1) a basic life orientation of cultivating a sense of disgust for *saṃsāra* and a yearning for *nirvāṇa*; (2) the cultivation of the virtues understood as essential for spiritual progress; (3) the cultivation of specific virtues as antedotes for specific mental defilements; and (4) the transmutation of defilements into wisdom, a characteristic tantric metaphor for returning the mind to its original spontaneity, the basis of the *rdzogs chen* system. In each of these four points, or levels of spiritual practice, differing textual claims are employed, thus reducing truth claim controversies or hermeneutical problems to issue of levels of practice, a hermeneutical principle very close to that found in the *Saṃyutta* passages cited above. Once hermeneutical problems become problems of levels of spiritual practice, as Klong chen pa suggests, then the road is paved - conceptually if not historically - for a hermeneutic based not on textuality but on the mind of the adept. It is to this theme that I now call your attention.

IV. Adept Based Hermeneutics

Probably what is best known about the Buddha's pedagogic method is its emphasis on the one who is taught over and above what is taught. Following from the *Brahmajāla*'s principle of psychoanalyzing metaphysical statements, from the Buddhist perspective metaphysical claims are cognitive and emotional obscurations of a fundamental lack of ease *(duḥkha)*. To combat this malaise of reifications *(kalpanā)*, the Buddha offers a therapy which is not based on naive counter-claiming (that is, combating falsehood with "truth") but on silencing the passion for claiming itself *(dṛṣṭi-tṛṣṇā)*. A doctrine is not that which could be independently or objectively established, but is that which is useful in quelling this psychosis of metaphysics. Understanding a claim or a text, then, entails

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[63] Klong chen rab 'jams pa dri med 'od gzer, *Chos bzhi'i rin po che'i 'phreng ba zhes bya ba*. *Miscellaneous Writings (gSun thor bu) of Kun-mkhyen Klon-chen-pa dri-med-'od-zer*. Ed. Sanje Dorje, Delhi 1973, vol.1, 258-264. This work has been capably translated by A.Berzin, *The Four-Themed Precious Garland: An Introduction to Dzog Ch'en*. Dharamsala 1978.

understanding the one who claims or the one to whom claims are addressed.
To do hermeneutics means to shake a text to its foundations, to so-
licit it to reveal its psychological matrix. To facilitate the Buddhist
hermeneutical enterprise, various theories and systems about the nature
and types of practitioners, and corresponding useful doctrines and prac-
tices, were employed, and a survey of some of these systems will be the
topic for this section.

It was well known in Indian linguistic thought that a signifier
might evoke various signifieds depending on the mind and intentionally
of the one who hears or reads it. Mādhvācārya, discussing Buddhism in
his *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*,[64] says:

> "It is a common experience that the same word conveys dif-
> ferent meanings to different persons. For example ... the
> sentence 'the sun is set' may imply to a thief that it is
> time for committing a theft; to a brāhmin, that it is time
> for saying his evening prayers; and to an amorous man, that
> it is time for meeting his sweetheart. But what was meant by
> the speaker himself? ... The problem is the same in the
> teachings of the Buddha."

While for Mādhvācārya this free play of the signifier represented
a weakness and a lack of consistency in Buddhism, according to Buddhist
texts any consistency could be found in principle but not in the letter
of the text. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[65] has the Buddha saying that he
teaches according to the abilities and talents of his auditors, and that
he adapts his teachings by the principle of the freed signifier, or
"permutable meanings" *(anyamanehi arthehi)*. A similar point is made in
the *Laṅkāvatāra*[66] to the effect that while a good physician employs the
same therapeutic principle in all cases, due to differences in diseases
specific cures might vary. Thus, from a Buddhist point of view it is not
the weakness of inconsistency involved, but the skillful employment of
a nondogmatic therapy.

The same point is made in the *Saṃyutta Nikāya*.[67] When the Buddha was
asked how it was that he taught different portions of the Dhamma to dif-
ferent disciples, he explained that one makes the greatest effort where

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[64] Quoted by V.Bhattacharya, *The Central Conception of Buddhism: Adharchandra Mooker-
jee Lectures, 1932.* Calcutta 1934, 27.

[65] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 86.

[66] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 204.

[67] Freer, ed., *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, vol.4, 314.

one expects the fullest result, just as a farmer tends his best fields
and only then turns his attention to the poorer ones. Thus, a skilled
farmer needs to know which fields have the greatest potential; similarly,
a Buddhist hermeneutician needs to know the psyche of the adept in or-
der to make sense of what is prescribed in his case. "Let us never for-
get," cautions Lamotte,[68] "that the omniscient Buddha is less a master
of philosophy than a physician for universal suffering; he imparted to
each the teaching that he needed."

In the Sutta Piṭaka several typologies of adepts are offered. Prob-
ably the most basic typology is found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*[69] where
two groups are mentioned, the *dhammayogā* and the *jhānīyā*. In general
terms, the first group of adepts was the more intellectual and the sec-
ond was more inclined towards transic meditations. Apparently, even dur-
ing the Buddha's lifetime there were some tensions between these two
types (and probably continue to this day), so the Buddha admonishes each
to see the rarity and value of the other. These two types are called in
the *Kīṭāgiri Sutta*[70] the *paññāvimutto*, those freed by insight, and the
ubhatobhāgavimutto, those freed from both portions who were also known
as the *cetovimutto*, those freed through the affective mind. The *Kīṭāgi-
ri* goes on to mention five other types of disciples . The *kāyasakkhī,
diṭṭhipatto, saddhāvimutto, dhammānusārī* and *saddhānusārī*, all of whome
were still in the course of their training *(sekhā)*. I have discussed
this typology in some detail elsewhere,[71] so here I will focus on the
most elementary typology which corresponds to our western distinction
of intellectual and intuitive persons. While it has been a fashion to
see the latter as superior to the former,[72] the Buddha found the matter
much less categorial, saying that such judgments are no easy matter,[73]
that full enlightenment is accessible for both types,[74] and that the dis-
tinction refers to the sort of meditative teachings one gives to each.[75]

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[68] Lamotte, La critique d'interprétation, 357.

[69] R.Morris and E.Hardy, eds., *Aṅguttara Nikāya*. London 1885-1900, vol.3, 356.

[70] Trenckner and Lord Chalmers, eds., *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol.1, 477.

[71] Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection*, 78-95.

[72] For example, Bhikshu Sangharakshita, *A Survey of Buddhism*. 3rd ed. Bangalore 1966,
    161.

[73] Morris and Hardy, eds., *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, vol.1, 120.

[74] Freer, ed., *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, vol.1, 191.

[75] Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection*, 78-82.

Here we have a clear sense that different personality types require different therapeutic methods without stratification of superior and inferior. This distinction again becomes important in Tsong kha pa's hermeneutics, as we shall see.

Discussions about three types of adepts are found from the early texts right through late tantric works. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, the Buddha speaks of three sorts of disciples:[76] the *arukūpamacitta*, one with the mind like an open sore which festers at the slightest stimulation; the *vijjūpamacitta*, one with a mind like lightning who is capable of seeing things as they are in a flash; and the *vajirūpamacitta*, one with a mind like a diamond who has destroyed the *āsava*, who has attained full enlightenment. Indrabhūti, in his *Jñānasiddhi*, also speaks of three types of disciples - the inferior *(mṛdu)*, middling *(madhya)* and superior *(adhimātra)* - for whom differing teachings are required.[77] Of these types, Atiśa in his *Bodhipathapradīpa*, says that the first merely pursues worldly pleasures, that the second strives after his own welfare *(rang zhi)*, and that the last pursues the goal of others.[78] According to Professor Wayman, various meditationals manuals *(blo sbyong)* were prepared for each of these types, so the hermeneutics of the adept rather than the text is understood as the basis for the entire *lam rim* genre of Tibetan literature.

Another important principle for adept based hermeneutics is the doctrine of the five buddha families *(rigs ni rnam pa lnga)* and its correlation with the five *kula* or *gotra*. The *gotra* idea is introduced in the *Laṅkāvatāra* where it is equated with five *yānas*.[79] The five buddha families doctrine is found in germinal tantras such as the *Guhyasamāja*[80] and the *Hevajra*,[81] where they are said to share characteristics with the five elements and the five *skandha*. It was for Indrabhūti, however, to make an explicit psychological typology out of the *Guhyasamāja's* five buddha families,[82] and he discusses the characteristics of each of the

[76] Morris and Hardy, eds., *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, vol.1, 123-124.

[77] Indrabhūti, *Jñānasiddhi*. B.Bhattacharyya, ed., *Two Vajrayāna Works*. Baroda 1929, 95-96.

[78] A.Wayman, trans., *Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real: From the Lam rim chen mo of Tsong kha pa*. New York 1978, 7-9.

[79] A.Kunst, Some Aspects of the Ekayāna. *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honour of Edward Conze*, ed., L.Lancaster, Berkeley 1977, 314.

[80] Bhattacharyya, ed., *Guhyasamāja Tantra*, 1-11.

[81] Snellgrove, ed., *Hevajra Tantra*, vol.2, 17.

[82] Indrabhūti, *Jñānasiddhi*, 41.

psychological types. He also reinterprets the notion of wisdom, *jñāna*, in terms of the five aspects of wisdom as correlated with the families as the major theme of his *Jñānasiddhi*.[83] Just as the Buddha did not assert a superiority of one type of practitioner over the other, Indrabhūti does not prefer one of the five psychological types over another; rather, he follows the *Hevajra's* dictum[84] that the yogi has no special liking for one or another type, and that this fivehold division exists on a relative level only. So important was this psychological typology that Dombī Heruka[85] says that this *kula* doctrine is one of the most important aspects of Buddhist tantra.

   Since claims have no *sui generis* authority but need a reduction to their psychological matrices for analysis, then the interpretation of claims, and especially of hermeneutical problems, presupposes a jump in levels to the mind of the practitioner for successful Buddhist exegesis and interpretation. It is this dominant theme which I call adept based hermeneutics, a stance affirmed within Buddhist hermeneutical literature from its inception right through the present. These issues have been discussed at length by tantric authors like Klong chen pa, Indrabhūti and Tsong kha pa, and future work in Buddhist hermeneutics needs to take them into very careful consideration.

V. Tsong kha pa and the *Yāna* Controversy

   Having sketched text and adept based hermeneutics, we may now return to our *yāna* controversy and Tsong kha pa's resolution of it as formulated in his *sNgags rim chen mo*. I find that he employs several hermeneutical strategies in this work, namely:
(1) a solicitation of *yāna* language as referential, affirming a uniform but empty "inner horizon" of *śūnyatā*;
(2) following the traditional medical model for Buddhist teachings, a return to an everyday use of *yāna* language rooted in adept based hermeneutical principles;
and (3) a provisional separation of wisdom and method, the former being *śūnyatā* and the latter involving the Mahāyāna *trikāya* doctrine as under-

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[83] *Ibid.*, 33-40.

[84] Snellgrove, ed., *Hevajra Tantra*, vol.2, 99.

[85] B.Bhattacharyya, ed., *Sādhanamālā*. Baroda (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 41) 1928, lx-lxi.

stood through the definitive tantric practice of deity yoga (lha'i rnal 'byor), both as a method and as the actualization of Buddha intentionality.

Distinctions among yāna cannot be asserted, Tsong kha pa writes, for superficial reasons:[86]

> "Individual vehicles (yāna) are posited (1) if there is
> a great difference of superiority or inferiority between
> them in the sense that a vehicle is a fruit or goal to-
> ward which one is progressing; or (2) if there are dif-
> ferent stages of paths that give a different body to a
> vehicle in the sense that a vehicle is a cause by which
> one progresses. However, if the bodies of the paths have
> no great differences in type, then a series of vehicles
> cannot be assigned merely because the paths have many in-
> ternal devices or the persons who progress along them
> differ in superiority or inferiority."

Following up on his first point, Tsong kha pa then deconstructs claims as to differentiation of yāna. Accepting the position of many *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*[87] that there is indeed a uniform "inner horizon" of enlightenment, which he calls the cognizing of śūnyatā, he dismisses the construction of yāna discourse on the basis of wisdom. "Without cognizing the mode of subsistence of phenomena," he writes,[88] "one cannot extinguish all afflictions and cross to the other side of the ocean of cyclic existence. Therefore, the wisdom cognizing the profound (emptiness) is even common to the two lower types of superiors (śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas)."

To reaffirm yāna discourse after such a thorough deconstruction, even on a relative level, is his next task, and a rather difficult one. He poses an enigma:[89] "There is no contradiction in the fact that for a Mahāyānist, Hīnayāna is an obstacle to full enlightenment, but for one in the Hīnayāna lineage, it is a method for full enlightenment." As a

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[86] Tsong kha pa, *rGyal ba khyab bdag rdo rje 'chang chen po'i lam gyi rim pa gsang ba kun gyi gnad rnam par phya ba zhes bya ba (sNgags rim chen mo)*. Kyoto und Tokyo (Suzuki Research Institute, vol.181, Otani no.6210) 1955. In this discussion I will follow the diligent translation of the first chapter by J.Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet: The Great Exposition of Secret Mantra*. London 1977, 100-101.

[87] For examples see Vaidya, ed., *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, 21, 137, 140, etc.; Conze, trans., *Pañcav. śatisāhasrikā*, 237, 388, etc.

[88] J.Hopk , *Tantra in Tibet*, 115.

method for a certain personality type, the so-called *hīnayāna* teachings
lead to full enlightenment; but for another personality type, these
teachings are an obstacle. Citing Āryadeva's *Caryāmelāpakapradīpa*, Tsong
kha pa relies on adept based theories to say that, "the vehicles are di-
vided through arranging practices into three types (i.e., the three *yā-
na*) from the viewpoint of the three types of trainee's interests,"[90] and
these three types are the same as found in Indrabhūti's *Jñānasiddhi*.[91]

Thus, Tsong kha pa has established his provisional distinction for
discussing the Buddhist path: (1) an "inner horizon" of wisdom, and (2)
an "outer horizon" of method which is based on typologies of adepts. Wis-
dom in tantric Buddhism is often symbolized by the mother and method by
the father, so Tsong kha pa employs these symbols in an extended meta-
phor:[92]

> "Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna are not differentiated through
> their view (of emptiness) (the "inner horizon"): the
> Superior Nāgārjuna and his sons assert that the two
> vehicles are discriminated by way of acts of skill-
> ful method ... For instance, a mother is a common
> cause of her children, but the fathers are the cause
> of discriminating their children's lineage (Tibetan,
> Mongolian, Indian and so forth). In the same way, the
> mother - the perfection of wisdom - is the common
> cause of all four sons (śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas,
> bodhisattvas and samyaksambuddhas), but the cause
> of their being divided into the individual lineages
> of Māhāyana and Hīnayāna are methods, such as the
> generation of an aspiration to highest enlightenment
> for the sake of all sentient beings."

Very similarly, the *Laṅkāvatāra*[93] makes a distinction between the
"realization itself" and the teaching about it, the former a uniform "in-
ner horizon" of *śūnyatā* and the latter simply a methodical distinction.
Taking this methodical distinction as something real, according to the
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka,[94] is simply *prapañca* or the "outer horizon" of the

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[89] *Ibid.*, 103.

[90] *Ibid.*, 91.

[91] Indrabhūti, *Jñānasiddhi*, 95-96.

[92] J.Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet*, 99.

[93] Nanjo, ed., *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, 149.

[94] Vaidya, ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, 65.

psycho-historical context in which a doctrine is taught. It should be emphasized that this "inner horizon" of śūnyatā is a deconstruction of referentiality and its bases, that is, the egoistic tendencies (vāsanā) towards reification (vikalpa).

As I have indicated, Tsong kha pa's deconstruction of yāna language is not based on a nihilism: hence, the double hermeneutical movement which negates only to reestablish on an everyday level. Since yāna cannot be established on the basis of wisdom or goal, their distinction is a pragmatic, pedagogic one. It is as though Tsong kha pa, having negated yāna, continues to use the term "under erasure". So pervasive is the Madhyamaka dialectic throughout his writings that each time the negated term reappears, it is as though crossed over: yāna becomes yāna as a methodical instrument.

Distinctions of Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna are similarly deconstructed and reconstructed sous rature. Clearly, as he says,[95] "the division of the Mahāyāna into two is not made on account of wisdom cognizing the profound emptiness but on account of method" and, citing the Ātmasādhanā-vatāra of Jñānapāda,[96] "that the vast deity yoga constitutes the difference in method between the (pāramitāyāna, or the perfection path of the bodhisattva, and the mantrayāna, or the path for tantric adepts)."

As mentioned above, the deity yoga practices are a uniquely tantric application of the Mahāyāna notion of a kāya. Incidentally, this discussion bears heavily on the early Buddhist distinction of the cetovimutto and the paññāvimutto, the former being one who, having practiced the jhāna meditations, attains the supernormal powers (iddhi) which are essential for discovering and unobstructedly teaching the Dhamma, and the latter being the one who by bare insight attains enlightenment. Although both share the same wisdom (aññā), only the latter can truly emulate the Buddha in pedagogic skill.[97]

The trikāya doctrine, as used in tantric Buddhism, is itself often a hermeneutical tool. Professor Guenther quotes from the dGongs pa zad thal:[98] "The dharmakāya promulgates that which is ineffable; the sambho-gakāya, the six self-existing letters (oṃ maṇi padme hūm); and the nirmā-

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[95] J.Hopkins, Tantra in Tibet, 115-116.

[96] Ibid., p.132.

[97] For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Katz, Buddhist Images of Human Perfection, 83-95.

[98] H.V.Guenther, Tantra and Revelation. History of Religions 7,4, 1967, 300.

ɐakāya, the enumerable sūtras and tantras." This is to say that from the highest perspective, there is *śūnyatā* as teaching; from the middle level is the realm of symbolic strategies; and on the ordinary level are the letters *(vyañjana)*. The letters become associated with their sense *(artha)* only when deconstructed, when they are understood as empty. This might be why Kong sprul[99] tells us that only a seventh level bodhisattva can appreciate this uniform, empty inner horizon. Thus, the three *kāyas*, according to tantric exegesis, cohere only when understood in their utter interpenetration, when they are not reified by notions such as independent existence *(svabhāva)*; thus, the tantric doctrine of a "fourth" *kāya*, *svabhāvikakāya*, indicating not a fourth but the interpenetration of the three.

According to *pāramitāyāna* texts such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the last several stages of a bodhisattva's career are spent in attaining the various teaching powers of a Buddha, symbolized through such *kāya* (or intentionality) discourse.[100] In Vajrayāna Buddhism, these powers are actualized through the deity yoga practices, which are considered as the very essence of tantra.[101] Thus, the Vajrayāna is understood as simply a short way *(myur lam)*[102] for doing what takes aeons according to the *pāramitāyāna* traditions.

The deity yoga practices involve the selection of a tutelary *(yi dam)*, a selection which is based on the abilities *(dbang)*, psyche *(bsam)* and sensitivities *(khams)* of the adept, according to the Seventh Dalai Lama.[103] Understood as embodying the three *kāyas*, the *yi dam* is a symbol of Buddhahood which collapses the ultimate and relative levels into each other, a practice thereby existentially demonstrating the highest wisdom according to Buddhism, since the distinction of relative and ultimate, like all distinctions, is a reification for one who adheres to it but a skillful method for one who employs it without entanglements. As Tsong kha pa says,[104] "One should know that joining such method and wisdom nondualistically is the chief meaning of the method and wisdom set forth in the Mantra Vehicle."

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[99] Kong sprul, *Shes bya kun khyab*, vol.3, 534.

[100] Asaṅga, *rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa las byang chub sems dpa'i sa (Bodhisattvabhūmi)*. Peking Tripitaka 5538; Otani 5538, 165a-165b.

[101] J.Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet*, 119.

[102] bLo bzang bskal bzang rgya mtsho, *gZhan phan ra ster*, 8b-9a.

[103] *Ibid.*, 8b.

[104] J.Hopkins, *Tantra in Tibet*, 127-128.

Thus, by analyzing such text-based distinctions as *nītārtha* and *neyārtha*, ultimate and relative, by employing adept-based considerations such as types of adepts, and by filtering Mahāyāna doctrines such as *trikāya* through tantric practices, Tsong kha pa exemplifies a hermeneutic rather characteristic of later Buddhism. Basing his system on the Madhyamaka thoroughly, he is able to deconstruct all referential tendencies underlying the use of language, allowing for the free play of the signifier in a skillful, pedagogic proliferation of methods.

THE AKṢAYAMATINIRDEŚASŪTRA AND MI PHAM'S MKHAS 'JUG

by

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I

A most prolific and comprehensive scholar, Mi pham 'jam dbyaṅs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912 [hereafter: Mi pham]) wrote many works concerning not only his own indigenous Tibetan Buddhist tradition but also the Mahāyāna tradition of India.[1] Among his many commentaries on the Indian Buddhist śāstra tradition, he has one called *mKhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo źes bya ba'i bstan bcos* (*paṇḍitasya nayam avatāramukhanāma śāstram* [hereafter: *mKhas 'jug*]).[2] This work consisting of 164 Tibetan folia systematizes the major philosophical, psychological, and religious systems that constitute the basic ideas underlying Mahāyāna developments in India. Therefore, this text is indispensable for those who wish to sift out, from the vast array of Buddhist literature, those topics that relate to each other in the classification of the Mahāyāna doctrine.

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[1] Mi pham was born in Golok (East Tibet), where, at the age of twelve, he joined the Me hor gSaṅ sṅags chos gliṅ Monastery of Źe chen. Many of his teachers were shining beacons in the nineteenth-century cultural renaissance which became known as the Eclectic movement *(ris med)* in Eastern Tibet, and include dPal sprul Rinpoche (b. 1807), 'Jams dbyaṅs mkhyen brtse'i dbaṅ po (1820-92), Koṅ sprul blo gros mtha' yas (1813-99), rDzogs chen mkhan po padma rdo rje, and others.
Mi pham wrote over thirty-two volumes, including works on music, painting, poetics, sculpture, engineering, chemistry, alchemy, logic, philosophy, tantra, and astrology as well as two volumes on the *Kālacakra Tantra*. He was also a creative physician and his medical works are highly regarded to this day.
For more information, see L.S.Kawamura transl., *Golden Zephyr*. Emeryville 1975, xi-xx.

[2] Mi pham, *mKhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo źes bya ba'i bstan bcos* (Woodblock print, Poṭi style, N.D.).
See also his *mKhas 'jug gi sdom byaṅ*, Ka sbug (Kalimpong) 1965, and his *mKhas 'jug gi sa bcad mdor bsdus pa pad dkar phriṅ ba*, 1965.
For a commentary on the *mKhas 'jug* see mKhan po Nus ldan, *mKhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo'i mchan 'grel legs bśad snaṅ ba'i 'od zer*, Delhi 1974.

In composing his *mKhas 'jug*, Mi pham begins with the usual verses of veneration and intention and then divides his text into three major discussions:[3]

1. *mkhas par bya ba'i gnas bcu* (*daśavidhaṃ kauśalyam*: the ten kinds of expertise: 2a3-123b6),

2. *chos kyi sdom bźi* (*dharmoddāna-catuṣṭaya*: the four synoptic statements concerning the doctrine: 123b6-140b5), and

3. *so so yaṅ dag par rig pa bźi* (*catvāri pratisaṃvidaḥ*: four detailed and accurate knowledges: 140b5-161b4).

He concludes the treatise with a short discussion on the import of the text.

In this paper, I wish to focus my attention on the eighty inexhaustible topics (*mi zad pa brgyad cu*) that substantiate Mi pham's discussion on what constitutes a Mahāyāna path. However, before becoming incolved with that topic, I believe that the eighty inexhaustible topics should be put into their proper context, and therefore, I shall deal first with the ten kinds of expertise (*mkhas par bya ba'i gnas bcu, daśavidhaṃ kauśalyaṃ*).

II

The ten kinds of expertise are discussed by Maitreya in his *Madhyāntavibhāgakārikā* (hereafter: *MVK*) and explained further by Vasubandhu in his *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (hereafter: *MVB*) and by Sthiramati in his *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (hereafter: *MVT*). Mi pham has also written a commentary[4] on the *MVK* and therefore his systematization of the major philosophical, psychological and religious systems of Buddhism in India in his *mKhas-'jug* according to the ten kinds of expertise has been modelled

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[3] In previous presentations I have discussed the reason for Mi pham's ordering of his text into the three major discussions. See *Dawn Horse*, A Journal of the North American Tibetological Society, 1, 1981.
I have given an outline of the "Expertise Concerning the Vehicles",*Theg pa la mkhas pa*, at the 31st Conference of the Japanese Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies. See their *Indogakku Bukkyōgaku Ronshū 29:1*, 956-61.
I have also submitted to *Bulletin of Buddhist Cultural Institute Ryūkoku University* (Kyoto, Japan) my article, An Analysis of *Yāna-kauśala in Mi-pham's mKhas-'jug*. See No.20. Vicennial Commemoration Volume. 1982, 1-19.

[4] Mi pham, *dBus daṅ mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos kyi 'grel pa 'od zer phreṅ ba* (Woodblock print, Poṭi style, N.D.).

after the discussion of them found in Maitreya's *MVK*.

According to this earlier Yogācāra text, the tenth *tattva*,[5] which is known as *kauśalyatattva* (reality of expertise), consists of ten kinds of expertise, each one of which is to be cultivated to overcome a specific kind of opinionated view concerning the "self" (*bdag tu lta ba, ātma-dṛṣṭi*). Hence, Vasubandhu states:

> *kauśalyatatvaṃ darśanapratipakṣeṇety uktam* |[6]
> "The reality of expertise has been explained as
> an antidote against opinionated views."

and Maitreya states (*MVK* III, 2c,d):

> *kauśalyatatvaṃ daśadhā ātmadṛṣṭivipakṣataḥ* ||[7]
> "The reality of expertise is of ten kinds in view of
> being antidotes against opinionated views about the 'self'."

Vasubandhu goes on to comment further as follows:

> *eṣa daśavidha ātmāsadgrāhaḥ skandhādiṣu pravarttate* |
> *yasya pratipakṣeṇa daśavidhaṃ kauśalyaṃ* .... |[8]
> "These ten kinds of attachment to the unreality of 'self'
> originate [as attachments to] the psycho-physical constituents
> etc. There are, therefore, ten kinds of expertise to overcome
> them."

Thus, the ten kinds of expertise counteract ten kinds of attachments to opinionated views about the "self". Both Vasubandhu (*MVB*) and Sthiramati (*MVT*) clarify further that the ten kinds of expertise and the ten kinds of opinionated views about the "self" are related to each other in a specific way. That is, each one of the ten expertise counteracts one of the ten kinds of attachments that result from the basic belief that what is known as a "self" must exist as a permanent entity. In accord with the specificity of the ten kinds of expertise as ten specific attachments of the "self", Mi pham's discussion on the ninth one - i.e., expertise concerning the vehicles (*theg pa la mkhas pa, yānakauśalya*)

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[5] On the ten *tattva*, see G.M.Nagao, ed., *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*. Tokyo 1964, (*MBV*), 37-49. See also P.O'Brien, A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyântavibhâgaçâstra. *Monumenta Nipponica* 9, 1953, 277-303 and 10, 1954, 227-269.
See also Mi pham's text mentioned in n.4 above; Roṅ ston Śes bya Kun rig, *dBus daṅ mtha' rnam par 'byed pa'i rnam bśad legs par 'doms pa lha'i rṅa ba che*, Delhi 1979; and S.Yamaguchi's *Chū-hen-fun-betsu-ron Shaku-so*, Tokyo, Reprint, 1956; and *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, Nagoya 1934.

[6] *MVB* 44,1.

[7] *ibid.* 37,5.

[8] *ibid.* 44,6.

can be understood to be specifically for the purpose of counteracting
the opinionated view that a performer of a meditative exercise must be
a "self" having a permanent essence (*ātman*) because a meditative expe-
rience refers to a special combination of the *ātman* with the *manas* (mind).
This is, of course, the belief held by the Vaiśeṣikas.[9] However, the
Yogācāra do not uphold this view and instead argue that a meditative ex-
perience is a dynamic process of spiritual development that carries one
from one level of awareness to higher levels; thus, what is called a
"self" is this transforming process.[10]

III

In one sense, all Buddhist literature can be said to explain a meth-
od of attaining this higher level of awareness. The method by which
the higher level of awareness is attained is spoken about in Buddhism
as a path (*lam, mārga*) or a vehicle (*theg pa, yāna*), because sentient
beings are transported from a degenerating or negative condition to a
higher or more positive condition by means of it. Further, because a path
or vehicle in this sense is not merely the support or merely a carrier,
but is also what results from being the support or carrier, the path or
vehicle must always be understood as both the cause and the effect. Not
only is that the case, but the path or vehicle must not be misunderstood
to be a single method for spiritual growth, for Buddhist texts speak of
many possible paths. Among those many possible paths is the Mahāyāna
path which is said to be the "Great Vehicle" or the "Superior Vehicle"
in comparison to others such as the *śrāvakayāna* or the *pratyekabuddha-
yāna* owing to seven kinds of superiorities (*chen po bdun, saptavidhama-*

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[9] Yamaguchi, *Chū-hen-fun-betsu-ron-Shaku-so*, 233, n.5.

[10] See for example, Sthiramati, *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*. S.Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*.
Paris 1925, 15,10-12: *atha vā dharmapudgalābhiniviṣṭāś cittamātraṃ yathābhūtaṃ na
jānantīty ato dharmapudgalanairātmyapradarśanena saphale vijñaptimātre 'nupūrveṇa
praveśārthaṃ prakaraṇārambhaḥ.*
This seems to indicate that rather than an "Idealism" in the Western philosophical
sense, Yogācāra is better understood as a system for overcoming attachments, and
hence, could be understood as a "mentalism", in the sense that what counts is the
mental imagery or attitudes *(vijñaptimātra)*. This is not to say that the world and
"self" are merely ideas. When one realizes that what is real is not ever what con-
stitutes an "idea", then there occurs a transformation in one's epistemology. When
one's way of looking at the world and at oneself changes, then one's whole state of
being or existence changes *(āśrayaparāvṛtti)*. This is what I mean to say when I use
the words "transforming process" *(pariṇāma)*.

hatva),[11] three kinds of excellences (*bla ma med pa gsum, trividham
ānuttaryam)*,[12] and three kinds of distinctivenesses (*khyad par gsum)*.[13]
Furthermore, because the Mahāyāna claims that only it can transport its
adherents to the highest and most perfect enlightenment (*bla na med pa
yaṅ dag par rdzogs pa'i byaṅ chub, anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi)*, it is not
surprising to find the following statement in Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

> "The first occurence of an enlightenment mind begins from
> an initial aspiration to become enlightened. The bodhisattva's
> mastery of positive qualities (*kuśalaparigraha)* for the sake
> of enlightenment is superior to the mastery of those quali-
> ties by others in two respects: viz., superior in its cause
> (*hetuvaiśeṣya)* and superior in its effect (*phalavaiśeṣya)*.
> Furthermore, the bodhisattva's mastery of positive qualities
> is the cause for the highest and most perfect enlightenment,
> and that [highest and most perfect enlightenment] is its
> effect. When even the mastery of positive qualities by others
> [such as] the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha is not [a cause for
> the highest and most perfect enlightenment], what is there
> to say for [the mastery of] other sentient beings? There-
> fore, the mastery of positive qualities of those bodhisattvas
> is superior in cause and in effect in comparison to the mas-
> tery of positive qualities by others."[14]

Thus, the highest and most perfect enlightenment begins from the first
instance of awakening the mind and directing it towards enlightenment.

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[11] See S.Lévi, ed. and transl., *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*. Paris 1907, 171 (XIX,5-6 and
commentary).

[12] See *MVB* 60-70

[13] U.Wogihara, ed., *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*. Tokyo 1932, reprint
1973, 84-128.
See also E.Obermiller, *Analysis of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, London 1933. Fasc.I.
Calcutta Oriental Series 27. On pp.100-101 Obermiller discusses the three varieties
of Mahāyānistic activity *(pratipatter uddeśaḥ)* and therein one finds these three
kinds of distinctiveness discussed.

[14] U.Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Tokyo 1971, 19,9-17: *dve ime prathamacittotpādi-
kasya bodhisattvasya prathamaṃ cittotpādam upādāya bodhāya kuśalaparigrahavaiśeṣye
tadanyaṃ kuśalaparigraham upanidhāya. hetuvaiśeṣyaṃ phalavaiśeṣyaṃ ca. sa khalu
bodhisattvasya kuśalaparigraho 'nuttarāyāḥ samyaksaṃbodher hetuḥ sā ca tasya phalaṃ.
na tadanyaḥ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhakuśalaparigrahaḥ. prāg eva tadanyeṣāṃ sattvā-
nāṃ. tasmād bodhisattvānāṃ kuśalaparigrahaḥ tadanyasmāt sarvakuśalaparigrahād dhetu-
bhāvataḥ phalataś ca prativiśiṣṭaḥ.*

From this first occurence of an enlightenment mind (*dan po sems bskyed, prathamaṃ cittotpādam*) the deep (*zab mo, gambhīra*) and vast (*rgya che ba, udāra*) Mahāyāna doctrine, whose expanse, like open space and the ocean, is difficult to measure, begins to unfold. However, this deep and vast doctrine cannot be mastered nor can the highest and most perfect enlightenment be experienced without cultivating a path that leads to such spiritual growth. Thus, Mi pham introduces his discussion on what constitutes a Mahāyāna path with the following summary statement:

> "The Mahāyāna path, the nature of which is deep and vast,
> is difficult to fathom, like open space and the ocean. How-
> ever, in summarizing what is to be taken to heart concern-
> ing it, here [in this treatise], only the eighty inexhaus-
> tible topics will be discussed, because [the Mahāyāna
> path] is accounted for in their mode of being."[15]

IV

The source from which Mi pham derives the eighty inexhaustible topics is, without a doubt, the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* (*'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa źes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo* [hereafter: *ANS*]).[16] This sūtra begins with a very lenghty prologue (*122b5-139b2*), discusses the eighty inexhaustible topics in a most exhaustive manner (*139b2-263b2*), and concludes with a lenghty epilogue (*263b2-270b1*). The colophon of the text indicates that the Venerable Translator of Źus chen, Dharmatāśīla[17] translated the text into the Tibetan language. The original Sanskrit text

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[15] *mKhas 'jug 77b:* ....*theg pa ni | bdag med gñis ka yoṅs su rdzogs par rtogs pa'i zab pa daṅ | sa daṅ lam daṅ phar phyin sogs tshad med pa'i spyod yul la 'jug pa'i rgya che ba ste* .... | *srid źi la skyon yon du mi rtog par mñam pa ñid du śes pa'i sgo nas 'bras bu mi gnas pa'i mya ṅan las 'das par ... 'gyur pa* .... |

[16] *Āryākṣayamatinirdeśanāmamahāyānasūtra* (P[eking Tripiṭaka] 842). I have not looked at the *Āryākṣayamatinirdeśaṭīkā* (P 5495) written by dByig gñen (Vasubandhu). The copy of the sūtra that was readily available to me was the one found in microfiche edition of the *Lhasa Kanjur*, New York 1979. In that edition the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa-sūtra* can be found in vol.60, LMpj 022,060 8/24, *122b5-270a7*. The folio number of the chart in this paper is in accordance with the microfiche edition.
For a discussion concerning the meditations in this sūtra, see A.Wayman, The *sa-mādhi* Lists of the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra. Acta Orientalia 34*, Budapest 1980, 305-318.
For a discussion on *sems bskyed, cittotpāda* see L.Dargyay, The View of Bodhicitta in Tibetan Buddhism. L.S.Kawamura, ed., *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism*. Waterloo 1981, 81-95.

[17] *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra 270b1.*

is lost, but there exists a Chinese translation of it in the *Taishō* edition of the *Tripiṭaka*.[18]

The eighty inexhaustible topics, which will be listed shortly, are discussed in the *ANS* in order to explain why Akṣayamati has the name that he does. The question is put forth by Śāradvatiputra, and the events that lead up to the question are as follows.

When the Bhagavan completed his discourse on the final meaning (*ṅes pa'i don, nītārtha*) of the teaching (*chos kyi rnam graṅs, dharmaparyāya*), a splendor of light, so bright that nothing can compare with it, arises from the Eastern Direction. Awed by the brilliance of this light, Ānanda requests that the Bhagavan explain the reason for its appearance. The Bhagavan explains that this light anticipates the visit of Akṣayamati and his 60 billion attendants to the Sahā world. When Akṣayamati arrives as predicted, he pays hommage to the Bhagavan and takes his seat on a Lotus Throne. Then the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks the Bhagavan to explain from whence Akṣayamati comes, what Buddha resides over his country, of what kind is his country, and how far away his country is. The Bhagavan suggests that the Elder Śāradvatiputra put these questions directly to Akṣayamati. Śāradvatiputra does so and Akṣayamati responds in a manner reminiscent of the *prasaṅga* or *reductio ad absurdum* method of argument found in the Mādhyamika system. Śāradvatiputra responds by telling Akṣayamati that such questions were put to him not for the sake of hearing a discourse on the concepts of "coming" (*'oṅ ba*) and "going" (*'gro ba*) but for the sake of hearing the teaching of the superior one. Akṣayamati tells Śāradvatiputra that in that case the questions should be directed to the Tathāgata. Śāradvatiputra then directs the question to the Tathāgata who then explains that Akṣayamati comes from a place in the Eastern Direction called Mi 'dzum (Animṣa?)[19] which is as infinitely far away as the infinite numbers of sand of the Ganges River and in which the Tathāgata Samantabhadra resides. When Śāradvatiputra requests to be shown such a place, Akṣayamati enters the meditation called "displaying all Buddha Lands" (*saṅs rgyas kyi źiṅ thams cad kun tu ston pa źes bya ba'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin*) and manifests that land. The assembly in the Sahā

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[18] See J.Takakusu and K.Watanabe, ed., *The Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō*. Tokyo 1927, Reprint 1960, vol.13, No.403, 583a-612b. This text corresponds to Nanjio No.74, where all eighty topics can be accounted for; but see *MSA* 17, n.2, where Lévi seems to imply otherwise.

[19] See B.Nanjio, ed., *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Kyoto 1923, Reprint 1956, 105, 10, where *animiṣa* appears as the Sanskrit term translated into the Tibetan *mi 'dum*.

world pays hommage to Samantabhadra by adorning Mi 'dzum with multitudes of flowers. The bodhisattvas in Mi 'dzum ask Samantabhadra to explain the reason for the adornments of flowers. Samantabhadra explains that Akṣayamati is visiting the Sahā world and when he manifested the world of Mi 'dzum, the bodhisattvas of the Sahā world paid respect to the Ta-thāgata therein. Samantabhadra's attendants then request to be shown the Sahā world. When Samantabhadra displays the Sahā world by emitting a ray of light from his body, his attendance pay hommage to Tathāgata Śākyamuni and asks him why so many bodhisattvas have gathered from the Buddha Lands of the ten quarters to listen to the *dharma*. At this point, the Elder Śāradvatiputra gets up from his seat and asks Akṣayamati to explain why he is so-called. Akṣayamati responds that he is so-called, because he intends to render the topics of the teaching "inexhaustible".

Then Akṣāyamati begins to discourse on the eighty inexhaustible top-ics, one by one, in the following sequence:[20]

1. The first occurence of an enlightenment mind (*dan po sems bskyed, prathamaṃ cittotpādam; 139b2-142a3*),
2. Earnest intention (*bsam pa, āśaya; 142a3-143b4*),
3. The linking-up phase (*sbyor, prayoga; 143b4-146b2*), and
4. Aspiration (*lhag pa'i bsam, adhyāśaya; 146b2-148b2*).

At this point, the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks Akṣayamati whether there are other kinds of inexhaustible topics. Akṣayamati continues with his list:

5. Perfection of giving (*sbyin pa, dāna; 148b4-153a3*),
6. Perfection of ethical behaviour (*tshul khrims, śīla; 153a4-157b2*),
7. Perfection of endurance (*bzod pa, kṣānti; 157b2-163b2*),
8. Perfection of endeavour (*brtson 'grus, vīrya; 163b2-172a2*),
9. Perfection of meditation (*bsam gtan, dhyāna; 172b2-179a3*),
10. Perfection of discriminating awareness (*śes rab, prajñā; 179a3-201a4*),
11. Friendliness (*byams pa, maitrī; 201a4-204a2*),
12. Loving-kindness (*sñiṅ rje, karuṇā; 204a2-206a2*),
13. Sympathetic-joy (*dga' ba, muditā; 206a2-208a4*),
14. Equanimity (*btaṅ sñom, upekṣā; 208a4-210a5*),
15-19. Five supersensible cognitions (*mṅon śes lṅa, pañca abhijñāḥ; 210a5-221a4*),

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[20] The designations, for example 139b2, refer to folio number 139, reverse side, line 2, according to the Lhasa Kanjur. See n.16 above.

20-23. Four factors of attracting [people] (*bsdu dṅos bźi, catvāri saṃgrahavastūni; 221a4-223a3*),

24-27. Four detailed and accurate knowledges (*so so yaṅ dag par rig pa bźi, catvāri pratisaṃvidaḥ; 223a3-228b2*),

28-31. Four supports of confidence (*rton pa bźi, catvāri pratisara-ṇāni; 228b2-233a4*),

32-33. The two accumulations of merit and knowledge (*bsod nams daṅ ye śes kyi tshogs, puṇyasaṃbhāro jñānasaṃbhāraś ca; 233a4-239b5*),

34-37. Four sustained attentivenesses (*dran pa ñe bar gźag pa bźi, catvāri smṛty-upasthānāni; 239b5-248a3*),

38-41. Four correct exertions (*yaṅ dag par spoṅ ba bźi, catvāri prahānāni; 248a3-250b1*),

42-45. Four footholds for higher cognition (*rdzu 'phrul kyi rkaṅ pa bźi, catvāri ṛddhipādāḥ; 250b2-251a5*),

46-50. Five powers (*dbaṅ po lṅa, pañcendriyāṇi; 251a5-252b2*),

51-55. Five strenghts (*stobs lṅa, pañcabalāni; 252b1-253b6*),

56-62. Seven adjuncts to enlightenment (*byaṅ chub kyi yan lag bdun, saptabodhyaṅgāni; 253b6-255b1*),

63-70. The noble eightfold path (*'phags pa'i lam yan lag brgyad, aṣṭāṅgamārga; 255b1-257b1*),

71-72. Calm and extraordinary seeing (*źi gnas daṅ lhag mthoṅ, śama-thavipaśyanāḥ; 257b1-259a5*),

73-74. Unfailing memory and eloquent speech (*gzuṅ daṅ spobs pa, dhāraṇipratibhāna; 259a5-260b2*),

75-78. Four axioms of the teaching (*chos kyi mdo bźi [?] chos kyi sdom bźi, dharmoddāna; 260b2-261a6*),

79. The only path to walk (*gcig pus brgod pa'i lam, ekāyana; 261a6-262a4*), and

80. Expertise concerning appropriate action (*thabs la mkhas pa, upāyakauśalya; 262a4-263b2*).

V

In Mi pham's *mKhas 'jug*, these eighty topics make up the contents of the Mahāyāna path and they appear there in the same sequence. However, whereas Mi pham groups numbers 11 through 14 as the four immeasurables (*tshad med bźi, catvāry apramāṇāni*) and numbers 34 through 70 as the thirty-seven facets of enlightenment (*byaṅ chub yan lag so bdun, sapta-*

triṃśad bodhipakṣyāḥ), the *ANS* does not. Also, Mi pham uses the more fa-
miliar form *chos kyi sdom bźi* to refer to numbers 75 through 78 rather
than *chos kyi mdo bźi*, a form which appears in Maitreya/Asaṅga's *Mahā-
yānasūtrālaṃkāra* (hereafter: *MSA*) XVIII,101 as a title of a sūtra.[21] Far
more significant than these minor differences is the fact that the *ANS*'s
treatment of these eighty topics is an "inexhaustive" treatment of them.
One needs only to compare Mi pham's treatment of them to the very detai-
led and lenghty discussion on them found in the *ANS*, to appreciate Mi
pham's summary and systematization of these eighty inexhaustible topics.

The break which occurs after the first four inexhaustible topics have
been discussed and at which point the Elder Śāradvatiputra asks Akṣa-
yamati whether there are any other inexhaustible topics is not without
reason. Mi pham introduces the eighty inexhaustible topics by drawing
our attention to the fact that the Mahāyāna path begins to unfold with
the first occurence of an enlightenment mind (*prathamaṃ cittotpādam*).
This act of generating a mind directed towards enlightenment begins with
a desire to attain the awakened state (*sans rgyas*) for the sake of bene-
fiting all sentient beings.[22] The act of generating a mind directed to-
wards enlightenment comes to its completion and culminates as the awak-
ened mind when it reaches a state of being freed from the afflictions of
degenerating emotions (*ñon mons pa'i sgrib pa, kleśāvaraṇa*) and muddled
thinking (*śes bya'i sgrib pa, jñeyāvaraṇa*). The gradual process of nur-
turing the mind towards enlightenment is a process of spiritual growth
that consists of four specific levels of *cittotpāda* that correspond to
four specific kinds of defining characteristics which are, in turn, con-
textually related to the first four inexhaustible topics. Therefore, the
break that occurs after these four inexhaustible topics have been dis-
cussed is a device to draw our attention to the importance of the first
four in generating a mind directed towards enlightenment.

The relationship between the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* and
the four specific kinds of defining characteristics of a mind directed
towards enlightenment has been clearly described by Maitreya/Asaṅga in
MSA IV,2:

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[21] *MSA* 158, 20: *dharmoddāneṣu hi bhagavatā sarve dharmā anātmāna iti deśitaṃ.*

[22] Mi pham, *mKhas 'jug* 95b5: ...*'bras bu bla na med pa'i byaṅ chub mchog chos kyi sku
thob pa daṅ | de thob nas nam mkha' ji srid du gzugs kyi skus phyogs bcu'i 'jig rten
kun tu byaṅ chub chen po'i tshul mdzad pa bcu gñis sogs ston pa'i phrin las sems
can gyi khams la rgyun mi 'chad par 'jug pa yin no ‖*

cittotpādo 'dhimokṣo asau śuddhādhyāśayiko 'paraḥ |
vaipākyo bhūmiṣu matas tathāvaraṇavarjitaḥ ||[23]

"That mind directed towards enlightenment is zealous
   application;
      is pure in intention on another [spiritual stage];
   Is thought of as a matured state, and likewise, is freed
      from afflictions."

Interpreting this *kārikā* according to Sthiramati's *Sūtrālaṃkāravṛtti-bhāṣya*,[24] the first specific level of a mind directed towards enlighten-ment is characterized by determination (*mos pa, adhimokṣika*), because this mind is generated from a trust (*dad pa, śraddhā*) in the deep and vast teachings of the Mahāyāna. It comes into operation at the stage of zealous application (*mos pa'i spyod pa'i sa, adhimukticaryābhūmi*). The second specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is charac-terized by a purity of intention (*lhag pa'i bsam pa dag pa, śuddhādhyā-śayika*), because at this stage, actions that benefit both oneself and others are done owing to the fact that a state of equanimity regarding oneself and others is attained. It is "pure", because this intention is freed from the subject/object dichotomy. It comes into operation from the first bodhisattva stage and lasts until the seventh (*saptasu bhūmi-ṣu*). The third specific level of a mind directed towards enlightenment is characterized by its capacity to bring sentient beings to maturation (*rnam par smin pa, vaipākika*), because at this stage, non-discriminating awareness (*mi rtog pa'i ye śes, avikalpajñāna*) occurs spontaneously and perfections, such as *dānapāramitā*, are cultivated with spontaneity and with ease. It is operative from the eight to the tenth bodhisattva stages (*aṣṭamyādiṣu*). The fourth specific level of a mind directed towards en-lightenment is characterized by its total lack of being bound up with obscurations (*sgrib pa spaṅs pa, anāvaraṇika*), because it is no longer obscured by degenerating emotions and muddled thinking. Thus, Sthirama-ti's commentary clearly indicates that the relationship between the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* and the four characteristics that empha-size the quality of each level reflects a gradual spiritual progress that begins with the generation of a mind directed towards enlightenment and that culminates in the attainment of an awakened state of enlightenment.

[23] *MSA* 14.

[24] D.T.Suzuki, ed., *The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition.* Tokyo-Kyoto 1959, vol.108, 233, leaf 2, line 6 to leaf 3, line 7.

In *MSA* IV,15-20, Maitreya/Asaṅga discuss the exemplary-traits (*aupa-myamāhātmya*) of *cittotpāda*.[25] It is in this connection that the *MSA* dis-cusses the eighty inexhaustible topics. That is, when a mind directed towards enlightenment is accompanied by one or more of the eighty inex-haustible topics, then that *cittotpāda* is said to exemplify certain traits that are discussed in view of twenty-two examples. Therefore, the *cittotpāda* that is accompanied by the first occurence of an enlighten-ment mind is said to be like the earth (*sa, pṛthivī*), because just as the roots, trees, medicine, and worms are supported by the great earth, so too in the same manner, it is on the basis of the first occurence of an enlightenment mind that earnest intention (*bsam pa*), the linking-up phase (*sbyor ba*), the perfections (*pha rol tu phyin pa*) and all of the other adjunts of enlightenment come forth.

Now, in Mi pham's discussion on the eighty inexhaustible topics, the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* are utilized to systematize the eighty into a coherent path of spiritual progress. This application of the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* to these eighty topics is lacking in *ANS*. Thus, in discussing the eighty inexhaustible topics as the contents of the Mahāyāna path, Mi pham cleverly puts them in the context of the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* and then discusses them in the light of the ten bodhisattva stages (*sa bcu, daśabhūmi*). What results on account of that systematization is as follows.

On the first specific level of *cittotpāda* - i.e., at the stage of zealous application (*adhimukticaryābhūmi*) - the first four inexhaustible topics are accomplished, and as each of the six perfections are accom-plished, the adherent passes from the first to the sixth bodhisattva stage.

On the second specific level of *cittotpāda* - i.e., when the adherent has reached purity of intention (*śuddhādhyāśaya*) - five component-groups that make up expertise in appropriateness of action (*thabs la mkhas pa, upāyakauśalya*) which characterizes the seventh bodhisattva stage come into operation. The five component-groups refer to:
1) the four immeasurables (numbers 11-14), the function of which is to encompass and not forsake all sentient beings;
2) the five supersensible cognitions (numbers 15-19) that have domain over the great desired outcome;

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[25] *MSA* 16-17.

3) the four factors of attracting [people] (numbers 20-23), whose func-
   tion is to bring sentient beings to maturity;

4) the four detailed and accurate knowledges (numbers 24-27), that func-
   tion to set one free;   and

5) the four supports of confidence (numbers 28-31), that do not let one
   down.

   On the third specific level of *cittotpāda* - i.e., when the adherent
has matured so as to help other sentient beings reach the highest and
most perfect enlightenment (*vaipāka*) - the adherent traverses the last
three bodhisattva stages (*aṣṭamyādiṣu*). During the eighth bodhisattva
stage when the perfection of the vow (*smon lam, praṇidhāna*) is cultivated,
three component-groups come into play. The three component-groups refer to:

1) the two accumulations of merit and knowledge (number 32-33) whose func-
   tion is to support the perfection of power (*stobs, bala*);

2) the thirty-seven facets of enlightenment (numbers 34-70) that are con-
   ducive to liberation (*nairyāṇika*);   and

3) the two of calm and extraordinary seeing (numbers 71-72) that func-
   tion as supports to the previous two.

During the ninth bodhisattva stage when the perfection of power is culti-
vated, two component-groups come into play. The two component-groups are:

1) the two of unfailing memory and eloquent speech (numbers 73-74) that
   function as supports for expounding the teaching, and

2) the four axioms of the teaching (numbers 75-78) that constitute the
   contents of the teaching.

In his discussion of the eighth and ninth stages, Mi pham seems to have
reversed the order[26] of the perfections, saying that the perfection of
power is cultivated in the eighth stage and the perfection of the vow in
the ninth stage. In the tenth stage, when the perfection of primordial
awareness (*je śes, jñāna*) is cultivated, expertise concerning appropri-
ateness of action (number 80) is attained. Its capacity to manifest the
twelve events of the Buddha's life (*mdzad pa bcu gñis*) comes as a result
of the six supersensible cognitions. These last three bodhisattva stages
are said to be the "three pure stages", because therein there is no dis-
tinction of "another" or of an "other" owing to the fact that there is
no attachment to the notion that a "self" exists as a permanent, inde-
pendent, entity. Therefore, in order to reach this state of equanimity,
pure and simple, the "three pure stages" are the only path to walk

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[26] Mi pham, *mKhas 'jug*, 93b: *sa brgyad par stobs kyi phar phyin la ñe bar rton pa* ...
and *sa dgu par smon lam chen po la dbaṅ bas* .....

(number 79).[27]

The three specific levels of *cittotpāda* discussed so far account for the contents of a Mahāyāna path, but do not account for the fruit reaped by following the path. In other words, the eighty inexhaustible topics do not account for the fourth specific level of *cittotpāda* – i.e., a state freeded from obscurations (*anāvaraṇa*) – which is the special quality of *buddhabhūmi*. Mi pham does not omit this aspect of *cittotpāda* in his *mKhas 'jug*, for he follows up the discussion on the eighthy inexhaustible topics with a discussion on the four kinds of *kāya* (states of being) and the five kinds of *jñana* (pristine awarenesses).

The eighthy inexhaustible topics have been categorized according to the five paths (*lam lṅa, pañcamārga*) in the *mKhas 'jug*. According to this scheme, the preparatory stage (*tshogs lam, sambhāramārga*) consists of the first three inexhaustible topics; the linking-up phase (*sbyor lam, prayogamārga*) is contextually related to "purity of intention", the fourth inexhaustible topic; the insight stage (*mthoṅ lam, darśanamārga*) is contextually related to the perfection of gift-giving (number 5) which is cultivated on the first bodhisattva stage of great joy (*rab tu dga' ba, pramuditā*); the path of practice (*bsgom lam, bhāvanāmārga*) is contextually related to all of the inexhaustible topics from the perfection of ethical behaviour to the only path to walk (numbers 6-79) which are cultivated during the eight bodhisattva stages beginning with the second stage of purity (*dri ma med pa, vimāla*) and ending with the ninth stage of good discrimination (*legs pa'i blo gros, sādhumatī*); and, finally, the fulfillment stage (*mthar phyin pa'i lam, niṣṭhamārga*), wherein the perfection of expertise concerning appropriateness of action (*thabs la mkhas pa, upāyakauśalya*) is cultivated, is the tenth and last bodhisattva stage called *dharmamegha* (*chos kyi spriṅ*), because the bodhisattva in this stage showers sentient beings with the *dharma*, just as clouds shower rain down upon the crops.

By way of conclusion, then, we have found that in his discussion on the eighty inexhaustible topics, Mi pham has incorporated the contents of the ANS in summarizing the Mahāyāna path according to the four specific levels of *cittotpāda* and in systematizing it according to the ten bodhisattva stages and the five paths. By this method, Mi pham has attempted to show that the Mahāyāna path as the cause for the highest and

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[27] Mi pham, *mKhas 'jug*, 93b: *dag pa sa gsum na ṅar 'dzin med pa'i phyir brgod gcig lam mñam pa ñid la źugs pas gcig pus bgrod pa źes kyaṅ ruṅ ṅo* ‖

most perfect enlightenment is contextually related to the first three specific levels of *cittotpāda*, the first nine bodhisattva stages, and the first four paths. As an effect, the Mahāyāna is the highest and most perfect enlightenment itself and this means that it is contextually related to the fourth specific level of *cittotpāda*, the tenth bodhisattva stage, and the fifth path.

NĀGĀRJUNA'S VYAVAHĀRASIDDHI

by

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I

Before we are in a position where we can attempt to form an opinion about the philosophy of Nāgārjuna in what I would consider its three main aspects, namely (1) the ontological, (2) the ethical (or religious) and (3) the logical (or epistemological),[1] we should, needless to say, try to reach a decision about the problem: which of the numerous works - actually more than one hundred - ascribed to him are really authentic.[2]

For this purpose we must propose certain internal and external criteria of authenticity. In this way we find ourselves enabled to assign the various texts ascribed to him to three groups: the authentic, the spurious and, finally, the uncertain ones. This is what I have endeavoured to do in a forthcoming book on the works and the philosophy of Nāgārjuna, and the following remarks to some extent draw on the results reached in that essay.[3]

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[1] For this tripartition of the problems of philosophical inquiry I am following the ancient Greek scheme probably hailing from Xenocrates (cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. mathematicos*, VII,16; Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum*, I,18 etc.).
Some modern philosophers additionally prefer to treat problems concerned with the nature and function of consciousness as an independant fourth "psychological problem", cf. e.g. H.Høffding, *The problems of philosophy*, New York 1905, and his *Erkenntnistheorie und Lebensauffassung*, Leipzig 1926.
To me it appears questionable whether Indian philosophers at large ever clearly recognized a distinction between the problems of being (ontology), the problems of language (logic/epistemology) and, subsequently, the problems of psychology. As for Nāgārjuna, he confines himself to a *satyadvayavibhāga*, a *upāya/upeya*-relationship in which our Occidental distinctions tend to be obliterated.

[2] As no critical or complete list of the attributions is available in one place one still has to resort to the indices to the Tibetan and Chinese collections and, for the texts edited in Sanskrit, to bibliographies such as H.Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism. A survey with bibliographical notes*. Osaka-fu 1980, 235-245 (incomplete).

[3] *Nagarjuniana. Studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna*, Copenhagen 1982. See also my *Nāgārjunas filosofiske værker*, København 1982.

First the internal criteria: Here we may most conveniently start by axiomatically accepting the unanimous Indian, Chinese and Tibetan tradition that Nāgārjuna is the author of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. No objection can seriously be raised against this assumption. We should then try to form ourselves a clear idea of the style, the purpose, the background and the contents of this work, which is, from the *yukti* point of view, his *magnum opus*.[4]

If we then peruse the other works transmitted under his name we shall find that a rather large group of these are in close agreement with the tenets of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in one way or other. However, before we are ready to accept the traditional ascription, our internal criteria must be supported by the available external criteria. Here the main evidence is afforded by the testimony of "reliable witnesses", i.e. authors and commentators belonging to Nāgārjuna's school. For various reasons we may consider it highly probable (but, admittedly, not absolutely certain) that subsequent Mādhyamikas such as *Piṅgala (i.e. the author of *zhōng lùn*), Buddhapālita, Bhavya (or Bhāvaviveka),[5] Candrakīrti, Śāntadeva (rather than Śāntideva),[6] Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita provide

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[4] From these four points of view *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is closely related to *Śūnyatā-saptatikārikā* (and the *vṛtti*) and *Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā* (also with the *vṛtti*). Their style only differs in so far as ŚSK and VVK are much briefer that MMK and that they were composed in the *āryā*-metre.
The cultural background of these three works comprises Abhidharma and some archaic Buddhist *vāda*-tradition. They are addressed to learned monks with the purpose of eradicating their *vikalpas, dṛṣṭis* etc., so as to attain *prapañcopaśama*. This is done by establishing *śūnyatā*, as preached in the *āgama* of Mahāyāna, by means of *sādhana* and, in particular, *dūṣaṇa*. - In the ultimate analysis this is fully consistent with the tenets of Nāgārjuna's other works. One should not allow the fact that the style of e.g. *Suhṛllekha, Sūtrasamuccaya, Ratnāvalī* or *Catuḥstava* is usually quite simple and unphilosophical to mislead one to the supposition, that they are, for that reason, spurious. That the *deśanā* varies according to the mental level of the *vaineya* is, of course, a *locus communis* in Mahāyāna as well as in the works of Nāgārjuna. The form and contents of the *dharmadeśanā* depend on the intention of the teacher. The decisive point is whether the teaching is useful or not, not whether it is ultimately "true" or not, cf. e.g. *Ratnāvalī* II,35, IV,94; *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XVIII,6, 8; *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 98-99, etc.

[5] I see no reason to take Bhavya and Bhāvaviveka (or Bhāvin etc.) as two different authors, as done e.g. by S.Yamaguchi and Y.Ejima. Cf. my Adversaria Buddhica, *WZKS 26* (1982).

[6] For the reading Śāntadeva - rather than Śāntideva (which may be explained as a later *lectio facilior*) - v. *JIP* 9 212, n.5.

us with reliable testimony when they assign a certain text to Nāgārjuna, the founder of their school.[7]

When the results from applying the said internal criteria are thus supported by the external ones, I do not think that we should hesitate in endorsing the authenticity of the works in question. In this way I have come to the conclusion that the following twelve works are to be considered authentic: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Śūnyatāsaptati, Vigrahavyāvartanī* (both including the *vṛtti*), *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā, Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā, Bodhicittavivaraṇa, Vaidalya, Catuḥstava, Sūtrasamuccaya, Bodhisaṃbhāra(ka), Suhṛllekha* and *Ratnāvalī*.[8] The remaining works, then, are in most cases of unascertained authorship,[9] or, in a few cases, certainly spurious, for instance if they quote a later author such as Āryadeva or Maitreyanātha.[10]

<div align="center">II</div>

Occasionally Indian śāstras belonging to the Madhyamaka school provide us with quotations from works which are not transmitted either in Sanskrit, Chinese or Tibetan, but which they, nevertheless, ascribe to Nāgārjuna, sometimes even mentioning the title of the work now lost to

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[7] To be sure, we are not to-day in a position to p r o v e that the testimony of these authors is always worthy of unreserved credit. The notion of "reliable witness" is based on a general impression from my study of all the extant works of these authors. It is only very seldom that one can go "beyond" them (as in the case of checking their quotations). Nevertheless it cannot be denied that they are - and certainly try their best to be - utmost faithful to the spirit and the letter of the tradition they represent. As they all are, at the same time, deeply conversant with their tradition and very conservative towards it, we may regard them as "good witnesses".

[8] In my *Nagarjuniana* I have edited the Sanskrit texts and/or the Tibetan versions of: *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā, Yuktiṣaṣṭikārikā, Vyavahārasiddhi* (fragment), *Bodhicittavivaraṇa, Catuḥstava* (I and III only).

[9] The most important of the uncertain works is no doubt the **Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā* (Taishō 1521). It has several quotations from Nāgārjuna's **Bodhisaṃbhāra(ka)* (Taishō 1660).

[10] Quotations from Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* occur in **Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (Taishō 1509), *Akutobhayā* and *Abudhabodhaka* (Peking ed. 5238. Cf. 3145 ascribed to Advayavajra. It is ultimately the same text). Maitreyanātha is quoted in the *Guhyasamājatantraṭīkā*.

us in its entirety.[11]

One of these is the *Vyavahārasiddhi*. As known, a work bearing this title is mentioned by the Tibetan historian Bu ston.[12] Referring to this text of Nāgārjuna he says that it was composed in order "to demonstrate that though there is no *svabhāva* in the absolute sense (*paramārthataḥ*), still *laukikavyavahāra* is justified in a relative sense (*saṃvṛtitaḥ*)..."[13] On the other hand, the very existence of this work is denied by later Tibetan authorities on the ground that there "is not a single instance of such a quotation (i.e. from a work of the name)".[14]

However, a new piece of evidence showing that Bu ston was quite right is to be found in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*.[15] Here we come

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[11] Here it will be appropriate to draw attention to a verse from Nāgārjuna's *Loka-parīkṣā-nāma-śāstra* (on the authority of Avalokitavrata, *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, TP 5259, Źa, 96a: *'jig rten brtag pa źes by ba'i gran [= bstan] bcos*). It is qouted by Bhavya, *Prajñāpradīpa*, TP 5253, Tsha, 114b (= Derge ed. 3853, Tsha, 94a):

| *'di ni yod ñid 'gog pa ste* || *med ñid yoṅs su 'dzin pa min* |
| *nag po min źes smras pa na* || *dkar po yin źes ma brjod bźin* |

In other words: one can, in the ultimate sense, "deny" the existence (of *svabhāva*) without at the same time positively accepting its non-existence. A similar idea is expressed *Ratnāvali* I,59:

syād astidūṣaṇād asya nāstitākṣipyate 'rthataḥ |
nāstitādūṣaṇād eva kasmād nākṣipyate 'stitā ||

(Incidentally, this verse is quoted and the idea discussed in Jitāri's *Sugatamatavi-bhaṅgabhāṣya*, TD 3900, A 62a, q.v.). Nāgārjuna's idea is that *paramārthataḥ* one does not d e n y (negate) *svabhāva*, one only s u g g e s t s, by way of *prajñapti*, that there really is no *svabhāva*. Such a "negation" (which only resembles a negation) without any affirmative implication may be supported by *dṛṣṭānta*s current on the *saṃvṛti*-level. Thus, for instance, *vyavahāra* may help us beyond itself towards *paramārtha* (cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,10 etc.).

[12] See E.Obermiller (tr.), *History of Buddhism by Bu-ston*. Heidelberg 1931, I,51.

[13] The Tibetan text may be found in Lokesh Candra (ed.), *The Collected Works of Bu-ston* (Śatapiṭaka Series 64, Ya 670: *don dam par raṅ bźin med kyaṅ kun rdzod tu 'jig rten gyi tha sñad 'thad ciṅ grub ston pa tha sñad grub pa daṅ drug yin no źes gsuṅ ṅo*.

[14] See F.D.Lessing and A.Wayman (eds./trans.), *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*. The Hague 1968, 86: ... *sña rabs pa dag tha sñad grub pa* | *źes bya ba daṅ drug tu 'dod la* | *raṅ re'i bla ma dag tha sñad grub pa źes bya ba'i gźuṅ rigs tshogs kyi ya gyal źig yod na* | *'phags pa'i slob ma rnams kyi gźuṅ du 'phags pa'i gźuṅ thams cad khuṅs su ma draṅs pa med pas* | *de dag tu draṅs 'oṅ dgos pa las* | *de dag tu draṅs pa gcig kyaṅ ma byuṅ ba'i phyir daṅ* | *tshig gsal gyi gśam du rigs tshogs thams cad bgraṅs kyaṅ tha sñad grub pa ma bgraṅs pa'i phyir* | *med par śes gsuṅ ṅo* | ...

[15] On this text v. M.Ichigō, A Synopsis of the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* of Śāntarakṣita. *JIBS* 20:2, 995-989. (Mr.Ichigō is also preparing an edition and translation of this important text.)

across a quotation of six verses discussing *pratītyasamutpāda*.[16] According-
ing to Kamalaśīla, his pupil and commentator, who, to be sure, we may
regard as a reliable witness, these verses are extracted from Nāgārjuna's
Vyavahārasiddhi.[17]

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[16] The six verses occur TP 5285, Sa 69b 1-5 and TD 3885, Sa 71b 3-6:

(1) | *yi ge gcigs sñags gaṅ yaṅ med* ‖ *yi ge maṅ po gźan yaṅ med* (Pañjikā *med pa'aṅ min*, DP *med pa yin*)|
   | *yi ge 'gags pa rnams min la* ‖ *rten nas de ni med pa'aṅ min* |
(2) | *de bźin raṅ gi yan lag las* ‖ *sman ni gud na* (P *nas*) *mi snaṅ ṅo* |
   | *sgyu ma'i glaṅ po snaṅ ba de* ‖ *de dag las min gźan yaṅ min* |
(3) | *rten ćin 'brel par byuṅ ba de* ‖ *yod dam med par su źig 'dod*|
   | *de la dmigs par byed pa yi* ‖ *mig gi rnam śes byuṅ ba ltar* |
(4) | *las daṅ ñon moṅs dbaṅ 'phaṅs* (D'phags) *pa*‖ *len bcas srid las 'byuṅ ba daṅ* |
   | *de bźin du ni gzugs 'byuṅ ba* ‖ *yod dam med par su źig 'dod* |
(5) | *de ltar srid pa'i yan lag kun* ‖ *tha sñad kyis ni gdags pa ste* |
   | *'di ltar 'gog la sogs pa yi* ‖ *chos kun dgoṅs te gsuṅs pa yin* |
(6) | *ji ltar sñags te sñags min daṅ* ‖ *ji ltar sman yaṅ sman min pa* (D *la*)|
   | *de ltar rten* (D *brten*) *nas gsuṅs pa de* (D *ste*) ‖ *gñis ka 'grub par 'gyur ma yin* |

[17] TP 5286, Sa,123a5-124b7 and TD 3886, Sa, 117a1-118a7:

...*'di ni 'phags pa klu* (P *glu*) *sgrub kyi źal sña nas kyis* Tha sñad grub pa *las
bstan to* ‖ *de las ni sñags daṅ sman daṅ sgyu ma'i dpes chos thams cad rten ćin
'brel par 'byuṅ ba ñid kyi gtan tshigs kyis don dam par yod pa daṅ med pa ñid las
yaṅ dag par 'das par sgrub par byed do* ‖
   'di ltar sñags ni yi ge re re'am 'dus pa źig yin par 'gyur graṅ na | *re źig re re
ni ma yin te* | *yi ge gcig brjod pa kho nas 'bras bu 'byuṅ bar thal bar 'gyur ro* ‖
gaṅ yaṅ *a źes bya ba la sogs pa yi ge gcig pa'i sñags 'byuṅ ba de yaṅ yi ge rnams
ni cha śas daṅ bcas pa yin pa'i phyir yaṅ dag par na gcig par mi ruṅ ba ñid de de
lta bas na* | yi ge gcig sñags gaṅ yaṅ (P *ya*) med de | *yi ge re re'i* (P *re ba'i*) *sñags
med do źes bya ba tshig go* ‖ yi ge maṅ po gźan yaṅ med *ces bya ba ni yi ge 'dus pa
rnams kyaṅ sñags ma yin pa ste* | *yi ge rnams ni rim gyis 'byuṅ ba can yin pas tshogs
pa med pa'i phyir ro* ‖ *'o na 'gags pa rnams tshogs par 'gyur ro sñam pa la* | yi ge
gags pa rnams min la *źes bya ba smos te* | 'gags pa *źes bya ba ni raṅ gi ṅo bo las
ñams pa źes bya'o* (P *ba'o*) ‖ *gaṅ dag raṅ gi ṅo bo las* (P *las* om.) *ñams pa de dag ni
bdag ñid med pa yin na gaṅ dag raṅ gi bdag med pa de dag ji ltar bsags par 'gyur* |
de lta bas na re źig sñags yod pa ñid bsal ba yin no ‖ *'o na ni śugs kyis med pa
ñid du 'gyur te* | *de phyir rtog pa daṅ ldan pa rnams sñags grub par bya ba'i phyir
'bad pa don med pa kho na'o* (P *na'o*) *sñam pa la* brten nas de ni med pa'aṅ min *źes
bya ba smos te* (P *te*) | *rkan la sogs pa'i byed pa las yi ge rnams 'byuṅ ba yaṅ mthoṅ
la de las kyaṅ* (P *kyaṅ* om.) *dug sel ba la sogs pa'i 'bras bu 'byuṅ ba yaṅ mthoṅ na* |
ji ltar gcig tu med pa ñid du 'gyur | *'dis ni sñags kyi dpes bsgrub par bya ba ma
tshaṅ ba ñid yoṅs su spaṅs so* ‖
   sman gyi dpe'i yaṅ yoṅs su spaṅ ba'i phyir | de bźin raṅ gi yan lag las (D *las* ‖)
źes bya ba la sogs pa smos so ‖ *gal te zva rgod daṅ gla sgaṅ* (P *glas gaṅ*) *la sogs
pa* (P *par*) *raṅ gi yan lag rnams las sman tha dad pa źig yin na ni de'i tshe dmigs
pa'i rig byar gyur pa'i phyir* (D *phyir* ‖) *logs śig na dmigs par 'gyur ro* ‖ *ci* (D *ji*)
*dmigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa ma yin na ni de'i tshe yan lag rgyur byed pa don med pa
kho nar 'gyur ro* ‖ *ci* (D *ji*) *ste yan lag 'dus pa tsam sman yin no sñam na de yaṅ
rigs pa ma yin te* | *de'i yan lag rnams kyaṅ 'dus pa tsam gyi raṅ bźin yin pas raṅ gi
ṅo bo ma grub pa'i phyir ro* ‖ *raṅ gi ṅo bo ma grub pa rnams kyaṅ* (P *kyaṅ* om.) *ji
ltar 'dus par 'grub par 'gyur* | *sgyu ma'i dpe las yaṅ bsgrub par bya ba'i phyir* |

The argument in these stanzas may be paraphrased as follows:
Phenomena such as mantras and *auṣadha* are quite efficient and useful in
daily life. They depend on their respective "parts" or "ingredients",
but are really neither quite identical with them nor quite different (i.
e. independent) from them. In the same way one may certainly speak of
the existence of a human individual or person based on the five *skandha*
which, again, depend on *karmakleśākṣepa*, the projective power of *karma*
due to passions. But, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a
human being or person, either identical with the *skandha* or absolutely

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sgyu ma'i glaṅ po de yaṅ snaṅ źes bya ba la sogs pa smos so ‖ *'di ltar sgyu ma'i glaṅ
po che de ni 'jim pa'i dum bu la sogs pa las tha dad pa'am tha dad pa ma yin pa źig
tu 'gyur graṅ na | re źig tha dad par ni ma yin te | 'di ltar sgyu ma mkhan daṅ sgyu
ma'i rgyu de dag las gud na mi snaṅ ba'i phyir ro* (P snaṅ ṅo) *źes khoṅ nas 'byuṅ
ṅo ‖ yaṅ na de dag las* źes bya ba ni sṅags daṅ sman dag las te | gaṅ gis ni de dag
las tha dad pa 'gyur ba 'jim pa'i dum bu la sogs pa dag las logs śig tu ni sgyu
ma'i glaṅ po che yaṅ dag par mi dmigs so ‖ tha dad pa ma yin pa* (P ma yin pa om.)
yaṅ ma yin no sñam la | gźan min min (P gźan min) *źes bya ba smos te | rigs pa źes
bya ba lhag ma yin no ‖ gźan ni tha dad pa źes bya'o ‖ gźan ma yin pa ni tha dad pa
ma yin pa źes bya ba'i tha tshig ste | de lta bu kho nar mig ma 'khrul pa can rnams
kyis mi mthon ba'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin pa'an ma yin no źes bya ba'i tha tshig
go ‖ 'o na ni de med pa kho na yin no sñam pa la | rten ciṅ 'brel par 'gyur ba de
źes bya ba la sogs pa smos so ‖ de źes bya ba ni sgyu ma'i glaṅ po che ste | rten
ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba yin pa'i phyir med do źes brjod par yaṅ mi nus la | de ñid
daṅ gźan du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa'i phyir yod do źes brjod par yaṅ mi nus pas
de'i phyir dpe grub pa yin no ‖ phyogs kyi chos bsdu ba'i phyir* (P phyir |) de la
dmigs par byed pa yi *źes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | gaṅ la gzugs kyi skye mched de
la dmigs pa'i ṅaṅ tshul yod pa de la skad ces bya'o ‖ mig gi źes bya ba ni 'jug lṅa
pa* (D mjug lṅa ba, P ljug lṅa) *| mig mas 'byuṅ ṅo źes bya ba'i tha tshig go ‖ yaṅ na
'di ni 'jug* (D mjug) *drug pa can yin te | mig daṅ 'brel pa can gyi* (P gyi om.) *mig
gi rnam par śes pa źes* (P źes om.) *bya ba'i tha tshig ste | srid pa las 'byuṅ ṅo źes
'og nas 'byuṅ ba daṅ sbyar bar bya'o ‖ las kyi bag chags 'bras bu 'byin pa la mṅon
du phyogs par gyur pa ni srid pa'o ‖
     las daṅ ñon moṅs dbaṅ 'phaṅs pa źes bya ba ni chod pa'i las kyi dbaṅ gis 'jug
pa'i phyir ro‖ len bcas pa ni zag pa daṅ bcas pa ste | srid pa las de lta bu'i ṅo.
bo byuṅ ba źes bya bar sbyar ro ‖ de bźin du źes bya ba ni las daṅ ñom moṅs pa'i
dbaṅ gis 'phaṅs pa ñe bar len pa daṅ bcas pa bźin du'o ‖
     srid pa'i yan lag kun źes bya ba ni ma rig pa la sogs pa rnams so ‖ de la sbyor
ba ni 'di ltar bya ste | gaṅ daṅ gaṅ dag rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba de dag ni don
dam par yod pa daṅ med pa ñid kyi tha sñad kyi lam las 'das pa'i yul* (P lus) *yin te |
dper na sṅags la sogs pa lta bu'o ‖ rnam par śes pa la sogs pa 'di dag kyaṅ de daṅ
'dra bas na raṅ bźin gyi gtan tshigs so ‖ gal te de lta na ji ltar bcom ldan 'das
kyis 'du byed rnams ni rtag pa med ces bya ba la sogs pas dṅos po rnams skye ba la
sogs par bstan sñam pa la | 'di ltar 'gog pa la sogs pa'i źes bya ba la sogs pa smos
te | gaṅ gi phyir dgoṅs nas bstan pa de'i phyir 'gal ba med do źes bya ba lhag ma yin
no ‖ dgoṅs pa ni skye ba la sogs pa ji ltar snaṅ ba kho na bźin yod pa'i phyir de
las dgoṅs nas | bdag med pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir skye ba la sogs pa bstan to
sñam pa yin no ‖
     ji ltar sman yaṅ sman min pa* (D pa ‖) źes bya ba la sogs pas ni ji skad bśad
pa'i don gyi* (P gyis) *mjug bsdud* (D sdud) *do ‖ gñis ka* (P gñi ga) źes bya ba ni
rgyu daṅ 'bras bu'o ‖ ...*

different from the *skandha*. Similarly, all external and internal *dharma* are, in fact, *pratītyasamutpanna*, born in mutual relationship, i.e. neither *sat* nor *asat*. Still, of course, one may speak of these specific Buddhist concepts in conventional terms for sheer practical purposes. They are not absolutely real, but they certainly "work" in our everyday lives.[18] In Kamalaśīla's introduction the purport of all this is conveniently summarized in a three-membered syllogistic formula:

> *pratijñā*: in the ultimate sense all *dharma* (concepts/things) transcend being and non-being;

> *hetu*: because they are *pratītyasamutpanna*;

> *dṛṣṭānta*: like a mantra, *auṣadha* or *māyā*.[19]

Let us see whether Kamalaśīla's attribution is supported by the internal evidence to be culled from some of the twelve authentic works mentioned above.

We may start by considering the very title of the text from which these verses are allegedly extracted, i.e. *Vyavahārasiddhi*, "establishment", or "proof" of *vyavahāra*.

The meaning Nāgārjuna assigns to the term *vyavahāra*, or *saṃvyavahāra* (m.c.) may be ascertained by consulting *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,6-10, 36; *Śūnyatāsaptati* 1 and 69; *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 28 and 70 (*vṛtti*) and *Ratnāvalī* II,14, q.v. Basically it means "usage", or "practice", either the conventional linguistic usage, or the various forms of commonly accepted practice, in particular Buddhist usage.[20]

Now, it may seem rather ironical that Nāgārjuna, so notorious for his destructive criticism of all conventional common-sense notions, should attempt positively to establish or prove *vyavahāra*.[21]

The paradox, however, is only apparent. As well known, Nāgārjuna advocates the reality of two truths, or, if you prefer, the truth of two realities: a relative (*saṃvṛti*) and an absolute (*paramārtha*).[22] Now, *vya-*

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[18] I have offered an annotated translation of the six verses in my *Nagarjuniana*.

[19] Striktly speaking this is a bit anachronistic. Nāgārjuna himself regularly applies the current five-fold syllogistic formula (v. *Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti, passim*), though he sometimes simplifies it by omitting *upanaya* and *nigamana*.

[20] Nāgārjuna's use of the term *vyavahāra* hardly differs from the traditional meaning of the word, v. *The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary*, s.v. *vohāra*.

[21] Actually, according to Nāgārjuna, one is in conflict with *saṃvyavahāra* when one does not take *śūnyatā* in the sense of *pratītyasamutpāda*. See *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV, 36; cf. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 70.

[22] Cf. the references and documents given in my *Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths*, and its sources. *JIP* 9, 161-214. Recently I became aware of S.Iida, *Reason and Emptiness. A Study in Logic and Mysticism*, Tokyo 1980. See especially 243 seqq.

vahāra belongs to the relative reality. According to Nāgārjuna one must understand and resort to the *vyavahāra* of *saṃvṛti* in order to realize and achieve *paramārtha*, which, again, is a necessary condition for attaining the *summum bonum* (*naiḥśreyasa*) of Buddhism: *nirvāṇa*.[23]

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[23] On the relationship between *saṃvṛtisatya* and *laukikavyavahāra* see the sūtra quoted in Candrakīrti's *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti*, TP 5268, Ya, 307b5: *kun rdzob kyi bden pa gaṅ źe na | ji srid du 'jig rten gyi tha sñad yi ge daṅ skad kyis ston pa'o ||* (TD 3867, Ya, 268b4.): *katamat saṃvṛtisatyam? yāval lokavyavahāraḥ ...*
Here, I cannot resist quoting *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,7-11 and 18 with illustrative extracts from Bhavya's *Prajñāpradīpa* (TP 5253, Tsha, 286a1-286b5, 287a4-287b4, 289a5-289b7 and TD 3853, Tsha, 227b6-228b1, 228b5-229a5, 230b1-231a1). - Summarizing this passage, with a glance to related passages elsewhere in Nāgārjuna's works, we may say that o n t o l o g i c a l l y (cf. n.1) *śūnyatā* is the law of *pratītyasamutpāda* established "beyond" being and not-being; e t h i c a l l y it presupposes *śraddhā* in the law of *karma* etc.; e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y it is a mystic intuition (*advaya-jñāna*) the result of a *śruta-*, *cintā-* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*; p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y it is strictly personal (*aparapratyaya*), freedom from *kleśa*.

> *atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyāṃ na tvaṃ vetsi prayojanam |*
> *śūnyatāṃ śūnyatārthaṃ ca tata evaṃ vihanyase || 7 ||*

'dir stoṅ pa ñid kyi dgos pa ni spros pa thams cad ñe bar źi ba'i mtshan ñid do || stoṅ pa ñid ni 'dzin pa thams cad daṅ bral ba'i mtshan ñid stoṅ pa ñid la dmigs pa'i ye śes so || stoṅ pa ñid kyi don ni de bźin ñid kyi mtshan ñid do || khyod kyis de dag ma rtogs (P rtog) pas | de'i phyir 'di lta ste |

> *yadi śūnyam idaṃ sarvam udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ |*

ces bya ba la sogs pa smra źiṅ | dper na nam mkha' la khu tshur gzas te | rnam pa du mas 'tshogs par byed pa de ltar gnod par byed do || theg pa chen po 'di la ni |

> *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |*

de dag kyaṅ gaṅ daṅ gaṅ źe na |

> *lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ || 8 ||*

de la 'jig rten pa'i kun rdzob ni 'jig rten gyi tha sñad de | 'di lta ste | gzugs la sogs pa dṅos po rnams (P rnams kyi) skye'o || gnas so || 'gag go ces bya ba daṅ | lhas (P lha) byin 'gro'o || khyab 'jug bśes gñen za'o || zla bas byin bsgom mo || tshaṅs pas byin grol lo źes bya ba dag 'jig rten gyi tha sñad kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pas | de ni 'jig rten pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin no || don dam par ni de don kyaṅ yin la | dam pa yaṅ yin pas don dam pa'am rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes dam pa'i don yin pas | don dam pa ste | de kho na gźan las śes pa ma yin pa la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid do || don dam pa ñid bden pa yin pas | don dam pa'i bden pa ste | de dus thams cad daṅ rnam pa thams cad du de bźin du gnas pa'i phyir ro || rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes de'i yul can yaṅ yul med pa'i tshul gyis don dam pa ste | de la don dam pa yod pa'i phyir ro || de 'gog pa daṅ rjes su mthun (P 'thun) pa skye ba med pa la sogs pa bstan pa daṅ | thos pa daṅ | bsam pa daṅ | bsgom (D bsgoms) pa las byuṅ ba'i śes rab kyaṅ don dam par ste | don dam pa rtogs pa'i thabs kyi phyir phyin ci ma log pa'i phyir ro ||

> *ye 'nayor na vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ |*
> *te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane || 9 ||*

gaṅ dag tshul bźin ma yin pa yid la byed pa'i liṅ tog chen pos | blo gros kyi mig gyogs pa tha sñad daṅ dom dam pa'i bden pa de gñis kyi rnam par dbye ba | yul gyi sbyor ba'i mtshan ñid ma 'dres pa | rnam par mi śes pa de dag gis ni saṅs rgyas kyi bstan pa zab mo'i de ñid rnam par mi śes so ||

. . . . .
gal te don dam pa'i bden pa bstan pa ñid kyis thar pa 'grub pa'i phyir | bden pa gñis
bstan pa ci (P ciṅ) dgos śe na | 'di ltar

    vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate |

de ni ṅag gi lam thams cad las yaṅ dag par 'das pa'i phyir ro ‖ gźan gyis yoṅs su
brtags pa'i rnam par rtog pa ma lus par | bsal ba med pa yaṅ don dam par rnam par
rtog pa daṅ | legs par bral ba gźan las śes pa ma yin par rtogs par mi 'gyur bas |
de'i phyir don dam par yaṅ bstan te |

    paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate ‖ 10 ‖

las daṅ ñon moṅs pa daṅ | skye ba ñe bar źi ba'i mtshan ñid do ‖ mkhas par rlom pa
gaṅ phuṅ po rnams stoṅ pa ñid las dṅos po med par lta ba daṅ | phuṅ po rnams mi stoṅ
ñid las dṅos por lta ba daṅ | bdag gis mthoṅ gyur to ‖ mthoṅ ṅo ‖ mthoṅ bar 'gyur
ro ‖ phuṅ po rnams stoṅ pa ñid do ‖ phuṅ po rnams las stoṅ pa ñid gźan no ‖ stoṅ pa
ñid la phuṅ po rnams yod do ‖ phuṅ po rnams la stoṅ pa ñid yod do ‖ stoṅ pa ñid phuṅ
po rnams daṅ ldan no sñam du sems pa de ltar tshul bźin ma yin par lta ba mṅon pa'i
ṅa rgyal can de ni |

    vināśayati durdṛṣṭā śūnyatā mandamedhasam |

rnam par mi rtog pa'i śes rab kyi srog gi bar chad byed pa'i phyir phuṅ bar byed
do ‖ lta ñes źes bya ba ni log par mthoṅ ba ste | dṅos po daṅ | dṅos po med pa la
sogs pa'i tshul du mthoṅ ba'o ‖ ji ltar phuṅ bar byed ce na |

    sarpo yathā durgṛhīto vidyā vā duṣprasādhitā ‖ 11 ‖

sprul rgod de khro gtum che ba dug drag po bzuṅ (P gzuṅ) ñes ni (D na) | 'dzin par
byed pa ñid phuṅ bar byed pa daṅ | nam mkha an da rñil ltar sṅo ba la 'phags te |
raṅ gi rgyan gyi nor bu'i 'od zer dag gis bar snaṅ brgyan par bya'o sñam du yid la
bsam pa byas pa | rig sṅags ñes par bsgrubs na | sgrub pa po ñid cho ga ñams pas
phuṅ bar byed pa ltar ro ‖ . . . . .

    yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe |

dṅos po rkyen rnams la raṅ gi dṅos po yod pa daṅ | med pa daṅ | yod med daṅ | gźan
daṅ | gźan ma yin pa daṅ | gñis kar yod pa ma yin pa ni | don dam par rkyen rnams las
rten ciṅ 'brel par ṅo bo ñid kyis 'byuṅ ba med do ‖ mig la sogs pa'i skye ba ni tha
sñad kyi bden pa la brten pa yin no ‖ de stoṅ pa ñid du bśad pa ni | ṅo bo ñid daṅ
bral ba'i phyir te | ji skad du |

    yaḥ pratyayair jāyati sa hy ajāto na tasya utpādu svabhāvato 'sti |
    yaḥ pratyayādhīnu sa śūnya ukto yaḥ śūnyatāṃ jānati so 'pramattaḥ ‖
źes gsuṅs pa daṅ | de bźin du
    svabhāvānutpattiṃ saṃdhāya mahāmate sarvadharmāḥ śūnyā desitā iti
gsuṅs pa lta bu'o ‖

    sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā ‖ 18 ‖

rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba źes bya ba | stoṅ pa ñid gaṅ yin pa de ni brten nas
gdags pa ste | 'jig rten pa daṅ 'jig rten las 'das pa'i tha sñad 'dod pas ñe bar
len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa yin no ‖ de ñid dbu ma'i lam yin te | dbu ma ni
skye ba daṅ | skye ba med pa daṅ | yod pa daṅ | med pa'i mtha' gñis spaṅs pa'i phyir |
'di lta ste | skyes pa yaṅ ma yin | ma skyes pa yaṅ ma yin | yod pa yaṅ ma yin | med
pa yaṅ ma yin | rtag pa yaṅ ma yin | mi rtag pa yaṅ ma yin | stoṅ pa yaṅ ma yin | mi
stoṅ pa yaṅ ma yin pas . . . 'phags dkon mchog brtsegs pa'i mdo las
    astīti kāśyapa ayam eko 'nta nāstīty ayaṃ dvitīyo 'ntaḥ yad etayor dvayor
    antayor madhyaṃ tad arūpyam anidarśanam apratiṣṭham (?) *anābhāsam avijñaptikam*
    aniketam
źes gsuṅs pa de dag grub po ‖ lam ni thob pa'i thabs źes bya ba'i tha tshig go ‖ . . .

All this could not be expressed more concisely than in the celebrated lines of *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,10 - but let us for a change quote *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 67cd and 68:

| *kun rdzob las ni tha dad par* |
| *de ñid dmigs pa ma yin te* |

| *kun rdzob stoṅ pa ñid du bśad* |
| *stoṅ pa kho na kun rdzob yin* |
| *med na mi 'byuṅ ṅes pa'i phyir* |
| *byas daṅ mi rtag ji bźin no* |

So, obviously, in a relative sense *vyavahāra* (*saṃvṛti*) is indispensable for Nāgārjuna, though, in an absolute sense, it vanishes into the inconceivable void of *śūnyatā*.[24]

Hence it is a matter of deep concern to Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of being in conflict with common Buddhist *vyavahāra*. To him this is a sheer slander - *adhilaya*.[25]

We have already seen above h o w Nāgārjuna proceeds to *establish vyavahāra*, namely by means of syllogistic proof. Thus, to summarize, *vyavahāra* is real in a relative sense, because it "works", just as does a mantra.

From these observations we must admit that Bu ston seems to have hit the mark exactly when he stated that though there is no *svabhāva paramārthataḥ*, still the common empirical *vyavahāra* is quite justified *saṃvṛtitaḥ*.[26] When we consider the fragment itself somewhat closer we see h o w Nāgārjuna attempted to prove *vyavahāra* in a relative sense. He does so by advancing syllogistic proof by means of the standard Naiyāyika inferential procedure, namely the five-membered syllogism: *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (logical reason), *udāharaṇa* (exemplification), *upanaya* (application), and finally *nigamana* (conclusion). We may observe that he also avails himself of this procedure in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* when arguing *saṃvṛtitaḥ*.[27] On the other hand, in *Vaidalyasūtra*

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[24] *śūnyatā* (= *śūnyam iti*) can be said of anything (including itself as a concept), but nothing can be said of *śūnyatā* as such (= *tathatā, paramārtha* etc.).

[25] Cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,13; *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 63.

[26] It seems that Bu ston knew more about *Vyavahārasiddhi* than the mere fragment would permit him to deduce. But from which source?

[27] Naturally, if he wished to persuade his opponents he would have to succumb to the rules of debate endorsed by them. Hence the discussion is conducted on the *saṃvṛti-* (*vyavahāra-*) level in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 1-27. (Note that the *athavā* in 28a marks the shift of level! Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva very often use *atha(vā)* with a very strong adversative sense.)

32-48, he refutes the five members of the syllogism, but this is, not surprisingly, *paramārthataḥ*.[28] Summing up, then, I find that the available external and internal evidence is mutually corroborative in favour of our regarding this, if we may say so, as a *siddhi* of *Vyavahārasiddhi*.

<div style="text-align:center">

III

</div>

Before concluding this paper I would like to add a final remark on the relationship between "logic" and "ontology" according to Nāgārjuna. He himself sees this problem, as most other problems, in the perspective of the two truths (*satyadvaya*).[29]

Thus on the *saṃvṛti*-level we find him engaged either in demonstrating his own standpoint (i.e. *sādhana*), or in refuting that of his opponents (i.e. *dūṣaṇa*). While on this level he willingly complies with the conventional, more or less common-sense, rules of debate current in his days. But sometimes we see him shifting to a hypothetical mode of argument which is quite his own. Now the *svātantrika*, so to speak, becomes a *prāsaṅgika*.[30]

First he hypothetically a s s u m e s - *argumenti causa* - that there is such a thing as *svabhāva* (nature/attribute)[31] in order, then, to point out the absurd implications (*prasaṅga*) inherent in this assumption when faced with the stern demands of logic and experience.[32] Here on the *saṃvṛti*-level he has only one thesis to defend, namely that all dharmas are empty of *svabhāva*.[33]

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[28] The number of the sūtras follow the one given in the edition of Y.Kajiyama in *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotensia 6-7*, 1965.

[29] Cf. ref. n.22 and 23.

[30] These terms, to be sure, are not of early Indian origin. Though usually employed (but, I may add, in my opinion, not quite pertinently) to distinguish Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's attitudes towards the role to be assigned to logic in Madhyamaka, they are quite convenient for describing the two possible modes of argumentation in Madhyamaka in general. Any Mādhyamika is, in fact, as well a *svātantrika* as a *prāsaṅgika*, but admittedly some are more *prāsaṅgika* than others. It is simply a question of whether one mainly employs *dūṣaṇa* or *sādhana* to "establish" *śūnyatā*. It is not a philosophical but a personal distinction.

[31] Basically, in Madhyamaka, the term *svabhāva* indicates either the natural existence or the specific essence of any *bhāva*, but, of course, only *saṃvṛtitaḥ*.

[32] The terms employed by Nāgārjuna to indicate an absurd implication (*prasaṅga*) inherent in the *pūrvapakṣa* confronted with logic and experience are: *(na) vidyate, yujyate, upapadyate, gamyate, bhaviṣyati (bhavet), upalabhyate, sidhyate* and *(a-)-sambhava*. Though Nāgārjuna apparently does not presuppose any formal theory of *pakṣābhāsa* his *prasaṅgas* nevertheless serve to point out some of these.

[33] This is made most explicit in *Vigrahavyāvartanī, passim*.

On the *paramārtha*-level, however, he is beyond the ifs and the musts of logic. In his own words, he no longer defends the thesis he took so great pains to defend on the *saṃvṛti*-level: that things lack *svabhāva*. (To be sure, it is *saṃvṛtitaḥ* that *paramārtha* is *niḥsvabhāva*. This is, as we shall see, a *prajñapti*.)[34]

We may now be tempted to ask whether there is a consistency behind the paradox that Nāgārjuna at the same time defends a thesis and also does not defend a thesis.

Let us consider this a bit closer. In both cases he is concerned with one and the same thing, namely lack of *svabhāva*. But a difference remains, it is one of the outlook, one might say.[35] On the *saṃvṛti*-level he s p e a k s and a r g u e s about lack of *svabhāva* as a truth (an ultimate truth). On the *paramārtha*-level he is still concerned with the same thing (or rather nothing) but here one cannot s p e a k about it. Here it has become r e a l i t y, as it were.

The distinction (*bheda*) between *truth* and *reality* is solely a question of whether the medium of language is present or not.[36] One can speak the truth, but one cannot possibly speak the reality. At the best one can, as Nāgārjuna points out, "suggest", or "allude" to reality by means of *prajñapti*, or indications.

The final problem, then, is to get "beyond" language – beyond *prapañca* as Nāgārjuna would say.[37]

There is no theoretical solution to this problem. Theoretical solutions can, at the best, offer us truth, not reality.

According to Nāgārjuna's faith the unexpressible gap between the truth of *saṃvṛti* and the reality of *paramārtha* can only be bridged in an utterly practical way, namely by devoting oneself with *śraddhā* to

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[34] For the Buddhist usage of *prajñapti* in general v. A.K.Warder in *JIP I*, 181-196 and P.M.Williams, *JIP VIII*, 1-45. In Nāgārjuna this key term occurs regrettably seldom. Judging from the context, however, it may be defined as a name devoid of content or reference, be it *sat* or *asat*. Thus, rather than a designation, it is a suggestion or an allusion to something which cannot, by definition, be designated, viz. *paramārtha*, or *śūnyatā*. As such a *prajñapti* (= *vyavahāra*) is a psychologically necessary means of *paramārthādhigama*.

[35] The difference is mainly epistemological and psychological, in no case ontological. Cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV,9: *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 5-6; *Ratnāvalī* I,42 etc.

[36] It is, in other words, "language" (*prapañca*) which expands and propounds "truth" from "reality". (Again, Nāgārjuna's use of this important term does not seem to differ significantly from its canonical employment. Cf. recently, R.E.A.Johansson, *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*. Oxford 1979, 190-196.)

[37] *prapañca* is only quenched by stopping its *modus operandi*, namely *vikalpa*. This happens in *śūnyatā*. Cf. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XVIII, 5 and 7.

this Buddhist way of life, or in a word, to *vyavahārasiddhi*.[38]

If we still insist in a theoretical definition of the relationship between *paramārtha* ("ontology") and *saṃvṛti* (its "empirical image")[39] we may avail ourselves of Candrakīrti's words and say that it is one of ends and means – *upāyabhūtaṃ vyavahārasatyam, upeyabhūtaṃ paramārthasatyam* ...[40]

This is not a very informative definition, merely an indication of their function. But Nāgārjuna was quite aware that this cannot well be otherwise:

Of *paramārtha* one cannot speak; it is a matter of belief and personal experience (*aparapratyaya*). Much less can one speak of its relationship to anything, viz. *saṃvṛti*. One must learn to remain satisfied with mere indications – *prajñapti*.

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[38] On *śraddhā*, v. *Ratnāvalī* I,5; *Śūnyatāsaptati* 72. For the canonical passages v. *Sūtra-samuccaya*, TP 5330, A, 175b seqq.

[39] We do not know how Nāgārjuna understood the word *saṃvṛti* etymologically. If we are to judge from his use of *saṃvṛti* in contrast to *paramārtha*, *saṃvṛti* is the *satya* which in a superficial way "covers" *paramārthasatya*, to which it somehow corresponds (i.e. when it is, to use a term not found in Nāgārjuna, *tathyasaṃvṛti*). Thus it is in a sense the "symbolic truth" (cf. the use of *prajñapti*, sometimes given as a synonym of *saṃvṛti*, e.g. *Śikṣāsamuccaya* 137.). To be sure, this hypothesis is not supported by the usual definitions given of *saṃvṛti*, cf. La Vallée Poussin in *MCB 5*, 159-160 and J.Imanishi, *Fragmente des Abhidharmaprakaraṇabhāṣyam in Text und Übersetzung*. Göttingen 1975, 8-11.

[40] *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,80. (*-bhūta* should be rendered "serves as".)

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THE BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA', AND THE MĀDHYAMIKA CLASSIFICATION IN TIBETAN GRUB MTHA' LITERATURE

by

K.MIMAKI (Kyoto)

In the course of my present work on a 14th century Tibetan *grub mtha'* text, the *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bśad pa'i mdzod* of dBus pa blo gsal, I noticed a significant detail concerning the classification of the Mādhyamika school. In this *grub mtha'* text, we find a kind of Mādhyamika classification which is not seen in the later dGe lugs pa texts and which gives us a hint for understanding a development in the classification of this school in Tibetan *grub mtha'* literature.

It is well known that dBus pa blo gsal is a 14th century bKa' gdams pa author and one of the principal compilers of the "Old Tibetan Canon of sNar than". As do the majority of *grub mtha'* authors, dBus pa blo gsal accords the highest position to the Mādhyamika school; but he emphasizes the philosophy of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, whereas Tibetan authors after Tson kha pa (1357-1419) rather stress Candrakīrtis philosophy.

dBus pa blo gsal's classification of the Mādhyamika school can be presented as follows:

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┌─ Sautrāntika-mādhyamika . .    Bhāvaviveka
├─ Yogācāra-mādhyamika . . .     Śāntarakṣita, Haribhadra
└─ 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa ...
                         . . .   Jñānagarbha, Candrakīrti
┌─ Svātantrika . . . . . .       Bhāvaviveka (Jñanagarbha, Kamalaśī-
│                                                                  la)
└─ Prāsaṅgika . . . . . . .      Buddhapālita (Candrakīrti)
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[Table No.1. dBus pa blo gsal (14th c.): *Blo gsal grub mtha'*]

In this classification, the following three points are to be noted:
1. There are two types of classification, that of the Sautrāntika-mā-dhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika and 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa on the one hand, and that of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika on the other. These two types of classification are strictly distinguished in this *grub mtha'*, and are not combined as in the case of later dGe lugs pa *grub mtha'* texts.
2. The school named 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa ("Mādhya-mika who practice in accordance with what is known in the world") com-prises Jñānagarbha and Candrakīrti. The sources supporting this opinion are: for Jñānagarbha, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* 21 and for Candrakīrti, the *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,35. This school is often identified with the Prāsaṅgika school, as for example in the *Chos 'byuṅ* of Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364). But the third point, now presented below, proves that, in the *grub mtha'* of dBus pa blo gsal, this school is not identical with the Prāsaṅgika.
3. Jñānagarbha is considered as being a follower of the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa, as well as of the Svātantrika. This clearly shows that, in this context, the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa school is thought to be distinct from the Prāsaṅgika school.

The later dGe lugs pa authors such as Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan (1469-1546), the second Dalai Lama dGe 'dun rgya mtsho (1475-1542), 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa (1648-1722), lCaṅ skya the second Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786), dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po (1728-1791) and Thu'u bkwan the third Blo bzaṅ chos kyi ñi ma (1737-1802) combine the sub-schools of Mādhyamika, and consider the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika as branches of the Svātantrika. As for the Mā-dhyamika classification by later dGe lugs pa authors, that of 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa can serve as an example:

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┌ Svātantrika
│  ├ Sautrāntika-mādhyamika . . . . .   Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha
│  └ Yogācāra-mādhyamika
│       ├ rNam bden daṅ mthun pa . . .   Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla,
│       │                                Āryavimuktisena
│       └ rNam rdzun daṅ mthun pa . . .   Haribhadra, Jitāri, Kambala
│            ├ Dri bcas daṅ mthun pa  . .  Jitāri
│            └ Dri med daṅ mthun pa . . .  Kambala
└ Prāsaṅgika . . . . . . . . . . . . .   Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti,
                                         Śāntideva
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[Table No.2. 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa (1648-1722): *Grub mtha' chen mo*]

Earlier authors such as Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147-1216), Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzaṅ (1310-1391) and Bo doṅ Paṇ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451) present various classifications of the Mādhyamika school. However, none of them considers the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogā-cāra-mādhyamika as sub-schools of the Svātantrika.

We know today that the terms indicating the sub-schools of the Mā-dhyamika, such as the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika, Svā-tantrika and Prāsaṅgika, have been invented by Tibetan authors, and do not appear in Indian texts.

It was Ye śes sde, the great official translator (*źu chen gyi lo tsa ba*) at the beginning of the 9th century, who used the terms mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma (i.e. Sautrāntika-mādhyamika) and rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma (i.e. Yogācāra-mādhyamika) for the first time. In his *lTa ba'i khyad par*, this author indeed lists Bhāvaviveka as belonging to the Sautrānti-ka-mādhyamika school, and Śāntarakṣita to the Yogācāra-mādhyamika school.

Several versions of this *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye śes sde are extant. Besides the text contained in the Tibetan Canon, various versions have been discovered among Tun-huang manuscripts: in particular PT 814, 815, ST 692, 694. In the course of my inquiries, I have found another two frag-ments of the same text in the Tun-huang manuscripts: PT 820 and 2101.

In addition to the *lTa ba'i khyad par* of Ye śes sde, the following texts from the same period mention one or both of the combination names "Sautrāntika-mādhyamika" and "Yogācāra-mādhyamika"; the *lTa ba'i rim pa* of dPal brtsegs, the *lTa ba'i rim pa* of Ñi ma 'od, as well as quite a number of other anonymous Tun-huang manuscripts (ST 693, PT 116, 121, 817, 837, 842).

However, it should be pointed out that these terms appear also in an Indian text, the *Pañcakramaṭīkā Kramārthaprakāśikā* of Lakṣmī. But the Kaśmīrian nun Lakṣmī lived at the beginning of the 11th century, that is two centuries after Ye śes sde and the other Tibetan authors. Her text, therefore, does not diminish Ye śes sde's importance as the inventor of these terms.

If Ye śes sde was the first to use the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika, it still remains to be seen who created the terms Svātantrika (Raṅ rgyud pa) and Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur ba). They do not figure at all in the texts of the first diffusion of Buddhism (*sṅa dar*). It seems that they were used for the first time by Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (1055-?) in the *phyi dar* period, when he made extensive transla-tions of the texts of Candrakīrti. Thus, the terms Svātantrika and

Prāsaṅgika were also created by Tibetans. It is to be noted that the
Tibetans themselves did know that these terms were created by Tibetans:
for example, Tsoṅ kha pa and Śākya mchog ldan state this clearly.

Now we may ask who combined these two types of Mādhyamika sub-schools.
In other words, who put the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhya-
mika under the Svātantrika rubric? A tendency to do this seems to appear
first in Tsoṅ kha pa's writings.

In his *Lam rim chen mo*, composed in 1402 when he was 46 years old,
Tsoṅ kha pa presented the divisions of schools as they had been men-
tioned by several previous authors. Naturally he used the terms such as
Sautrāntika-mādhyamika, Yogācāra-mādhyamika, Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.
But he did not yet clearly combine the two types of classification.
Rather he kept a more or less critical attitude toward the division of
Mādhyamika schools.

In his *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po*, composed in 1406 when he was 50
years old, the combination of the two types of terms does not yet ap-
pear. This text is, among Tsoṅ kha pa's works, the nearest to being a
grub mtha' text. It consists of two parts: the first part is an exposi-
tion of Vijñānavādin philosophy based on the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* and the
second part deals with Mādhyamika based on the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*.   The
Mādhyamika part is subdivided into two sections: that of the Svātantrika
and that of the Prāsaṅgika. The Svātantrika section is again subdivided
into two parts: the doctrinal position of Bhāvaviveka and that of Śānta-
rakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

The outline of the *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po* can be presented as
follows:

		[ed.Sarnath/ed.Pek.]
⌐ Vijñānavādin		3.20/ 87b3
⌐ Mādhyamika		89.10/121a8
├ Svātantrika		108.2 /129a1
	├ Bhāvaviveka	108.4 /129a1
	└ Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla	118.18/133a7
└ Prāsaṅgika		138.15/141b2

[Table No.3. Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419): *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po*]

It is there that Tsoṅ kha pa should have used the terms Sautrāntika-
mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika, had he wished to combine the two
types of Mādhyamika classification. But in this treatise, the terms Sau-

trāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika do not appear even once:
this clearly shows that the combination of the two types of Mādhyamika
sub-schools was not yet systematically established. Be that as it may,
the organization scheme used by Tson kha pa in this treatise is almost
exactly that of later dGe lugs pa *grub mtha'* texts, the only difference
being the absence of the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mā-
dhyamika.

In the *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, a commentary on the *Mādhyamakāvatā-ra* of Candrakīrti, which Tson kha pa composed in 1418 one year before
his death, he used the term "rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa" (Yogācāra-
mādhyamika) and "Phyi don khas len pa'i raṅ rgyud pa" (Svātantrika who
admit the external object) in juxtaposition. We may say that in this
work Tson kha pa tends more toward the combination of the two types of
classification, even if it is not yet completely systematical.

In this context one should also check the works of Tson kha pa's two
eminent disciples, rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and mKhas grub rje (1385-
1438). A fertile field of inquiry might be the *sTon thun chen mo* of mKhas
grub rje. If one did find any mention of the classification in question,
this would of course antedate Se ra rJe btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan
(1469-1546), the author whom we took to be the first to explicitly com-
bine the two classifications.

Thus one might conclude, although not without reservations, that the
tendency to consider the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhya-
mika as sub-schools of the Svātantrika began to stabilize from Tson kha
pa on, and did not exist before his time.

However, one problem remains. A Bon po *grub mtha'*, the *Bon sgo gsal
byed* (or *Bon sgo dkar chag*) of Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal, presents the
classification of Mādhyamika as shown in the following Table:

```
┌─ Raṅ rgyud pa ──────┬──── mDo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa
│                     └──── rNal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma
└─ Grags ste spyod pa'i dbu ma = Thal 'gyur ba
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[Table No.4. Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal (14[th] c.?): *Bon sgo gsal byed*]

1. The Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and the Yogācāra-mādhyamika schools
are considered as sub-schools of the Svātantrika.

2. The Grags ste spyod pa'i dbu ma - by which we should understand
the 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa as we have seen it above
(*ste* is therefore an error for *sde*) - is identified with the Prāsaṅgika
school.

On the basis of the fact that Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal is a Bon po author, we might say that his classification was taken from his Buddhist precursor. As far as the identification of the Grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma with the Prāsaṅgika school is concerned, there is no problem: Bu ston could be his precursor. But the consideration of the Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika schools as branches of the Svātantrika raises a considerable problem. If Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal was posterior to Tsoṅ kha pa, there would be no problem. But it seems that he lived slightly before Tsoṅ kha pa. We should therefore take a closer look at Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal's dates.

According to the *rDzogs pa chen po źaṅ źuṅ sñan rgyud brgyud pa'i bla ma'i rnam thar* and the *g-Yuṅ druṅ bon gyi bstan 'byuṅ* of dPal ldan tshul khrims (20th c), Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal was a disciple of sPa ston dPal ldan bzaṅ po who was himself ordained in gŚen ston bSod rgyal dpal's presence.

According to the *Legs bśad mdzod* of Śar rdza bKra śis rgyal mtshan (1859-1935), bSod rgyal dpal was a grandson of Khro 'bum in the gŚen family. The younger brother of Khro 'bum, named Khri skyoṅ dar po was ordained and received the name of gŚen ston Ye śes blo gros. We can arrange these lineages as shown in Table No.5. The simple line indicates a familial relation and that with an arrow the transmission from master to disciple.

[Table No.5. Transmission down to Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal]

According to the *bsTan rtsis* composed in 1842 by Ñi ma bstan 'dzin (born in 1813, 24th Abbot of the sMan ri monastery), gŚen ston Ye śes blo gros constructed the monastery of Dar ldiṅ gser sgo khra mo'i gtsug lag khaṅ at Dar ldiṅ in gTsaṅ in the year 1173. However, according to the *źaṅ bod gaṅs ri'i ljoṅs dar g-yuṅ druṅ bon gyi dgon deb* of dPal ldan tshul khrims, the monastery was constructed in 1233, in other words the water-serpent year of one *rab byuṅ* later. Finally, according to another *bsTan rtsis* composed in 1928 by 'Jigs med nam mkha'i rdo rje (1897-1956),

the monastery in question was built in 1257. It is difficult to decide at which of these three dates the Dar ldin monastery was founded. All we can say is that it was constructed between 1173 and 1257. Therefore, gŚen ston Ye śes blo gros lived either in the second half of the 12th century or in the middle of the 13th century.

If we count thirty years between father and son, and twenty years between master and disciple, the period of activity of Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal could be almost one century later than that of gŚen ston Ye śes blo gros. We can therefore with some certainty date Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal either in the second half of the 13th century or in the middle of the 14th century. At any rate, it is unlikely that he lived after Tson kha pa.

The present inquiry might be fruitfully continued by investigating the influences that shaped Tre ston rGyal mtshan dpal's classification of the Mādhyamika schools. But at least, at the present stage, I believe I have traced one development in the Tibetan classification of the Mādhyamika schools in *grub mtha'* literature, and shown, on the basis of dBus pa blo gsal's classification, that the combination of the two types of classification is a product of a later period.

(N.B. The above is a summary of the Introduction to my forthcoming publication: *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, chapitre IX (Vaibhāṣika) et XI (Yogācāra) édités, et chapitre XII (Mādhyamika) édité et traduit, Kyoto, 1982.)

EMPTINESS - TOWARDS A SEMIOTIC DETERMINATION OF EMPTINESS IN MĀDHYAMIKA DISCOURSE

by

O.H.PIND (Århus)

I

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā |

tathāvidhaś ca saddharmas tatsamaś ca tathāgataḥ ||

tat tattvaṃ paramārtho 'pi tathatā dravyam iṣyate |

bhūtaṃ tad avisaṃvādi tadbodhād buddha ucyate ||

Nāgārjuna, *Acintyastava*

alakṣaṇam anutpādam asaṃskṛtam avāṅmayam |

ākāśam bodhicittaṃ ca bodhir advayalakṣaṇā ||

Nāgārjuna, *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*

1. Introductory remarks

1.1

The Mādhyamika discourse on Emptiness, *śūnyatāvāda*, has been a controversial topic in the field of Buddhist studies.[1] It remains so, and mainly for two reasons: on the one hand, it has proved difficult to establish a definitive and uniform determination of its underlying structure, since its paradoxical and basically dialectical nature seems to resist all attempts at a logical formalization.[2] On the other hand, the concept of Emptiness itself is ambiguous. The various contexts in which it occurs makes it clear that it not only represents an ontological category which defines the mode of being of entities, their essential lack of self-existence, *niḥsvabhāva*. Emptiness in Mādhyamika discourse is also a term which, among other terms, designates the category of the Absolute.[3] And it is the ontological status of this metaphysical category that first of all determines the Mādhyamika explication of the topic of Emptiness. For the basic theoretical object of Mādhyamika philosophy is not primarily the field of reality. Reality as such does not play any decicive role in its philosophical discourse except as an object of negation. And in this respect it manifests a radical negativity which aims

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[1] For a recent survey of this topic by J.May, see *Hōbōgirin* 470-493, s.v. *Chūgan*, and *Ruegg 1981* (unfortunately not accesible to me).

[2] There have been various attempts at formalizing Nāgārjuna's dialectic within the framework of western logic. See, for instance *Robinson 1957* and *1967* 50-57: Nāgārjuna's logic; cp. *Chatalian 1972*, which is an important critical study of *Robinson 1967*.

[3] For various synonyms of the Absolute, see BCAP 200, 19-21: ... *ekānekasvabhāvaviviktam anutpannāniruddham anucchedam aśāśvataṃ sarvaprapañcavinirmuktam ākāśapratisamaṃ dharmakāyākhyaṃ paramārthatattvam ucyate | etad eva ca prajñāpāramitāśūnyatātathatābhūtakoṭidharmadhātvādiśabdena saṃvṛtim upādāya abhidhīyate |*

    Ruegg 1978 seems to deny this terminological ambiguity, see especially p.180.

    For a description of the category of the Absolute in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, see *Ramanan 1966* 251-275, and *Ruegg 1969* 297-388.

    It might be argued that the position of the Absolute differs in the two traditions of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. But, as I hope to indicate in the second part of this paper, there is no difference with respect to the position and the nature of the Absolute as such. What separates the two traditions is the degree of radicality they display as regards the possibility of establishing a discourse on the Absolute. The Mādhyamika attitude is almost totally uncompromising in this respect, whereas the Yogācāra tradition seems to represent a more liberal attitude. It is, in the final analysis, a question of the position of language in the philosophical discourse. The Mādhyamika position is clear: language has to be abolished in order that the Absolute may be accessible. Hence this attitude prohibits the establishing of a positive dogmatic discourse.

at a total dialectical annihilation of reality by reducing it to zero.

This dialectical emptying of the field of reality and its final dis-
appearance as an object of perception and designation is said to merge
into the subjective realization of the category of the Absolute trans-
cending difference and representation.[4] But so far the nature of this
dominant dimension in Mādhyamika philosophy has been beyond the reach of
analysis.[5] And it must be admitted that the problematic presented by the
existence of this category almost seems to preclude a discursive approach.
For it is difficult, if not impossible, to speak with any certainty a-
bout the nature of this annihilation. By definition Emptiness is virtu-
ally obliterated in so far it is designated as such. For by doing this
it would become an object having the same ontological status as other
objects. It is undoubtedly this fundamental ambiguity which is reflected
in the prohibition against designating this total absence of difference,[6]
since this would involve a process of differentiation and thus stain the
non-different purity of the Absolute. Hence it is not without reason that
Candrakīrti equates the category of the Absolute with silence,[7] which

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[4] The classical formulation of this dialectical emptying of being and representation
may be found in Nāgārjuna *MMK* XVIII, (*ātmadharmaparīkṣā*)*. See especially the vers-
es 7 and 9:
  nivṛttam abhidhātavyaṃ nivṛttaś cittagocaraḥ |
  anutpannāniruddhā hi nirvāṇam iva dharmatā ‖ 7 ‖

  aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam |
  nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam ‖ 9 ‖

* This title is much more in accordance with the actual contents of the *prakaraṇa*
than the title in Candrakīrti, *ātmaparīkṣā*. It is represented by *Akutobhayā*, P
5229, 84b: *bdag dań chos brtag pa*, and may thus be considered old.

[5] For an attempt to place the discourse on the Absolute within the category of mysti-
cism, see *de Jong 1950* and *Schayer 1935*. However, the actual problem is not solved
by referring it to the phenomenology of mysticism. It is the position of the mystical
object in the structure of the mystical discourse, i.e., the semiotics of the mysti-
cal discourse that needs to be analysed. And this is not totally impossible in spite
of the seemingly inaccessible nature of this subjective experience.

[6] See, e.g., *MMK* XXII,11:
  śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet |
  ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti prajñaptyarthaṃ tu kathyate ‖
Cp. *MMK* XIII,8:
  śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ |
  yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire ‖
and *BCA* IX,33:
  śūnyatāvāsanādhānād dhīyate bhāvavāsanā |
  kiṃ cid nāstīti cābhyāsāt sāpi paścāt prahīyate ‖

  This stage is presupposed by the following description of the access to the Ab-
solute in verses 34-35. Cp. the analysis of *BCA* IX,35 below.

[7] See *PP* 57,7-8: *paramārtho hy āryāṇāṃ tūṣṇīmbhāvaḥ*

does not mean that silence as such represents the realization of the Absolute, but only that silence is its necessary condition since speach itself involves the speaking subject in a process of differentiation.

However, the question of the nature of this subjective realization remains to be solved. For what is the position of the subject in this radical negativity where even consciousness emptied of representation seems to be reduced to zero in the undecidable presence of the Absolute?

1.2

The nature of these fundamental levels in Mādhyamika discourse is not fully disclosed by the immense literary productivity of the Mādhyamika school. The transmitted texts do not present their philosophical doctrines in a way that elucidates the concepts and essential presuppositions which determine their discourse. In this respect there is nothing that distinguishes Nāgārjuna from some of his most illustrious successors. And historically conditioned developments within the conceptual framework of the Mādhyamika school do not affect the basic problematic, even though Bhāvaviveka's attempts at implanting Dignāgean logic in the basically dialectical discourse of Nāgārjuna - a fact that provoked the severe but just criticism by Candrakīrti - in a certain sense represents a deviation on the epistemological level.[8] The discourse of Mādhyamika writers succeeding Nāgārjuna represents basically an ongoing process of accumulation that reflects the various developments within Buddhist philosophy as a whole. There is no conspicuous break with the fundamental principles of the Mādhyamika school as such.

1.3

It is therefore necessary to institute a theoretical supplement to Mādhyamika discourse in order to determine the nature of its presuppositions. They remain generally implicit and unformulated because they ex-

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[8] Bhāvaviveka's attempt to represent Nāgārjuna's dialectic (prasaṅga) within the framework of contemporary Buddhist logic is no doubt caused by the ambiguous position of dialectics in Indian logic. Dialectical arguments are here relegated to a secondary and insignificant position in contrast to the independent syllogism. Moreover, it is clear from Bhāvaviveka's commentary to MMK that he thereby wants to defend the Nāgārjunean discourse against unwanted dialectical implications. See e.g., PD 14, 13 and cp. Kajiyama 1963 and 1964.
  For some notes on the position of prasaṅga in Buddhist and Nyāya logic, see Mimaki 1976 56-57 and n.222-224.

ert their influence on Mādhyamika thinking in a way that is beyond the theoretical reach and interest of the Mādhyamika philosophers.

The interpretation of Mādhyamika discourse therefore confronts two main theoretical objects: 1) to establish a theoretical position which will make it possible to analyse the basic principles that determine Mādhyamika dialectic and lend to it its paradoxical and seemingly evident truth, 2) to establish an analysis that explains the transcendental position of the Absolute which by definition precludes discourse itself and even leads to its annihilation.

The first point will necessarily direct the theoretical interest towards the question of the semantic structure of language and especially to the field of structural semantics. The second point, and the most complicated, representing the subjective dimension in the analytical project, necessitates reference to recent developments in the field of psychoanalysis and the theory of the subject.

The following theoretical supplement represents only an attempt in this direction and does not claim to be exhaustive. The main object has been to centre upon, and delimit, the conditions for a solution to some of the problems involved in framing a satisfactory analysis of Mādhyamika discourse.

2. Neither/nor

2.1

Among the various narratives that constitute the biography of the illustrious Mādhyamika philosopher Śāntideva[1] there is one which reflects some of the fundamental features of Mādhyamika discourse. It may therefore serve as a point of departure for opening the discussion of its semiotic structure.

The narrative relates a supernatural event which is said to have taken place while Śāntideva was reciting his new treatise, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. At the following crucial verse in the chapter on *prajñāpāramitā*,

> *yadā na bhāvo nābhāvo mateh saṃtiṣṭhate puraḥ* |
> *tadānyagatyabhāvena nirālambā praśāmyati* ||
>
> (*BCA* IX.35)

"When neither being nor not-being presents

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[1] For an analysis of the extant biographies, see *Pezzali 1968* 3-45.

> Itself to the mind, then, since there are
> No other ways (of being), it becomes
> Appeased, being devoid of substrate",

he gradually vanished before the eyes of his audience, rising higher and higher into heaven until he finally became invisible. Only his voice was heard. And from this transcendental realm he completed the recitation of his work.[2]

Despite the supernatural character of this tale it is interesting because it clearly reflects the semiotic structure of the verse that provoked the incident itself. For what does this narrative display on the pragmatic level of events if not a parallel and analogous occurence to what the verse presents on the cognitive level? Śāntideva's disappearance as visible presence, leaving the invisible and immaterial voice as the only trace of his existence, parallels the disappearance of the fundamental cognitive categories of being and not-being: when being and not-being, the basic conditions for sustaining the world of difference and signification are obliterated, the field of reality itself disappears as an object of consciousness.[3] Consequently the phenomenological subject disappears too, being no longer embedded in the world of difference. For the subject withdraws from the empiric and this fundamental semiotic process of differentiation no longer exists as a subject. This disappearance represents in a certain sense the death of the subjet. But the death of the subject also represents the realization of the Absolute and the access to Nirvāṇa. It is therefore not without reason that the narrative ends with Śāntideva's disappearance into the transcendental realm of heaven.[4]

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[2] Cf. Bu ston's reproduction of the narrative in *Pezzali 1968* 7:
  śer le'i | gaṅ tshe dṅos daṅ dṅos med dag | ces pa nas | nam mkha la je mtho je mthor soṅ nas | mthar sku mi snaṅ bar gsuṅ grags pa'i sgo nas rdzogs par bton te gśegs so ||

  "In the chapter on *prajñāpāramitā* (=*BCA* IX) where it is said 'When neither being nor not-being .....' he went higher and higher towards heaven, and finally, being invisible, he recited it thoroughly in his glorious voice and went away (into heaven)."

  According to *Obermiller 1931* 2, 161 and *Pezzali op.cit.* 7 Śāntideva returned after having completed the recitation. But this interpretation of *gśegs* is hard to defend and also against the tradition, which obviously presupposes that Śāntideva remained in heaven. This, e.g., is clear from the Nepalese version. See *Pezzali op.cit.* 31-32.

[3] In Mādhyamika discourse the obliteration of "being" and "not-being" is regarded as the necessary condition for neutralizing the field of perception. See, e.g., the pivotal formulation in Nāgārjuna, *MMK* V,8:
  astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ |
  bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti dṛṣṭavyopaśmaṃ śivam ||

[4] Cf. n.2 and the translation proposed there.

2.2

But how are we to interpret this paradoxical utterance which con-
juncts the negation of being (*bhāva*) with the negation of not-being
(*abhāva*) and thus discloses the dimension of the Absolute? And what log-
ical and cognitive status does it have? Śāntideva's commentator Prajñā-
karamati is obscure on this point and leaves the difficulties connected
with a formal logical interpretation of the propostion unexplained in
spite of his attempt at establishing a formalized interpretation of this
annihilation of being and not-being. But this difficulty is characteris-
tic of Mādhyamika discourse in his specific context:

> *t a d ā   a n y a g a t y a b h ā v e n a   vidhipratiṣedhābhyāṃ*
> *gatyantarābhāvāt, ubhayānubhayapakṣayor etaddvayavidhi-*
> *pratiṣedhātmakatvāt, ābhyām avyatiriktatayā anayoḥ*
> *saṃgrahe tāv api saṃgṛhītāv iti nirāśrayā, sadasator*
> *ālambanayor ayogād buddhiḥ   p r a ś ā m y a t i   upaśāmyati|*
> *sarvavikalpopaśamān nirindhanavahnivad nirvṛtim upayā-*
> *tīty arthaḥ ‖   (BCAP 199,4-7)*

> "Then, because there are no other ways (of being),[5] i.
> e., because there are no other ways (of being) than af-
> firmation and negation, and because the two alternative
> propositions of both and neither consist in affirmation
> and negation of this pair, they are also contained in the
> totality of these two because they are not different from
> these two. Therefore, being devoid of substrate because
> it is not in conjunction with the two substrates of being
> and not-being, the mind becomes appeased, i.e., it becomes
> extinguished. And because all representations have become
> extinguished like a fire without fuel, it becomes extin-
> guished in Nirvāṇa. This is the meaning."

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[5] It is tempting in this specific context to refer to Dharmakīrti, *PV* IV,225:
   vidhānaṃ pratiṣedhaṃ ca muktvā śabdo ʼsti nāparaḥ |
   vyavahāraḥ, ...
However, in Dharmakīrti negation and affirmation belong exclusively to the discur-
sive order: *PV* IV,228:
   tasmād āśritya śabdārthaṃ bhāvābhāvasamāśrayam |
   abāhyāśrayam atreṣṭaṃ sarvaṃ vidhiniṣedhanam |

But in Mādhyamika discourse it is virtually impossible to establish a definite
boundary between "being" and "not-being" as perceptual facts in the field of reali-
ty and judgements of "being" and "not-being". The concepts of negation and affirma-
tion are therefore to be interpreted as referring both to being and not-being of
phenomena and to judgements of being and not-being.

Prajñākaramati is undoubtedly correct when he interprets the main pur-
port of the verse: when negation and affirmation, i.e., being (*bhāva*)
and not-being (*abhāva*), are negated the mind is totally emptied of re-
presentation (*sarvavikalpopaśama*) and becomes extinguished in Nirvāṇa.[6]
The quantification *sarva* seems to contradict the proposition in Śānti-
deva, which only refers to the term "being" and its negation "not-being".
This quantification, however, may be explained on the grounds that propo-
sitions involving "being" and "not-being" are generally treated as the
basic propositional attitudes a subject may assume when referring to en-
tities. They may thus be considered to represent the fundamental forms
of representation that determine the existence of all other types of re-
presentation.[7]

But Prajñākaramati's interpretation of the proposition itself exhib-
its another characteristic feature. It shows that he interprets the log-
ical form of the proposition within the conceptual framework of the *ca-
tuṣkoṭi*,[8] even though he does not expressly refer to this pivotal term in
Mādhyamika theory. His analysis may be presented in the following table:

$$A = bhāva = vidhi \qquad\qquad A + B = ubhaya$$
$$B = abhāva = pratiṣedha \qquad \bar{A} + \bar{B} = anubhaya$$

$$I \qquad A: \quad vidhi$$
$$II \qquad B: \quad pratiṣedha$$
$$III \qquad A + B: \quad vidhi + pratiṣedha = vidhi$$
$$IV \qquad \bar{A} + \bar{B}: \quad \overline{vidhi} + \overline{pratiṣedha} = pratiṣedha$$

However, we cannot fail to notice that the conjunction of *na bhāva* and

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[6] This is the moment that corresponds with the disappearance of the phenomenological
subject in the narrative of Śāntideva's entrance into heaven.

[7] This is no doubt the reason why the obliteration of "being" and "not-being" plays a
paradigmatic role in Mādhyamika discourse. Cp. *MMK* XV,7:
    kātyāyanavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam |
    pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā ||,
and *RĀ* I,58-62.

The transgression of this fundamental dichotomy is represented as a moment where the
mind has become devoid of support and the dimension of the subjective realization is
disclosed. Cp. *BCA* IX,35 above and *YṢ* 1:
    astināstivyatikrāntā buddhir yeṣāṃ nirāśrayā |
    gambhīras tair nirālambhaḥ pratyayārtho vibhāvyate ||,
quoted in Nāḍapāda, *Sekoddeśaṭīkā*. Ed. Carelli, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 1941;
and *RĀ* I,75-76:
    iti naiḥśreyaso dharmo gambhīro niṣparigrahaḥ |
    anālaya iti proktaḥ sambuddhais tattvadarśibhiḥ ||

    asmād anālayād dharmād ālayābhiratā janāḥ |
    astināstyavyatikrāntā bhītā naśyanty amedhasaḥ ||

[8] See *Ruegg 1977* for a discussion of this central term and cp. the analysis proposed
below in 6: The semiotics of *catuṣkoṭi*.

nābhāva in the proposition of Śāntideva is identical with the semantic
structure of the fourth *koṭi*. But this is implicitly denied by Prajñā-
karamati's analysis which only reflects the traditional Mādhyamika nega-
tion of the four alternative propositions within the scheme of the *catuṣ-
koṭi*.[9] It also shows that the analysis is based on purely formal crite-
ria consisting in identifying the distribution of the negation and the
affirmation within the four positions of the scheme, without taking into
consideration the formal contrast between the first and the second pair
of propositions, since the latter represent complex propositions of a
totally different logical and semantic order. Moreover, from a logical
point of view the negation of I and II is redundant since I $\bar{A}$ = II B and
II $\bar{B}$ = I A. And the same is the case with III and IV, where III $\bar{A}$ + $\bar{B}$ = IV
$\bar{A}$ + $\bar{B}$ and IV $\bar{A}$ + $\bar{B}$ = III A + B. But the logical status of this redundancy
is not questioned by Prajñākaramati, and as a rule it never is. It only
shows that negation as such is a primary and dominant factor in Mādhya-
mika discourse. In fact, one does not clarify the problematic involved
merely by trying to establish a logical interpretation of this radical
negativity, since the semantic structure of the *catuṣkoṭi* first of all,
and no doubt exclusively, reflects the illocutionary negation of any
propositional attitude a human subject might assume towards the field
of reality. And in this respect the fourth *koṭi* itself is totally neu-
tralizing.

2.3

    This crucial verse in Śāntideva may be said to exemplify the deci-
sive feature of Mādhyamika discourse. For in so far as difference itself
is a pervasive and categorical feature in things and language, Mādhyamika
philosophy aims at neutralizing difference in order to establish the in-
effable presence of the Absolute. But it is also obvious that this ab-
solute negativity which marks Mādhyamika discourse has nothing to do
with the kind of negativity which generally constitutes the negation on
the level of propositions. It is a negativity that annihilates the total
field of difference by reducing semiosis to zero. But this point leads

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[9] Cp. the quotation in *BCAP* 174,11-12:
    na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam |
    catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ Mādhyamikā viduḥ |

  This verse is part of *Jñānasārasamuccaya*. See *Mimaki 1976* 188; cp. *CŚ* VIII,20 and
  XVI,25.

necessarily to the question of the specific epistemic principle upon which Mādhyamika philosophy is based and which determines its dialectical annihilation of the field of reality. And this principle can be shown to involve a characteristic exploitation of a fundamental feature of the semantic structure of language.

3. Difference and identity - *pratītyasamutpāda*

3.1

The general difficulty in interpreting Mādhyamika philosophy is primarily caused by the conspicuous lack of a systematic and exhaustive account of its own epistemological presuppositions. In this respect it remains on a pre-theoretical level, and Nāgārjuna's writings that constitute the fundamental ideological framework of the Mādhyamika school are no exception to this absence of theoretical coherence. But his writings show clearly that he considers *pratītyasamutpāda*, Origination in Dependence, to be the fundamental and supreme principle of Mādhyamika discourse. The major part of Nāgārjuna's scholastical works centres upon the development of the modalities of this principle which is used as a dialectical devise for putting the concepts of identity and difference under erasure.[1]

3.2

In one of the few cases where Nāgārjuna formulates the consequences of the inherent logic of *pratītyasamutpāda* he states the following "axiom":

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[1] All the major scholastical works, excepting *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* where it is used implicitly, refer expressly to the concept of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Cp. *MMK* 0,1-2 and XIV,18; *YṢ* 0:

   gaṅ gis skye daṅ 'jig pa dag |
   |*tshul 'di yis ni spaṅs gyur pa* |
   |*rten ciṅ 'byuṅ ba gsuṅs pa yi* |
   |*thub dbaṅ de la phyag 'tshal lo*|
        (P 5225, 22b3f.),

ŚS 73 where Nāgārjuna refers to *idaṃpratyayatā*:

   rkyen ñid 'di pa 'di śes nas |
   |*lta ṅan dra ba'i rtog pa ldog* |
   |*chag rmoṅs khoṅ khro spaṅs phyir te* |
   |*ma gos mya ṅan 'das ñer 'gro* |
        (P 5231, 138a6)

and *VV* 73. Cognitive and soteriological perspectives merge in this category.

pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat |
na cānyad api tat tasmāt .... ||

(*MMK* XVIII,10)

"An A that exists in dependence on B is in
the first place not identical with B
nor is it other than B ...",

which means that A cannot be designated as A, nor as non-A (=B).[2] Iden-
tity and difference thus become neutralized and unthinkable categories.
And by constantly having recourse to the axiomatic status of *pratītya-*
samutpāda Nāgārjuna is able to annihilate all categories that can be
shown to involve the concept of Origination in Dependence.

The main difficulty, however, is represented by the logical conse-
quences Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school deduce from the concept of
pratītyasamutpāda. For it is very far from clear what has led them to
the paradoxical statement that the inherent logic of the concept of de-
pendence is incompatible with the concepts of identity and difference.

From a logical point of view it is obvious that in order to estab-
lish a rational discourse based upon the concept of Origination in De-
pendence we must presuppose the initial identity and difference of the
dependent elements before their final dialectical dissolution into Emp-
tiness. But Nāgārjuna and the following generations of Mādhyamika scho-
lars obviously did not reflect upon this epistemological difficulty.
They only continue the dialectical exploitation of the category of *pra-*
tītyasamutpāda, which disseminates its effects in a variety of contexts
throughout the ramifications of Mādhyamika writings.

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[2] Cp. Candrakīrti, *PP* 376,10, where the categories of cause and effect are referred to
in order to exemplify the axiom: *yataś caivaṃ yat kāraṇaṃ pratītya yat kāryam ut-*
padyate, naiva tat kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ bhavati, na ca tasmāt karaṇāt tat kāryam anyat.

There are other verses in *MMK* that have a similar "axiomatic" function, but they
may all be classified in relation to this basic axiom the implications of which
they develop. Cp. *MMK* XIV,5-7, which develop the question of difference within this
perspective:
anyad anyat pratītyānyan nānyad anyad ṛte 'nyataḥ |
yat pratītya ca yat tasmāt tad aı.yan nopapadyate ||
yady anyad anyad anyasmād anyasmād apy ṛte bhavet |
tad anyad anyad anyasmād ṛte nāsti ca nāsty ataḥ ||
nānyasmin vidyate 'nyatvam ananyasmin na vidyate |
avidyamāne cānyatve nāsty anyad vā tad eva vā ||.

and *MMK* X,10-11, which state the implications of dependence and identity:
yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati |
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatām kam apekṣya kaḥ ||
yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham |
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsya na yujyate ||

3.3

It is obviously the concept of dependence as such which constitutes the fundamental problem. For it is the paradoxical and undecidable nature of this relationship upon which Nāgārjuna's philosophy is based and which lends to it its seemingly logical consistency. It is therefore necessary to discuss the problematic of the two dependent terms in this relationship in order to disclose the implicit presuppositions of Mādhyamika dialectic.

3.4

The discussion of this pivotal question may provisionally be opened by trying to re-formulate the underlying assumption which determines Nāgārjuna's conclusive proposition, namely, that dependent elements are empty (śūnya) since they are devoid of self-existence (svabhāva).[3]

The canonical argument consists in demonstrating that if a thing A only exists through B and B only through A, which means that A is dependent (pratītya/apekṣya) on B and B on A, it follows necessarily that they cannot exist as self-existent substances of things. A substance or a thing exists in itself and not through anything else. But, according to Nāgārjuna, this also rules out the possibility of establishing the identity or difference of the dependent elements A and B. Hence they become

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[3] A clear and comprehensive exposition of the canonical argument is found in *VV*, which - in fact - is composed in defense of the proposition śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ. Cp. also *MMK* XV and XX: svabhāvaparīkṣā and sāmagrīparīkṣā, and passim. In *ŚS* (P 5231, 137b; N dBu ma, Tsa 128a) it is stated that this proposition represents the ultimate truth, paramārtha:

> dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin gyis |
> stoṅ pa yin pas dṅos rnams kyi (NP kyis) |
> rten 'byuṅ de ni de bźin gśegs |
> mtshuṅs pa med pas ñe bar bstan | (68)

> ¦dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin gyis stoṅ pa yin pas | dṅos po rnams kyi rten nas 'byuṅ ba 'di de bźin gśegs pas ñe bar bstan to ||

> dam pa'i don ni der zad do |
> saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis ni |
> 'jig rten tha sñad brten nas su |
> sna tshogs thams cad yaṅ dag brtags | (69)

> don dam pa (NP pas) ni rten ciṅ 'brel par 'byuṅ ba'i dṅos po thams cad raṅ bźin gyis (NP gyi) stoṅ ṅo || źes bya ba der zad do ¦| ....

> "The incomparable Tathāgata has explained that the dependent origination of phenomena is expressed in the words that all phenomena are empty of self-existence. This only (sa eva) is the ultimate truth (paramārtha). Buddha Bhagavān has designated all the different phenomena such as they are by taking his stand on worldly discourse (laukikavyavahāra)." Cp. *MMK* XXIV,8-10.

neutralized, and Nāgārjuna therefore concludes that there is an inherent insubstantiality in things: they are devoid of self-existence (niḥsva-bhāva). Consequently perception and representation are false since there is nothing in the field of reality that corresponds to perception and re-presentation.[4] Thus the natural logic of language breaks down in demon-strating that it has no real object. The object is empty, and as such it has only an imaginary existence. Reality is an illusion like mirage.[5]

3.5

But the almost paralysing effect of Mādhyamika dialectic is based on the assumption that language fundamentally reflects the structure of reality, and Nāgārjuna's philosophy actually shows that he treats lin-guistic difference and perceptual difference as if they were concomitant features in being and were to be analysed on the same level. In Mādhya-mika theory the apparent illogicity of language is the illogicity and unreality of being. This conception of language is common to all types of sophistical discourse where the sophistical effect generally is pro-duced on the implicit assumption that the linguistic sign so to speak "adheres" to the thing it signifies, which, of course, has a fatal ef-

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[4] See, e.g. Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava*, quoted in *BCAP* 180, 28-29:
    indriyair upalabdham yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi |
    jātās tattvavido bālās tattvajñānena kim tadā ǁ (18)

This verse is one of the few instances in Nāgārjuna where the epistemological break between the order of the sensible and the order of the intelligible is stated explic-itly, even though the incompatible duality of these two orders constitute the under-lying presupposition of Nāgārjuna's dialectic. Cp. *RA* IV,51-57.

[5] Cp. *RĀ* I,52-53:
    dūrād ālokitam rūpam āsannair dṛśyate sphuṭam |
    marīcir yadi vāri syād āsannaiḥ kim na dṛśyate ǁ

    dūrībhūtair yathābhūto loko 'yam dṛśyate tathā |
    na dṛśyate tadāsannair animitto marīcivat ǁ ,

and *YṢ* 27-28:
    ¦*gnas med dmigs pa yod ma yin* |
    ¦*rtsa ba med ciṅ gnas pa med* ¦
    ¦*ma rig rgyu las śin tu byuṅ* |
    ¦*thog ma dbus mtha' ·rnam par spaṅs* |

    ¦*chu śiṅ bźin du sñiṅ po med* |
    ¦*dri za'i groṅ khyer 'dra ba ste* ¦
    ¦*rmoṅs pa'i groṅ khyer mi bzad pa'i* |
    ¦*'gro ba sgyu ma bźin du snaṅ* ¦

Metaphor becomes an argument in its own right when Nāgārjuna refers to the unreali-ty of the world.

fect on the natural logic of language: the rationality of language breaks down.

The Mādhyamika philosophy is undeniable part of this general problematic of language and being. And it must be admitted that Nāgārjuna's reflection on the order of language remains on a pre-theoretical level. This is made clear by his sophistical and unusually discursive treatment of the Nyāya category of discussion (vāda) in Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, where he analyses the topic of "signifier" (abhidhāna) and "signified" (abhidheya). But the analysis does not deviate from his general axiomatic usage of the concept of dependence: the word and the thing it denotes are neither different nor identical, and their relationship may thus be said to be indeterminate.[6]

But while Nāgārjuna's dialectic shows the absurd consequences that follow from the category of pratītyasamutpāda, Origination in Dependence, when it is thought to be universally present in things, it shows at the same time that the question of the nature of this category as such is beyond his theoretical reach. On this point his philosophy remains at a pre-theoretical and intuitive level.

4. NS and the semiotics of negation and dependence

4.1

NS IV.1,37-40 and Vātsyāyana's important commentary contain an interesting discussion of this problematic, which obviously is influenced by Mādhyamika concepts, and it may be ascribed to this school, even though it is impossible to be definite on questions connected with the social and historical situation of Mādhyamika discourse at this early stage of Indian philosophy. This discussion displays, along with the sophistical purpose of demonstrating that all things are non-entities, the same level of analysis as in Nāgārjuna, even though the sūtras, and especially Vātsyāyana's explication, develops the discussion of the category of dependence considerably by introducing the function of negation for establishing difference and identity in things that are maintained to be reciprocally dependent.

> sarvam abhāvo bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddheḥ ‖ 37 ‖

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[6] Cp. Vaidalyaprakaraṇa 147-149, (§§ 51-55).

yāvad bhāvajātaṃ tat sarvam abhāvaḥ | kasmāt,
bhāveṣv itaretarābhāvasiddheḥ | asan gaur
aśvātmanā 'naśvo gaur, asann aśvo gavātmanā
'gaur aśva ity asatpratyayasya pratiṣedhasya
ca bhāvaśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyāt sarvam
abhāva iti ‖ 37 ‖

"Everything is not-being since it is a fact
that there is reciprocal not-being in things."

"Everything is not-being in so far it has
status as being.
For what reason?
Because it is a fact that there is reciprocal
not-being in things: since the cow is not-being
in the nature of the horse, the cow is not-horse,
and, since the horse is not-being in the nature
of the cow, the horse is not-cow. Therefore,
since the concept of not-being and the negation
have coreferentiality with the word 'being',
everything is not-being."

The underlying assumption of the Buddhist argument is that if two things
are reciprocally dependent, which in this case means that the element A
(*go*) is dependent on the element B (*aśva*) and B on A, it follows that A
is the negation of B and B the negation of A. Hence negation and not-
being become essential for defining identity and difference.

But while the text is important because it implicitly identifies
not-being and negation with the category of difference and thus shows
that not-being itself is considered to be a pervasive and categorial
feature in things, it fails because it demonstrably identifies not-being
and negation with non-existence, since the way in which Vātsyāyana repro-
duces the Buddhist argument indicates that it identifies the reciprocal
negation of A and B, "cow" and "horse", with the negation of their ac-
tual existence. Thus it locates a semantic and linguistic problematic
in the field of reality and not in the structure of language.

Moreover, Vātsyāyana's reproduction of the argument also indicates
that it confuses the copulative function of the lexeme "be" and its ex-
istential signification. For it is obviously the logical function of
the negative copula which is the cause of the confusion in the argument.
The negative copula only states by implication that A = A (*go = go*) be-
cause it is not B (*anaśva*), and, that B = B (*aśva = aśva*) because it is

not A (ago). But the text is clearly ignorant of this logical relation,
and this also seems to be the case in Indian philosophy in general.[1]

4.2

The following argument, *NS* IV.1,38: *na svabhāvasiddher bhāvānām*,
which defends the idea that things are self-existent and therefore not
to be considered mere non-entities, exhibits the same problematic. Vā-
tsyāyana points out the sophistical nature of the Buddhist argument by
discussing the function of negation as productive of difference. But
he is unable to deal with the reciprocal derivation of the dependent
terms, which is the central point in the Buddhist sophism. Vātsyāyana's
explication of the argument against the Buddhist position also shows
that the defence of self-existence (*svabhāva*) in things, which, in fact,
is only a way of explaining the question of identity, centres on the
question of the nature of the referent, but not on the nature of the se-
mantic structure of language, a fact that discloses the same problem-
atic as the position which it is meant to refute: it locates primarily
negation in the order of things and not in the order of language:

> *avyatirekapratiṣedhe ca bhāvānāṃ saṃyogādisambandho*
> *vyatireko 'trāvyatireko 'bhedākhyāsambandhaḥ tatprati-*
> *ṣedhe sadā 'satpratyayasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam yathā na*
> *santi kuṇḍe badarāṇīti | asan gaur aśvātmanā 'naśvo*
> *gaur iti ca gavāśvayor avyatirekaḥ pratiṣidhyate ga-*
> *vāśvayor ekatvam nāstīti | tasmin pratiṣidhyamāne*
> *bhāvena gavā sāmānādhikaraṇyam asatpratyayasyāsan gaur*
> *aśvātmaneti yathā na santi kuṇḍe badarāṇīti kuṇḍe*
> *badarasaṃyoge pratiṣidhyamāne sadbhir asatpratyayasya*
> *sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti || 38 ||*

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[1] It is a remarkable fact that the function of copula in simple predicate structures
does not seem to play any decisive role in Indian logical theory. Technical terms like
tādātmya and *abheda* cannot reasonably be said to describe the function of copula.
Cp. *Randle 1976* 271,n.1. This absence may be explained on the grounds that copula
is not manifested, generally speaking, on the surface level of the proposition in
Sanskrit. But this point needs further investigation. Cp. *Benveniste 1976* 151-176:
La phrase nominale, and *Derrida 1972* 209-246: Le supplément de la copule. La philo-
sophie devant la linguistique.

"And, when the non-difference of entities is being ne-
gated - in this connection difference consists in a rela-
tionship of non-conjunction, etc., non-difference in a
relationship called non-distinction - so, when this (non-
difference) is being negated it has always coreferential-
ity with the concept of not-being, just as, for instance,
in a proposition 'there are no jujubes in the pot'. And,
when it is said that the cow is not-horse since the cow
is not-being in the nature of the horse, the non-differ-
ence between cow and horse is negated because there is no
identity in the cow and the horse. When this (identity)
is being negated in the proposition 'the cow is not-be-
ing in the nature of the horse', the concept of not-be-
ing has coreferentiality with the entity 'cow', just as,
for instance, the concept of not-being has locus in com-
mon with existent things when the conjunction of the ju-
jubes with the pot is negated in the proposition 'there
are no jujubes in the pot'."

Negation and negative propositions are thus said to reflect an ab-
sence of material conjunction of two things, and thereby their differ-
ence. For, as Vātsyāyana's exemplification of his thesis makes clear,
the negation only indicates that an element A (= go) does not exist in
an element B (= aśva), and, by converse, that B does not exist in A.
This means that the negation states that A is different from B and B
from A because there is mutual not-being in the horse and the cow. The
analysis may be represented thus:

And this brings the discussion back to the problematic of the sūtra that
opened it.

4.3

But if the question of difference is displaced from the order of re-
ality and perceptual difference to the order of language and linguistic
difference, it becomes obvious that perceptual difference and linguistic

difference that pertain to different epistemological orders necessarily must be kept apart in order to avoid sophism. For it is this fundamental lack of discrimination that causes the ambiguity in the discussion between the Buddhist sophist and the Nyāya opponent.

However, if the negation does not primarily reflect the order of reality, but only, as a linguistic element internal in judgement, states that A = A because it is not B, and, that B = B because it is not A, which means that the horse is only "horse" (aśva) because it is "not-cow" (ago), and, the cow only "cow" because it is "not-horse" (anaśva),[2] it becomes possible to indicate the actual epistemological difficulty in Mādhyamika philosophy. For if something only exists as such on the basis of its own negation, that is, by virtue of what it is not, it follows that it cannot exist as a thing or a substance since a thing or a substance exists in itself and not by virtue of anything else: it only exists as a concept.

It is this theoretical position which Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school are unable to formulate and which creates the ambiguity in their philosophy. The paradoxical effect of their dialectic is based on the fact that they displace the question of what constitutes linguistic difference and conceptual representation to the field of perceptual difference by unconsciously assuming that the dialectical derivation of the concept reflects the structure of reality.

It is therefore clear that the pivotal Mādhyamika concept of niḥsvabhāva, "devoid of self-existence", does not refer to a lack of self-existence in things, as Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school maintain, but to the fact that conceptual structures are defined by reciprocal derivation. It is the concept and thus the linguistic sign that is devoid of self-existence. In fact, Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school unknowingly formulate a basic semiotic principle while apparently thinking that they formulate the fundamental nature of things.

4.4

But if two concepts A and B are inter-dependent, which means that they are dialectically derived, it follows that they should be present

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[2] The function of the negation in the dialectical derivation of the concept is identical in structure with the basic form of the Buddhist theory of apoha. See below 8.3 for a semiotic determination.

at the same time since one would be non-existent without the other. Hence
Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school who confuse the order of language
and the order of reality conclude that there is an inherent illogicity
in things since it thus becomes impossible to define objects and events
in the field of reality without being forced into a paradoxical position:
to maintain the actual co-presence of objects or events that perception
and common experience show to be discrete and existing in temporal suc-
cession. We shall return to this problematic.

4.5

This inherent confusion in the Mādhyamika conception of dependence
is analysed by Vātsyāyana in his interpretation of the two sūtras that
terminate the discussion openend by *NS* IV.1,37. It deserves to be quoted
in extenso because it appears to be the first and only attempt, except-
ing the subcommentaries, to analyse and comment upon this central con-
cept in Mādhyamika dialectic. Moreover, it is also remarkable for its
concise determination of the inherent weakness in the Mādhyamika theore-
tical position. The discussion opens with a short reproduction of a well-
known Mādhyamika stereotype often used for exemplifying the concept of
dependence: [3]

> *na svabhāvasiddhir āpekṣikatvāt* || 39 ||
>
> *apekṣākṛtam āpekṣikam | hrasvāpekṣākṛtaṃ dīrghaṃ*
> *dīrghāpekṣākṛtaṃ hrasvaṃ, na svenātmanāvastithaṃ*
> *kiṃ cit | kasmāt? apekṣāsāmarthyāt, tasmān na*
> *svabhāvasiddhir bhāvānām iti* || 39 ||
>
> "They are not established per se because they are
> dependent" || 39 ||
>
> "'Dependent' means 'obtained in dependence'. Long

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[3] Cp. *PP* 10,7 and *RĀ* I,48: *asmin satīdaṃ bhavati dīrghe hrasvaṃ yathā sati |*
and *RĀ* I,49:
  hrasve 'sati punar dīrghaṃ na bhavati svabhāvataḥ |
  pradīpasyāpyanutpādāt prabhāyā apy asaṃbhavaḥ ||

NB.: In its exploitation of the concept of dependence Mādhyamika discourse does not
distinguish between substance, qualification and functions. It would not seem to be
reasonable to analyse the concepts of cause and effect on the same level as the
qualifications "long" and "short", but this, in fact, is done constantly and thus
indicates that the problematic of dependence in Mādhyamika dialectic belongs to the
structure and nature of semantic categories.

is obtained in dependence on short, and, short is
obtained in dependence on long. There is nothing
that is established in its own nature.
For what reason?
Because of the function of dependence. Therefore
entities are not established on basis of self-
existence."

Vātsyāyana introduces his explication of the concluding sūtra by
pointing out that the logical consequence which the Mādhyamika opponent
deduces from the category of reciprocal dependence, viz. that dependent
elements cannot be defined as self-existent, is incompatible with the
existence of the category of dependence as such. For elements that enter
into a relationship of dependence on Mādhyamika premises can only be de-
fined as non-entities, and non-entities, being non-existent, do not en-
ter into a relationship of dependence:

vyāhatatvād ayuktam ‖ 40 ‖

*yadi hrasvāpekṣākṛtam dīrgham, kim idānim apekṣya
hrasvam iti gṛhyate? atha dīrghāpekṣākṛtam hrasvaṃ,
dīrgham anāpekṣikam? evam itaretarāśrayayor ekābhāve
'nyatarābhāvād ubhayābhāva iti dīrghāpekṣāvyavasthā
'nupapannā |*

"This is illogical because it is contradictory." ‖ 40 ‖

"If long is obtained in dependence on short, now,
in dependence on what is it perceived as 'short'?!
If, on the other hand, short is obtained in depend-
ence on long, long is not-dependent. If thus one
of the two mutally dependent (things) is non-exist-
ent, both are not-dependent since either one is
non-existent. Therefore it is illogical that short
is established in dependence on long."

And Vātsyāyana continues:

*svabhāvasiddhāv asatyām samayoḥ parimaṇḍalayor vā
dravyayor āpekṣike dīrghahrasvatve kasmān na bhava-
taḥ?*

"If they are not established on the basis of self-
existence, why are not longness and shortness that
are dependent found in two substances that are either

similar or circular?!"

If things are devoid of self-existence (= identity), the possibility of defining difference is obliterated, and long and short might then be expected to define substances that are neither short nor long. However, it is sufficient to point out the actually perceived differences in order to refute the Mādhyamika sophism.

The absence of self-existence in things has further consequences:

> *apekṣāyām anapekṣāyāṃ ca dravyayor abhedaḥ |*
> *yāvatī dravye apekṣamāṇe tāvatī evānapekṣamāṇe*
> *nānyataratra bhedaḥ | āpekṣikatve tu saty*
> *anyataratra viśeṣopajanaḥ syād iti |*

> "In case of dependence and not-dependence there
> is no difference with respect to two substances.
> There are just as many substances that are depend-
> ent as there are substances that are not-depend-
> ent. There is no difference with respect to ei-
> ther one. But if they are dependent, there should
> be an addition of distinctive features with respect
> to either one."

What characterizes the function of dependence is therefore not the absence of self-existence in the dependent elements, but an addition of distinctive features. And the concluding remarks are meant to clarify the nature of this addition of distinctive features:

> *kim apekṣāsāmarthyam iti cet? dvayor grahaṇe*
> *'tiśayagrahaṇopapattiḥ | dve dravye paśyann*
> *ekatra vidyamānam atiśayaṃ gṛhṇāti tad dīrghaṃ*
> *vyavasyati, yac ca hīnaṃ gṛhṇāti tad ghrasvam*
> *iti vyavasyatīti | etac cāpekṣāsāmarthyam || 40 ||*

> "If you ask what is the function of dependence,
> the answer is that it is the occurrence of per-
> ception of preponderance when two things are
> perceived. The one who sees two substances per-
> ceives the preponderance that is found in one.
> This one he determines as 'long', and the one
> which he perceives as deficient, that one he de-
> termines as 'short'. This, indeed, is the function
> of dependence."

This explanation seems to indicate that Vātsyāyana locates the real func-
tion of dependence in judgement and not primarily in things, even though
his analysis refers to the field of reality as the final instance on which
the nature of the Mādhyamika sophism is to be measured. The distinctive
features are perceptual facts that are reflected in judgement as a sup-
plement to the dependent substances. Dependence, therefore, is not pri-
marily a relationship between substances. It is a relationship between
terms, which in this case means the terms "long" and "short". Hence de-
pendence is not a categorial feature in things as the Mādhyamika sophism
presupposes, but a categorial feature in language. Mādhyamika philoso-
phy confuses the inter-dependence of the terms "long" and "short" and
the things they denote. This appears to be the essence of Vātsyāyana's
concise remarks on the concept of dependence.

4.6

But the question of the linguistic nature of the concept of depend-
ence cannot be solved by referring to the nature of the empiric. The ac-
tual paradox of Mādhyamika dialectic is based on the dependent nature
of linguistic and conceptual categories. Hence the epistemological prob-
lematic of Mādhyamika philosophy may, in the last instance, be reduced
to the question of the linguistic nature of conceptual categories.

5. The semiotic square and *pratītyasamutpāda*

5.1

In order to transcend the traditional difficulties in framing a sat-
isfactory analysis of Mādhyamika discourse it may be useful to analyse
its basic structure from the point of view of structural semantics since
it has become clear that the actual problematic of Mādhyamika dialectic
is to be located in the structure of language. For Mādhyamika philosophy
does not function on the basis of an established logical canon. Its par-
adoxical nature is rather connected with the problematic of the funda-
mental structure of signification. Hence the Mādhyamika exploitation of
the concept of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Origination in Dependence, may be said
to reflect a logic of signification, a semio-logic, and not a logic in
the proper sense of this word.

5.2

The level of the semiological reflection which I shall attempt to implant in Mādhyamika discourse relates to the fundamental structure of signification.

It is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable results of structural semantics that it has been possible to demonstrate that even highly different types of discourse are based on this structure which may be said to govern the discourse as a structural universal. And its productive dynamics can be traced in practically any discourse irrespective or its cultural and ideological context.

This structure is represented by what in the field of structural semantics has been called the s e m i o t i c   s q u a r e.[1] And a semiotic a-nalysis of the basic features of Mādhyamika dialectic shows that they on a fundamental level reflect the structure of the semiotic square. This structure which presents itself as the fundamental syntax of significa-tion may be represented in the following way:

both/and

$$s_1 \text{——+——} s_2$$

either   or

neither/nor

The two primitive terms, the semes s_1/s_2, are said to enter into a relationship of reciprocal presupposition. The formal logical nature of this relationship remains, however, indeterminate. This represents the semantic axis which also constitutes a semantic category. Each of the terms on this axis may enter into a new relationship of the type $s_1/\overline{s_1}$ and $s_1/\overline{s_2}$. This relationship is called the relationship of contradic-tion, and in the field of speech acts it represents the illocutionary act of negation of the primitive terms. The assertion of the contradic-tory terms $\overline{s_1}/\overline{s_2}$ presents itself as an implication, $\overline{s_1} \supset s_2$ and $\overline{s_2} \supset s_1$.

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[1] Cf. *Greimas 1970* 135-155: Les jeux des contraintes sémiotiques, and *Greimas/Courtés 1979* s.v. *Carré sémiotique*.

Moreover, the semes s_1 and s_2 are said to enter into a relationship which constitutes a complex semantic category, $s_1 + s_2$. And the semes $\overline{s_1}$ and $\overline{s_2}$ constitute a so-called neutral semantic category, $\overline{s_1} + \overline{s_2}$. They represent basically propositions or terms of the type b o t h / a n d, n e i - t h e r / n o r. Finally there are instances where the primitive terms on the semantic axis represent a contradictory semantic category. Hence the implications $\overline{s_1} \supset s_2$ and $\overline{s_2} \supset s_1$ may be considered tautoligical. However, the syntax of signification does not primarily reflect the order of formal logic, and this is abundantly clear in the case of Mādhyamika discourse.

5.3

If the Mādhyamika concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* is analysed on the basis of this syntax of signification, it becomes clear that the reciprocal presupposition of the two primitive terms on the semantic axis is identical in structure with the common Mādhyamika conception of dependence, which, in fact, relates to the order of syntax of signification. And if the structure of the s e m i o t i c s q u a r e is applied on 'this category of dependence, it will clarify some of the basic problems that derive from its use in Mādhyamika discourse.

5.4

In order to exemplify this thesis I shall attempt an analysis of the introductory statements in Nāgārjuna's main work, *Madhyamakaśāstra*, since these statements in a certain sense may be said to represent a paradigmatic instance of Mādhyamika discourse.

Nāgārjuna introduces his śāstra with the following set of propositions:

> *anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam |*
> *anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam || 1 ||*
> *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam |*
> *deśayām āsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam || 2 ||*

> "I salute the Perfected Buddha, the foremost
> among teachers, who has proclaimed the
> Dependent Origination, the blissful extinction of
> difference, which is
> neither origination nor destruction,

> neither continuous nor discontinous,
> neither identical nor different,
> neither going nor coming."

If these eight qualifications of the *pratītyasamutpāda* are invested in the s e m i o t i c   s q u a r e, it becomes clear that they represent four negated semantic categories. In their positive form they represent four semantic categories which on a fundamental level reflect the punctuation of the field of reality in time and space. Their negation may therefore be said to efface the semantics of time and space:

1)   nirodha ⟷ utpāda
 anutpāda   anirodha
        └──── + ────┘

2)   uccheda ⟷ śāśvata
 aśāśvata   anuccheda
        └──── + ────┘

3)   ekārtha ⟷ nānārtha
 anānārtha   anekārtha
        └──── + ────┘

4)   āgama ⟷ nirgama
 anirgama   anāgama
        └──── + ────┘

Categories: 1) existence, 2) duration, 3) difference,
            4) movement

But how are we to interpret the conjunction of the negated terms which constitute the so-called neutral semantic category in the s e m i - o t i c   s q u a r e ? Do they represent any meaningful statement? The point is that there cannot be established any meaning at all since the neutralization of the implication which is produced by the conjunction of the negated terms obliterates the syntactic possibility of maintaining the semantic category as such and consequently the possibility of establishing semantic difference. This neutralization of difference, "the blissful extinction of difference", which thus introduces the subjective dimension into the philosophical project by delimiting it from the field of reality and perceptual difference, is what Mādhyamika theory qualifies by the term *śūnyatā*, Emptiness. This concept may therefore be said to signify the neutralization of difference as an effect of *pratītyasamutpāda*, a fact which is corroborated by statements in Nāgārjuna where the concepts of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* occur on the same level of reference.[2]

5.5

Mādhyamika discourse may thus be said to represent a dialectical ex-
ploitation of the elementary structure of the s e m i o t i c   s q u a r e in
order to neutralize semantic difference and thereby the field of reali-
ty. This is done by abolishing the very syntax that structures linguis-
tic difference. However, from the moment the category of the neutral
and non-different is considered to be signification, the discourse nec-
essarily enters upon a transgression of reference to the field of reali-
ty. And this seems to be characteristic of the fundamental ambiguity of
Mādhyamika discourse: while the aim of the philosophical discourse it-
self is to transcend the field of difference by annihilating significa-
tion, it is at the same time forced to identify the semiotic category of
the non-different with signification, which, in fact, only relates to
the erasure of the syntax of signification.

Mādhyamika philosophy is forced to produce signification, even though
this is done on a highly limited scale, otherwise the discourse would
have no decidable object. The Mādhyamika tradition was well aware of
this ambiguity, so it seems, and a reflex of this problematic can be
seen in the distinction between the two truths, which is not an episte-
mological distinction, but a pragmatic one: in order to present the
truth one has to speak or write, which necessarily involves significa-
tion and difference.

In any case, negation and neutralization of difference leaves the
field of reality as it is, but not necessarily the human subject who i-
dentifies its own project with the cognitive discourse of *śūnyavāda*.

6. The semiotics of *prapañca*, *dvaya* and *vikalpa*

6.1

Other important technical terms in Mādhyamika theory such as *pra-*
pañca, *dvaya* and *vikalpa* also have their definite place in the structure
of the s e m i o t i c   s q u a r e.

---

[2] Cp. *VV* 71: *yaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamāṃ pratipadaṃ ca |*
           ekārthaṃ nijagāda praṇamāmi tam apratimabuddham ||

  and *MMK* XIV,18:
               yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe |
               sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā ||

Prapañca, difference,[1] is the fundamental process which unfolds, explicates, the binary opposition of the two primitive terms in the semiotic square. This opposition involves what in Mādhyamika theory is called duality, *dvaya*, and this semantic duality determines the existence of conceptual alternatives, *vikalpa*.[2] A general representation may be given in the following way:

For the concept of *prapañca*, see *May 1959* 175-176, n.562, and *Schmithausen 1969* 137-142, n.101.

It should be kept in mind that *prapañca* (sg.) designates the process of explication and differentiation, and *prapañca* (pl.) the result of this process, i.e., the differences, real and linguistic. Moreover, *prapañca* seems in general to designate sets of alternatives involving a binary structure, and, therefore, does not primarily refer to difference as such. It designates the process of explication as well as its result, but both defined by a bipolar structure of opposition.

See, e.g., *MMK* XXII (*tathāgataparīkṣā*), which represents such series of bipolar structures that are to be transcended:

prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam |
te prapañcahatāḥ sarve na paśyanti tathāgatam || 15

It should be noted, however, that these bipolar structures are contradictory – Nāgārjuna does not discriminate between opposition and contradiction. Cp. *RĀ* I,50-51, where the structure is one of opposition:

evaṃ hetuphalotpādaṃ dṛṣṭvā nopaiti nāstitām |
abhyupetyāsya lokasya yathābūtyaṃ parpañcajam ||

nirodhaṃ ca prapañcotthaṃ yathābhūtyād upāgataḥ |
nopayāty astitāṃ tasmān mucyate 'dvayaniśritaḥ ||

[2] For the concept of *vikalpa* see *May 1959* 64-65, n.64. For *dvaya/advaya* see *RĀ* I,51 and IV,95-96.

14

7. The semiotics of *catuṣkoṭi*

7.1

The semiotic square may also be proved to represent the underlying structure of the much-discussed term *catuṣkoṭi*, which was found to be involved in Prajñākaramati's commentary on *BCA* IX,35. It may be described an an exhaustion of the possible propositional positions within the semiotic square. The promblematic of the concept of *catuṣkoṭi* thus relates to the syntax of signification. s_1 represents the first *koṭi*, s_2 the second, the complex term $s_1 + s_2$ the third, and the neutral term $\overline{s_1} + \overline{s_2}$ the fourth:

(3)

(1) s_1 s_2 (2)

$\overline{s_2}$ $\overline{s_1}$

(4)

It should be noted, however, that the primitive terms in the *catuṣkoṭi* always represent a contradictory semantic axis and not one of opposition. This, for instance, is made clear by the Mādhyamika exhaustion of the contradictory axis of *sat⇌asat*, being vs. not being. And it must be admitted that most, if not all, examples which the literature presents as instances of the *catuṣkoṭi* centre upon the syntactico-semantic exhaustion of the lexeme "be" (*sat*),[1] or upon simple predicate structures involving copula. An instance of the latter is *MMK* XVIII,8:

---

[1] Cp. n.3.9 above. If the verse from *Jñānasārasamuccaya* is invested in the square we get the following structure:
1. *koṭi: na sat* = $\overline{sat} \supset asat$
2. *koṭi: na asat* = $\overline{asat} \supset sat$
3. *koṭi: na sadasat* = $\overline{sadasat}$ = $\overline{asat} + \overline{sat}$
4. *koṭi: na sadasat* = *sadasat* = *sat + asat*

This indicates that *catuṣkoṭinirvimuktam* as a discursive fact does not pertain to the order of logic. It represents the illocutionary act of negation of any propositional position that might be adopted by a speaking subject. Hence it is a question of obliteration of language and the process of differentiation. Cp. the analysis of *BCA* IX,35 proposed above.

sarvaṃ tathyaṃ na vā tathyaṃ tathyaṃ cātathyam eva ca |

naivātathyaṃ naiva tathyam etad buddhānuśāsanam || ,

which may be invested in the square in the following way:

(3)

(4)

It is also a fact that the texts manifest a tendency towards delimiting the fourth *koṭi* as the one which is most significant of the Buddhist attitude towards discourse, even though Mādhyamika discourse claims to transcend the four positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, which, in fact, is only a circumscription of silence, since the extreme negativity that affects the terms *sat* and *asat* is only productive of tautologies and thus devoid of cognitive value. The illocutionary force of negation is here to be interpreted as a prohibition against thinking and discourse itself. The peculiar position of the fourth *koṭi* is emphasized by *Akutobhayā* on *MMK* XVIII,8d where the bipolar opposition "neither/nor" representing the neutral term in the semiotic square is interpreted as a proposition which corresponds with the principle of the Absolute. But this would only be natural since the obliteration of signification and difference already is inscribed in the structure of the fourth *koṭi* as such:

> *yaṅ dag min min yaṅ dag min źes bya ba ni |*
>
> *don dam pa'i tshul gyis chos thams cad skye*
>
> *ba med pa'i phyir śes pa rnam par rtog pa daṅ*
>
> *bcas pa daṅ rnam par rtog pa med pa'i spyod yul*
>
> *ñid du 'gyur ba['i] dṅos po'i tshul gyis*
>
> *yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa ñid du rnam par brtags pa*
>
> *daṅ yaṅ dag pa ñid du rnam par brtags pa gaṅ*
>
> *yin pa de lta bu med pa yin no ||*
>
> (P 5229, 83b1ff.)

"'Neither true nor not true': Since all
things (*dharma*) are without origination according
to the principle of the absolute (*paramārtha*), such
a thing that is represented as not-true (*atathya*)

and true (*tathya*) according to the principle of
being, which has status as the field (*gocara*) of
cognition (*jñāna*) with and without conceptual dis-
crimination (*savikalpanirvikalpa*), does not exist."

There may thus be seen a kind of propositional hierarchy within the
structure of the *catuṣkoṭi*, and this corresponds very well with the fact
that the proposition in Śāntideva analysed above has been proved to re-
present the fourth *koṭi*.

8. The semiotics of negation, difference and dependence

8.1

The discussion in *NS* indicated that it is difficult to formulate a
consistent solution to the problem involved in determining the precise
limits of identity and difference among things. For dependence itself
which is essential in organizing the relationship between things has
proved to raise some fundamental problems: either the dependent cate-
gories are dissolved into irreality and pure nothingness because it is
impossible to delimit one term from the other, or rather, to indicate
the precise limits of the mutually dependent terms; or the category of
negation is introduced as the element that delimits the boundaries a-
mong the mutually presupposed terms. But here the analysis in *NS* dis-
closed a characteristic lack of discrimination between "be" in its two
functions as copula and existential verb. "Not-being" was here inter-
preted as an utterance about non-entity since the Buddhist sophism was
based on the implicit consideration that the one who talks about not-
being seems to be talking about non-entity. However, the not-being as-
serted here does not state the opposite of what is, but only something
different from what is.

8.2

If the example used by Vātsyāyana for illustrating the Buddhist con-
ception of mutual not-being, *itaretarābhāva*, is invested in the s e m i -
o t i c   s q u a r e , their relationship become obvious: the negated terms
ago/anaśva are to be construed syntactically with the primitive terms
on the semantic axis. The function of the negation as productive of dif-
ference and as an element internal to judgement may thus be given a con-
sistent explanation. The place of the negated terms which in this syntax

are affected by the act of assertion and thereby imply the positive
terms, *ago* $\supset$ *aśva* and *anaśva* $\supset$ *go*, may be represented in the square
as follows:

(domestic animal)

8.3.

It is evident that the light which the semiotic square sheds on the
syntactical position of the negation also elucidates the Indian concep-
tion of the two types of negation, *paryudāsa* and *prasajyapratiṣedha*. *pa-*
ryudāsa, "limitative negation", is the type of negation which implies
the assertion of one of the primitive but not manifested terms on the
semantic axis. The other type of negation, *prasajyapratiṣedha*, "absolute
negation", does not involve implication and therefore not the assertion
of the primitive terms either. But this fact is obviously not inscribed
in the nature of negation as such, and it therefore needs to be inter-
preted, which means that other elements in the proposition become deci-
sive for its correct interpretation, like, for instance, modality.[1] It
is also easy to recognize the problematic of the Buddhist theory of *apoha*
in the structure and function of negation within the framework of the
semiotic square. The mutual relationship between the terms may be re-
presented in the following manner:

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
[1] This, for instance, is the case with Bhāvaviveka's description of *prasajyaprati-*
ṣedha in *Tarkajvāla*, P 5256, 63a8-b1: *med par dgag pa ni dṅos po'i ṅo bo ñid tsam*
żig 'gog par zad kyi de daṅ 'dra ba de ma yin pa gżan gyi dṅos po sgrub par mi byed

9. Conclusive note

The Mādhyamika dialectic has shown that it is difficult to define the limits among the inter-dependent elements, and that this difficulty may be exploited in the interest of reducing semiosis and thus also being to zero.

The effectiveness of their dialectic is based on the fact that, since the terms on the semantic axis are inter-dependent, in the sense that one is meaningless without the concomitant presence of the other, the event which represents a change from one state to another becomes inde-terminable and illogical because the determination of an event involves the presence of both terms, and because the two terms are incompatible when transposed to the field of reality. It is sufficient here to recall

---

pa ste | dper na bram ze chaṅ btuṅ bar mi bya'o ‖ źes bya ba de tsam źig 'gog par zad kyi de las gźan pa'i btuṅ ba btuṅ ṅo ‖ źe 'am mi btuṅ ṅo źes mi brjod pa lta bu'o ‖

"As regards *prasajyapratiṣedha*, it only negates the nature of phenomena as such, but does not establish another phenomenon which is different from this one. For in-stance, the proposition 'a brāhmaṇa should not drink (*na pibet*) liquor (*sūra*)' only negates this as such, but does not specify whether or not he should drink a beverage that is different from this one."

The concept of negation in Indian philosophy and grammar is a complex phenomenon and covers a multitude of heterogenous elements. Cp.*Renou 1957* 230 for *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, and *ibid.* 202 for *paryudāsa*. See also *Kajiyama 1973* with references.

It is obvious that Bhāvaviveka primarily refers to the concept of *prasajyaprati-ṣedha* in order to defend Nāgārjuna's propositions against unwanted implications. This, for instance, becomes abundantly clear when reading his commentary on *MMK* I, 1. Cp. *PD* 10. There it is used as a hermeneutical devise without considering its logical implications. For if the negation in this case has to be construed with *vidyante*, all the qualifications *svataḥ, parataḥ, dvābhyām, ahetutaḥ* become redun-dant because the propositions only state that things do not exist: and this, of course, precludes the possibility of implication. But, if the qualifications are not redundant, it becomes possible to deduce the dialectical implications which Bhā-vaviveka attempts to avoid. The fact is that a dialectical argument like this can-not be reduced to independent propositions, but should be syntactically connected since it represents a dialectical exhaustion of the possibilities of causation.

N.B.: The four propositions in *MMK* I,1 cannot be invested in the s e m i o t i c s q u a r e and cannot, therefore, be considered an instance of *catuṣkoṭi* as generally claimed:

It is impossible to invest the term $\overline{ahetutaḥ}$ in this syntax, and *dvābhyām* is not manifested. It can at best be described as an irregular instance of the *catuṣkoṭi*.

Nāgārjuna's treatment of the concept of the three modes of time and the category of process in the theory of causation in order to prove this point.[1]

There is therefore no reason for ascribing the notion of contradiction to Mādhyamika dialectic since this only confuses the true nature of the Mādhyamika concept of *virodha*, which is one of incompatibility. The notion of contradiction requires that contradiction as such is located in judgement, but this is not the case in Nāgārjuna, who locates contradiction in reality.[2]

Since Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school do not treat this problem as a question referring to the cognitive status of language in relation to being, but rather as a proof of the illogicity of being itself, the effectiveness of their thinking rests exclusively on the implicit identification of the semantic structure of language with the order of reality.

The negative dialectic empties, obliterates, being and difference in order to establish the existence of an imaginary Absolute that transcends being and difference. A second part of this paper will be devoted to the analysis of this imaginary category.

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[1] Cp. *MMK XIX*, *(kālaparīkṣā)* for a Nāgārjunean analysis of the concept of time. For an analysis of the concept of process *(kriyā)* and causation see *MMK I (pratyayaparīkṣā)* and *MMK XX (sāmagrīparīkṣā)*. As a characteristic example 'of the impossibility of determining the event we may mention *MMK XXI (saṃbhavavibhavaparīkṣā)*.

[2] *Robinson 1967* 50 maintains that Nāgārjuna knew the principle of contradiction and consciously applied it. But it is impossible to substantiate this thesis on the basis of the few examples from *MMK* that seems to support it. *MMK* VIII,7 evidently locates contradiction in being. What Nāgārjuna says is that an entity - in this case *karman* - cannot be both existent and non-existent since existent and non-existent are mutually incompatible and therefore cannot occur as one: *parasparaviruddhaṃ hi sac cāsac caikataḥ kutaḥ ‖* And the same is the case with *MMK* VII,30: *ekatve na hi bhāvaś cābhāvaś copapadyate ‖* Cp. also *MMK* XX,20: *ekatve phalahetvoḥ syād aikyaṃ janakajanyayoḥ ǀ* None of these examples indicate that Nāgārjuna locates contradiction in the proposition. Contradiction is located in the field of reality and is best described as opposition and incompatibility.

Abbreviations

JIBS   *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies.* Tokyo

JIP   *Journal of Indian Philosophy.* Dordrecht 1971/72 ff.

OLZ   *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung.* Leipzig 1898 ff.

PEW   *Philosophy East and West.* Honolulu 1955 ff.

WZKSO/WZKS   *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens/Südasiens.* Wien 1957 ff.

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BCAP   *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā.* See BCA

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ŚS   *Śūnyatāsaptati*. N dBu ma, Tsa 116b-128b, P 5231

Vaidalyaprakaraṇa see *Kajiyama 1965*

VV   *Vigrahavyāvartanī*. - The Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna with
        the authors commentary. Ed. E.H.Johnston and A.Kunst. *Mélanges
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ON THE THESIS AND ASSERTION IN THE MADHYAMAKA / DBU MA

by

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I

When the philosophy of the middle (Tibetan dBu ma = Sanskrit Madhya-
maka) was adopted in Tibet as the predominant school of thought, its
Tibetan followers were confronted with a number of difficult, and highly
interesting, philosophical and religious problems several of which had
not been fully clarified in their Indian sources.

This adoption of the Madhyamaka in Tibet is reported to have taken
place by royal command immediately following the so-called "Council of
bSam yas" or "Council of Tibet" in the 790s. And by the beginning of the
ninth century indigenous Tibetan scholarship had begun to grapple with
some of these questions, as can be seen from the treatises composed at
that time by dPal brtsegs and Ye śes sde, two of the greatest scholars
and translator-editors of the Old Tibetan Kingdom. However, the deeper
and more systematic penetration of the problems posed by the philosophi-
cal traditions of the Madhyamaka appears to have begun only at the start
of the Later Propagation (*phyi dar*) of the Dharma in Tibet. Initiated
by scholars and translators such as Rin chen bzaṅ po (958-1055) and Ati-
śa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, 982-1054), this philosophical penetration was ac-
tively pursued later in the eleventh century by rṄog Blo ldan śes rab
(1059-1109) and (s)Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (born in 1055). Together with
their immediate disciples these last two masters are regarded as the
leading early Tibetan representatives of the Madhyamaka in its two bran-
ches known in Tibet as the Raṅ rgyud pa (*Svātantrika) and Thal 'gyur ba
(*Prāsaṅgika), a pair of designations which appears to have become cur-
rent only during the Later Propagation of the Dharma in Tibet.

One of the thorniest and most interesting problems to be encountered
in the history of the Madhyamaka is the question whether the follower of
this school - the Mādhyamika (Tib. dBu ma pa) - may legitimately, within

the frame of his school's doctrine, maintain a philosophical proposition
or thesis (*pratijñā* = *dam bca'*) and a philosophical position (*pakṣa* =
phyogs) of his own, and indeed whether there is any legitimate place in
the Madhyamaka for a doctrinal system of one's own (*svamata* = *raṅ lugs*).
This question - which appears not to be unconnected with some of the top-
ics under discussion between India, Chinese and Tibetan thinkers to-
wards the end of the eighth century at the time of the "Coucil of Ti-
bet"[1] - has been frequently raised in Tibetan philosophical literature.
For the Tibetan dBu ma pas the problem arises because Nāgārjuna, the
source of Madhyamaka thought in all its branches, has himself stated
that he has no *pratijñā*, and because this idea has been repeated by Ārya-
deva, the second common source of all branches of the Madhyamaka, as well
as by Candrakīrti, the principal master of the Prāsaṅgika branch of the
Madhyamaka.[2] Yet Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti, and the other Mādhya-
mikas who have thus disowned a *pratijñā* were nevertheless thinkers enga-
ged in expounding a philosophical theory (*darśana* = *lta ba*, or *vāda* =
smra ba) - as distinct from a speculative view or dogma (*dṛṣṭi* = *lta ba*)
- and in explaining a teaching that they held to be true - viz. the teach-
ing of the Buddha. Confronted thus with the question of how the state-
ment that the Mādhyamika has no *pratijñā* or *pakṣa* relates to the actual
procedure of the great masters of the Madhyamaka as philosophers and ex-
egetes, the Tibetan dBu ma pas have found it necessary to investigate in
detail the rejection of a thesis and its philosophical status and moti-
vation. The need to do so was especially keenly felt since this problem
had not been thoroughly elucidated in the Indian sources.[3]

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[1] See below, p.224.

[2] That the statement "All *dharmas* are unborn (*anutpannāḥ sarvadharmāḥ*) should not be
made a *pratijñā* is explained also in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (ed. B.Nanjio, Kyōto 1923),
III,166-167. Cf. also II,41,8; II,122,12 (in a discussion of the *catuṣkoṭikā*); V,
219,8 (verse 3, in connexion with the avoidance of disputes, *vivāda*, on which see be-
low). This sūtra in addition rejects the *pakṣa* that postulates existence/non-exist-
ence (*sad-asat*) in II,23,6 (verse 7). Cf also II,72-73, etc.
   That the rejection of a *pratijñā* must not be equated with position 4 of the *ca-
tuṣkoṭi(kā)* can be seen from *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* II,122. And the *Samādhirājasūtra*
states (IX,27) that the wise person will not take his stand even in a position between
the two extreme positions of existence and non-existence (i.e. positions 1 and 2 of
the *catuṣkoṭi*) - a point that has sometimes been overlooked in recent discussions of
the Madhyamaka. See also Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX,35 together with Prajñākara-
mati, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* on IX,33 ff. Cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, The uses of the four
positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, *JIP* 5. 1977,1-71.

[3] Interpretations of certain aspects of this complex of problems by Jayānanda (in his
Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā) and by his Tibetan Lotsāba disciples have been criticized by
Tsoṅ kha pa Blo bzaṅ grags pa'i dpal, *Lam rim chen mo*, 433b1 f., 436b4 f. See below.

II

In his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* Nāgārjuna states (29-30):

> *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ* |
> *nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ* ||
> *yadi kiṃcid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā* |
> *pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ* ||
>
> "If I had some *pratijñā* [this] defect would as a conse-
> quence attach to me, but I have no *pratijñā* so that there
> is no defect for me. If I apprehended something by means
> of direct perception and the other factors [that are valid
> means of right knowledge] I would engage in affirmation
> or denial, [but] because of their non-existence no criti-
> cism [is possible] against me."

This passage contains Nāgārjuna's reply to the objection of an opponent
according to whom it is precisely the Mādhyamika's *pratijñā* - i.e. his
statement "All entities are empty" - that is defective.[4] Indeed, as the
opponent had argued earlier (*vv* 1),

> *sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaś cet* |
> *tvadvacanam asvabhāvaṃ na nivartayituṃ svabhāvam alam* ||
>
> "If [as you maintain] no self-nature exists for all enti-
> ties, then your [own] statement, [which is therefore also]
> without self-nature, cannot controvert self-nature."

However, according to the commentary on *vv* 29 ascribed to Nāgārjuna
himself, given that all entities are empty of self-nature, entirely quiet
and "isolated" in nature, the Mādhyamika can have no *pratijñā*; no char-
acter of a *pratijñā* will then apply to his statement (contrary to what
the opponent has argued in *vv* 4); and the alleged defect resulting from
having acquired the character of a *pratijñā* cannot therefore arise.[5]

---

[4] *vv* 4:
> *pratiṣedhapratiṣedho 'py evam iti mataṃ bhavet tad asad eva* |
> *evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mama* ||
The opponent is here represented as assuming that the Mādhyamika argues that the
opponent's negation of the Mādhyamika's negation of self-nature (*svabhāva*) of enti-
ties is improper, and the opponent now maintains that this argument is itself im-
proper. For, he reasons, it is the Mādhyamika's negation - and not the opponent's
denial of the Mādhyamika's negation - that takes on the character of a *pratijñā* or
thesis and it is therefore this *pratijñā* of the Mādhyamika that is defective.

[5] *VVV* on 29: *yadi ca kācin mama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt pūr-
vako doṣo yathā tvayoktas tathā mama syāt* | *na mama kācid asti pratijñā* | *tasmāt
sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣv atyantopaśānteṣu prakṛtiviviktdeṣu kutaḥ pratijñā* | *kutaḥ prati-
jñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ* | *kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ* | *tatra yad bhavatoktam tava
pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt tavaiva doṣa iti tan na* |

With regard to the nature of his negative statement, and in reply to
the opponent's objection that a negation can apply only to something
real that is absent in a particular place (*vv* 11),[6] Nāgārjuna states
(*vv* 63):

> *pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit* |
> *tasmāt pratiṣedhayasīty adhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate* ||

"I negate nothing [really existing] and there exists
nothing to be negated: therefore by saying that I
negate [some thing] you make a [false] imputation."[7]

Nāgārjuna has specified the nature of his negation in *vv* 23:

> *nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ svamāyayā sṛṣṭam* |
> *pratiṣedhayeta yadvat pratiṣedho 'yaṃ tathaiva syāt* ||

"Let the negation [employed by us] be like [the case]
where one] projection might put an end to [another] pro-
jection [or where, in a magical show put on by a clever
illusionist, one] man-of-*māyā* [might put an end to an-
other] created by his own illusory power (*māyā*)."[8]

This line of discussion has been elaborated by Āryadeva with regard to the reason
((*hetu*) and example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in a *pratijñā* (see *CŚ* XVI,21-23).
    See also Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,171-178.

[6] E.g. *nāsti ghaṭo gehe* "there is no pot in [this] house".

[7] In the Tibetan translation of the Kārikās only of the *VV* by Jñānagarbha and Ka ba
dPal brtsegs which was revised by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde dpal (sic!?), *adhilaya*
is translated by *yaṅ dag min* (*te khyod kyis smras*). And in the translation of the
Kārikās together with the Vṛtti by Jñānagarbha and dPal brtsegs (?), the word is
translated by *bkur pa* (Peking ed.)~ *skur pa* (sDe dge ed.) "denial, rejection". The
Vṛtti speaks here of an irrelevant (*aprastuta*) *adhilaya* (*skur pa thog tu ma bab pa*).
Compare below, n.11.

[8] See also *VV* 27. - According to one theory of negation, there can properly speaking
be negation (*pratiṣedha*) only of something that exists, e.g. a pot. This principle
is stated by Nāgārjuna's opponent in *VV* 11. In *VV* 30 Nāgārjuna argues that there
would be affirmation/negation if some thing were really apprehended as existent by
a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), i.e. by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), infer-
ence (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), and valid testimony (*āgama*). But since he con-
siders all entities (*sarvabhāva*) to be empty of self-nature, there exists no thing
for the Mādhyamika to negate; and the opponent's criticism of Nāgārjuna for negating
everything is therefore irrelevant (*aprastuta*). - The question whether negation can
be applied to a real thing is discussed by Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttika*, Parārthā-
numānapariccheda 225-226 = *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II,16-17), Dharmottara (*Kṣaṇabhaṅga-
siddhi*, ed. E.Frauwallner, *WZKM 42*, 1935, 227; cf. 246), Śāntarakṣita (*Madhyamakā-
laṃkāra* 72), and Haribhadra (*Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* V.8-9 ed. W.Wogihara, Tōkyō 1932,
838). The further question as to whether empty subject terms are negatable cannot
be gone into here.
    When the Mādhyamika makes use of negation, then, it is as if, in a magical show,
one illusory projection puts an end to another (*VV* 23,27). Neither is real, both
being products of the magician-illusionist's cleverness and dexterity. Use of nega-
tion does not therefore imply, for the Mādhyamika, the existence of a real negandum
(*pratiṣedhya, pratiṣeddhavya = dgag bya*). (See also *YṢ* 8 cd and 46, quoted by mKhas

The idea that no criticism (*upālambha*) can be levelled against one who understands that all entities are empty of self-nature (*svabhāva-śūnya*), and who therefore entertains no thesis affirming or denying a self-nature, is further alluded to in other passages of the *vv.* [9]

Āryadeva also makes this point in his *Catuḥśataka* (XVI,25):

> *sad asat sadasac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate* |
> *upālambhaś cireṇāpi tasya vaktuṃ na śakyate* ||

> "It is not at all possible to level a criticism
> against the person who has no position positing
> [some thing] existent, non-existent, and both
> existent and non-existent." [10]

Nāgārjuna moreover observes in his *MMK* (XXIV,13):

> *śūnyatāyām adhilayaṃ yaṃ punaḥ kurute bhavān* |
> *doṣaprasaṅgo nāsmākaṃ sa śūnye nopapadyate* ||

> "The charge[11] you moreover make concerning Empti-
> ness does not apply to the empty as the occurence
> of a fault for us."

That is, according to Candrakīrti, it does not apply in the case of the doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatāvāda*), which has the sense not of negativism or nihilism (*abhāva*) but of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

---

grub rje, *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* 148a.)
    For the example in *VV* 23, compare *MMK* XVII,32 where the *dṛṣṭānta* is applied to an agent and an action.

[9] *VV* 59: *sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvaṃ copapāditaṃ pūrvam* |
        sa upālambhas tasmād bhavaty ayaṃ cāpratijñāyāḥ ||
"The fact that all entities are empty having been previously established, this criticism [of yours] therefore relates to what is no *pratijñā* [of mine]." And *VV* 67:
        yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kas taṃ nivartayed grāham |
        śeṣeṣv apy eṣa vidhis tasmād eṣo 'nupālambhaḥ ||
"If that perception [of a mirage, *mṛgatṛṣṇā*, *VV* 65] existed by self-nature, what would cancel it? This same principle applies to the other [*dharmas*] also, so that this [criticism raised in *VV* 13-14] is [in fact] no criticism."

[10] See also *CŚ* XVI,10:
        dṅos po mthoṅ nas dṅos po ni | | *med pa źes bya bzlog 'gyur na* ||
        de ltar phyogs ni bźi char la | | *ñes pa spaṅs pa gaṅ źig mthoṅ* ||
"The non-existence of an entity being excluded when an entity is seen, in the case of the four *pakṣas* [corresponding to the four positions of a *catuṣkoṭi*] what is seen to be without a defect?" – For the four extreme positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, only three of which have been mentioned in *CŚ* XVI,25, see e.g. *CŚ* VIII,20 (below, p.213) and XIV,21. Cf. *JIP* 5. 1977, 1-71.

[11] In Candrakīrti's *PP*, *adhilaya* is glossed as *adhikṣepa* ("abuse, dismissal"), and as *nirākaraṇa* and *pratikṣepa* ("refutation, rejection"). The Tibetan translation has *spoṅ ba (r byed pa)*; but in *PP* VII,15 (159,15) *adhilaya* = *smod pa (r byed pa)* "blame". Cf. above, n.7.

A related point is made by Nāgārjuna in *MMK* IV,8-9:

> *vigrahe yaḥ parihāraṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |*
> *sarvaṃ tasyāparihṛtam samaṃ sādhyena jāyate ||*

> *vyākhyāne ya upālambhaṃ kṛte śūnyatayā vadet |*
> *sarvaṃ tasyānupalabdhaṃ samaṃ sādhyena jāyate ||*

> "If someone makes a rebuttal when a debate[12] is being
> conducted in terms of Emptiness, nothing serves him
> as a rebuttal: there [merely] arises an equivalent
> with what is to be established. If someone makes a
> criticism when an explanation is given in terms of
> Emptiness, nothing serves him as a criticism: there
> [merely] arises an equivalent with what is to be
> established."

In other words, whatever may be adduced in a debate or discussion as a
reply or objection against *śūnyatā* will itself fall within the scope of
śūnyatā and cannot therefore ground an argument against it.[13] Thus, as
Candrakīrti explains, the existence of sensation and the following three
Groups (*skandha*) cannot be adduced as an argument against the non-sub-
stantiality and Emptiness of *rūpa*, the first *skandha*, since the exist-
ence as substantial entities of the last four *skandha*s is equivalent (*sa-
ma*) to - and hence just as dubious as - the *sādhya* in question, i.e. the
substantial existence of visible form (*rūpasadbhāva*).[14]

In the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* the context is not only logical and ontological,
as in the passages quoted above, but ethical and soteriological as well.

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[12] Candrakīrti glosses *vigraha*, "conflict", by *parapakṣadūṣaṇa*, "refutation of an oppo-
nent's (or: an opposed) thesis".

[13] See also *CŚ* VIII,16 (quoted in *PP* IV,9):
   bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ |
   ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā ||
   "The seer of one thing is considered a seer of [any thing at] all: Emptiness of one
   thing is [tantamount to] Emptiness of [any thing at] all."

[14] This is the principle (*vidhi*, *PP* 127,15) of circularity in proof. For the expression
sādhyasama see also *VV* 28 and *VVV* 69. - J.May translated *sādhya-sama* as "pétition de
principe"; see *Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris 1959, 93 f., 532.
This translation has been criticized by K.Bhattacharya, *JIP 2*. 1974, 225-30; see
also B.K.Matilal, *JIP 2*. 1974, 221 f., who seeks to show that Nāgārjuna's *sādhya-
sama* does not correspond with a standard interpretation of *petitio principii* and
prefers to render the expression by "same predicament".

In this treatise Nāgārjuna indeed states not only (51):

> *che ba'i bdag ñid can de dag* | | *rnams la phyogs med rtsod pa med* ||
> *gaṅ rnams la ni phyogs med pa* | | *de la gźan phyogs ga la yod* ||

"For these great beings there is no position (*pakṣa*), no dispute (*vivāda*). How could there be another's [counter-] position for those who have no position?",[15]

but also (47):

> *rāgadveṣodbhavas tīvrakaṣṭa[?]dṛṣṭiparigrahaḥ* |
> *vivādās tatsamutthāś ca bhāvābhyupagame sati* ||

"When one makes an affirmation concerning an entity
one espouses terrible and wrong [speculative] views
in which attraction and hostility arise, and that
leads to disputes resulting from the latter."[16]

The eirenic character of a philosophy that makes no postulations concerning entities is here closely linked with dispassion and strifelessness on the ethical level.[17]

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[15] This translation (which is somewhat uncertain) attempts to follow the Tibetan version by Muditaśrī and Pa tshab Ñi ma grags reproduced here, which is cited by mKhas grub rje in his *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* (146a2). But the (earlier) translation by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye śes sde, included in their translation of Candrakīrti's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, reads:
  rtsod med che ba'i bdag ñid can | | *de dag la ni phyogs med do* ||
  gaṅ rnams la ni phyogs med pa | | *de la gźan phyogs ga la yod* ||
Following this version, pādas a and b could perhaps be translated: "Those whose nature is greater (?) non-disputatiousness have no position." The Tibetan version of Candrakīrti's *Vṛtti* has: *raṅ gi phyogs khas len pa yod na ni de'i tshe de gzugs pa'i phyir gźan rṇams daṅ rtsod par gyur na de dag la ni de lta bu yaṅ med pas de bas na rtsod med che ba'i bdag ñid can no* | | *gal te de dag la raṅ gi phyogs med du zin kyaṅ gźan gyi phyogs gźig pa med mi srid de* | *de bas na gźan gyi phyogs yod daṅ* | *bdag gi phyogs kyaṅ med du mi ruṅ ṅo* || See also Candrakīrti, *MA* VI,118 f.

[16] The Sanskrit text of this verse of the *YṢ* is quoted by Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* II,8 (161). The reading of the Sanskrit text is uncertain.

[17] In addition to *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* V,3 (219), which links a *pratijñā* with *vivāda*, see also *Samādhirājasūtra* IX,28, which connects the twin opposed views of existence and non-existence with *vivāda* and Pain (*duḥkha*). See also *CŚ* VIII,10:
  svapakṣe vidyate rāgaḥ parapakṣas tu te 'priyaḥ |
  na gamiṣyasi nirvāṇaṃ na śivaṃ dvandvacāriṇaḥ ||
"Being attached to [your] own position and disliking another's position, you will not attain Nirvāṇa: there is no tranquillity for him who lives in opposition"; and compare *CŚ* XII,15 and Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,118.
  These ideas can be traced back to the old canon, for example the *Dīghanikāya* (II, 58-59), the *Saṃyuttanikāya* (I,4) and, especially, the *Suttanipāta* (e.g. the Paramaṭṭhakasutta, Tissametteyyasutta, Pasūrasutta, Māgandiyasutta, Purābhedasutta, Kalahavivādasutta, Cūlaviyūhasutta, and Mahāviyūhasutta of the Aṭṭhakavagga; the verse *Suttanipāta* 842 is found in *Saṃyuttanikāya* I,12). Still, notwithstanding e.g. *Suttanipāta* 837, the perfected Bhikkhu and Arahan may say that he makes a statement (or teaches a doctrine?) (*Saṃyuttanikāya* I,14); but he does so only according to consensual usage

Concerning a *pakṣa* and its correlative counter-position, in the *Ratnā-vali* also ascribed to Nāgārjuna we read (II,4):

> *dṛṣṭaśrutādyaṃ muninā na satyaṃ na mṛṣoditam |*
>
> *pakṣād dhi pratipakṣaḥ syād ubhayaṃ tac ca nārthataḥ ||*

> "What is seen, heard and so forth is said by the Sage
>
> to be neither true nor false: from a position a counter-
>
> position (*mi mthun phyogs*) may proceed, but neither [holds]
>
> in fact."[18]

This verse follows one stating that neither *ātman* nor *anātman* is appre-hended in reality, and that they constitute two speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) that the great Sage has excluded.

Ratnāvali II,3-4 are quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* on *MMK* XVIII,6 where Nāgārjuna states that, while the designation *ātman* has been used and *anātman* has been taught, the Buddhas have also taught nei-ther *ātman* nor its opposite (*anātman*).[19] And in *MMK* XVIII,8 Nāgārjuna

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(*vohāramattena*, I,15).

The above-mentioned passage would suggest a close connexion between absense of strife and contentiousness, achieved through refraining from adhering to one's own theses and rejecting others' theses, and the Buddhist ideal of *araṇa/araṇā* (Tib. *ñon moṅs med pa*) "absence of affliction, passion" as a quality of Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas and Buddhas. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* I,8, the *raṇas* are defined as *kleśas* "afflictions, passions" that inflict harm on oneself and others. And according to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* VII,35-36, *araṇā* "passionlessness, strifelessness" is a con-dition where the Arhat avoids becoming the objective support (*ālambana*) for the aris-ing of *kleśas* in others. Cf. *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* VIII,7 and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XX, 45 for the same in connexion with a Buddha. This *araṇa* is sometimes associated with *maitrī* "friendliness"; see *Abhidharmakośa* IV,56; *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (ed. P.Jaini, Patna 1959), 144, and L.de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa* VII (Paris-Louvain 1925), 86-87 (cf. also *Gaṇḍavyūha*, Maitreya Chapter, verse 39 [ed. Suzuki and Idzu-mi, Tōkyō n.d., 482] and F.Edgerton, *BHSD* s.v. ?). The concept of *araṇā(vihārin)* has been discussed by M.Walleser, *Die Streitlosigkeit des Subhūti*. (Sitzungsber. der Heidelberger Ak. der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl., Jahrg.1917, 13.Abh.), Heidel-berg 1917.

In the case of the Mādhyamika, his philosophical endeavour is not directed as such towards refuting another's thesis inasmuch as the latter simply dissolves and dis-appears in the clear light of the Madhyamaka analysis, just as darkness disappears before light, or as a mirage vanishes (*VV* 65-66), or as an illusion disappears (*VV* 23, 27). (See also Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,118.) What the Mādhyamika achieves, then, by means of his *prasaṅga*-type reasoning is the dissolving or decon-struction of all propositional theses postulating substantial entities (*bhāva*), rather than their refutation (involving the setting up of a counter-thesis and the holding of a counter-position within the framework of binary alternatives).

[18] Cf. *Ratnāvali* I,72:

> *vināśāt pratipakṣād vā syād astitvasya nāstitā |*
>
> *vināśaḥ pratipakṣo vā kathaṃ syād astyasambhavāt ||*

"Because of destruction, or because of a counter-position (*gñen po*), for existence there would be non-existence. [But] because of the non-existence (or: impossibility) of existence how would there be destruction, or a counter-position?" - On the mean-ings of *pakṣa* cf. below, n.25.

[19] On the interpretation of *MMK* XVIII,6, see D.Seyfort Ruegg, *JIP* 5. 1977, 7-9.

specifies that teachings that all is "so" (*tathya*, i.e. true), "not so" (*atathya*, i.e. *mrṣā* "false"), "both so and not so", and "neither so nor not so" represent a progressive instruction (*anuśāsana*). According to Candrakīrti, since the Buddhas, employing great compassion, introduce their various disciples to the quintessential elixir of immortality of reality (*tattvāmrtāvatāra*), their teaching is a progressive one (*anupūr-vyā śāsanam*), or one that conforms to their disciples (*vineyajanānurū-pyeṇa śāsanam*).[20] Here Candrakīrti quotes Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* (VIII, 20)

> *sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayaṃ ceti kathyate |*
> *nanu vyādhivaśāt sarvam auṣadhaṃ nāma jāyate ||*

> "Mention is made [in the Buddha's teachings] of
> the existent, the non-existent, the existent-and-
> non-existent, and what is neither. [Indeed,] does
> not everything become what is called medicine be-
> cause of [the various] diseases [to be treated]?"[21]

Reality is then defined as without discursive development (*prapañ-cair aprapañcitam*) and as free of conceptual dichotomization (*nirvikal-pa*). Hence, for the Mādhyamika, it cannot be hypostatized in terms of the positions of the *catuṣkoṭi*.[22]

Exactly how, then, are the Sanskrit term *pratijñā* and its Tibetan e-quivalent *dam bca'* - together with corresponding verbal forms such as Skt. *pratijānīte* and Tib. *dam 'cha' ba* - to be understood?

In a number of our sources the term *pratijñā* very clearly refers to a propositional thesis postulating an entity (*bhāva*). And it is just such a thesis that Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva have disowned in the *vv* and the *cs*. This meaning is also clearly attested in the Sanskrit text of Candrakīrti's *PP* 16,7-12 (*svatantrā pratijñā*), 23,3 (*svapratijñā*), 19,4 (*svapratijñātārtha*) and 18,6 and 34,5 (*parapratijñā*), in particular in the context of his critical discussion of Bhāvaviveka's employment of an independent inference (*svatantrānumāna*) and an independent "syllogism" (*svatantraprayogavākya*) to establish the understanding of the Madhyamaka (see *PP* 16, 18-19, 25, 34).

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[20] See *JIP* 5. 1977, 5-6, 37-39.

[21] *PP* on *MMK* XVIII,8 (372). Cf. *JIP* 5. 1977, 7. - Instead of *sarvam* (*thams cad*) part of the tradition however reads *pathyam* (*'phrod pa*).

[22] Cf. *JIP* 5. 1977, 10f. On a use of the "neither ... nor" formula in the Madhyamaka which does not correspond to position 4 of the *catuṣkoṭi*, see, however, *loc.cit.* 16-18.

In other passages of the *PP*, however, the meaning "sentence" or state-
ment" is no less well attested for the word *pratijñā*. For example, the
four (negative) statements enunciated by Nāgārjuna in *MMK* I,1 – "Nowhere
are any entities whatever ever produced from self, an other, both, and
from no cause [i.e. from neither self nor an other]" – are termed *pra-
tijñās* by Candrakīrti (*PP* on I,1 [13,3]; cf. *Madhyamākavātarabhāṣya* on
VI,8 [81,17-18]). Moreover, Nāgārjuna's two statements in *MMK* VIII,1 –
"A real agent does not effect a real action, nor does an unreal agent
bring about an unreal action" – are referred to by Candrakīrti as
pratijñās or theses (*PP* 181,1-2; cf. *PP* on VIII,7 [185,3]); but such
a thesis clearly does not assert the existence of any kind of *bhāva*.
Similarly, in commenting on *MMK* XXI,2 – "How indeed without coming into
existence (*sambhava*) will there be destruction (*vibhava*), [for then]
without birth precisely [there would be] death; there is [then] no de-
struction without birth" – Candrakīrti identifies a *pratijñā* ("How in-
deed without coming into existence will there be destruction"), the ad-
duction of an argument *ad absurdum* pointing out a consequence undesired
by the opponent (*prasaṅgāpādana*: "[for then] without birth precisely
[there would be] death"), and the conclusion (*nigamana*: "there is no
destruction without birth").[23] In addition, in connexion with the Vinaya,
Candrakīrti uses *pratijñā* in the meaning of "vow" (*PP* on XVII,32 [334,2]).

This second series of examples taken from Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*
demonstrates that the Mādhyamika does use the word *pratijñā* in a posi-
tive or neutral context, without automatically rejecting it as a thesis
postulating some kind of entity or relegating it to an opponent's *pūrva-
pakṣa*. And we accordingly have to distinguish between *pratijñā/dam bca'*
as a philosophical statement or thesis enunciated by Nāgārjuna or anoth-
er Mādhyamika, and *pratijñā/dam bca'* as a propositional thesis postulat-
ing the substantial existence of some kind of *bhāva*, which the Mādhya-
mika firmly rejects. Though of course related, the meanings "statement",
"vow" and "propositional thesis (postulating an entity)" have therefore
to be carefully distinguished in the usage of the Mādhyamikas.[24]

The word *pakṣa/phyogs* has been used by the Mādhyamikas in much the
same way as *pratijñā/dam bca'*, as has been seen above where it denotes

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[23] See also *PP* IV,2 (123,11) for *pratijñā*; and v.5 (131,17) for *nigamana*.– For the
pratijñā in an opponent's *pūrvapakṣa* (where it is of course rejected), see *PP* on
XII,2 (227,12), XX,20 (403,15), and 9,1, where we find the expression *pratijñā-
mātra(ka)*.

[24] For some relevant Sūtra passages see above, n.2.

the kind of philosophical position disowned by the Mādhyamika.[25] It has, however, also been used by Candrakīrti in a positive context (see the *avataraṇikā* in *PP* on XXIV,15 [501,10]: ... *āsmākīne pakṣe supariśuddha-tare sarvavyavasthāsv aviruddhe vyavasthite.*...). And, under the influence apparently of logicians like Dharmakīrti and some of his successors[26] who developed a synthesis of the Madhyamaka with logic, the Tibetan Mā-dhyamikas have not hesitated to formulate *prasaṅga*-type arguments in which a *pakṣa* and a *pratijñā* are found. Indeed, as already seen above, Candrakīrti has himself sanctioned this use of *pratijñā*.[27]

Given these two distinct uses of *pratijñā* (and *pakṣa*), there is no paradox in a philosopher's saying "I have no propositional thesis (*pra-tijñā*)", for this sentence is not automatically synonymous with "I have no philosophical thesis (*pratijñā* = *darśana*, *vāda*, etc.)". And no logical inconsistency need therefore exist between Nāgārjuna's statement in *VV* 29 and the actual procedure of this philosopher and other Mādhyamikas. There does, however, appear to exist a certain philosophical tension between these two approaches of the Mādhyamika; and this is a question that has been addressed in particular by the Tibetan exegetical tradition.

III

The complex of problems connected with the status of a philosophical thesis in Madhyamaka thought has received special attention in the *sTon thun sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed*, an extensive treatise by mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po (1385-1438) on the philosophy of the Madhyamaka.[28]

The author, often referred to as mKhas grub rje or mKhas grub thams cad mkhyen pa, was at first, like Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419), a disciple of Red mda'

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[25] The functions of *pakṣa*, as a term equivalent to *anumeya*, in an inference have been studied by J.F.Staal, *JIP 2*. 1973, 156-166. Here, however, we are concerned only with *pakṣa* ("position") as either the equivalent or the content of a *pratijñā*.

[26] An example is Jitāri.

[27] *PP* on XXI,2, referred to above.

[28] *Zab mo stoṅ pâ ñid kyi de kho na ñid rab tu gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos, sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed ces bya ba*, in vol.Ka of the gSuṅ 'bum of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzaṅ po (Źol edition). This work is included in the list of mKhas grub rje's writ-ings in the *rNam thar* written by one Svasti (bDe legs or dGe legs?), 11b2 (vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum). - An account of mKhas grub rje's life is also to be found in Sum pa mkhan po Ye śes dpal 'byor, *dPag bsam ljon bzaṅ*, ed. S.Ch.Das, Calcutta 1908, 271 f. For further biographical material see A.Vostrikov, *Tibetskaja istoričeskaja literatura*, Moscow 1962, n.362 and 562. There is also an important gSan yig in vol. ka of the gSuṅ 'bum.

ba gźon nu blo gros (1349-1412) - a renowned master of the Prāsaṅgika branch
of the Madhyamaka - from whom he received his monastic ordination, and
with whom he studied the philosophical curriculum including dBu ma (Ma-
dhyamaka).[29] Then, in his twenty-third year, mKhas grub rje joined Tsoṅ
kha pa, who was to be his principal teacher and with whom he studied dBu
ma and the *Lam rim* among many other subjects. mKhas grub rje succeeded
his senior codisciple rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) - himself
the direct successor of Tsoṅ kha pa - on the abbatial seat of dGa' ldan
monastery.

The *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* was written down by Źaṅ źuṅ pa Chos dbaṅ
grags pa (1404-1469), a disciple of mKhas grub rje who, according to the
colophon of this text, faithfully recorded his master's teaching without
making either unwarranted additions or subtractions.

The following is a summary of salient points in the treatment of our
problem which appears in the *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* in the context of mKhas
grub rje's discussion of various opinions on the difference between the
Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika branches of the Madhyamaka (145b-156b).

The discussion opens with a quotation of the opinion of many persons
who lay claim to being modern Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas.[30] According to them,
even in transactional usage (*tha sñad = vyavahāra*) the Prāsaṅgika has no
doctrinal system of his own (*raṅ lugs = svamata*), no propositional the-
sis (*dam bca' = pratijñā*), and no tenet or affirmation (*khas len = abhyu-
pagama*) whatsoever. Otherwise, they argue, the Prāsaṅgika would not dif-
fer from the Svātantrika [i.e. from a Mādhyamika who adopts independent

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[29] The above-mentioned *rNam thar* by Svasti places (3b2) his ordination in the year
śiṅ mo lug (=1415), when he would have been in his 30[th] or 31[st] year. This date
must be wrong if Red mda' ba died in 1412. Was the year of mKhas grub rje's ordina-
tion then 1405 (*śiṅ bya*), when he would have been the age usual in Tibet for ordi-
nation? This is the year that Sum pa mkhan po Ye śes dpal 'byor actually indicates
in his Re'u mig for the ordination. However, the *gSan yig* (3a1) gives for this event
the *khyi lo* (1406). In his *rNam thar* of mKhas grub rje, dKon mchog 'jigs med dbaṅ po
gives the year *śiṅ mo lug* (=1415), in his subjects's 31[st] year (5a, in vol. Ca of the
gSuṅ 'bum).

[30] *phyis kyi dbu ma thal 'gyur bar khas che ba*. mKhas grub rje does not specify who
these persons were. The qualification *phyis* ("later") excludes such masters as the
Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna of the "Council of Tibet". (Could the reference perhaps be to Roṅ
ston Śākya rgyal mtshan [1367-1449], who is known as an opponent of mKhas grub rje
[see e.g. the *rNam thar* by Svasti, 6b6 f.] as well as of Tsoṅ kha pa?) The same view
is mentioned by Tsoṅ kha pa, who writes *da lta* ("now"), in the place of mKhas grub
rje's *phyis*, in his *Lam rim chen mo*, 435b3. The persons in question are not identi-
fied in the annotated edition of the *Lam rim chen mo* (ed. Chos 'phel legs ldan, after
the Tshe mchog gliṅ blocks, 2 vols., New Delhi 1972: see the reference below, n.65).

inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) and "syllogisms" (*svatantraprayogavākya*) to
establish the understanding of the middle (*dbu ma* = *madhyamaka*)].[31] To
support his view the opponent quotes Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29-30
and 63ab and *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 51; Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* XVI,25; and Candra-
kīrti's *Prasannapadā* on I,1 (16.2 and 23.3) and *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI,171
ff. and VI,81. (145b5-146b2)

mKhas grub rje replies by formulating a *prasaṅga*-type argument re-
ducing the opponent's proposition to absurdity in the following words:
[According to you,] the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika - the subject (*chos can* =
dharmin) [of the thesis] - proves (*thal* = *prasajyate*) not to advocate a
doctrinal position (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*) because he does not affirm
(*khas len pa*) any doctrinal position whatever.[32] [Now,] if this is what
you hold, [the Mādhyamika's supposed] status as the best of all advo-
cates of doctrinal position [which you also allege][33] is destroyed. [That
is,] the person advocating such [a view] - the subject [of the thesis] -
proves (*thal* = *prasajyate*) to have a *pratijñā*, because he is one who
proposes a propositional thesis (*dam 'cha' ba po*) owing to his conceptu-
al attachment to some thing veridical [in the proposition] "I have no
pratijñā whatever".[34] (146b4-6)

The opponent, believing he has discovered a flaw in mKhas grub rje's
reply, then points out that to affirm that the denial of an affirmation
is itself an affirmation[35] is like requesting from somebody who has just
told one that he has no wealth at all (*nor ci yaṅ med do*) that wealth

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[31] Cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India*,
Wiesbaden 1981, 58-59, 61f.

[32] In Tibetan literature the verb *thal ba* (*prasajyate*) can be used not only to designate
an undesired "occurrence" or consequence (in an opponent's doctrine), but also to
formulate an argument that does not involve the philosopher in the onto-logical dif-
ficulties pointed out for example by Candrakīrti in his critique of Bhāvaviveka's
svatantrānumāna and *svatantraprayogavākya*. The latter use is then adopted by the
Thal 'gyur ba to give expression to his own arguments in a non-assertive (and non-
referring) language, i.e. one that does not presuppose the ultimate reality, as ob-
jects of right knowledge (*gźal bya* = *prameya*), of the entities being talked about,
including the valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa*).

[33] Cf. below, 149b3-4.

[34] *khas len ci yaṅ med do źes bden źen gyis dam 'cha' ba po yin pa'i phyir.* - For the
term *bden źen* compare below, 150b2, *dṅos por mṅon par źen pa* = *bhāvābhiniveśa*, i.e.
conceptual commitment or attachment to an entity (*bhāva*) conceived of as having self-
nature (*svabhāva*, "aseity") or as being *bden* (*par*) *grub* (*pa*) ("established in truth"
or in a veridical cognition).

This *prasaṅga*-type argument used by the Thal 'gyur ba includes a *pratijñā*, a
prasaṅgāpādana and a *nigamana*, which have been mentioned by Candrakīrti, *PP* on
XXI,2 (see above, p.214).

[35] *khas len med pa de ñid khas len yin no źes zer ba.*

called "nothing at all".[36] - mKhas grub rje however answers that this re-
ply is totally inappropriate. For what we have said, mKhas grub rje ob-
serves, is that your opiniated averring that there is no affirmation is
itself an affirmation; but we have certainly not said that [as such] non-
affirmation (*khas len med pa*) is affirmation.[37] (146b6-147a2)

mKhas grub rje subsequently quotes passages from works by Nāgārjuna
and Candrakīrti where an accepted doctrine is in fact explicitly mention-
ed.[38] Accordingly, these masters of the Madhyamaka can both clearly be

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[36] *ci yan med pa źes bya ba'i nor de byin cig ces zer ba dan mtshuns so.* - On *MMK* XIII,
8, where Nāgārjuna has characterized *śūnyatā* as release from (or: the expeller, *niḥ-
saraṇa*, of) all speculative views (*dṛṣṭi*) and has also described those who hold the
view of Emptiness (*śūnyatādṛṣṭi*) as incurable, Candrakīrti gives as an example some-
body who, when told by another that he will give him no merchandise whatever (*na
kiṃcid api paṇyam*), replies: "Give me that no-merchandise whatever". - The negation
in this example is interpreted as *prasajyapratiṣedha*, i.e. as non-presuppositional
absolute negation by which nothing else is implicitly affirmed, in contradistinction
to *paryudāsapratiṣedha* or presuppositional relative negation by which something else
is indirectly affirmed. See also Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka on *MMK* XIII,8.
   In its application to the problem of a philosophical affirmation (*khas len* = *abhyu-
pagama*), the question is whether the statement "I have no *pratijñā*, no *abhyupagama*,
etc." entails the assertion of a *pratijñā* or is pure negation. For mKhas grub rje's
opponent, it is evidently only negative and implies no indirect affirmation. But it
nevertheless risks taking on the character of a positive assertion (in some ways com-
parable to position 4 of the *catuṣkoṭi*). Alternatively, if interpreted negativisti-
cally, the statement could also come close to the theory ascribed to the Hva śaṅ at
the "Council of Tibet", which mKhas grub rje rejects below (fol.152a-b).

[37] *kho bo cag gis khas len med par źe bas smras pa de ñid khas len yin no źes smras
kyi | khas len med pa khas len yin no źes ma smras pa'i phyir ro.* - Here mKhas grub
rje calls attention to the non-affirmative character of negation in the statement
khas len med pa "There exists no *abhyupagama*", which is of the *prasajya*-type; but he
considers that the opponent's *źe bas smras pa* or vehement averring does not corre-
spond to such non-presuppositional absolute negation. - Tsoṅ kha pa has phrased this
point slightly differently in his *Lam rim chen mo* (440a): *'di ltar kho bo cag khas
len med pa de ñid khas len no źes mi smra'o | | 'o na ci źig smras sñam na | khas len
med do źes źe bas smra ba des khas len med par khas blans dgos so | źes ston pa yin
pas ran tshig gi bsal ba spon bar mi nus so ‖* "Accordingly, we do not maintain that
absence of affirmation itself is an affirmation. - [Opponent:] What then do you main-
tain? - [Reply:] It being shown that this vigorous affirmation [by you] of the ab-
sence of affirmation has to be affirmed as absence of affirmation, [your] rejection
of [your] own statement cannot be avoided". (In the expression *źe bas smra ba*, *źe
bas* is glossed by *thabs kyis* and *rim gyis* "methodically, systematically" in the an-
notated edition of the *Lam rim chen mo*, vol.2, 247b4.)

[38] Particular reference is made to *VV* 28cd:
    saṃvyavahāraṃ ca vayaṃ nānabhupagamya kathayāmaḥ ‖
"Without having accepted pragmatic usage (cf. *MMK* XXIV,10) we do not speak [philo-
sophically]";
YṢ 8cd:
    de phyir dam pa rnams kyis kyan | | sgyu ma byas lta'i 'gog pa bźed ‖
"Therefore (P and D read *de bźin*, "thus") the excellent ones also accept cessa-
tion (*nirodha*) like that of something projected by magic (*māyā*)";
YṢ 46: *gan dag brten nas dnos po rnams | | chu yi zla ba lta bur ni ‖*
        yan dag ma yin log min par | | 'dod pa de dag ltas mi 'phrog ‖

seen to have recognized that a Mādhyamika does have a philosophical sys-
tem (*rnam par bźag pa* = *vyavasthā*) establishing a doctrine and an affir-
mation (*khas len* = *abhyupagama*) of a doctrine. And one should not there-
fore imagine that the contrary view represents some acme of philosophi-
cal doctrine (*grub mtha'*); for to do so is simply to proclaim oneself to
be one who is, because of lack of philosophical ability due to inferior
intellect and capacity, no Mādhyamika of either variety, Prāsaṅgika or
Svātantrika.[39] (148a1-149b4)

The opponent then asks: Well then, how is one to interpret the mean-
ing of the texts cited above? (149b5-6)

mKhas grub rje points out in reply that the above-mentioned verse
29 of the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* in which Nāgārjuna states that he has no
pratijñā is a specific reply to a particular objection by an opponent
who has argued (*vv* 1): "If all entities are altogether without self-na-
ture, your [i.e. Nāgārjuna's] statement (*vacana*), [which is therefore al-
so] without self-nature, cannot controvert self-nature [maintained by
us]." mKhas grub rje gives the following interpretation of this passage:
Were the Mādhyamika, who has affirmed that all entities are without self-
nature, then to affirm that a statement propounding that all entities
are without self-nature exists by self-nature (*raṅ bźin gyis yod pa*),
that would indeed constitute a defect (*skyon* = *doṣa*) for him. But because
in the Mādhyamika's doctrinal system (*lugs* = *mata*), no statement pro-
pounding such a thing is in fact established by self-nature (*raṅ bźin
gyis grub pa med pa*), the defect of internal inconsistency (*naṅ 'gal gyi
skyon*) alleged by the opponent does not arise.[40] (150a1-3)

"Holding that entities, which [are born] in dependence, are neither true nor false,
like the moon reflected in water, they are not carried away by a view";
MMK XXIV,18ab: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe* |
"We regard origination in dependence to be Emptiness";
PP on I,1 (54-55): *idaṃpratyayatāmātreṇa saṃvṛteḥ siddhir abhyupagamyate* | *na tu
pakṣacatuṣṭayābhyupagamena sasvabhāvavādaprasaṅgāt, tasya cāyuktatvāt* | *idaṃpratyaya-
tāmātrābhyapagame hi sati hetuphalayor anyonyāpekṣatvān nāsti svābhāvikī siddhir iti
nāsti sasvabhāvavādaḥ* ||
"The establishment of the surface level is affirmed in virtue of pure conditionship -
but not because the four positions [negated in *MMK* I,1] are affirmed, since [in this
case] there would be the undesired consequence of the doctrine of [an entity] having
self-nature and this is not correct. When pure conditionship is affirmed there is no
establishment in self-nature because of the interdependence of cause and effect, so
that there is [then] no doctrine of [an entity] having self-nature"; etc.

[39] The opponent also considers the Madhyamaka according to the interpretation of the
Prāsaṅgika school to be the highest of the Siddhāntas, or schools of Buddhist thought,
recognized in the Grub mtha' literature of India and Tibet. Cf. above, 146b5.

[40] Compare below, n.71.

However, mKhas grub rje explains, one must not conclude from this that Nāgārjuna has taught that, *in general* (*spyir*), no *pratijñā* exists for the Mādhyamika. And *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30cd – "Because of there being no [affirmation and denial, 30ab] due to factors such as direct perception (*pratyakṣādi*), no criticism (*upālambha*) is [possible] against me" – means: While in accordance with what has been stated previously it is taught that there exist no thing apprehended (*dmigs bya*) and no apprehender (*dmigs byed*) established by own being (*raṅ gi ṅo bos grub pa*) with respect to a valid means of knowledge (*tshad ma = pramāṇa*) and an object of knowledge (*gźal bya = prameya*), it has however n o t been taught that there exist no valid means of knowledge and no object of knowledge arising in conditioned dependence (*rten 'byuṅ = pratītyasamutpāda*). (150a3-4)

In his *Vṛtti* on *Catuḥśataka* XVI,25 – "It is not at all possible to level a criticism against the person who has no position positing [something] existent, non-existent, and both existent and non-existent" – Candrakīrti has shown that the doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatāvāda*) cannot become the target of a refutation (*sun 'byun = dūṣaṇa*). But, mKhas grub rje points out, since the opponent has stated that he does not accept ('*dod pa*) even Emptiness, how could there be room for the non-existence of any tenet ('*dod pa*) whatever?[41] Āryadeva's meaning is therefore that, because it involves no position falling into the extremes (*mthar lhuṅ gi phyogs*) of postulating existence, non-existence, etc., established by self-nature, the doctrine of Emptiness cannot at all be criticized. (150a4-6)

As for Nāgārjuna's statement in the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (51) that great beings keep to non-disputatiousness (*rtsod med = avivāda* ?) and have no position (*phyogs = pakṣa*), in his comment on a previous verse Candrakīrti has explained (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*) that persons who do not comprehend the reality (*dharmatā*) of origination in conditioned dependence (*pratītyasam-utpāda*) construct imaginarily specific characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of entities, as Nāgārjuna has said in verse 47: "When one makes an affirmation concerning an entity one espouses terrible speculative views in

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[41] It is only in terms of the theory of *śūnyatā* that it is possible to have no propositional thesis postulating some kind of entity. In the absence of the theory of *śūnyatā*, the philosopher inexorably falls either into the extreme of eternalism and substantialism or into the extreme of annihilationism and negativism. But for him who accepts that all entities are empty of self-nature – and for him alone – everything holds together, as Nāgārjuna has observed in *MMK* XXIV,14 (*sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate | sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate ||*) and *VV* 70 (*prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ | prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya ||*).

which attraction and hostility arise, and that leads to disputes result-
ing form the latter."[42]   Therefore, mKhas grub rje explains, he who has
no such thesis affirming that an entity is established by specific char-
acteristic (raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa) does not become engaged in
disputes involving the establishment of his own position (raṅ gi phyogs
= svapakṣa) and the rebuttal of another's position (gźan gyi phyogs =
parapakṣa), activities that result from conceptual attachment to an en-
tity. [43] However, this is certainly not to say that it has been taught
that the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system of his own (raṅ lugs = sva-
mata). (150a6-b2)

Therefore, when Candrakīrti states in his Prasannapadā (on I.1 [16])
- where the passages in question from the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Ca-
tuḥśataka are quoted as testimony - that there is no affirmation of any
other position (pakṣāntarābhyupagamābhāva), the meaning is to be under-
stood in the same way as indicated above. (150b2-3)

In Vigrahavyāvartanī 64ab - "I negate nothing and there exists noth-
ing to be negated" - the meaning is: I do not negate anything established
by self-nature. This being a case of a negative inferential nexus based
on inconsistency ('gal khyab),[44] no negator ('gog byed) is established
by specific characteristic (raṅ gi mtshan ñid) because there is no im-
putation (sgro 'dogs = samāropa) whatever of any negandum (dgag bya =
pratiṣedhya, pratiṣeddhavya) established by self-nature. In our own doc-
trinal system also an unreal (rdzun pa = alīka) māyā-like negandum and
negator are accepted; and this is what Nāgārjuna has stated in vv 23
where he compares this negation with a magic show. (150b3-4)

Accordingly, when Candrakīrti states in his Prasannapadā: "Because
we have no pratijñā",[45] this means that there is no independent proposi-
tional thesis (raṅ rgyud kyi dam bca' = svatantrā pratijñā),[46] not that

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[42] See above, p.211.

[43] Cf. bden źen above, 146b5, and p.217, n.34. - Thus, according to Nāgārjuna, the as-
sertion of a pakṣa in the final analysis involves the postulation of an entity, in
other words the bhāvābhiniveśa, or bden źen, referred to here and elsewhere. See al-
so Haribhadra's comment on YṢ 47 in his Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā II,8 (161).

[44] For a classification of types of negative inference see e.g. Mokṣākaragupta, Tarka-
bhāṣā, ed. H.R.Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore 1944 31,7 ff. (= ed. Embar Krishnamacharya,
Baroda 1942, 16,20 ff. = ed. Raghunath Giri, Varanasi 1969, 51,1 ff.); cf. Y.Kajiya-
ma, An introduction to Buddhist philosophy, Kyōto 1966, 81 ff.

[45] raṅ la dam bca' ba med pa'i phyir. See PP 23; cf. 16 (quoting VV 29-30 and CŚ XVI,
25), 19, and 34.

[46] For the expression svatantrā pratijñā see PP on I,1, (16,12).

the Mādhyamika has no doctrinal system of his own (*rań lugs = svamata*). (150b5-6)[47]

Moreover, if there were no *abhyupagama* and no *pratijñā* whatever, there would then be no possibility of taking refuge (*skyabs 'gro = śaraṇa-gamana*) in the ordinary and extraordinary Refuges by admitting the Three Jewels which can, in the future, arise in one's own conscious stream (*rgyud = saṃtāna*),[48] and also admitting the Buddha already perfected in another's conscious stream as the Teacher (*ston pa = śāstṛ*), the Dharma as the Path, and the Community (*dge 'dun = saṃgha*) as the Friend on the Path, etc. Nor would it be possible to form the altruistic intention (*lhag bsam = adhyāśaya*) consisting in vowing (*dam 'cha' ba*) to remove the Suffering of all sentient beings,[49] to form the Thought of resolution (*smon sems = praṇidhicitta*) consisting in vowing to attain buddhahood for the sake of others, to form the Thought of execution ('*jug sems = prasthānacitta*) consisting in vowing to observe the practice (*spyod pa = caryā*) of the Bodhisattva,[50] and to form the Thought of elimination (*spoń sems*) consisting in vowing to reject all obstacles to the observance (*bslab pa = śikṣā*) of the Bhikṣu. And as a consequence the sprout that gives birth to the great medicinal plant of the Tathāgata healing all living beings would then be uprooted.[51] - Objection: There is no fault [in our position] because, although in this case there is no *pra-tijñā* (*dam mi 'cha' ba*) with respect to a system of one's own (*rań lugs = svamata*), there is [still] *abhyupagama* with regard to another's understanding only.[52] - Reply: It would as a consequence be very clearly established that your discipline (*tshul khrims = śīla*), your production of the Thought of Awakening (*sems bskyed = cittotpāda*) and your taking refuge would all be mere pretence (*smras chos tsam*), and they would not be

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[47] The following lines take up some technical points raised by Candrakīrti in his *MA* (VI,171-175 and VI,81).

[48] Cf. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, II,11; and Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* II,26 f.

[49] On *adhyāśaya* see Prajñākaramati, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* on III,9-10; Haribhadra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā* IV,24-26 (585); *Bodhisattvabhūmi* § 2,3 (312 f., 333); Asaṅga, *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* § 2,34.

[50] On the *praṇidhicitta* and *prasthānacitta*, see Śāntideva, *op.cit.*, I,15-17.

[51] For the *bhaiṣajyamahāmahīruha* cf. PP on XXII,1 (*avataraṇikā*, 431,8).

[52] *gźan ńo tsam du khas len pa*. The opponent here extends to the sphere of general ethical and philosophical praxis the principle adopted by the Prāsaṅgika who, when engaging in a discussion by means of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning, argues *ad hominem* (in the non-pejorative sense) with respect to what another has accepted (*paraprasiddha*) and thus rejects - or rather dissolves - others' theses without accepting any contrary theses of his own (*svaprasiddha*); see *PP* on I,1, pp.18,24 and 34-37. (This is possible for the Prāsaṅgika because his negations are technically of the *prasajya-pratiṣedha* rather than of the *paryudāsapratiṣedha*; see above, n.36).

sincere (*že bas ma yin*).[53] And were we to agree without compunction to whatever fault [another may] utter on the ground that he [has spoken] thus also, it would be very strange indeed![54] (151b6-152a6)

[Moreover,] many who hold themselves to be meditators (*bsam gtan pa*) of the Snow-mountains [of Tibet] talk, in exalted cryptic terms (*skad gsaṅ mthon po*), of theory (*lta ba = darśana*) free from all affirmation (*khas len = abhyupagama*), of meditative realization (*sgom pa = bhāvanā*) free from all mentation (*yid la byed pa = manasikāra*) of [philosophical] practice (*spyod pa = caryā*) free from all denial and assertion (*dgag sgrub = niṣedha-vidhi*) and of a Fruit ('*bras bu = phala*) free from all wishes and qualms (*re dogs*). And they imagine that understanding is born in the conscious stream when - because in a state where there is no mentation about anything at all (*ci yaṅ yid la ma byas par bžag pa na*) there arises something like non-identification of anything at all (*gaṅ la 'aṅ ṅos gzuṅ med pa 'dra ba žig śar bas*) - one thinks that there exists nothing that is either identical or different. By so doing one has proclaimed great nihilism where there is nothing to be affirmed according to a doctrinal system of one's own (*gaṅ yaṅ raṅ lugs la khas blaṅ rgyu med pa'i chad pa chen po*), as well as the thesis of the Hva śaṅ in which nothing can be the object of mentation (*ci yaṅ yid la byar mi ruṅ ba'i hva śaṅ gi dam bca'*).[55] (152a6-b2)[56]

Thus, according to mKhas grub rje and his school, the Mādhyamika's refraining from asserting a thesis (*dam bca'/pratijñā*) or tenet (*khas len/abhyupagama*) is to be interpreted

1) neither as a total rejection of any philosophical and ethical praxis or position in surface-level pragmatic usage,

2) nor, on the contrary, as a quasi-thesis (which would in effect be comparable to position IV of the "tetralemma" [*catuṣkoṭi*] where an indeterminate entity "x" is posited and defined as being

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[53] Compare Nāgārjuna's discussion of the question whether the theory of *śūnyatā* cancels the four noble truths, etc. (*MMK* XXIV).

[54] It is , therefore, not legitimate to extend to all cases of ethical and philosophical praxis the logical principle that has been correctly applied by the Prāsaṅgika, but only (according to mKhas grub rje) in his *prasaṅga*-type arguments dissolving the assertions of other philosophers who postulate some kind of entity. In mKhas grub rje's opinion, then, the two situations are entirely different and exclude the kind of extrapolation to which his opponent has fallen victim.

[55] mKhas grub rje thus considers that the Hva śaṅ does indeed have a thesis, if only a negativistic and quietistic one. Cf. above, 146b-147a; and n.36 and 37.

[56] In the final lines of this section mKhas grub rje has discussed the question of how the Prāsaṅgika really differs from the Svātantrika, criticizing and refuting his opponent's misapprehensions on the subject. Cf. also above, 145b6.

without the predicates "A" and "Ā" - in terms, perhaps, of a log-
ic which is not two-valued and based on the pronciple of biva-
lence, or in terms of some "logic of mysticism" postulating an
ineffable entity).

3) In particular, the Mādhyamika's theory is not to be identified
with what has often been called in Tibet the theory of the Hva śaṅ,
namely the idea that philosophical theory is free from all tenets,
that meditative realization is free from all mentation, that phi-
losophical praxis is free from both denial and affirmation, and
that the Fruit of spiritual insight is free from all hopes and
qualms. mKhas grub rje has in fact pointedly referred to this
theory as the *dam bca'* or assertion of the Hva śaṅ. - In this
connexion it is to be observed that the bulk of the Tibetan tra-
dition from at least the thirteenth century, the time of Sa skya
Paṇḍi ta (1182-1251), has clearly regarded the debate with the
Chinese Hva śaṅ (Ho shang) at the "Council of bSam yas" or "Coun-
cil of Tibet" as bearing on questions of philosophical theory and
praxis, and not as a largely political struggle for dominance be-
tween Indian and Chinese missionaries and between the Tibetan po-
litical factions allied with them. (It has to be recalled, fur-
thermore, that in his treatment of some of these questions in his
Bhāvanākramas, Kamalaśīla has already connected them explicitly
with classical problems alluded to in the Sūtra literature.)
Thus, although the debates at the "Council of Tibet" may have had
local as well as international political dimensions, in the Ti-
betan view from quite early times they were in fact concerned
with fundamental - and urgent - philosophical and religious is-
sues.

4) The disowning of any propositional thesis, assertion and tenet can-
not represent the total philosophical and ethical outlook of the
Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika as one who, in contradistinction to the
Svātantrika, would have no philosophical position of any kind.
For, according to mKhas grub rje and his school, whereas the Prā-
saṅgika does indeed differ from the Svātantrika by not employing
an independent inference with an epistemologically grounded log-
ical reason - let alone a full independent "syllogism" - to es-
tablish the theory and understanding of the Madhyamaka, he never-
theless does have a philosophical theory (the *śūnyatādarśana* and
niḥsvabhāvavāda) which he upholds by philosophical investigation,
and by *prasaṅga*-type reasoning which dissolves any propositional

thesis asserting an entity. In fact, in accordance with Nāgārju-
na's comment on *vv* 64, although the statements of the Mādhyamika
are clearly not supposed to be factitive or to possess apodictic
and probative force in virtue of a formal process of independent
inference or deduction, they equally clearly have an indicative
and communicative (*jñāpaka*) value revealing a philosophical con-
tent: the Emptiness of all entities. And the difference between
the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika does not, therefore, lie
s i m p l y in the latter having a philosophical position while
the former does not.

In his exposition in the *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* mKhas grub rje has large-
ly followed the explanation given by his teacher Tsoṅ kha pa in a work
he completed in his middle forties, the *Lam rim chen mo*.[57]

In a later work completed in his early fifties which thus represents
his most mature thinking, the *Draṅ ṅes rnam 'byed Legs bśad sñiṅ po*, Tsoṅ
kha pa also touched on the problem of the Mādhyamika's philosophical the-
sis when discussing and criticizing the opinions of earlier scholars who
held that the Mādhyamika employs a logical reason and inference to ne-
gate (*'gog pa*) substantial self-nature (*raṅ bźin*), but that he never em-
ploys a logical reason and inference to prove (*sgrub pa*) non-substanti-
ality (*raṅ bźin med pa*) (108a6-112a2, especially 109b6 ff.). According
to Tsoṅ kha pa their view is incorrect because, for the understanding of
Emptiness and non-substantiality, a positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod
pa*) of negation (*bkag pa*, i.e. *niḥsvabhāvatā*) is necessary in addition
to the negative determination (*rnam par bcad pa*) of the negandum (*dgag
bya*, i.e. *svabhāva*) since these two aspects of determination are in fact
inseparable (110b2-3). Moreover, in this context Tsoṅ kha pa has called
attention to the fact that pure exclusion (*bcad [pa] tsam*) of the negan-
dum is not confined to the Prāsaṅgika's method alone, and that it is em-
ployed also by the Svātantrika; for in addition to implicative and pre-
suppositional relative negation (*paryudāsapratiṣedha*), Bhāvaviveka has
fully acknowledged non-implicative and non-presuppositional absolute (or

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[57] *Byaṅ chub lam rim che ba = Lam rim chen mo* (lHa sa edition, vol Pa), 433a6-462a4,
especially 438b2-447a3 containing Tsoṅ kha pa's reply to an (unknown) opponent's
pūrvapakṣa cited in 435b3-436a6, which is the third of four *pūrvapakṣas* cited by
Tsoṅ kha pa in his discussion of the difference between the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantri-
ka branches of the Madhyamaka. (Cf. A.Wayman, *Calming the mind and discerning the
real*, New York 1978, 284 ff.). - This topic has also been treated by Tsoṅ kha pa
in his commentaries on the *MMK* - the *Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho* - and on the *Madhyamakā-
vatāra* - the *dGoṅs pa rab gsal*. Cf. also his *Lam rim chuṅ ba* 171b5 ff.

exclusion) negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*) and the method of reasoning which employs it (108b-109a, 110a3-6, 111a5). In sum, it is not possible to maintain that, for the Madhyamaka, there is no content (*brjod bya = abhidheya*) in scriptural texts (*luṅ = āgama*), no object of knowledge (*śes bya = jñeya*) in knowledge (*śes pa = jñāna*) and nothing to be established (*bsgrub bya = sādhya*, "probandum") for a logical reason (*rtags = liṅga*). However, above and beyond pure negation (*bkag tsam*) of the negandum (i.e. self-nature), *prasajya*-negation neither presupposes nor implies some putative self-nature of non-existence (*dṅos med kyi ṅo bo ñid*, of an entity) (110b-111a). Accordingly, when it is known that what is to be established in *MMK* I,1 has the form of *prasajya*-negation (cf. 109a2), one understands that there is established the pure negative determination of production in ultimate reality (*don dam par skye ba rnam par bcad tsam sgrub kyi*) without there being an additional establishment of the existence of some (putative) ultimately real non-production (*de min pa'i don dam pa'i skye med yod par mi sgrub pa*) (111b2). In other words, beside the negative determination (or exclusion) of establishment in reality (*bden [par] grub [pa]*, i.e. substantial self-nature) there is no positive determination of some non-establishment in reality that could be regarded as established in reality (*bden med bden grub*); however, the positive determination of *bden med* must of necessity still accompany the negative determination (or exclusion) of *bden grub* (111b3-4).[58] And in *VV* 26 Nāgārjuna has in fact stated:[59] "Were prevention of [things, *bhāva*, as] having no self-nature effected by [the affirmation of] something [i.e. a sentence] having no self-nature,[60] self-nature would then become established once [this sentence] having no self-nature is stopped [i.e. negated]." According to Tsoṅ kha pa, then, Nāgārjuna clearly means that,

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[58] Compare Tsoṅ kha pa's reply to the second *pūrvapakṣa* in *Lam rim chen mo* 437b-438a: *gźan gyi grub mtha' la sun 'byin pa'i thal 'gyur byed na ni raṅ bźin yod pa bkag pa ñid raṅ bźin med pa bsgrubs pa yin par sñar rtsod zlog rtsa 'grel las gsuṅs pa ltar yin pas de la phuṅ gsum med do | | de lta min na raṅ bźin med pa bsgrubs pa yin gyi raṅ bźin yod pa bkag pa min no źes bzlog nas smras na lan ci yod | raṅ bźin med pa yoṅs su gcod na raṅ bźin gdon mi za bar rnam par bcad dgos pas so sñam na | de lta na raṅ bźin yod pa rnam par bcad na'aṅ gdon mi za bar raṅ bźin med pa yoṅs su gcod dgos pa mtshuṅs pa yin no ||*

[59] *VV* 26: *naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvyena vāraṇam yadi hi |*
      naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi prasiddham syāt ||
The Tibetan version reads:
      gal te raṅ bźin med ñid kyis | ji ste raṅ bźin med pa zlog ||
      raṅ bźin med pa ñid log na | ¦ raṅ bźin ñid du rab grub 'gyur ||

[60] The *Vṛtti* explains: *...yadi naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato 'yaṃ dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ syāt | iha tu naiḥsvābhāvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kriyate |* ...

if the non-substantiality of things were prevented by means of a sentence which is itself without self-nature, these things would then be found to be actually in possession of a self-nature. But in the Madhyamaka this is not the case. Moreover, Tson kha pa explains, it will not be possible for both existence in ultimate reality a n d non-existence in ultimate reality to be negated in such a manner; but it nevertheless remains possible for both existence in ultimate reality a n d the existence in ultimate reality of non-existence in ultimate reality to be negated (111b-112a).[61] B o t h members of the first (contradictory) pair, where negative determination does not bring with it the positive determination in question, indeed cannot be negated in the process of the Mādhyamika's reasoning leading to understanding of reality. But b o t h members of the second (non-contradictory) pair, where negative determination does bring with it the positive determination in question, can be so negated; and this is precisely what the Mādhyamika does in his reasoning leading to understanding of reality.[62] In this way the Mādhyamika will thoroughly establish, by means of both *āgama* and *yukti*, the profound Middle Way free from objectification (*dmigs med/anupalambha*) which avoids the twin extremes of maintaining an ultimately real (*bden pa*) negation and an ultimately real negandum (112a1-2).

For both mKhas grub rje and his teacher Tson kha pa, then, the question whether the Mādhyamika entertains a propositional thesis, assertion and tenet is no longer mainly a logical and methodological problem. It has acquired an epistemological, or rather gnoseological, significance of the most fundamental importance; and it turns out to be inseparably linked with the question as to how the theory and understanding of reality arises in the conscious stream according to the two branches of the pure Madhyamaka, the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika.

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[61] In this connexion Tson kha pa provides a valuable explanation of *prasajya*-and *paryudāsa*-negation (108b3 f.)

[62] A correlation between positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod pa* = *pariccheda*) and negative determination or exclusion (*rnam par bcad pa* = *vyavaccheda*) appears in Dharmakīrti's discussion of the *anupalabdhihetu*. See *Hetubindu* (ed. E.Steinkellner), 25*f

IV

mKhas grub rje's *sKal bzaṅ mig 'byed* is cited, together with Tsoṅ
kha pa's two larger *Lam rim* treatises, by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa'i rdo rje
Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus (1648-1721) when discussing the question whether
the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical position.[63]

'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa observes in the first place that it could not
have been the opinion of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (1055-) - who was largely
instrumental in establishing Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the Ma-
dhyamaka in Tibet in collaboration with the Kashmirian Paṇḍit Jayānan-
da - that the Mādhyamika maintains no position at all. For in his reply
to an enquiry from the *dge bśes* Śar ba pa (1070-1141) Pa tshab is stated
to have declared that the two truths (*bden gñis*, i.e. the *saṃvṛti°
paramārtha-satya*) are both required on the foundational level (*gźi*),
that the two forms of Equipment (*tshogs gñis*, i.e. the *puṇya°* and *jñāna-
sambhāra*) as well as Intellect and Means are required on the Path (*lam*),
and that the two Kāyas (*sku*) are both necessary on the level of Fruit
(*'bras bu*).[64]

In the opinion of another Lo tsā ba who followed Jayānanda - identi-
fied as (among others) Khu lo tsā ba, a collaborator of this same Kashmir-
ian Paṇḍit - the Mādhyamika, however, only negates the tenets of others
without propounding a thesis (*dam bca'*) of his own; and no independent
(*raṅ rgyud* = *svatantra* inferential or syllogistic) establishment or proof
is possible because the subject (*chos can* = *dharmin*) and the other com-
ponent elements of an inference or syllogism are not agreed on in common
by both the Mādhyamika and his opponent in discussion (the *phyir rgol* =
prativādin who advocates the existence of things having a substantial
self-nature). This opinion is mentioned by Tsoṅ kha pa as the second
pūrvapakṣa relating to the problem of how the Madhyamaka theory (*dbu ma'i
lta ba*) arises in the conscious stream according to the two branches of

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[63] *Grub mtha'i rnam bśad raṅ gźan grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzaṅ
źiṅ gi ñi ma luṅ rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skoṅ* (completed in the year
sa mo yos = 1699), Madhyamaka chapter, 29b f. (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. Pha, in the bKra śis
'khyil edition, reprinted by Ngawang Gelek Demo, *The collected works of 'Jam-dbyaṅs-
bźad-pa'i-rdo-rje*, vol.14, New Delhi 1973). - The same author has also treated this
problem in a refutation of the view of sTag tshaṅ Lo tsā ba (born in 1405) entitled
*Tshig gsal stoṅ thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bśad zab rgyas kun gsal tshad ma'i 'od brgya
'bar ba* (gSuṅ 'bum, vol. Da; *Collected works*, vol.11).

[64] *Op.cit.* 30a.

Mādhyamikas, the Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas.[65]

A fourth *pūrvapakṣa* quoted in the same context by Tsoṅ kha pa mentions the following argument which includes a refutation of the opinion that the Mādhyamika has neither a position corresponding to a doctrinal system of his own (*raṅ lugs kyi phyogs*) nor a valid means of correct knowledge to establish it (*sgrub byed kyi tshad ma*). According to this *pūrvapakṣa*, the Mādhyamika's procedure consists rather in first negating an objectively gained[66] *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*) - i.e. direct perception and inference - where one accepts a system comprising a means of correct knowledge and its object (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa* and *gźal bya* = *prameya*) established in virtue of the characteristic of reasoned analysis of reality (*rigs pas rnam par dpyad pa'i raṅ gi mtshan ñid*); and the Mādhyamika then himself establishes, by means of a perfect logical reason, the fact of the non-substantiality of entities by adducing, against the opponent (*phyir rgol* = *prativādin* who advocates the existence of entities having substantial self-nature), a probative proposition (*bsgrub pa'i ṅag* = *sādhanavākya*) after having accepted (*khas blaṅs nas* = *abhyupagamya*), in pragmatic usage, simply a *pramāṇa* and *prameya* recognized in the every-day consensus (*'jig rten grags pa* = *lokaprasiddha*) - a procedure that does not involve philosophical analysis (*ma dpyad pa*) of reality. According to this opinion, this probative procedure does not make the Mādhyamika into a Svātantrika precisely because it is established here by means of a *pramāṇa* recognized in the every-day consensus only which, therefore, does not involve philosophical analysis of reality.[67]

From the annotated edition of the *Lam rim chen mo* it is perhaps not quite clear whether it is the whole of this fourth *pūrvapakṣa* that is to

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[65] *Lam rim chen mo* 434b-435a. - The identification of the propounder of this *pūrvapakṣa* as Khu Lo tsā ba is made in a note by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa; see *mÑam med rje btsun tsoṅ kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byaṅ chub lam rim chen mo'i dka' ba'i gnad rnams mchan bu bźi'i sgo nas legs par bśad pa theg chen lam gyi gsal sgron*, vol. Kha, 237a4 (reproduced from a print of the corrected Tshe mchog gliṅ blocks by Chos 'phel legs ldan, New Delhi 1972, with the short title *Lam rim mchan bźi sbrags ma*).

Khu Lo tsā ba is presumably Khu mDo sde 'bar, the Tibetan scholar and translator who collaborated with both Jayānanda and Pa tshab Ñi ma grags in translating Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* and with Jayānanda alone in translating this Kashmirian Paṇḍit's *Tarkamudgara*. He must have flourished c.1100.

[66] *dṅos po stobs źugs* = *vastubalapravṛtta*. Inferential knowledge may be gained by objective validation (*vastubala*) and by consensual validation through convention or authority. For the term *vastubala* (or its synonyms) see e.g. Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna-pariccheda 65, 130; Pratyakṣa ° 45, 185; and Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* 1395.

[67] *Lam rim chen mo* 436b.

be ascribed to rMa bya, a follower of Pa tshab Lo tsā ba.[68] But in any case, according to 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo*, rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus - who had only a partial familiarity with the basic text and the explication of the Madhyamaka (*dbu ma rtsa 'grel phyogs byed pa*) - held, following *vv* 29, that for the Mādhyamika there exist no theory consisting in a position of his own that is to be affirmed and no valid means of correct knowledge possessing probative force. rMa bya is said by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa to have maintained this opinion in his comment on the *Prasannapadā* and in his *dBu ma'i stoṅ thun*.[69]

Another early Mādhyamika mentioned in this connexion by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa is rGya dmar ba.[70]

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[68] See 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's note in the annotated edition of the *Lam rim chen mo* (cited above, n.65), vol. Kha, 240b5. This note seems in fact to refer to rMa bya *et al.* as the propounders of the entire fourth *pūrvapakṣa* discussion by Tsoṅ kha pa (rather than just as the advocates of the doctrine rejected in this *pūrvapakṣa*). (For the problem raised by this ascription see the end of this note.) - According to the Madhyamaka chapter of 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo* (103a4), a pupil of rMa Byaṅ named bSod nams rdo rje held that the Svātantrika used independent (*raṅ rgyud*) reasoning to establish his own position and to negate the opponent's, whereas the Prāsaṅgika did so by adverting only to arguments recognized by his opponent and dissolving them by *prasaṅga*-type apagogic reasoning. Against this view 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa remarks that the Svātantrika as well as the Prāsaṅgika makes use of *prasaṅga*-type reasoning.

The Tibetan historiographical and doxographical tradition knows of two early Tibetan masters of the Madhyamaka named rMa bya. (1) The first was rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye śes, who was a disciple of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags (see e.g. Padma dkar po, *Chos 'byuṅ* 193a1). (2) The other was rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, who is recorded to have been a disciple not only of rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye śes but also of Jayānanda, Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde 'bar, Thaṅ sag pa, and Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169). In this case, however, the dates pose a problem; and the name of Phya pa's disciple is also given as rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge. (Is this possibly a third rMa bya, or is he identical with Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus, the disciple of Pa tshab?) The traditions appear to be confused on this point. However this may be, it is difficult to ascribe the fourth *pūrvapakṣa* cited by Tsoṅ kha pa, and attributed to rMa bya by 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, to rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus since it does not appear to coincide with the doctrine on this same point ascribed to Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus in 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo* (see below). But the doctrine ascribed in the *Grub mtha' chen mo* to Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus does seem to be consonant with the doctrine rejected in this fourth *pūrvapakṣa*. It is of course possible that the rMa bya mentioned in 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's note on the *Lam rim chen mo* is not Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus but rMa bya Byaṅ chub ye śes (or even rMa bya rTsod pa'i seṅ ge if the latter is different from Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus). The early history of the Tibetan dBu ma requires much further study before it will be possible to clear up such questions.

[69] *Grub mtha' chen mo*, Madhyamaka chapter 30a (passage quoted below, n.71).

[70] *Grub mtha' chen mo*. Madhyamaka chapter 30a. - This is apparently Gaṅs rGya dmar ba Byaṅ chub grags of sTod luṅ(s). He was a disciple of Gaṅs pa Śe'u (who is recorded to have been the pupil of both rÑog Lo tsā ba [Blo ldan śes rab] and of Pa tshab Lo tsā ba) and of Khyuṅ Rin chen grags (another master of the Madhyamaka and a pupil of rÑog Blo ldan śes rab). He commented on Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*. Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) and Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110-1193) were among his disciples.

These masters, 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa specifies, held that all extreme positions which unilaterally postulate existence and non-existence are simply to be negated through the *prasaṅga*-type argument of internal inconsistency (*naṅ 'gal*).[71] The works of rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus (save his commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*) as well as those of Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, Khu mDo sde 'bar and rGya dmar ba are not now accessible; and the views of these early Tibetan masters are known to us from occasional references in later sources.[72]

One of the earliest extant original Tibetan discussions of the question whether the Mādhyamika maintains a philosophical position and thesis is found in the *mKhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo* by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251).[73] There Sa paṇ first points out that not holding an established philosophical doctrine (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*) can merely result from either ignorance or a fear of error. (1) The first case is of course of little philosophical interest because nobody would care to engage in debate with an ox-like fool. (2) As for the second case, it is convenient to distinguish between affirmation and non-affirmation of this non-affirmation (*khas mi len pa ñid khas len nam mi len*). (a) If one were to affirm non-affirmation, one's thesis of non-affirmation (*khas mi len pa'i dam bca'*) would be undetermined inasmuch as affirming non-affirmation would be no different from giving some thing the name of "nameless". (b) On the contrary, if at this stage one does not affirm non-affirmation, there will inevitably be affirmation; for the negation of a negative (*dgag pa* = *niṣedha*) is equivalent to a positive affirmation (*sgrub pa* = *vidhi*), in just the same way as the not non-blue is blue.[74] (212b)

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[71] *Grub mtha' chen mo*, Madhyamaka chapter 30a: *dbu ma pa la raṅ phyogs khas blaṅs rgyu'i lta ba ci yaṅ med ciṅ | de ñid kyis sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yaṅ med la gźan gcig tu yod med kyi mtha' thams cad naṅ 'gal thal 'gyur gyis 'gog pa yin źes tshig gsal bśad pa maṅ po daṅ dbu ma'i stoṅ thun dag las bśad pa ltar ro ||*
    The *prasaṅga*-type argument based on internal inconsistency in an opponent's proposition is one of the four arguments characteristic of the Mādhyamika mentioned e.g. by dBus pa Blo gsal in his *Grub pa'i mtha' rnam par bśad pa'i mdzod* 101a-b, and by Tsoṅ kha pa in his discussion of the second *pūrvapakṣa* (ascribed to Khu) in the *Lam rim chen mo* 434b-435a.

[72] rMa bya Byaṅ chub brtson 'grus has very briefly referred to our problem in his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, the *dBu ma rtsa ba śes rab kyi 'grel pa 'thad pa'i rgyan* 8a (reprinted at Rumtheg, 1975).

[73] This work is reprinted in the *Complete works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya pa sect* (Sa skya bka' 'bum, published by bSod nams rgya mtsho, vol.5, Tōkyō 1968).

[74] *sṅon po ma yin pa ma yin na sṅon por 'gyur ba bźin no.* - Here the negation is of the relative (presuppositional and implicative) kind (*ma yin dgag pa* = *paryūdasapratiṣedha*). - Compare mKhas grub rje's observation cited above (p.218) on the question of the

There however exist two additional cases where persons expert in
reasoning also make no affirmation. (3) Sometimes such non-affirmation
is due to a stratagem (g.yo sgyu). For example, the Vātsīputrīya may re-
frain from affirmation, saying that the self (bdag, i.e. the indetermi-
nable pudgala which he posits) is not describable as permanent or imper-
manent. (4) Non-affirmation may, however, also be used knowingly and in
all straightforwardness (draṅ po). Thus, the theory of the Madhyamaka
is correct because the real nature of things, which is free from discur-
sive development (spros pa = prapañca) and is not within the scope of
words and cognition (sgra blo'i yul ma yin pa), is beyond [discursive]
knowledge and verbal expression (śes brjod las 'das pa);[75] and the Son of
the Jina will accordingly remain silent.[76] Indeed, Sa paṇ observes fol-
lowing the Ratnāvalī (I,61-62), one should ask people - including the
Sāṃkhya, the Aulūkya (i.e. the Vaiśeṣika ?), the Nirgrantha (i.e. the Jai-
na) and the advocates of the pudgala and of the skandhas - if they main-
tain something going beyond existence and non-existence; and one should
therefore know the precious Dharma-heritage declared to be the profound
ambrosial essence of the Buddhas' teaching which is beyond existence and
non-existence.[77] Just like the heterodox Tīrthika's affirmation, then,
non-affirmation as a deceitful stratagem is comparable with the non-
acknowledgement of a theft. But the Mādhyamika's non-affirmation is al-
together different, for it is comparable with non-acknowledgement when
no theft has in fact been committed.[78] (212b-213a)

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assertion of non-affirmation (and also on the thesis of the Hva śaṅ). (Like mKhas
grub rje, Sa skya Paṇḍi ta does not here make a distinction between "internal" ne-
gation of the proposition and "external" negation of the assertion sign. On this
distinction see below, § VI.)

[75] Is Sa paṇ alluding here to the doctrine ascribed to rṄog Blo ldan śes rab and gTsaṅ
nag pa, in contradistinction to that of Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (see e.g. 'Gos gźon
nu dpal, Deb ther sṅon po, Cha, 10a [349 of Roerich's translation])? - Concerning the
definition of absolute reality (paramārtha), see for example Prajñākaramati, Bodhi-
caryāvatārapañjikā on IX,2.

[76] The silence of the wise Ārya-Bodhisattva is thus altogether different from the mere
muteness of the unlearned.

[77] See Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī I,61-62:
     sasāṃkhyaulūkyanirgranthapudgalaskandhavādinam |
     pṛccha lokaṃ yadi vadaty astināstivyatikramam ||
     dharmayautakam ity asmān nāstyastitvavyatikramam |
     viddhi gambhīram ity uktaṃ buddhānāṃ śāsanāmṛtam ||
     The Tibetan version differs slightly from the Sanskrit. - On a use of the "neither
     ... nor" formula where it does not correspond to position 4 of the catuṣkoṭi(ka),
     see above, note 22.

[78] This is a case of non-presuppositional and non-implicative absolute negation (med
     par dgag pa = prasajyapratiṣedha). The Tibetan text reads: dbu ma pa khas mi len pa
     ni ma brkus pa khas mi len pa lta bu yin pas khyad par che'o.

Our complex of problems has furthermore been touched on indirectly, in connexion with the Mādhyamika's avoidance of the four extreme positions (mtha' = anta) on the objective (yul) side and with his elimination of conceptual attachment to existence and non-existence on the subjective (yul can) side, by Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags (1572-1641) in his treatment of the Indo-Tibetan philosophical traditions.[79] This Sa skya pa master at the same time emphasizes the importance of clearly distinguishing this correct theory from what was known in Tibet as the Hva śaṅ's theory, that is, the above-mentioned attitude usually described as anti-intellectual and quietistic.[80]

In one of the earliest Tibetan doxographical treatises now available to us, the Grub mtha' by dBus pa Blo gsal who flourished in the early part of the fourteenth century, we also find expressed the view that the Prāsaṅgika has no thesis (dam bca') of his own and no theory to affirm (khas len gyi lta ba), and that he confines himself to as it were dissolving an opponent's doctrine (grub mtha') by an argument reducing it to absurdity without, however, rebutting it in the sense of propounding a counterthesis. On the contrary, the Svātantrika is said to seek to establish his doctrine of Emptiness by means of apagogic reasoning (thal 'gyur ba = prasaṅga) which has positive and probative force (sgrub pa 'phen pa) in addition to such prasaṅga-type reasoning which simply serves to refute (sun 'byin pa/dūṣaṇa) opposed doctrines.[81] dBus pa Blo gsal then links the idea according to which the Prāsaṅgika has no thesis with the idea expressed by Nāgārjuna that one is to be deemed untreatable (bsgrub tu med pa = asādhya) if one becomes attached to the concept of śūnyatā – which is in fact release from (or: the expeller of) all dogmatic opinions (MMK XIII,8, and which, according to MMK XXIV,11, destroys him who wrongly grasps it) – and also with the statement in the Acintyastava, also ascribed to Nāgārjuna, that all dharmas are free from the four extreme positions (mu bźi = catuṣkoṭi).[82]

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[79] Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags, Bod kyi mkhas pa sṅa phyi dag gi grub mtha'i śan 'byed mtha' dpyod pa daṅ bcas pa'i 'bel ba'i gtam skyes dpyod ldan mkhas pa'i lus rgyan rin chen mdzes pa'i phra tshom bkod pa (Poṭ chen drug gi 'bel gtam) 110b ff. (reprinted at Thimpu 1979).

[80] Op.cit. 112b. – See above, p.223, on mKhas grub rje's view on this point.

[81] Grub mtha' rnam par bśad pa'i mdzod 101a-b (sDe dge edition, reprinted at Thimpu 1979). – On dBus pa Blo gsal, see D.Seyfort Ruegg, Life of Bu ston Rin po che, Rome 1966, 22; and K.Mimaki, Zinbun: Memoirs of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, Number 15, Kyōto 1979, 176 f.

[82] Op.cit. 103a-104b. – On the catuṣkoṭi(kā), see JIP 5, 1977, 1-71.

V

To return now to Nāgārjuna's statement "I have no *pratijñā*" which was the point of departure for this discussion, in accordance with the second and narrower of the two uses of the term *pratijñā* noticed above (§ II) it can be interpreted as signifying: "I have no propositional thesis asserting an entity". It is then possbile to understand it as a metaphilosophical statement in which Nāgārjuna stipulates that none of his statements is to be taken as an assertion (of an entity). Since Nāgārjuna's philosophy in fact clearly appears not as a speculative and constructive ontological doctrine with a corresponding system of assertions about substantial entities (*bhāva*), but rather as a discourse concerning non-substantial factors originating in the structured conditionship of *pratītyasamutpāda*, his statement "I have no *pratijñā*" is readily intelligible. This interpretation also disposes of the supposition that Nāgārjuna's statement was intended as a paradox (comparable perhaps to the liar-paradox of Epimenides and Eubulides). And its *prima facie* antirational and antiphilosophical appearance is simply due to not recognizing its metatheoretical function.

But this is not all. According to Nāgārjuna's *VV*, although the statements of the Mādhyamika are clearly not intended to be factitive and to possess apodictic and probative force in virtue of a formal process of inference and deduction, they are equally clearly regarded as having an indicative and communicative (*jñāpaka*) value revealing a philosophical content, namely the non-substantiality and Emptiness of all entities originating in conditioned interdependence.

The second, and related, question whether the view that the Mādhyamika's statements are proof against falsification and being countered by an opposed thesis (see § II above) is antiphilosophical has not yet been considered here. Indeed, even if we accept that the Mādhyamika's statements are not supposed apodictically to prove that entities are empty of self-nature and only reveal that this is so, it might still be maintained that his theory and the statements expressing it should at least be open to debate and refutation. In other words, it might be argued (in a Popperian way) that a theory or statement formulated in such a way as to make it immune from objections and refutations is not really meaningful philosophically.

Now it has to be observed in the first place that the Mādhyamika has not expressly set out to develop a theory and to formulate statements in a manner calculated to make them immune from objections and refutation. Their unassailability is, on the contrary, a pure by-product

of the Madhyamaka theory of Emptiness, which does not posit any kind of entity and does not, therefore, make assertions referring to such an entity, and also of its method of *prasahga*-type reasoning in which all assertions are neutralized ontologically (because they do not refer to substantial entities) and logically (because they do not give rise to counter-statements). Hence this unassailability cannot properly be used as a ground for accusing the Mādhyamika of deliberately avoiding rational thinking and taking up a stance of philosophical indifferentism or facile agnosticism.

The gnoseological and metaphysical constitution of reality in the Madhyamaka as well as the eirenic attitude that the Mādhyamika has been seen to adopt (above, p.210ff.) therefore have nothing to do with an antirational outlook or philosophical indifferentism. This feature of the Madhyamaka would not be well defined as agnosticism either. Nāgārjuna has indeed himself provided definitions of reality (*tattvalakṣaṇa*) in *MMK* XVIII,7 and 9, as well as a positive statement about *śūnyatā* in *MMK* XXIV,18 and about the *paramārtha* in *MMK* XXIV,8-10, but all the while keeping from making assertions there about an entity in terms of any of the four conceivable positions of the "tetralemma" (*catuṣkoṭi*).

In sum, since Nāgārjuna and his faithful followers have not postulated such an entity and since their philosophy therefore has no place for theses asserting something about its ontological status, the question of falsification and refutation can no more arise than that of verification and proof: *niṣedha* and *vidhi* would come into play only in those speculative ontological theories (*dṛṣṭi*) for which no place exists in the Madhyamaka.

However, according to Tsoṅ kha pa and mKhas grub rje, refraining from postulating an entity in a speculative theory and from constructing a propositional system asserting something about the ontological status of such an entity should not be regarded as tantamount to the rejection of any philosophical theory or tenet (*darśana* or *vāda*) whatever. And, as seen above, they have sought to show that the Mādhyamikas, including Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, indeed entertain (non-speculative) philosophical tenets and (non-assertive) *pratijñās* in conformity with the theory of Emptiness of self-nature. Their school has in particular paid the greatest attention to developing a gnoseological theory that is testable and a mode of reasoning that can be logically validated. In working out this theory and mode of reasoning, their school has elaborated a remarkable synthesis between Madhyamaka thought and certain logical and epistemological methods going back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that were also adopted by Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri. But since their

school has, following Red mda' ba gźon nu blo gros, built on the foun-
dation of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika branch of the pure Madhyamaka, this
synthesis is distinct both from Bhāvaviveka's branch of the pure Madhya-
maka and from Śāntarakṣita's synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka.

For this school, then, there can be no question of the Mādhyamika's
rejecting all tenets and theses in the sense of statements with a mean-
ingful philosophical content, and of renouncing a well-founded gnoseo-
logy in its *rigs śes* leading to the comprehension (*rtogs pa*) of non-sub-
stantiality and Emptiness in which positive determination (*yoṅs su gcod
pa: pariccheda*) of negation plays an important part beside negative de-
termination (*rnam par bcad pa: vyavaccheda*) of the negandum.

On the level of ultimate reality this school has of course recogniz-
ed, like its Mahāyanist predecessors, that only the silence of the Ārya
is appropriate. The absence of *pratijñā* discussed here is even, in a cer-
tain sense, the methodological corollary of this silence. But Tsoṅ kha
pa and mKhas grub rje seek to show that the principle of the absence of
pratijñā and *abhyupagama* in the Madhyamaka must not be overextended and
applied indiscriminately. In this way they differ both from many other
Tibetan interpreters of the Madhyamaka, and from several modern writers
on this school.

                                    VI

The Mādhyamika's approach to the problem of the *pratijñā* appears,
then, to derive from his rejection of epistemic commitment to any pro-
position and assertion - positive or negative - that presupposes an en-
tity (*bhāva*) existing in terms of the binary categories of dichotomic con-
ceptualization (*vikalpa*) and the quaternary categories of the "tetralem-
ma" (*catuṣkoṭi[kā]*). As for his own statement "All entities are empty
[of self-nature]", it is not only exclusively factive and communicative
(rather than probative, apodictic or in any way factitive) but it is
emptied of all *propositional* content presupposing the existence of things
as substantive entities.

Now, when he subjects a categorical assertion to semantic analysis
based on a theory of pragmatics and speech acts, the semiotician and lo-
gician finds it to be made up not only of a propositional content (the
phrastic component) but of two further illocutionary components often
described as the modal (i.e. the it-is-so tropic) and the performative
(i.e. the I-say-so neustic). This is so, according to this kind of ana-
lysis, whether the utterance includes an explicit sign of modality and

subscription or not. And negation may then relate to any of these three components of assertion, so that the semiotician and logician takes into account (at least) three distinct kinds of negation: the propositional (i.e. negation of the phrastic), the modal (i.e. negation of the tropic) and the performative (i.e. negation of the neustic).[83]

That ordinary context-free propositional negation is not the only kind of negation operating in the Mādhyamika's rejection of a *pratijñā* is probably sufficiently clear in the light of what we now know of Madhyamaka thought. This is so because such propositional negation is logically implicative and presuppositional; that is, in propositional negation (e.g. in the utterance: "The grass is not red") just as much as in assertion (e.g. in the utterance: "The grass is green") the producer of the utterance is committed to (the truth of the underlying proposition) presupposing the existence of an entity (e.g. grass). This is the principle operating in *paryudāsa*-negation (as opposed to *prasajya*-negation).

The question then arises whether the Mādhyamika's rejection of a *pratijñā* can be appropriately analysed in terms of the two additional kinds of negation mentioned above that relate to the other two components of an assertion which have not usually been taken into account in discussions of the propositional calculus, viz. modal negation (of the tropic component) and performative negation (of the neustic component). It is in any case fairly clear that a form of "external" negation of the assertion sign (Frege's ⊢) - i.e. negation of the tropic and negation of the neustic - rather than "internal" negation - i.e. negation of the phrastic - is to be taken into consideration when the subject of the embedded proposition (*bhāvas*, etc.) is empty (*śūnya*) and null, in other words when the existential presupposition fails or is not determinable in terms of the positions of the binary *vikalpa* and the quaternary *catuṣkoṭi*.

Certain considerations adduced by the Mādhyamika when explaining his rejection of a *pratijñā* can in fact be cited in support of an analysis in terms of negation of the tropic, it-is-so component of assertion. Historically, the Mādhyamika's rejection was no doubt very often a denial in philosophical debate of another philosopher's assertion; and in

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[83] For this type of analysis and its terminology, see J.Lyons, *Semantics*, Vol. 2 (Cambridge 1977), 749 f., 768 f., 802 f. In addition to concepts developed by Austin, Searle *et al.*, Lyons has made use of ideas and terms employed by R.M. Hare in his article, Meaning and speech acts, *Philosophical review* 79, 1970, reprinted in his book *Practical inferences*, London 1971, 74-93, where the tropic is defined as the sign of mood and the neustic as the sign of subscription.

speech-act theory denial may be defined as context-bound rejection of
another's assertion. Against this analysis there stands the Mādhyamika's
observation that denial of a *pratijñā* may itself be construed as just
another *pratijñā*;[84] but the reason for this objection seems to lie in
the fact that the Mādhyamikas in question evidently regarded such denial
not as external negation of the tropic but as internal propositional ne-
gation - and hence as falling within the scope of implicative and pre-
suppositional *paryudāsa*-negation where denial of a proposition commits
one to the affirmation of the opposite proposition and to admitting its
presupposition.

Analysis of the Mādhyamaka's rejection of a *pratijñā* in terms of per-
formative negation - i.e. of the I-say-so neustic component - would seem
to be especially appropriate. And this interpretation would be consonant
with the Mādhyamika's concept of non-implicative and non-presupposition-
al *prasajya*-negation whereby he is not committed to the affirmation of
the contradictory or contrary of the proposition he is negating. (Con-
text-bound denial by negation of the tropic is, however, also commitment-
free with regard to presupposition, e.g. in the classic example of the
denial of the proposition that the present King of France is bald.) In
speech-act theory such negation is described as the illocutionary act
of non-commitment.

In Buddhist thought the perlocutionary effect of such a speech act
with non-commitment to the content of any propositional assertion or the-
sis presupposing or positing a self-nature (*svabhāva*) for one's own self
(*ātman*) or what is commonly supposed to belong to oneself (*ātmīya*) would
be of gnoseological and soteriological value, and it would conduce to
the freedom of sentient beings (*sattva*).

The notion of performative negation thus appears to approach especi-
ally closely purposes envisaged by the Mādhyamika in his rejection of a
thesis and assertion as well as in his use of *prasajya*-negation in con-
tradistinction to *paryudāsa*-negation.

It seems all the more appropriate and legitimate for us to consider
the rejection of a *pratijñā* in terms of a pragmatic rather than of an
exclusively propositional analysis of assertion and its negation since,
from the earliest time, the Madhyamaka - and indeed the Mahāyāna as a
whole - has engaged in the analysis and deconstruction of ordinary lan-
guage with its conceptual categories. And this approach is, moreover,

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[84] See the observations by Sa skya Paṇḍi ta and mKhas grub rje cited above.

especially pertinent for any consideration of the ethical aspect of re-
fraining from taking up a contentious position (*pakṣa*) to which atten-
tion has been drawn above. But it must at the same time be recognized
that in the middle period of the history of the Madhyamaka school[85] this
concern with the pragmatics of transactional usage (*vyavahāra*) became
overshadowed by the more specifically logical problems into which the
Mādhyamika was obliged to enter in the course of his discussions with
other schools of philosophy, and that from the time of Bhāvaviveka in
particular Madhyamaka philosophy was deflected from a consideration of
pragmatics towards a special preoccupation with the proposition and the
logical problems connected with the employment of independent inferences
and "syllogisms" in the understanding of reality. And the question of
the *pratijñā* and *pakṣa* then tended to be treated above all in terms of
the thesis in an inference or "syllogism" rather than in the broader
context of assertions and speech acts. In later Madhyamaka thought, es-
pecially in Tibet, the problem of the *pratijñā* and its rejection was reg-
ularly associated with the division between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika
Mādhyamikas.

In this section we have nevertheless referred to some contemporary
work in semantics and the philosophy of speech acts as a possible heur-
istic instrument and as an aid in explicating what the Indian and Tibe-
tan Mādhyamikas have had to say on the *pratijñā*. The historian of the
Madhyamaka – and of Indian and Tibetan philosophy in general – must of
course refrain from anachronistically transposing and arbitrarily impos-
ing the concepts of modern semantics and philosophical theory, which
have originated in the course of particular historical developments, on
modes of thought that have evolved in quite different historical circum-
stances, and which have therefore to be interpreted in the first place
within the frame of their own concerns and the ideas they have themselves
developed. Still, in studying Indian and Tibetan thought, the importance
of religious and philosophical praxis, and of pragmatics, must receive
due attention.

A consideration of pragmatics proves to be especially useful when
studying what we can now perhaps best describe as the Mādhyamika's neu-
tralization of the *pratijñā* as an assertory philosophical statement and
his rejection of the *pratijñā* as a propositional thesis. This neutrali-
zation is found to affect the propositional content of an assertion,

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[85] For this periodization of Madhyamaka thought, see our *Literature of the Madhyamaka
school of philosophy in India*, Wiesbaden 1981.

the ontological presupposition of the proposition in terms of self-nature being annulled together with the question of its truth/falsity. And there is also to be found a cancellation of the two sides of the assertion sign: viz. the performative component - the I-say-so (or *pratijānāmi*) commitment to the propositional content - and the assertory component - the it-is-so (or *pratijñā*) tropic. But despite - or no doubt rather precisely because of - the suspension of all three of these components of a *pratijñā*, real philosophical activity becomes possible, according to the Madhyamaka, for the philosopher and practiser of the Middle Way. Rather than frustrating the correct gnoseological comprehension of reality on the semantic or pragmatic level by making verification, falsification and any other kind of philosophical activity impossible, this neutralization has been regarded as a necessary - albeit doubtless not sufficient - precondition for this comprehension. [86]

Abbreviations

CŚ   *Catuḥśataka* by Āryadeva

MA   *Madhyamakāvatāra.* – *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction tibétaine.* Ed. L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-12

MMK   *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās.* – *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.* Ed. L.de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1903-13

PP   *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* see *MMK*

VV   *Vigrahavyāvartanī.* – The Vigrahavyāvartanī of Nāgārjuna with the Author's Commentary, ed. E.H.Johnston and A.Kunst. *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 9.* 1948-51, 99-152, reprinted in K.Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna.* Delhi 1978

VVV   *Vigrahavyāvartanīvṛtti* see *VV*

YṢ   *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* by Nāgārjuna

For the *CŚ* and *YṢ* fragments only of the Sanskrit texts are now extant, but Tibetan translations are available in the bsTan 'gyur.

DIE MADHYAMAKA-PHILOSOPHIE DER SA SKYA PA-SCHULE
- RED MDA' BA GŹON NU BLO GROS -

von

M.SATO (Morioka)

Im Rahmen des letzten Csoma de Körös Symposiums habe ich eine kurze Umschreibung des tibetischen Buddhismus unter dem Titel "Versuch einer Umschreibung der Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus vor Tsoṅ kha pa"[1] vorgetragen. Dabei handelte es sich um eine kritische Untersuchung des historischen Verständnisses der Prāsaṅgika (*prasaṅga* = *reductio ad absurdum*; *-ika* = Anhänger) -Schule in der Madhyamaka (mittlere Lehre)-Philosophie, das ich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der zu jener Zeit gültigen Rituale (*cho ga*) darzulegen versucht habe. Auf eine Darstellung der religiösen und philosophischen Bedeutung der verschiedenen Auffassungen der Madhyamaka-Philosophie und Tsoṅ kha pas Bedeutung für den tibetischen Buddhismus habe ich damals bewußt verzichtet.

Diesmal möchte ich näher darauf eingehen und Red mda' ba (1349-1412) als bedeutenden Sa skya pa-*bla ma* und als Lehrer von Tsoṅ kha pa (1357-1419) darstellen, denn das Problem der Madhyamaka-Philosophie von Red mda' ba bis zu Tsoṅ kha pa ist ein zentrales historisches Problem hinsichtlich der Beziehung der Sa skya pa- und der dGe lugs pa-Schule. Red mda' ba war der erste von sechs berühmten Sa skya pa-Kommentatoren des *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* von Candrakīrti.[2] Vor allem scheint es mir, daß die Sa skya pa-Schule, im Gegensatz zu der dGe lugs pa-Schule, kein eindeutiges, festes System der Madhyamaka-Philosophie hat, und somit dem Denken einen freien Spielraum läßt, was sich z.B. in den Werken der eigen-

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[1] *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae XXXIV, 1-3*. Budapest 1980. 209-217.

[2] Red mda' ba, Roṅ ston śes bya kun rig, Go ram bsod nams seṅ ge, Śākya mchog ldan, Ṅag dbaṅ chos grags und Blo gter dbaṅ po werden in Sa skya-Klöstern oft genannt. Weitere Beispiele finden wir in: Sherab Gyaltsen Amipa, *rGyal bstan spyi daṅ bye brag rje btsun sa skya pa'i bstan pa bstan 'dzin daṅ bcas pa byon tshul gyi rnam par thar pa śin tu mdor bsdus pa ho mtshar rgya mtsho'i chu thig*, (*Historical Facts on the Religion of the Sa-skya-pa Sect*). Rikon 1970. 53-61.

ständigen Philosophen Roṅ ston śes bya kun rig, Śākya mchog ldan, Red
mda' ba und anderer zeigt. Die Sa skya pa-Schule ist lediglich nach dem
Ort, aus dem diese Schule stammt, benannt. Sa skya pa ist kein inhalt-
lich bestimmter Begriff, wie er bei der bKa' gdams (autoritatives Wort)
pa- oder dGe lugs pa (die Tugendhaften)-Schule Verwendung findet. Obwohl
in der dGe lugs pa-Schule jedes Kloster über einen eigenen Lehrtext (yig
cha)[3] verfügt hat, welcher als Grundlage den Urtext von Tsoṅ kha pa hat,
besteht trotzdem ein einheitliches Verständnis. In den verschiedenen
Klöstern wird zuerst nur das klostereigene Lehrbuch gelesen, also ge-
wissermaßen ein Kommentar zu Tsoṅ kha pa. Nicht so in der Sa skya pa-
Schule, obwohl es nur ein bedeutendes Lehrbuch von Go ram pa bsod rnams
seṅ ge (1492-1489) gibt, das als fundiert angesehen werden kann. In der
Sa skya pa-Schule können wir z.B. für den Begriff śūnyatā (Leerheit) zwei
Hauptinterpretationen finden, raṅ stoṅ[4] und gźan stoṅ[4] oder prasaṅga und
svatantra[5], was darauf zurückzuführen ist, daß in dieser Schule zwei
Hauptrichtungen vertreten sind. Bei der dGe lugs pa-Schule aber ist eine
strenge einheitliche Interpretation vom Standpunkt des raṅ stoṅ oder
prasaṅga feststellbar, mindestens in der exoterischen Madhyamaka-Philo-
sophie.

Welche Bedeutung hat dann Red mda' ba in dieser Sa skya pa-Schule?
Nach den Angaben des Geschichtswerkes Deb gter sṅon po,[6] des religions-
geschichtlichen Werkes Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i
rnam par thar pa rgyal bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan mchog phul byuṅ nor bu'i
phreṅ ba[7] und Thu'u bkvans philosophischen Werkes Grub mtha' thams

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[3] Z.B.: Mādhyamika Text Series Vols.1-8, New Delhi 1972-74, für das Madhyamaka-Stu-
dium in der dGe lugs pa-Schule.

[4] Nach gźan stoṅ dbu ma sñiṅ po von Tāranātha (fol.7b) zitierte ich beispielsweise
eine Definiton von raṅ (das eigene) und gźan (das andere): "Die Weisheit, d.h.
die dharmatā, ist nach ihrem eigenen Wesen von Anfang an vollendet und wird nimmer
mehr entstehen. Deshalb ist sie nicht durch das eigene Wesen śūnya geworden, sondern
existiert immerwährend. Auf die Frage, ob die Kanons nicht besagen, daß diese Wirk-
lichkeiten auch śūnya sind, wird geantwortet, daß sie allgemein śūnya realisieren,
ebenso wie die śūnyatā durch das eigene Wesen nicht śūnya zu werden braucht. Die
Weisheit (ye śes) hat die Verneinung (śūnya) der von ihr verschiedene Zeichen haben-
den Mannigfaltigkeit und des Subjektes und des Objektes im ganzen, und daher wird
sie śūnyatā geheißen."

[5] svatantra heißt hier selbständige (positive) Schlußfolgerung. Deshalb muß der Svā-
tantrika die Körperlichkeit als samvrtisatya anerkennen.

[6] Verfaßt von 'Gos lotsava gźon nu dpal (1392-1481) im Jahr 1478. Ed. Lokesh Chandra,
New Delhi 1979, 302-303 (Cha 6b-7a), 310 (Cha 10b). G.Roerich, Blue Annals. New Del-
hi [2]1979, 339-40, 349.

[7] Verfaßt von dGe slon ye śes rgyal mtshan (1713-1792) im Jahr 1787. Toyobunko No.371-
2665, 465a-479b.

cad 'kyi khuns dan 'dod tshul ston pa legs bśad śel gyi me loń[8] verbrei-
tete sich die Madhyamaka-Philosophie nach der Zeit von Red mda' ba, be-
sonders anhand des *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* von Candrakīrti. Red mda' ba ist
ein bedeutender Lehrer von Tson kha pa. Tson kha pa hatte als Schüler
von Red mda' ba dessen Lehren vom *prasanga* übernommen und dann mit ei-
gener Terminologie noch entschiedener vertreten. Tson kha pas Auftreten
wurde erst zum Anstoß für das Auftreten, später für die Angriffe der Sa
skya pa-Gelehrten und ihres Systemes. Die dGe lugs pa-Schule faßte die
verschiedenen Lehren zusammen[9] und bezeichnete die dGe lugs pa-Lehre als
orthodox. Bei der Sa skya pa-Schule ist immerhin die *lam 'bras* (Weg zur
Frucht)-Praxis auf Grund des *Hevajratantram* wichtiger als die Theorie
an sich. Die Praxis erfolgt in diesem Falle von Anfang an gemeinsam mit
der Theorie, nicht nach ihr. Deshalb läßt die Sa skya pa-Schule der The-
orie einen größeren Spielraum. Nun aber sahen sich die Sa skya pa-Gelehr-
ten veranlaßt, gegen Tson kha pa und seine Nachfolger Kritik zu äußern,
aber dazu fehlte es an einer einheitlichen Linie. Das war die Folge der
freien Auslegung durch die Sa skya pa-Schule. In dieser Zeit erfolgte ei-
ne einheitliche Neuorientierung der dGe lugs pa-Schule, nachdem Tson kha
pa die Philosophie von Candrakīrti als die einzig legitime unter den
Madhyamaka-Philosophien erklärt hatte. Somit verstehen wir, daß Red mda'
ba zum Angelpunkt des Madhyamaka-Verständnisses in Tibet geworden ist.

   Prof. G.Tucci sagte schon: "gźon nu blo gros (Kumāramati) of Re mda'
(1349-1412), one of the greatest man Lamaism has had between Buston and
Tson k'a pa. He had been a disciple of the Ña dpon Kun dga' dpal, he had
commented on the *prajñā* with penetrating research, continuing a traditi-
on derived from the lotsāva rÑog and his followers; then, after leaving
his work as a teacher to meditate in a hermitage, he had particularly
studied 'Maitreya's five lows', laying down, on the base of those texts,
the principle that cosmic consciousness is the only reality, and that,
being inborn in each of us, it represents a necessary passport and the
cause of that return to the purity of 'Buddha's essence' which is iden-
tified with nirvana."[10]

   Professor Tuccis Darlegung im obgenannten Werke ist nicht so aus-
führlich. Ich habe dies etwas ausführlicher auf japanisch in meinem Auf-

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[8] dGon lun Ausgabe, Sa skya pa-Kapitel 10a.

[9] Z.B. in der Madhyamaka-Philosophie zitierte Tson kha pa als Prāsangika in seinem
Buch *dGons pa rab gsal* (Pekinger Ausgabe 72a) die Erklärung aus dem philosophischen
Werk *Madhyamakāloka* von Kamalaśīla als Svātantrika.

[10] G.Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*. Roma 1949, 118-119. Noch eine Erwähnung: D.S.Ruegg,
*La Théorie du Tathagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie
du Bouddhisme*. Paris 1969, 58-65.

satz *Die philosophische Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus vor* Tsoṅ
kha pa (1) - Red mda' ba gźon nu blo gros,[11] *im Jahrbuch der Universität*
Hiroshima 1977, behandelt, sowie die Bedeutung von Red mda' ba für die
tibetische Philosophie und Religion darzulegen versucht. Nach dem reli-
gionsgeschichtlichen Text *Byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i*
rnam par thar pa rgyal bstan mdzes pa'i rgyan mchog phul byuṅ nor bu'i
phreṅ ba schrieb Red mda' ba insgesamt 18 Werke, alles Kommentare zu den
wichtigsten Texten, von denen bisher nur drei publiziert worden sind:

1) *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bźad de kho na ñid gsal ba'i sgron ma* (Ma-
   dhyamakāvatāraḥ-Kommentar). New Delhi 1974

2) *dBu ma bźi brgya pa'i 'grel pa* (*Catuḥśatakam*-Kommentar). Varanasi
   1974

3) *bŚes pa'i spriṅs yig gi 'grel pa don gsal* (*Suhṛllekhaḥ*-Kommentar).
   Darjeeling 1974[12]

Diese drei wichtigen Texte sind von Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva und Candrakīrti
verfaßt und, wie oben erwähnt, von Red mda' ba kommentiert worden. Sei-
ne *Prasannapadā*-Synopsis, ebenfalls ein sehr wichtiges Werk, ist bis
jetzt noch nicht erschienen. Nach dem obengenannten philosophischen Werk
Grub mtha'[13] studierte Red mda' ba bei mKhan chen byaṅ seṅ die Madhyama-
ka-Philosophie. Im Selbststudium befaßte sich dann Red mda' ba mit der
Prāsaṅgika - Philosophie, deren Essenz er dank seiner großen intellektu-
ellen Kraft verstehen konnte. Das läßt sich daraus schließen, daß er für
sein Studium nicht die Übersetzung des *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* von Pa tshab
Ñi ma grags, sondern die ältere von Nag tsho lotsa ba[14] benutzt hat. In-
wieweit er vom berühmten Übersetzer und Verbreiter der Madhyamaka-Philo-
sophie im 12. Jahrhundert, Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, beinflußt worden ist,

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[11] in: *Studies in Area Culture, Memoirs of the Faculty of Integrated Arts and Sciences,*
Hiroshima University, I. Vol.2, 1976, 251-280.

[12] Nach der englischen Übersetzung von Lobsang Tharchin und Artemus B.Engle, *Nagarju-*
na's Letter to Friend, with a commentary by the Venerable Rendawa Zhön-nu-Lo-drö.
Dharamsala 1980, wurde dieser Text schon zweimal publiziert. Die beiden Publikati-
onen waren mir leider nicht zugänglich.

[13] vgl. 10a.

[14] Nur in der Pekinger Ausgabe (No.5261) gibt es *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i tshig le'ur byas*
pa in der Übersetzung von Krsnapandita und (Nag tsho) Tshul khrims rgyal ba, und
revidiert von Pa tshab Ñi ma grags. In der Tat finde ich darin keinen großen Unter-
schied zu No.5262, der Übersetzung von Ñi ma grags. Vgl. Shoju Inaba, On the Trans-
lation of Treatises on Prajñāpāramitā (Çer phyin) and Mādhyamika (Dbu ma) Philosophy
in the Early Middle Ages of Tibet (1) [Japanisch]. *Buddhist Seminar 4.* Kyoto 1966,
33.
   In der Übersetzungs- und Überlieferungsgeschichte der Prasaṅga-Schule in Tibet
werden Atiśa. Nag tsho, 'Brom ston, Pa tshab Ñi ma grags, sKyobs mchog dpal bzaṅ
und Red mda' ba auch von Karma pa Mi skyod rdo rje als Vorgänger anerkannt (vgl.
dBu ma 'dzug pa la ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa'i śal luṅ dvag brgyud grub pa'i śiṅ rta.
Rumtek-Ausgabe 149-150).

dessen Lehre sich - nach dem Geschichtswerk *Deb gter sňon po*[15] - in Ti-
bet verbreitete, ist noch nicht nachweisbar. Bevor Red mda' ba seine ei-
genen Werke schrieb, studierte er, nach Angaben des obengenannten reli-
gionsgeschichtlichen Textes der Lam rim-Meister: *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Abhi-*
samayālaṃkāraḥ, Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Vinaya von Gunaprabha, *Uttara-*
tantram, Pramāṇa und *Guhyasamājatantram*.

Nach dem *Grub mtha'*, Kapitel Sa skya pa, gab es damals drei Denk-
richtungen der Madhyamaka-Philosophie in der Sa skya pa-Schule[16] :

   1) 'Jam mgon sa paṇ und Roň ston śes bya kun rig und andere, welche
      die Leerheit (*śūnyatā*) durch die Schlußfolgerung beweisen woll-
      ten;

   2) Red mda' ba, der nur die Prasaṅga-Methode anwendet; und

   3) Śākya mchog ldan, der zuerst die Madhyamaka-Philosophie, dann die
      Vijñānavāda-(Nur-Bewußtsein-Lehre) und zuletzt die Jo naṅ pa-Phi-
      losophie studiert hatte.

Nach dem Geschichtswerk *Deb gter sňon po* entfernte sich Red mda' ba ge-
gen Ende seines Lebens von der Vijñāna-Lehre und wandte sich der Madhya-
maka-Lehre zu.[17] Bevor ich eine Übersicht über die historisch-philoso-
phischen Hintergründe Red mda' bas und seiner Zeitgenossen gebe, möchte
ich nun näher auf allgemeine Einzelheiten eingehen.

Im allgemeinen soll jeder Kommentar in der indischen und tibetischen
buddhistischen Tradition nach den Ideen des Grundtextes kommentieren,
nicht nach dem eigenen Standpunkt, um somit den Text an sich verständ-
lich zu machen. Im Fall von Red mda' ba kann man deshalb anhand der Kom-
mentare seine eigene Grundanschauung nur schwer herausfinden. Im Nach-
wort des Kommentares zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* erklärt Red mda' ba, daß in
oben erklärter Art und Weise sein Kommentar die Erklärung von Candrakīr-
ti selber - nach der *Madhyamakakārikā* von Nāgārjuna und nach der Erklä-
rung der alten, legitimen Nachfolger von Nāgārjuna - ist, nicht seine
eigene.[18] Red mda' ba schreibt in der oben genannten Stelle folgendes:
"Dieses Verstehen von mir ist nicht von anderen anerkannt worden."[18'] Die-
se Aussage besagt auch etwas über die damalige allgemeine schwierige Si-
tuation des Verständnisses der Madhyamaka-Philosophie in Tibet, wie sie
auch in oben erwähnten Geschichtswerken erscheint. Daraus erkennen wir Red

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[15] Vgl. 7b-8b, Roerichs Übersetzung 341-345.

[16] Vgl. 10a.

[17] Vgl. 10b und Ye śes rgyal mtshans Werk 477a-479b.

[18] Vgl. 153b.

[18'] Vgl. 156a.

mda' bas Richtung: Er versteht Candrakīrti nach der Madhyamaka-Philoso-
phie und sieht in der Prāsaṅgika-Philosophie von Candrakīrti die richti-
ge Überlieferung . Weitere Beispiele für die Übereinstimmung von Red
mda' bas Kommentar zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* mit Candrakīrti möchte ich hier
nicht ausführlich aufzeigen.

In der Vorrede zu seinem Kommentar zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* bringt Red
mda' ba eine Chronologie des Buddhismus.[19] Dabei unterscheidet er fol-
gende Perioden: Erste Dharmacakra-Periode der vier Edlen Wahrheiten von
Buddha in Varanasi; Zweite Dharmacakra-Periode der Prajñāpāramitā-Lehre;
dritte Dharmacakra-Periode des *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtram*.

Er erwähnt *dharmacakra* (Rad der buddhistischen Lehre) und *saṃgīti*
(Sammlung der Fassung der buddhistischen Kanons), um dann eine entschei-
dende Richtung zu der tiefen Einsicht und der breiten Übung einzuführen,
dann zeigt er von seinem Standpunkt aus die endgültige Richtung unter
den verschiedenen Lehren. Im Buddhismus tritt man durch die vollkommene
Wahrheit, die zwei Mittel, *puṇya* (moralischer Verdienst) und *prajñā* (Ein-
sicht oder Weisheit), in das Meer der *prajñāpāramitā*, bekommt die voll-
kommene Wahrheit und dreht dann das *dharmacakra* für den Menschen. *dhar-
macakra* beinhaltet *śīla* (sittliches Verhalten), *dhyāna* (Meditation) und
prajñā, als Bedeutung 12 Sūtren und - je nach den Bedürfnissen und dem
Vermögen der verschiedenen Menschen - vierundachzigtausend Eingänge.

Für die dritte Periode zitiert er aus dem *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīkasūtram*,
Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtram und *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtrabhāṣyam*. Für die *ekayā-
na*-Menschen wird diese Lehre im *Puṇḍarīkagarbhaḥ* verkündet. "Lehre" heißt
hier zwölf Sūtren, "Einsicht" heißt von *darśanamārga* (Weg der Erleuchtung)
bis zu *āryamārga* (Heiliger Weg).

Noch nicht endgültig sind in Lehre und Praxis die erste und zweite
Periode. Das trifft nicht zu auf die Vijñānamātra-Lehre und Tathāgatagar-
bha-Lehre. Nach meiner Auffassung müßte sich die Zugliederung der dritten
Periode durch Red mda' ba auf die Madhyamaka-Lehre beziehen. Gegen Ende
seines Lebens weist Red mda' ba deshalb auf die Vorläufigkeit der Vijñā-
na-Lehre hin und wendet sich der Madhyamaka-Lehre zu. Seiner Meinung
nach sind hauptsächlich *Mūlamadhyamakākarikā* und *Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikā*
wichtig, daneben erwähnt er auch *Vigrahavyāvartanīkārikā* und *Śūnyatā-
saptatiḥ*. Äußeres Verhalten soll durch das Prajñāpāramitā-Fahrzeug, in-
neres Verhalten durch das Vajrayāna-Fahrzeug bestimmt werden, besonders
durch *guhyasamāja* und *pañcakrama*.

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[19] Vgl. 3a-b

Bis zur *Catuḥśatakakārikā* von Āryadeva war die Madhyamaka-Philoso-
phie gleich Nāgārjuna's Überzeugung. Dann verzweigte sich die Madhyamaka-
Schule in die Prasaṅga-Lehre und Svatantra-Lehre. Candrakīrti verfaßte
den *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* auf Grund der Lehre von den "zehn Stufen" (*daśa-
bhūmi*) und beseitigte die Vijñānamātra-Lehre. Nāgārjuna und Asaṅga sind
die Maßstäbe für den Mahāyānabuddhismus. Die Feststellung der zwei Wahr-
heiten ist nach Nāgārjuna wichtig (*nītārthasatya* und *neyārthasatya*).

Bemerkenswert ist die Erwähnung des *Prajñāpāramitāśāstram* (jap. *Dai
chi do ron*; chin. *Ta chih tu lun*) eines Nāgārjuna durch eine chinesische
Information, vielleicht Yuan ce's Kommentar zum *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtram*,
welche bisher kaum beachtet wurde. Wir finden den Namen zweimal, dem
Sinne nach stimmt der Inhalt mit dem Upāya-Kapitel von diesem Śāstram
überein. Später erwähnt Tsoṅ kha pa dies in seinem *Draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i
don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bśad sñiṅ po* (*legs bśad sñiṅ
po*).[20] Man kann vermuten, daß Tsoṅ kha pa von Red mda' ba auf diese drei
Cakra-Chronologien hingewiesen worden war.

Red mda' ba schreibt die Erklärung zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*, wie gesagt
nach Candrakīrti, dem Nachfolger von Nāgārjuna, und fügt nicht weiter
seine eigene kritische Meinung bei. Dagegen nimmt Tsoṅ kha pa in seinem
Kommentar zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*, dem *dGoṅs pa rab gsal*, kritisch Stel-
lung zu anderen Meinungen, und legt seine eigene Auffassung dar. Red mda'
ba webt in den Kommentar zu Candrakīrti seine eigene Meinung ein und
gibt außerdem eine Kurzfassung von Candrakīrti. Darin sehe ich einen
Hinweis darauf, daß Candrakīrtis Prasaṅga-Methode in Tibet zur gültigen
Form der Madhyamaka-Philosophie geworden war. Erst später wird die Ma-
dhyamaka-Lehre noch weiter, nämlich in die Raṅ stoṅ-Lehre und gžan stoṅ-
Lehre eingeteilt, wie zum Beispiel bei der dGe lugs pa-Schule im Gegen-
satz zu der Sa skya pa-Schule (Go ram bsod rnams seṅ ge, Roṅ ston śes
bya kun rig und Śākya mchog ldan). Aber bei Red mda' ba gibt es noch kei-
ne Unterteilung der Madhyamaka-Lehre.

Red mda' ba kommentiert auch die *Catuḥśatakakārikā* von Āryadeva. Er
bedient sich dabei der Prasaṅga-Methode, um die Widersprüche in unseren
herkömmlichen Vorstellungen, von dem Ich, von Raum und Zeit usw. aufzu-
zeigen. Red mda' ba wählt diesen Text vermutlich, weil er neben dem theo-
retischen auch einen praxisbezogenen Teil hat. In den früheren Madhyama-
ka-Texten gibt es nur wenig Erwähnung der Praxis für das gewöhnliche

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[20] Vgl. bKra śis lhun po - Ausgabe 13a-b. Dasselbe Zitat finde ich auch im *rGyud sde
spyi'i rnam par bžag pa rgyas par bśad pa* von mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzaṅ,
bKra śis lhun po - Ausgabe, Pha 12a-13a.

Leben. Im *Catuḥśatakakārikā*-Kommentar ist die Betrachtung von dem Standpunkt der zwei Wahrheiten - mit Hinblick auf die Praxis - wichtig. Red mda' ba gliedert diesen Text in zwei Teile; der erste Teil umfaßt jene Kapitel, die den Standpunkt der weltlichen Wahrheit vertreten, der zweite Teil jene, die den Standpunkt der absoluten Wahrheit darlegen. Auch die Sa skya pa-Schule vereint Praxis und Theorie. Mit diesen Hinweisen kommentiert Red mda' ba mit der Prasaṅga-Methode unsere gewöhnlichen Vorurteile als Widersprüche.

Diese praxisbezogene Darstellungsweise findet sich auch im *Suhṛllekhaḥ* (Brief an einen Freund)-Kommentar; hier zitiert Red mda' ba aus folgenden Texten: *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* (4 mal), *Uttaratantram* (1 mal), *Ratnāvalī* (5 mal), *Abhidharmakośaḥ* (4 mal), *Śatapañcaśatakam* (1 mal), *Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ* (4 mal), *Sūtram* (5 mal), *Madhyamakakārikā* (2 mal), *Catuḥśatakam* (1 mal), *Lokātītastavaḥ* (2 mal), *Yuktiṣaṣṭikām* (1 mal), *Sūtrālaṃkāraḥ* (5 mal), *Saṃcayagāthā* (1 mal), *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā* (1 mal) und *Madhyantavibhāgaḥ* (1 mal). Daraus können wir seine grundlegenden und umfangreichen Kenntnisse vom damaligen Buddhismus ersehen.

Red mda' bas Definition der Leerheit kann man so verstehen, daß die Leerheit von den beiden Extremen (Sein und Nichts) entfernt ist.[21] Derart bestimmt er die Leerheit gemäß der Prasaṅga-Methode (*thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro*). Seiner Biographie zufolge[22] erhielt Red mda' ba die Initiation (*abhiṣeka*) des *Guhyasamājatantram* und blieb bis zu seinem Tod als Einsiedler in den Bergen. Bei Red mda' ba findet sich sicher eine Verschmelzung von Sūtra und Tantra bezüglich der Praxis der Sa skya pa-Schule. Damit verstehen wir die Richtung von Red mda'ba. Nun wollen wir uns mit Tsoṅ kha pa beschäftigen, weil dessen Beziehung zu Red mda' ba die Grundzüge der Philosophie beider noch übersichtlicher machen kann.

In Tsoṅ kha pas *Prajñāpāramitā*-Kommentar (*gSer gyi phreṅ ba*), den er dem Epilog zufolge in seinem 31. Lebensjahr geschrieben hat, finde ich noch nichts Eigenständiges. Wie bekannt, begründet Tsoṅ kha pa nach dem Treffen mit bLa ma dBu ma pa in seinem 35. Lebensjahr seine Autorität auf der Begegnung mit Mañjuśrī und der Kenntnis von der Entwicklung der Geschichte des tibetischen Buddhismus. Erst später, in seinem 50. Lebensjahr, schreibt Tsoṅ kha pa das bedeutende Werk *Draṅ ba daṅ ṅes pa'i don rnam par 'byed pa'i bstan bcas*, *Legs bśad sñiṅ po*[23], nimmt er die Ein-

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[21] Vgl. *Suhṛllekhaḥ*-Kommentar S.2.

[22] S.117.

[23] Vgl. bKra śis lhun po - Ausgabe, Pha 12a-13a.

teilung der Geschichte des Buddhismus in die drei Perioden vor, nämlich
die Dharmacakra-Periode der vier Edlen Wahrheiten (caturāryasatya), der
Prajñāpāramitā und des *Samdhinirmocanasūtram*. Diese Einteilung können
wir auch schon bei Red mda' ba erkennen. Tson kha pa benutzt diese kri-
tische Beurteilung der Entwicklung der Geschichte des Buddhismus und
das Treffen mit Mañjuśrī als historischen und persönlichen Grund für
die Einrichtung seiner neuen Richtung. Gemäß den obengenannten Geschichts-
werken und dem rÑin ma pa-Geschichtswerk *Bod sha rabs pa gsah chen rñih
ma'i chos 'byuh legs bśad* versteht Red mda' ba das *Kālacakra-Tantram*
als nicht reines buddhistisches Tantra.[24] Trotz der Mahnung von Red mda'
ba kommentiert Tson kha pa das *Kālacakratantram* in seinem Werk *Yi ge
gsuh gi zla zer źes bya ba*.[25] In diesem Punkt sehe ich einen großen
Unterschied zwischen Red mda' ba und Tson kha pa. Tson kha pa studiert
sehr ausführlich und bringt in seinem Werk auch Kritik vor. Für die Ei-
genart von Tson kha pa möchte ich ein Beispiel aus Kapitel VI des *Ma-
dhyamakāvatārah*-Kommentares geben. Es folgt meine Übersetzung:

> "Wenn man nicht weiß, wie alle Sachen als wirklich nichts
> entstehen und wie man sie als wirklich erfaßt, wenn man sie
> als wirklich erkennt, kann man die Einsicht in die Wirklich-
> keit bestimmt verfehlen. Aus dem *Bodhicaryāvatārah*: 'Ohne
> die falsch verstanden Sachen zu berühren, kann man die Sa-
> chen als Nicht-Sein erfassen.'[26] Wenn man so die allgemei-
> ne Struktur der falsch verstandenen Sachen, nämlich des zu
> Vernichtenden, im Geist nicht klar erfaßt, kann man dieses
> zu Vernichtende als Nicht-Sein nicht exakt erfassen. So
> wird erklärt. Wenn man deshalb das Wahrsein als Nicht-Sein
> und die Struktur des Nicht-Seienden als Leerheit in der La-
> ge des Denkenden nicht tatsächlich weiß, dann kann man das
> Nicht-Sein der Wahrheit und Leerheit an sich nicht verste-
> hen. Wenn man nur schnell durch das System der Philosophie
> oder nur mit dem Erkennen der falschen Vorstellung die Wirk-
> lichkeit zu kennen versucht, soll man durch die Philosophie
> die ohne Anfang bewahrte falsche Vorstellung von der Wirk-
> lichkeit, die in der Entstehung der Wirklichkeit und in
> keiner Entstehung des Geistes zusammen entsteht, und die
> damit begriffene Existenz der Wirklichkeit gut erkennen.

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[24] Vgl. 742f. Chinesische Übersetzung. Hong Kong 1973, 346.

[25] Vgl. Tohoku No.5381. In der Pekinger Ausgabe ist dieser Text nicht enthalten.

[26] Vgl. Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatārah* IX,140ab, Vaidya Edition p.346.

Das ist der wichtigste Schwerpunkt.

Wenn man die Existenz der Wirklichkeit durch die Vernunft
als das Nicht-Seiende annimmt, ohne die Existenz der Wirk-
lichkeit klar zu erkennen, kann die ohne Anfang bewahrte
falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit gar nicht verhin-
dert werden. Deshalb muß man die falsche Vorstellung von
der Wirklichkeit im Bewahren des Selbst, des Subjektes und
des Objektes, verneinen. Dadurch muß man die Art und Weise
des Prozesses der Vernunft in der Verbindung mit der wirk-
lichen Situation erkennen."[27]

Tson kha pa übt Kritik an der falschen Vorstellung von der Wirklich-
keit. Diese falsche Vorstellung (*bden 'dzin*)[28] ist in dem gewöhnlichen
Leben tief verankert, deshalb weist Tson kha pa deutlich darauf hin. Vor
Tson kha pa gibt es - auch bei Red mda' ba - in der allgemeinen Termino-
logie eine "falsche Vorstellung vom Selbst oder dem Wesen" (*bdag 'dzin*);
das heißt vom Ich als Subjekt und von Sachen als Objekt. Tson kha pas
Hinweise auf die falsche Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit finde ich zum
ersten Mal bei ihm, allerdings finde ich schon vor Tson kha pa Hinweise
im *Avataṃsakasūtram* in Indien und auch beim Zenbuddhismus in China.[29]
Aber Tson kha pa analysiert original die falsche Vorstellung von der
Wirklichkeit und der Existenz der Wirklichkeit (*bden grub*) und demgemäß
erklärt er das Nicht-Sein der Wirklichkeit (*bden med*).

Daraus können wir ersehen, daß Tson kha pa Red mda' ba einen Schritt
voraus ist. Red mda' ba hebt in der Sa skya pa-Schule nur die Prasaṅga-
Lehre als die richtige hervor. In seinem *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*-Kommentar fin-
de ich keine solchen Aussagen wie bei Tson kha pa.

Wenn ich noch meine hypothetische Interpretation äußern darf, möch-
te ich es vielleicht so darstellen, daß Tson kha pa den Begriff der Er-
scheinung (*snaṅ ba*, skt. *prabhāsa*, *pratibhāsa*) als analysierende Kritik
zum ersten Mal benutzt. Und darauf reagieren die anderen alten Schulen

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[27] Vgl. Pekinger Ausgabe 71b-72a. Diese Lehre zeigt, daß der Übende auf der Basis der
Prasaṅga-Methode durch die Analyse des Irrtums die falsche Vorstellung von der Wirk-
lichkeit an den Tag bringen muß. Dabei braucht er das Wissen vom Irrtum, nicht nur
von der Wirklichkeit, und auch die höhere intellektuelle Denkkraft, nicht nur die
Kraft der Meditation. Am Ende des Denkens wird das Verstehen aus der Wahrheit über
die Grenze der Denkkraft kommen, ohne das Denken von Anfang an aufzugeben.

[28] Dieses Wort kann ich als Übersetzungsterminus aus dem Sanskrit (*satyagrāha*) nur
schwer verstehen. Wenn *satya svabhāva* bedeutet, und wenn *grāha abhiniveśa* bedeutet,
kann man *satyagrāha* verstehen. Dabei kann man die Wirklichkeit als das Wesen oder
das Selbst und im Zusammenhang mit der Objektivierung nicht verstehen. Das Wort kann
man nur mit einer philosophischen Interpretation verstehen. Ich vermute deshalb,
daß es sich bei *bden 'dzin* u.a. um Tson kha pas neue Termini handelt.

[29] Z.B.: Bi yian lu', Kapitel 1. Taisho Tripiṭaka No.2003 (Band 48), 139. Das Beharren
auf der absoluten Wahrheit wird hier schon scharf kritisiert.

und erklären Tsoṅ kha pas Lehre als nicht traditionell. Dabei möchte ich
noch die Analyse und Struktur der Erkenntnis des religiös Übenden bei
Tsoṅ kha pa erwähnen. Ohne die Sache an sich zu erkennen, erkennt man
ein Objekt als Erscheinung durch die Vorstellungskraft in der Sprache
und entsprechend der weltlichen Wahrheit. Tsoṅ kha pa will nicht solche
weltliche Auffassung verneinen. Und bei der religiösen Einsicht gibt es
die zwei Phasen der Erscheinung. Historisch gesehen, stammt "die Erschei-
nung" ursprünglich von der Yogācāra-Vijñāna-Schule. Auch Red mda' ba
erwähnt die *prajñāpāramitā* ohne Erscheinung und mit Erscheinung im Kom-
mentar zum *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*.[30] Die *prajñāpāramitā* ohne Erscheinung heißt
die absolute Erleuchtung, die von den erscheinenden Mannigfaltigkeiten
entfernte Erleuchtung, die Realisierung der Gleichheit der Wirklichkeit
und die Vernichtung des gewöhnlichen Verstandes. Die *prajñāpāramitā* mit
Erscheinung heißt die Weisheit nach der Erleuchtung, die Vernichtung der
Wesenheit nur nach der Kette der bedingten Entstehung der Leerheit, und
die durch diese Einsicht bekommene, von den erscheinenden Mannigfaltig-
keiten entfernte Sache als bloße Erscheinung. Red mda' ba schrieb, daß
man die zwei Phasen der *prajñāpāramitā*, nämlich die zentrale Bedeutung
und die sich daraus entfaltende Bedeutung, verstehen muß.

   Diese Erscheinungsart erläutert Tsoṅ kha pa weiter ausführlich be-
schreibend, systematisch in seiner repräsentativen Einführung in die
Praxis, *sKyes bu gsum gyi ñams su blaṅ ba'i rim pa thams cad tshaṅ bar ston
pa'i byaṅ chub lam gyi rim pa (Lam rim chen mo)*. Tsoṅ kha pa erklärt da-
bei die Erscheinung durch das Gleichnis des Trugbildes (*māyā*), besonders
Personen betreffend. Es gibt bei dem Trugbild der Erscheinung zwei Sor-
ten.

> "*paramārthasatya* ist wie ein Trugbild; es besteht zwar,
> aber als wesenlos. Körperlichkeit u.a. sind wie ein Trug-
> bild; sie sind an sich *śūnyatā*, aber ihre Erscheinung als
> Körperlichkeit erscheint wie bei einem Trugbild. Dieses
> beinhaltet jenes, aber jenes hat nicht immer dieses. Die
> Art des Entstehens der Bedeutung des Trugbildes besteht
> aus dem Erfassen der Erscheinung und aus dem endgültigen
> Verstehen der *śūnyatā*. Zum Beispiel: Ein Pferd und eine
> Kuh erscheinen vor Augen als ein Trugbild. Man sieht sie
> mit den Augen, aber erkennt durch das feine Erkennen, daß
> sie gleich einer Erscheinung nicht existieren. Dadurch
> weiß man entschieden, daß ihre Erscheinung wie ein Trug-

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[30] Vgl. 40a-b.

bild oder eine Erscheinung von Unwirklichem ist. So auch bei
der Person: Die Person erscheint als Nicht-Irrtum in sprach-
lichem Wissen, und diese Erscheinung an sich wird durch die
richtige Erkenntnis als wesenlos verstanden. Diese beiden
Betrachtungsweisen verursachen die endgültige Erkenntnis:
die Person als ein Trugbild oder eine Erscheinung des Irr-
tums. In diesem Fall entsteht aus der richtigen Erkenntnis
nicht, daß man eine Erscheinung hat, und daß die Erscheinung
an sich *śūnyatā* ist, stammt nicht aus dem Maßstab des sprach-
lichen Gebrauches. Deswegen muß man die richtige Erkenntnis
davon, ob die Erscheinung ein Wesen hat, und das sprachliche
Wissen, das Dasein der Körperlichkeit, erfaßt haben. Wenn
die Körperlichkeit als Erscheinung wie bei einem Trugbild
erscheint, entsteht natürlich das Wissen im sprachlichen
Gebrauch ohne die Bemühung durch das Mittel des Wissens.
Man überlegt oft durch das richtige Erkennen, ob es die
Wesenheit gibt, dann entsteht das scharfe Verständnis der
Verneinung der Wesenheit. Wenn man danach die wieder vor-
kommende Erscheinung betrachtet, erscheint sie wie ein
Trugbild. Aber die *śūnyatā* als Trugbild hat keine entschei-
dende Erkenntnis an einem anderen Ort. Wenn man die Wesen-
heit der Entstehung und des Verfalls in der Erscheinung des
ein Zugehöriges Habenden (*dharmin*, Subjekt) durch die rich-
tige Erkenntnis nur vernichtet, so heißt diese '*śūnyatā* der
bloßen Vernichtung' oder '*śūnyatā* wie der Luftraum'. Danach
erscheint die Erscheinung der Körperlichkeiten wie die We-
senheit. Das heißt '*śūnyatā* wie ein Trugbild' (*māyopama-
śūnyatā*). So erklärten die früheren Lehrer. Wie oben erklärt,
betrachtet der durch die Logik Übende bei der Übung der Ver-
ehrung, des Umwanderns von links nach rechts (*pradakṣiṇa-
kriyā*), und des Gebetes auch, ob es die Wesenheit gibt;
dann verneint man die Wesenheit. Mit Hilfe dieses endgül-
tigen Verständnisses lernt der Übende, daß die Erscheinung
wie ein Trugbild ist. Damit übt er die Übung. Wenn der Üben-
de diese Wichtigkeit kennt, so übt er die '*śūnyatā* wie der
Luftraum' in der Meditation. Kraft dessen erscheint später
die '*śūnyatā* wie ein Trugbild'. Damit soll man die Art und
Weise der Erscheinung verstehen. Wenn man in diesem Fall,
wie oben erklärt, den Maßstab des zu Verneinenden nicht
gut kennt, und wenn man nur Einheit und Vielheit mittels
echter Logik untersucht und die Verneinung davon betrachtet,

sagt man, daß es die Person nicht gibt, oder daß Dinge wie
Personen gleich Hörnern von Kaninchen keine Wirkung haben.
Das ist Nihilismus. Das ist eine große falsche Auffassung
vom Nichts. Man muß verstehen, hier den Mittelweg für das
richtige Verständnis zu finden.

'Wenn es so ist,

wie könnte das Dasein nicht wie ein Trugbild sein?'
so steht im *Catuḥśatakam*[31]; in dem Kommentar *Bodhisattvayo-
gacaryācatuḥśatakaṭīkā* zum *Catuḥśatakam* folgendes:[32]
'Wenn man den *pratītyasamutpāda* richtig betrachtet, ist
dieser wie ein gemachtes Trugbild, nicht wie das Kind einer
unfruchtbaren Frau. Wenn jemand mit dieser Überlegung denkt,
daß es das Entstehen der Veränderlichkeiten nicht gibt,
dann schätzt er es nicht wie ein Trugbild ein, sondern
wie das Kind einer unfruchtbaren Frau. Aus Furcht, daß
dabei der *pratītyasamutpāda* zu Nichts wird, können wir
seiner Meinung nicht nachfolgen. Ohne den Widerspruch
mit dem *pratītyasamutpāda* folgen wir der Lehre vom Trug-
bild. So wird erklärt. Auch wenn man deshalb die Bedeu-
tung vom Nur-Trugbild durch das logische Wissen, ob es
die Wesenheit gibt, ergreift, ist es ein Fehler. Wenn man
dagegen aber die Wesenheit durch das echte Wissen ver-
nichtet und das Wesen *śūnya* wird, so begreift man die
Sachen im ganzen als Bedeutung des Trugbildes. Dies soll
bestimmt entstehen. Das ist fehlerlos!"[33]
Dabei benutzt Tson kha pa oft auch das Gleichnis von Zauberer, Stoff,
Pferden, usw. und vom Zuschauer. Die Gleichnisse, die Tson kha pa zur
Erklärung der Erscheinung verwendet, sind nicht neu. Ursprünglich finden
wir das Zauberer (*māyākāra*)-Gleichnis im *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpā-
ramitāsūtraṃ*, *Laṅkāvatārasūtram* und *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtram* usw.
Mit diesen Gleichnissen für die Erscheinung erklärt auch Red mda' ba
śūnyatā und *pratītyasamutpāda* und die zwei Wahrheiten, zum Beispiel im
Kommentar zum *Catuḥśatakam*. Aber bei früheren Erklärungen finde ich fast
immer statische Beispiele. Bei Tson kha pa finde ich eine dynamische für
den Übenden, nicht nur eine normalsprachliche erkenntnistheoretische

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[31] Vgl. Kārikā 360cd.

[32] Vgl. Pekinger Ausgabe 255b-246a.

[33] Vgl. bKra śis lhun po-Ausgabe 447b-449b; Fa tsuns Chinesische Übersetzung, Taipei
²1975, 561-563; G.Nagao, *Chibet Bukkyo Kenkyu*. Tokyo 1954, 318-321.

Erklärung.

Bei Red mda' ba gibt es ein ähnliches Verständnis. Er verneint nicht
das Gleichnis, "daß der *pratītyasamutpāda* wie ein Trugbild ist, weil
die Verneinung unnötig ist. Wenn es auch verneint wird, würde man den
Fehler begehen, den *pratītyasamutpāda* als minder zu behandeln. Solange
der Übende das kostbare Einverständnis ohne Erscheinung bekommen kann,
verneint die Madhyamaka-Schule diese Erscheinung des Trugbildes des *pra-
tītyasamutpāda* nicht."[34]

Also finde ich dabei eine, im Vergleich mit Tson kha pa nicht so
stark aktive, sondern beschränkte Bedeutung. Thu'u bkvan erklärt später
die Erscheinungs-Lehre der Sa skya pa-Schule im allgemeinen.[35] "Wenn man
die Erleuchtung erlangt, erlöschen die falschen Vorstellungen, nämlich
die Erscheinung, die Vermehrung des Wissens um das Objekt als Erschei-
nung und die Überzeugung (von der Existenz) des Objektes. Dafür soll man
stufenweise durch die drei Praxen Unwissen an den Tag bringen, um Er-
leuchtung zu erlangen." Red mda' bas Erläuterung der Erscheinung gilt
auch bei dieser Bestimmung. Das heißt, er ist in dem Kreis von Sa skya
pa geblieben. Also hat Red mda' ba keine Betonung der Erscheinungslehre
wie Tson kha pa. Die Anerkennung dieser Erscheinung gefällt den Sa skya
pa von der absoluten Wahrheit her nicht. Zum Beispiel die Aussage des
Philosophen Go ram bsod nams sen ge in *lTa ba'i san 'byed theg mchog
gnad kyi zla zer*:

> "Die echte, absolute Wahrheit übersteigt das Verstehen des
> gewöhnlichen Menschen. Die Erscheinung der Zweiheit verschwin-
> det von der vollkommen reinen Weisheit des Heiligen. Die Ex-
> treme von Sein und Nichts, von Ewigem und Augenblicklichkeit
> wird von ihr keineswegs gesehen. Das ist die echte, absolute
> Wahrheit."[36]

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[34] Vgl. 198-199.

[35] Vgl. 19a.

[36] Vgl. *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum.* Vol.13, Tokyo 1969, Ca 14a2f.: weiters 5a4: *ma rñed pa'i
bden pa dkag tsam gyi sñad ñid med dgag de ñid dbu ma'i rta ba mtha' thug pa yin.*
Dieselbe Richtung vertritt auch rDo sbi lha ram pa ses rab rgya mtsho (14./15. Jh.)
in seinem *mTha' brad dbu ma chen mo'i gtam du bya ba yan dag lha ba'i 'od 'byin.*
(*'Bras klu 'bum rdo sbi lha ram pa ses rab rgya mtsho'i gsun 'bum.* New Delhi 1979,
Ka 281-290.)
   Go ram pas Richtung ist jetzt in den Sa skya-Klöstern als die repräsentative der
Sa skya-Philosophie anerkannt. Go ram pa kritisiert in seinem Kommentar zum *Madhya-
makāvatāraḥ* Tson kha pas Meinungen ausführlich. Aber hier habe ich nur die repräsen-
tative Meinung von Go ram pa dargestellt.

Dabei kann Tsoṅ kha pas Lehre von der Erscheinung keinen Platz finden.[37]

Red mda' ba vertritt meiner Meinung nach nur die allgemeine Prāsaṅgika-Philosophie. Tsoṅ kha pa hat die grundlegenden Gedanken der Madhyamaka-Philosophie von Red mda' ba gelernt. Hierbei stimmen beide überein. Tsoṅ kha pa entwickelt auf dieser Basis seine eigenständige Philosophie mit der Terminologie der falschen Vorstellung von der Wirklichkeit und der Erscheinung. Bei ihm finden sich später schon hohe intellektuelle Analysen und Betonungen, die wie durch einen ins Wasser geworfenen Stein Wellen entstehen lassen, die sich ausbreiten und wieder zurückkommen.

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[37] Diesbezüglich gibt es noch mehrere Probleme. Ich habe meine Untersuchung nur vom religiösen Standpunkt aus dargestellt. Das Absolute und seine Wirkung oder die Erhebung nach der Wahrheit und die Entfaltung aus der Wahrheit und auch Mißverständnisse möchte ich in einem anderen Rahmen behandeln.

THE DARŚANAMĀRGA SECTION OF THE ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYA AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY TIBETAN COMMENTATORS (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO BU STON RIN CHEN GRUB)

by

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1.

The Path of Vision (or Insight) (*darśanamārga, mthoṅ lam*)[1] is the first immediate and truly adequate full comprehension of Truth by a given person, or arising in a given stream of personality. It is the phase which for the first time eradicates Defilements (*kleśa, ñon moṅs*),[2] or Obstacles (*āvaraṇa, sgrib pa*),[3] though, it is true, not yet all of them. But even the further stages of (at least the Supramundane) Path largely consist in a kind of repetition of the *darśanamārga*.[4] The latter may thus well be called the decisive stage of the Buddhist Path to Salvation.

While investigating a certain line of thought in the Yogācāra treatment of the *darśanamārga*,[4a] I had to deal with the exposition of this subject in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (*mṄon pa kun btus = AS*)[5] ascribed to Asaṅga. In addition to the Indian commentary, viz. the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-*

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[1] Cp., e.g., E.Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*. 3.Aufl. Berlin 1969, 127 and 331; Abhidharma-Studien III. *WZKS 15*, 1971, 83f. and 86ff.: H.V.Guenther, *Philosophy and Psychology of the Abhidharma*. 2nd rev. ed. Delhi 1974, 195ff., 221ff., L.Schmithausen, Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus. *Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils*. Hrsg. v. G.Oberhammer, Wien 1978, 104ff. and 110ff.

[2] E.g. *AS* 66,15f.

[3] E.g. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. Trad. L.de La Vallée Poussin, vol.2, Paris 1929, 590.

[4] See references in n.1.

[4a] A detailed exposition of the result of this investigation will be presented in a later publication which is still in progress.

[5] *AS* 66,3-68,2; AS_t 110b1 - 111b5. The Sanskrit text of the passage is not preserved in manuscript form; what we find in Pradhan's edition is only the editor's reconstruction, mainly from the Chinese, with the help of the *pratīkas* includet in the *ASBh*. Additional help for - at least approximately - restoring the original wording is offered by a quasi-quotation in *AAĀ* 347,1-5, 7-14, and 20f. - *AS* 67,5-13 does not form part of the text of the *AS* but belongs to the *ASBh* (see n.52).

bhāṣya[6] ascribed to one Jinaputra by the Tibetan tradition,[6a] there are several autochtonous Tibetan commentaries on the *AS*. So far, I have examined five Tibetan commentaries, viz. those written by Bu ston Rin chen grub[7] (1290-1364), rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen[8] (1364-1432), Bo don paṇ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal[9] (1376-1451), gSer mdog paṇ chen Śākya mchog ldan[10] (1428-1507), and Mi pham 'Jam dbyaṅs rnam rgyal rgya mtsho[11] (1846-1912). As for the passage concerned, Bo doṅ's commentary[12] is by far the most detailed one; next in length and substance are the commentaries of Bu ston[13] and Śākya mchog ldan,[14] whereas rGyal tshab rje's[15] is significantly shorter and less substantial. Mi pham's commentary to the passage[16] is hardly more than excerpts from *AS* and *ASBh*.

In the present paper, I shall limit myself to a discussion of B u s t o n ' s commentary on the passage, and to a provisional one at that. The other Tibetan commentaries will be referred to only occasionally. In order to understand and evaluate Bu ston's explanations it is, however, necessary to see how the topic of *darśanamārga* is treated in the basic text itself as well as in the Indian commentary which is of course authoritative for the Tibetans. This means that I have to begin with an outline of the *darśanamārga* section of the *AS* and the *ASBh*.

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[6] The paragraph on *darśanamārga* is explained in *ASBh* 76,19-78,22 (= § 85); Peking Tanjur, Sems tsam, Śi, 69a3ff. and 259a4ff.

[6a] For other ascriptions see J.W.de Jong, in: *TP LIX*, 340f. (= Buddhist Studies by J.W. de Jong, ed. G.Schopen, Berkeley 1979, 602f.).

[7] *Chos mṅon pa kun las btus kyi ṭīk rnam bśad Ñi ma'i 'od zer* (*The Collected Works of Bu ston*. Ed. Lokesh Chandra, vol.20 (VA), New Delhi 1971, 79ff.).

[8] *Legs par bśad pa chos mṅon rgya mtsho'i sñiṅ po* (*Gsuṅ-'bum of rGyal-tshab Dar-ma-rin-chen*, blockprint preserved in the State Library of Berlin, vol.Ga, second part).

[9] *Encyclopedia Tibetica* (*The Collected Works of Bo-doṅ Paṇ-chen Phyogs-las-rnam-rgyal*). Vol.16, New Delhi 1970.

[10] *Dam pa'i chos mṅon pa kun las btus pa'i rnam par bśad pa rNal 'byor spyod gźuṅ rgya mtsho'i rlabs kyi phreṅ ba. The Complete Works (Gsuṅ 'bum) of Gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan.* Vol.14, Thimphu (Bhutan) 1975, 1-340.

[11] *mÑon pa kun btus kyi rnam graṅs sna tshogs bśad pa. Collected Writings of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho.* Vol.70, Gangtok 1975, 401ff.

[12] *Bo doṅ* 658,6-699,5. As also indicated in the edition, a piece of text reaching from 692,4 to 696,6 is misplaced (it has to be inserted in 701,2) and belongs to the section of the *bhāvanāmārga*.

[13] *Bu ston* 578,4-585,1.

[14] *Śākya* 220,5-227,1.

[15] *rGyal tshab* 154b3-156b1.

[16] *Mi pham* 466,2-468,5.

2.

The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* offers four definitions, or characterizations, of the *darśanamārga*, three being styled a "summary" (*samāsatah*,[17] *mdor bsdu na*), the fourth being "detailed" (*prabhedatah*,[18] *rab tu dbye na*). All these definitions can be traced back to other, mostly clearly older, sources, though to this a proviso applies in the fourth case.

The f i r s t definition characterizes the *darśanamārga* as "a concentrative absorption and comprehension ... consisting in non-perception, or non-apprehension" (*anupalambhah samādhih prajñā ..., mi dmigs pa'i tiṅ ṅe 'dzin daṅ śes rab ...*),[19] i.e., as another passage of the AS[20] makes clear, non-perception of [the dichotomy of] what is apprehended and what apprehends (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*, *gzuṅ ba* and *'dzin pa*), i.e. of object and subject imagined as separate entities.

This definition of the *darśanamārga* as "non-perception" or "non-apprehension" (*anupalambha*), reminiscent of the terminology of the Prajñāpāramitā,[21] closely resembles the characterization of the *darśanamārga* found in the Yogācāra works ascribed to Maitreya(nātha)[22] and especially in some verse fragments closely related to these, one of which is actually quoted in the AS as stemming from a Sūtra.[23] According to the Maitreya texts, "non-perception" does not mean complete cessa ·on of all experience but only cessation of ordinary experience, viz. experience dichotomized into object and subject, this cessation resulting at the same time in the manifestation of non-dichotomic absolute reality (*dharmadhātu, chos dbyiṅs*).[24]

The s e c o n d definition of the AS describes the *darśanamārga* as a comprehension in which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely

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[17] AS 66,3 = AAĀ 347,1.

[18] AS 66,6 = AAĀ 347,2; ASBh 77,1 has *prabhedaśah*.

[19] AS 66,3f.; cp.AAĀ 347,2.

[20] AS 82,18.

[21] See E.Conze, *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*. Tokyo 1973, 35f.

[22] Cp., e.g., *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XI.47d; *Madhyāntavibhāga* (ed. Nagao) I.7-8; *Dharma-dharmatāvibhāga* (ed.Nozawa) 15,8-10 (+ 48,21ff.) und 17,7ff.

[23] AS 82,23; in *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (ed.Lamotte) III.17 the same verse is traced to a *Yogavibhāga* which is ascribed to Maitreya by Kuei-chi (cp. R.Yūki, *Yuishiki-gaku Tenseki-shi*. Tokyo 1962, 60).- Another pertinent verse is quoted, without indication of its source, in *Triṃśikābhāṣya* (ed. Lévi) 42,5-8.

[24] Cp., e.g., *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* XIV.23ff. and VI.7-8; *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* 15,9f. (+ 49,2f.).

the same, or: alike (samasamālambyālambakajñāna).[25]

This expression stems from the Śrāvakabhūmi[26] where it is, however, not applied to the darśanamārga but to the consummation of a certain stage of the Preparatory Path, a stage at which the mental activity which investigates the four Noble Truths makes i t s e l f its object and, starting from the perception of its o w n impermanence, comprehends the four Noble Truths as bearing also on i t s e l f, or, to look at it from another point of view, comprehends even itself as also being character- ized by these Truths.[27] In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha,[28] as in the AS, the same expression is used but now, in contradistinction to the Śrāvakabhūmi, applied to comprehension free from imaginative and conceptualizing ac- tivity (nirvikalpa-jñāna), i.e. to the darśanamārga. In this case, the expression should mean, in analogy to its usage in the Śrāvakabhūmi, that the nirvikalpa-jñāna, the true essence of which is True Reality (tathatā, de bźin ñid), comprehends this tathatā as its o w n essence, or comprehends i t s e l f as being, on the absolute level, nothing but this tathatā.

There can be no doubt that this definition, like the preceding one, is, in spite of its terminological roots in the Śrāvakabhūmi, essential- ly Mahāyānist. But it is expressed in p o s i t i v e terms, in contrast to the first which is negative.

The t h i r d definition of the AS[29] characterizes the darśanamārga as comprehension cognizing dharmas

> 1) in the case of one's own person, without applying the conven-
>   tional notion of "living being" (sattva);
> 2) again in the case of one's own person, without applying the
>   conventional notion of "dharmas";
> 3) in the case of everybody and everything, without applying
>   either notion.

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[25] AS 66,4 = ASBh 76,20 (-ālambana- has to be changed into -ālambaka-: cp. the fol- lowing note and Triṃśikābhāṣya 43,18 where we should of course read samasamālambyā- lambakaṃ). AS$_t$ 110b2 renders the compound by dmigs par bya ba daṅ dmigs par byed pa mñam pas mñam par śes pa, possibly implying an interpretation similar to that of the ASBh (76,20f.; cp.n.50).

[26] Ed. Shukla (Patna 1973), 499,7f. and 13.

[27] Ib. 498,2ff.

[28] III.9 (p.53,6f.).

[29] AS 66,5 (= ASBh 76,21f.): pratyātmam-apanītasattvasaṃketa-dharmasaṃketa-sarvato-'panī- tobhayasaṃketālambanadharmajñānam api tat. As$_t$ 110b2f.: so so raṅ la sems can gyi brda daṅ | chos kyi brda bsal ba daṅ | thams cad du gñi ga'i brda bsal ba la dmigs pa'i chos śes pa'aṅ de yin no ‖.

This definition, almost unintelligible in the wording of the *AS*, is taken from the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*[30] where it is found in a more extended form. It analyzes the *darśanamārga* into three successive comprehensions the first two of which, to say it in other words, cognize the constituents of one's o w n   p e r s o n   under the aspect of "Essencelessness of Person" (*pudgalanairātmya, gaṅ zag gi bdag med*) and under the aspect of the "Essencelessness of *dharmas*" (*chos kyi bdag med*), respectively, whereas the third moment extends this two-fold insight to a l l *dharmas*. This definition can be characterized as a kind of combination of a typically (though not exclusively) "Hīnayā-nist" and a specifically Mahāyānist element, and as using, though still rather economically, an analytical pattern.

The f o u r t h and most detailed characterization[31] looks purely "Hīnayānist" and describes the *darśanamārga* as a process of sixteen mo-ments, the number sixteen resulting from the fact that it is now the traditional four Noble Truths that are regarded to be its object and to be cognized successively, each of them, again, requiring a set of four cognitive phases. Structurally and also terminologically, this descrip-tion agrees with the *darśanamārga* theory of the Vaibhāṣikas.[32] But the concrete interpretation[33] of the functions of the four phases, actually given for one but valid for all four Truths, is, in the *AS*, highly arti-ficial and completely different from the more natural one offered by the Vaibhāṣikas, and it is not known to me from any source prior to the *AS*.

According to the *AS*, the first phase, viz. the *dharmajñānakṣānti* (*chos śes pa'i bzod pa*), is an undefiled immediately perceiving comprehension of the respective Noble Truth itself.[34] Through it one abandons the De-filements to be abandoned by the [first] vision of that Truth.[35] The sec-ond phase (*dharmajñāna, chos śes pa*) is an immediately perceiving compre-hension of the Liberation from Defilements effectuated by the first phase.[36]

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[30] *Y*t Zi 72b3ff.

[31] *AS* 66,6-10; cp. *AAĀ* 347,2-4.

[32] Cp. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. Pradhan (Patna 1967), 349,19ff.; E.Frauwallner, Abhi-dharma-Studien III, *WZKS 15*, 1971, 83ff.

[33] *AS* 66,12ff.; cp. *AAĀ* 347,7ff. and *ASBh* 77,2ff.

[34] *AS* 66,15 = *AS*t 111a1: *sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa mṅon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i śes rab ~ duḥkhasaty(apratyakṣ)ānubhāviny anāsravā prajñā* (cp. *AAĀ* 347,8 and *ASBh* 77,3f.).

[35] *AS* 66,15f. = *AS*t 111a1: *gaṅ gi<s> sdug bsṅal mthoṅ bas spaṅ bar bya ba'i ñon moṅs pa spoṅ ba ste ≈ yayā duḥkhadarśanaprahātavyaṃ kleśam prajahāti* (cp. *AAĀ* 347,8f. and *ASBh* 77,4f.).

[36] *AS* 66,17f. = *AAĀ* 347,9f.: *yena jñānena kṣāntyanantaraṃ vimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti.*

The third phase (*anvayajñānakṣānti*, *rjes su rtogs par śes pa'i bzod pa*) cognizes the first two phases,[37] and the fourth phase (*anvayajñāna*, *rjes su rtogs pa'i śes pa*) confirms the third.[38] Thus, the first two phases comprehend an object (*grāhya*, *gzuṅ ba*, viz. the respective Truth and Liberation), the last two comprehend the subject (*grāhaka*, *'dzin pa*, i.e. comprehension itself).[39]

There can hardly be any doubt that these four definitions or descriptions of the *darśanamārga* offered by the *AS* are heterogeneous, both historically and from the point of view of content. Some even seem to be contradictory, esp. the first definition which has to be understood, in the light of its sources as well as of the *AS* itself, as defining the *darśanamārga* as non-perception or non-apprehension of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, and the fourth which expressly declares the *darśanamārga* to consist in comprehensions of *grāhya* and of *grāhaka*, respectively. It seems that the author of the *AS* has simply j u x t a p o s e d several heterogeneous definitions of *darśanamārga* he had found in his sources (perhaps reinterpreting the last one for reasons I could specify only hypothetically[40]). In juxtaposing these heterogeneous definitions, the author of the *AS* has, however, quite apparently arranged them according to a deliberate principle, proceeding from the apophatic and unitary to the cataphatic and analytical, and at the same time from the purely Mahāyānist to the mixed and finally to the essentially "Hīnayānist" characterization. But beyond this attempt at systematically a r r a n g i n g the materials, there does n o t seem to be any attempt at uniting the heterogeneous elements into a philosophically or doctrinally c o h e r e n t system.

Several patterns by means of which this could have been achieved had already been developed in different passages of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. One of these patterns was the distribution of different descriptions of the *darśanamārga* to different Paths of Salvation: to that of the Śrāvakas (and Pratyekabuddhas) on the one hand, and to that of the Bodhisattvas on the other.[41] In the *AS*, too, there are, indeed, one or two pas-

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[37] *AS* 66,19f. = *AS$_t$* 111a3f.: ... *sdug bsnal la chos śes pa'i bzod pa daṅ | sdug bsnal la chos śes pa ... mṅon sum du 'gyur ba'i zag pa med pa'i śes rab ≈ duḥkhe dharma-jñānakṣāntau duḥkhe dharmajñāne ca ... pratyakṣānubhāviny anāsravā prajñā* (cp. *AAĀ* 347,10ff. and *ASBh* 77,10).

[38] *AS* 66,22 = *AAĀ* 347,12: *yena jñānena tām anvayajñānakṣāntim avadhārayati.*

[39] *AS* 67,1f. (read *dharmajñānakṣāntijñānair* with *ASBh* 77,13f. and *AS$_t$* 111a5 <*chos*> *śes pa'i bzod pa daṅ śes pa rnams kyis*).

[40] For this I have to refer to the study in progress mentioned in n.4a.

[41] E.g. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. Dutt, Patna 1966) 25,22ff. - For a detailed exposition and discussion of this and the following theories and passages, I must, once more,

sages favouring such an interpretation,[42] but they are just another het-
erogeneous element not applicable to the present passage which by choos-
ing the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" seems to
preclude any material distinction.

According to another model,[43] the *darśanamārga* proper consists in
the Mahāyānist uniform awareness of True Reality (*tathatā, de bźin ñid*),
and the "Hīnayānist" type of *darśanamārga* is nothing but a subsequent
analytical conceptualization. This model, too, is hardly applicable to
the *AS* because in another passage of this text[44] it is clearly stated
that not only this subsequent conceptualization but also the *darśana-
mārga* proper consists of 16 moments.

A further model tries to cope with the difficulties by distributing
the different characterizations of the *darśanamārga* to different levels
of establishing Truth.[45] But this model, too, can hardly be intended by
the merely formal distinction of "summary" and "detailed" definitions
in the *AS*. This distinction leaves us with the result that the author
of the *AS* has, at least in the present context and perhaps with the ex-
ception of the reinterpretation of the "Hīnayānist" detailed description,
confined himself to collecting and arranging heterogeneous traditional
materials without achieving, or even attempting, doctrinal consistency.
This task was, as it were, left to the commentators.

3.

The *A b h i d h a r m a s a m u c c a y a b h ā ṣ y a* (*ASBh*), goes beyond the
AS mainly in two ways:

Firstly, it shows a tendency towards assimilating the content of the
four characterizations to one another. Of primary importance in this
context is its interpretation of the fourth description, i.e. of the
darśanamārga in 16 moments: The *ASBh* takes the first moment of each set
of four as a perceptual comprehension not of the respective Truth itself

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refer the reader to the prospective publication announced in n.4a.

[42] Cp. esp. *AS* 94,7ff. (1.8: *prativedhaviśeṣaḥ*!).

[43] E.g. *Y*_t_ Zi 302b4ff.; 'i 15a5ff.; cp. also Zi 73a5ff.

[44] *AS* 93,9ff. = *AS*_t_ 131a5f.: *tattvābhisamayaḥ katamaḥ | gaṅ mthoṅ ba'i lam gyi sems kyi
skad cig bcu drug po dag thob pa'o (≈ *yaḥ ṣoḍaśadarśanamārgacittakṣaṇapratilambhaḥ)|
mthoṅ ba'i lam la ni satyavyavasthāpanāny abhisamayāntikāni samvṛtijñānāni pratila-
bhate, na tu sammukhīkaroti* (cp. *ASBh* 122,18ff.).

[45] *Y*_t_ Zi 123b6 (ff.); cp. *Bu ston* 578,6ff.

in the concrete-collective sense of all individual factors as character-
ized by that Truth, but as a comprehension of the uniform t r u e e s -
s e n c e (*tathatā*, *de bźin ñid*) of that Truth.[46] And the second moment
of each set is understood as referring to the "transformation of the ba-
sis" (*āśrayaparivṛtti*, *gnas gyur pa*)[47] which, as another passage[48] sug-
gests, is to be understood as that same *tathatā*, although now freed from
the respective Defilements.

In this way at least these two phases have become, to a certain ex-
tent, compatible with the first three definitions of the *AS*. As to these,
the *ASBh* does not seem conscious of any incompatibility between them. On
the contrary, it suggests that they are to be understood to refer to dif-
ferent aspects of one and the same experience. The *first* definition is
interpreted as intending what I would call the f o r m a l aspect of the
darśanamārga, viz. its being a synthesis of mental calmness (*śamatha*,
źi gnas) and clear insight (*vipaśyanā*, *lhag mthoṅ*) free from imagina-
tive, conceptualizing and reflecting activity (*vikalpa*, *rnam par rtog
pa*).[49] The explanation of the *second* definition can be understood as
clarifying what is the c o n t e n t of the *darśanamārga*, viz. *tathatā*,
this time, it is true, characterized by the non-existence of *grāhya* and
grāhaka,[50] whereas the *third* definition seems to be interpreted as
stressing what is n o t the content of the *darśanamārga*, viz. the *ni-
mittas* (*mtshan ma*),[51] i.e. the pseudo-objective correlates of *vikalpa*.

Thus to the *ASBh* the main difference between the definitions would
lie in their indicating different aspects of the *darśanamārga*, and, of
course, in the different degree of their analytical elaboration. The

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[46] *ASBh* 77,2ff.: *tatra duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣāntiḥ ... duḥkhasatye tattathatā-pratyakṣānu-
bhāvinī ... prajñā.*

[47] *ASBh* 77,6ff.: *tayā kṣāntyā ... parivartita āśraye tadanantaram yena jñānena t ā m
ā ś r a y a p a r i v ṛ t t i ṃ pratyanubhavati, tad "duḥkhe dharmajñānam" ity ucyate;* cp.
also 78,13.

[48] Cp. *ASBh* 77,12f. saying that the [Supramundane] Path, insofar as it belongs to the
dharmajñāna group (i.e. the first and second moment of each set), has *tathatā* for
its object (*dharmajñānapakṣasya mārgasya tathatā viṣayaḥ*); cp. also *Bu ston* 581,6:
rnam grol te | bden pa'i d e b ź i n ñ i d gnas gyur de (text: te) | *Śākya* 225,7f.:
"*dharmatā* (= *tathatā*) is twofold: pure by nature and pure in the sense of being
freed from [accidental] impurities; insight into it is [accordingly] also twofold:
dharma[jñāna]kṣānti and dharmajñāna" (chos ñid la gñis te | raṅ bźin rnam dag gi
daṅ | glo (text: blo) bur rnam dag gi'o || de śes pa la yaṅ gñis te | chos bzod pa
daṅ | chos śes so ||).

[49] *ASBh* 76,19f.

[50] *ASBh* 76,20f.: *tena grāhyagrāhakābhāvatathatāprativedhāt.*

[51] *ASBh* 76,21-26.

secondary importance of such differences in the view of the *ASBh* – and this leads us to the second important contribution of the *ASBh* going beyond the *AS* itself – is evinced by its assertion that the whole pro-lix treatment of the *darśanamārga* in the *AS* is only a makeshift (*vya-vasthānamātra*) for the sake of instruction and preparation, the real na-ture of the supramundane state of the *darśanamārga* being accessible to personal experience only.[52]

Inspite of these important contributions to a doctrinally consistent interpretation of the *AS*, the *ASBh* does not, at this point, discuss the question whether there is any difference between the *darśanamārga* expe-rience of the Bodhisattvas and that of the Śrāvakas (as one would be in-clined to assume on the basis of other passages[53]) and in what relation the definitions of the *AS* stand to this difference.

4.

This problem leads me to B u s t o n.

The first thing to state is that Bu ston makes ample use of the ex-planations of the *ASBh*, sometimes rendering them more explicit, as, e.g., in the case of the first definition where he expressly states that *nir-vikalpa* in the *ASBh* corresponds to *anupalambha* in the *AS*.[54]

Sometimes Bu ston supplies additional word-explanations, as, e.g., when analysing the compounds *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, etc.[55] Such ex-planations are usually helpful but occasionally questionable, e.g. when he understands the last words of the third definition[56] as a separate, positive element, interpreting the word *chos* (*dharma*) as referring to

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[52] *ASBh* 77,23ff. (= § 85C which, although it has somehow crept into the Chinese ver-sion, has to be included from the text of the *AS* on the basis of *AS*$_t$).

[53] E.g. *ASBh* 123,5-7.

[54] Bu ston 580,4: ... <u>rnam par mi rtog pa</u> dmigs pa'i rnam rtog gi gñen por gyur pas <u>mi dmigs pa</u> ...

[55] Bu ston 581,2f.; of the two analyses of the compound *dharmajñānakṣānti*, it is ob-viously the second one ((chos) śes pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas sdug bden la bzod pa) which suits the peculiar interpretation of this term given in the *AS* (*AS* 66,13ff.: *dharma-jñānaṃ katamat | prayogamārge ... dharmavicāraṇājñānam | kṣāntiḥ katamā | pūrvavi-cāraṇām adhipatiṃ kṛtva ... duḥkhasaty(apratyakṣ)ānubhāvinī ... prajñā |*; text changed acc. to *AS*$_t$ and AAĀ 347,7f.); the first analysis (*chos kyi de kho na ñid śes pa'i phyir bzod pa*), on the other hand, agrees, at least structurally, with the analysis of the term given in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 350,5 (*dharmajñānārthaṃ kṣāntiḥ*).

[56] See n.29.

the *tathatā*.[57] Such an interpretation is hardly justified, neither by
the wording of the AS nor by that of its source, the Viniścayasaṃgraha-
ṇī.[58] Another example is Bu ston's explanation of the word *dharma* in the
expression *duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti*, where he takes it to indicate the
specific and common features [of the entities included in the Truth of
Suffering] expounded in the Sūtras, viz. impermanence, etc.[59] This in-
terpretation, though reconcilable with the Tibetan text of the AS,[60] is
at variance with the interpretation of the ASBh,[61] which is almost cer-
tainly right in understanding *dharma* in this passage as "doctrinal texts
(dealing with the Truth of Suffering)".

It is, however, other aspects of Bu ston's commentary which are more
interesting.

Although Bu ston reproduces,[62] almost literally, the remarks of the
ASBh on the makeshift character of all analytical treatment of the *darśa-
namārga*, he himself seems to take the analytical description in the AS
much more seriously:

When explaining the detailed analysis (=fourth definition) of the
darśanamārga, Bu ston points out that the statement of the AS[63] that the
first two phases of each set comprehend the object, i.e. the *tathatā*,[64]
whilst the last two phases comprehend the subject, i.e. [the respective-
ly preceding phases of] correct comprehension (*yaṅ dag pa'i ye śes, samyag-
jñāna*)[64] [itself], e x c l u d e s [by its wording] both the theory that
the *darśanamārga* does not have any finite entity as its object[65] as also
the view of A bhya (Abhayākaragupta) who explains this statement of the
AS in the sense of [comprehension of] the   E s s e n c e l e s s n e s s of

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[57] *Bu ston* 580,6f.: ... <u>brda</u> *ste* | *'du śes* <u>bsal</u> *ba ste* | *ma dmigs par gtogs* (read *rtogs*)
pa daṅ (!) | *de bźin gśegs pa'i* <u>chos</u> *de bźin ñid* <u>śes pa</u>*'o* ‖.

[58] See n.30.

[59] *Bu ston* 581,3: <u>de'i dbaṅ du byas pa'i</u> *chos mi rtag pa la sogs mdo sde las* <u>bstan pa</u>
raṅ mtshan spyi mtshan <u>rnams so</u> ‖.

[60] AS$_t$ 110b7: *sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa'i dbaṅ du byas pa'i chos bstan pa rnams so* ‖.

[61] ASBh 77,2: *duḥkhasatyādhikārika s ū t r ā d i d h a r m a* ; cp. also the Tibetan translation
(Śi 69a8): *sdug bsṅal gyi [s] bden pa'i dban du byas pa' mdo la sogs pa'i
chos* ...

[62] *Bu ston* 583,3ff.

[63] AS 67,1f. (see n.39).

[64] Cp. ASBh 77,12f.

[65] *Bu ston* 582,3f.: *'dis mthoṅ lam chos can yul du mi byed zer ba bsal źiṅ* | ... accord-
ing to my colleague Tsultrim Phuntsog, *chos can* means *kun rdzob bden pa* (which
would, in the present context, especially consist of *samyagjñāna* in opposition to
tathatā = chos ñid).

both object and subject.[66]

Moreover, Bu ston precedes the presentation of his own interpretation of the wording of the *AS* with a section where he refutes other theories of how to understand the purport of the *darśanamārga* section of the *AS*, discarding, in favour of the 16 moments theory, the opinions that the *darśanamārga* consists of one,[66a] two, or four moments only.[67] Bu ston does not specify these theories; they are, however, more extensively described and discussed in the commentaries of Bo don[68] and Śākya mchog ldan,[69] but a detailed investigation of this matter would exceed the limits of this paper.

Finally, at the end of his commentary on the *darśanamārga*, Bu ston adds a paragraph[70] in which a theory suggested by a passage of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī[71] (and there connected with the theory of the *darśanamārga* as consisting in three successive phases) - viz. the theory that the four groups of Defilements (*kleśa*, *ñon moṅs*) to be removed by the first Insight into the four Noble Truths, respectively, are removed s i - m u l t a n e o u s l y - is refuted in favour of the 16 moments theory which asserts their g r a d u a l elimination.

On the other hand, the analysis of the Vaibhāṣikas, which agrees with the fourth theory of the *AS* in acknowledging 16 moments (though limiting the *darśanamārga* to the first fifteen moments and grouping the sixteenth

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[66] *Bu ston* 582,4: ... *A bhya | gzuṅ 'dzin raṅ bźin med pa la 'chad pa'aṅ bsal lo ‖*.
Cp. Abhayākaragupta, *Munimatālaṃkāra* (Peking-Tanjur, dBu ma, Ha), 243a8ff., where the passage under discussion (viz. *AS* 67,1f.) is explained as expressing that "in the [*darśanamārga*] object and subject are comprehended t o b e w i t h o u t e s -
s e n c e (*niḥsvabhāva*)" (b2: *'dir gzuṅ ba daṅ 'dzin pa dag raṅ bźin med pa ñid du rtogs so ‖*). - The position of Abhayākaragupta seems to have been accepted by Bo don, who glosses the passage *AS* 67,1f. accordingly (697,2): ... *chos bzod daṅ chos ses kyis bźuṅ* (read: *gźuṅ*) *ba raṅ bźin med par rtogs la | rjes bzod rjes ses kyi‹s› 'dzin pa raṅ bźin med par rtogs so ‖*. Cp. also *Bo don* 689,5 stating that *anupalambha* (*AS* 66,3) does not mean not perceiving anything at all but means comprehension of object and subject as lacking essence: ... *mi dmigs pa źes pa yaṅ ci yaṅ mi dmigs pa min gyi ‹|› bzuṅ* (read: *gzuṅ*) *'dzin raṅ bźin med par ... ses pa yin la |* ...

[66a] Cp. also *AAĀ* 347,21ff. and esp. 26ff.

[67] *Bu ston* 579,1-4; cp. also 578,4ff. referring to statements on the *darśanamārga* occurring in other texts/systems (*gźuṅ gźan*).

[68] *Bo don* 662,5ff., adding (665,2ff.) a theory according to which the *darśanamārga* consists of e i g h t moments.

[69] *Śākya* 224,5ff. (o n e moment); 225,4f. (t w o moments); 226,4f. (f o u r moments).

[70] *Bu ston* 584,6-585,1.

[71] Y_t Zi 134a1.

with the *bhāvanāmārga*[72]) and in using for them the same terms, is grouped
by Bu ston under the heading of "positions to be established or affirmed"
(*gźag*), along with the exposition of the *AS* itself but expressly set off
from it as not forming part of the *AS*'s own system.[73] In another passage,[74]
by the way, Bu ston states that the system of the Śrāvakas, though not
primarily and clearly set forth in the *AS*, is largely in agreement with
[the doctrine of] this text.

The t h r e e "s u m m a r y" d e f i n i t i o n s of the *AS* are regarded
by Bu ston as describing the n a t u r e (*ño bo*) of the *darśanamārga*[75] (i.e.
of the *darśanamārga* as a whole, and therefore of a n y of its moments),
thus n o t at all as a l t e r n a t i v e s to the 16 moments theory.

For the *third* theory of the *AS*, this seems to imply that Bu ston un-
derstands it as not referring to three successive moments but to three
a s p e c t s of the *darśanamārga* which would be included in e a c h of the
16 moments.

Let me now return to the question which could not be answered in
the case of the *ASBh*, viz. the question whether this harmonized structure
is meant to describe the *darśanamārga* of Śrāvakas, or Bodhisattvas, or
both. Fortunately, Bu ṣton's commentary contains some pertinent remarks
which suggest at least a tendency to consider the exposition of the
darśanamārga in the *AS* as valid for a l l vehicles, though Bu ston is
obviously aware of the fact that the wording of most of the different
elements of that exposition seems to fit one vehicle better than the
others.

E.g., the wording of the 16 m o m e n t s t h e o r y is, it is true,
primarily Śrāvakayānist, but Bu ston[76] asserts that it is a l s o valid
for the *darśanamārga* of P r a t y e k a b u d d h a s and B o d h i s a t t v a s,
provided that it is given some additional qualification: The *AS* does not,
admittedly, mention any removal of the respective Obstacle to [knowing
all] that has to be known (*jñeyāvaraṇa*, *śes sgrib*) but only speaks of
the removal] of the respective [Obstacle consisting in] Defilements

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[72] *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Patna 1967) 352,19ff.; cp. *Bu ston* 579,6 and 585,1; *Bo doṅ*
660,6ff.

[73] *Bu ston* 579,1 + 579,4: *dgag gźag spaṅ gsum gyi ... gñis pa la | mdzod daṅ raṅ lugs
gñis ...*

[74] *Bu ston* 570,5: *gźuṅ 'dir dṅos su gsal bar mi 'byuṅ yaṅ ñan thos kyi rnam gźag phal
cher de daṅ mthun te |.* Cp. also D.Seyfort Ruegg, *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du
gotra.* Paris 1969, 69, n.2.

[75] *Bu ston* 580,3ff.

[76] Cp. also *Śākya* 222,5f.

(kleśa, ñon moṅs); yet a removal of the *jñeyāvaraṇa*, too, has, according to Bu ston, to be considered as being i m p l i e d with regard to Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, the former being freed from the concept of object to be apprehended *(gzuṅ rtog, grāhyavikalpa)* but not from the concept of an apprehending subject *(grāhakavikalpa)*, whereas the Bodhisattva is freed from both.[77] However, such a doctrine with regard to the Pratyekabuddha, especially, is alien to the *AS* and, as far as I can see, to the older Yogācāra school as a whole. It rather belongs to the tradition of the *A b h i s a m a y ā l a ṅ k ā r a*,[78] a text which, as is well known, has been very influential in Tibetan Buddhism and has been commented upon by many Tibetan scholars,[79] including Bu ston himself.[80]

This connection with the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* tradition is also confirmed by another passage[81] where Bu ston says that according to the method [of describing and practising the *darśanamārga* insofar as it is] common [to all Vehicles, i.e. as it is practised also by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas], [the *darśanamārga* forms, to be sure,] an uninterrupted series of "equiposed" *(mñam bźag, samāhita, i.e. non-conceptualizing)* mental phases, whereas in the specific practice of Bodhisattvas it is said to be interspersed with "subsequent" *(rjes thob, pṛṣṭhalabdha, i.e. conceptualizing)* mental phases as, e.g., cultivating the Unlimited [Meditations] *(tshad med, apramāṇa*, viz. friendliness, compassion, etc.) or urging other persons to perform good deeds or praising them [for performing them on their own account]. That this view, too, stems from the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* tradition is shown by a quotation from the *Ñi khri snaṅ ba*, i.e. Āryavimuktisena's *Abhisamayālaṅkāravṛtti*,[82] adduced by Bu ston in another place.[83] This passage points out that for a Bodhisattva

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[77] Bu ston 581,5f.: 'dir mthoṅ spaṅ śes sgrib spoṅ ba ma smos kyaṅ raṅ rgyal gyis gzuṅ rtog daṅ | byaṅ sems kyis gñis ka spoṅ ba don gyis thob bo || .

[78] Cp. esp. AA II.8 *(grāhyārthakalpanāhānād grāhakasyāprahāṇataḥ ... vijñeyaḥ khaḍgamārgasya samgrahaḥ)*; AAĀ 345,14-16: *tatra grāhyavikalpaprahāṇena pratyekabuddhādhigamam śrāvakebhyo viśinaṣṭi, grāhakavikalpaprahāṇābhāvena ca pratyekabuddhebhyo 'nuttarabuddhādhigamam*; cp. also AAĀ 403,25ff.

[79] Cp., e.g., E.Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature*. 2nd ed. Tokyo 1978, 115ff.

[80] The *Luṅ gi sñe ma* (Collected Works, pt.18).

[81] Bu ston 583,2f.: thun moṅ gi lugs kyis | mñam bźag phreṅ (Text: breṅ?) gcig yin la | phar phyin pas tshad med sgom pa daṅ | gźan dge ba la 'god ciṅ bsṅags pa brjod pa sogs rjes thob kyaṅ bar bar du bśad do ||

[82] Cp. E.Obermiller, *History of Buddhism (Chos-ḥbyung) by Bu ston*, II,155.

[83] Bu ston 579,3f.; the passage is found in Peking-Tanjur, Śer phyin, Ka, 114b6-8; see also AAĀ 354,16f.: *ata evoktam Āryavimuktisenena: aṣṭame hi darśanamārgakṣaṇe prayojanam bodhisattvasyāpramāṇaiḥ; itarathā hi navame kṣaṇe sattvadhātunirapekṣo nirodhe prapated iti.*

it is necessary to interrupt the series of the constitutive phases of
the *darśanamārga* after the eight moment by an exercise of friendliness,
etc., in order to avoid becoming, for want of concern for other living
beings, inclined to premature Nirvāṇa when subsequently comprehending
the Truth of Cessation. Encouraging and praise of other persons are
attributed to the 15[th] phase of the *darśanamārga* in Haribhadra's *Abhi-
samayālaṅkārālokā.* [84]

Bu ston thus, at least in the case of the *darśanamārga*, systemati-
cally supplements the exposition of the *AS* by materials stemming from
the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*-tradition. The way for such a fusion had already
been paved by H a r i b h a d r a who in his *Abhisamayalaṅkārālokā* [85] uses,
though without any explanations, the *darśanamārga* exposition of the *AS*,
especially the detailed analysis into 16 moments, in order to concretize
the *darśanamārga* of the Bodhisattvas (!).

Bu ston, we saw, supplements the fourth definition of the *AS* to make
it applicable to the *darśanamārga* of not only the Śrāvakas but also the
Pratyekabuddhas and the Bodhisattvas; similarly, he renders the t h i r d
definition, too, suitable for not only the Bodhisattvas but a l s o the
Ś r ā v a k a s. For it includes a comprehension free from the conventional
notion of *dharmas*, which obviously implies a comprehension of the Es-
sencelessness of *dharmas* accessible to Bodhisattvas only. Bu ston, how-
ever, remarks [86] that even Śrāvakas, though, it is true, they cannot di-
rectly perceive *dharmanairātmya*, do not actually apprehend the conceptu-
al-imaginary mark of an Essence (*bdag gi mtshan ma*) of *dharmas* either,
during the *darśanamārga*, and that this is considered sufficient to sat-
isfy the requirements of the definition which is, in fact, a negative
one.

A problem is posed, however, by the s e c o n d definition of the *AS* -
the *darśanamārga* as comprehension in which what is cognized and what cog-
nizes are completely the same (or alike). This is interpreted by the
ASBh [87] as comprehension of True Reality as [characterized by] the non-
existence of the [imaginary dichotomy of] object and subject (*grāhyagrā-
hakābhāvatathatā*). This explanation, which is essentially adopted also

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[84] *AAĀ* 357,16ff., esp. 18.

[85] *AAĀ* 347,1ff.; cp. also *Bo doṅ* 667,4ff.

[86] *Bu ston* 581,1: '*dir ñan thos kyis chos kyi bdag med dṅos su mi mthoṅ yaṅ chos bdag
gi mtshan mar mi 'dzin pa'i phyir de skad bśad zer ro* || Cp. *Sākya* 221,3: *dman pa'i
mthoṅ lam gyis chos kyi bdag med ma rtogs kyaṅ chos kyi bdag tu mi 'dzin pa la bsams
pa yin no* ||.

[87] *ASBh* 76,20f. (see n.50).

by Bu ston,[88]   seems to p r e c l u d e   an application to the *darśanamārga*
of the Ś r ā v a k a s, and in fact Bu ston himself, in a later passage,[89]
makes use of it in order to characterize the Full Comprehension (*ubhisa-
maya, mṅon rtogs*) of the B o d h i s a t t v a s   as d i s t i n c t from that
of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. But he is silent in the present
passage. rGyal tshab rje,[90] on the other hand, expressly states that
this definition is specific (*thun moṅ ma yin pa*), i.e. refers to Bodhi-
sattvas only. A similar view is indicated by Bo doṅ,[91] whereas Śākya
mchog ldan[92] tries to render this definition, too, applicable to b o t h
vehicles by distinguishing two sets of imagined object and subject –
one referring to persons and the other to *dharmas* – and by assigning
insight into the non-existence of the first set to the Hīnayānist *darśa-
namārga*, while insight into the non-existence of the second set is
achieved [only] by the Mahāyānist *darśanamārga*.

5.

I hope it has become clear from my exposition how the commentaries –
Indian as well as Tibetan – try to draw doctrinal consistency out of the
heterogeneous materials merely juxtaposed in the *AS*. One could perhaps
say that they explicitly and legitimately accomplish a task necessarily
arising out of that very juxtaposition. But it would be more risky to
assert that also the specific form of their solutions is already implied
in the basic text. Especially, the elements from the tradition of the
Abhisamayālaṅkāra brought into play by Bu ston are definitely alien to
the basic text and its tradition. But this does not, of course, mean that
his attempt at doctrinal harmonization of the *AS* material (with itself
but also with another tradition) is not highly interesting in its own

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[88] *Bu ston 580,5: dmigs bya gzuṅ ba daṅ dmigs byed 'dzin pa med par mñam pas de bźin
ñid daṅ mñam par śes pa'aṅ de yin te | .*

[89] *Bu ston 691,3f.: sa rab dga' (read: dgar?) ... dmigs bya dmigs byed mñam ñid du śes
pa'i ye śes thob ste | .*

[90] *rGyal tshab 154b5: thun moṅ min pa'i dbaṅ du byas na | gzuṅ 'dzin rdzas tha dad kyis
stoṅ par rtogs pa'i bden pa mṅon par rtogs pa'o || .*

[91] *Bo doṅ 662,2f.: ñan thos pa* ... dmigs bya dmigs byed mñam ñid du śes pa'i śes rab ...
med pa'i phyir ...   *Read la.*

[92] *Śākya 220,7f.: gzuṅ 'dzin kun brtags la'aṅ gñis gñis te | gaṅ zag gi dbaṅ du byas
pa'i gzuṅ 'dzin daṅ | chos kyi dbaṅ du byas pa'i gzuṅ 'dzin no || dman pa'i mthoṅ lam
gyis daṅ po gñis daṅ | theg chen mthoṅ lam gyis phyi ma gñis med par mthoṅ ba'o || .*

right. Moreover, Bu ston is, from the historical point of view, obvious-
ly right in giving so much weight to the fourth, highly analytical char-
acterization of *darśanamārga* in the *AS*, and also in taking comparative-
ly seriously the "Śrāvakayānist" character of much of the materials con-
tained in the *AS* as a whole.

Abbreviations

AA   *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*

AAĀ   *Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā* of Haribhadra, in: *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Pra-*
            jñāpāramitā, ed. P.L.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960

AS   *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, ed. P.Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950

AS_t Tibetan translation of the *AS* (Peking-Tanjur, Sems tsam, vol.
            Li, 51a2ff.

ASBh   *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, ed. N.Tatia, Patna 1976.

Bo doṅ   see n.9

Bu ston   see n.7

Mi pham   see n.11

rGyal tshab see n.8

Śākya   see n.10

Y_t Tibetan translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Peking-Tanjur, Sems
            tsam, vol. Dzi ff.

< >   in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be added
[ ]   a) in Sanskrit and Tibetan texts = to be deleted
      b) in translations = added by the translator

In quotations from the Tibetan commentaries, simple underlinig means
that a word or passage corresponds to the wording of the *ASBh*, whereas
double underlining marks correspondence to the wording of the *AS*.

TSHAD MA'I SKYES BU.
MEANING AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM

by

E.STEINKELLNER (VIENNA)

Man unterschätze den Terminus nicht!
Quod non est in verbc, non est in cogitatione.

(Friedrich Kainz, Philosophische Etymologie
und historische Semantik, 22)

The term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* occurs in numerous passages[1] of the works of rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432) and mKhas grub rje (1385-1438) that belong to the epistemological and logical literature, the "*tshad ma*"-literature, and is well-used in the later kindred literature of the dGe lugs pas. The "earliest" text it can be found in, is rGyal tshab's *Tshad ma'i brjed byan chen mo*;[2] and this text is a compilation of notes taken down by rGyal tshab at the occasion of Tson kha pa's lectures on *tshad ma*.[3]

The term is easy enough to understand and to interprete within its context. The genitive characterizing the compound is simply attributive; the word literally means, therefore, that the person (*skyes bu*) is a means of valid cognition (*tshad ma*), and I translate the term as "a person of authority". The word designates the Buddha, of course, the authority par

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[1] E.g. in the *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* of rGyal tshab (Ca/VIII, 1b5, 3a1 and passim) and of mKhas grub (Ta/VI, 1b3, 4a4 and passim). For rGyal tshab's and mKhas grub's works I am using the microfiches of the Lhasa-edition of the *Yab sras gsuns 'bum* prepared by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York.

[2] E.g. 3b5.

[3] It is therefore often included in Tson kha pa's collected works too (cf. Tohoku 5400 = 5438, Lhasa Pha/VII = Rgyal Tshab NA/III).
Although written by rGyal tshab these notes could be considered as representing a truthful mirror of the contents of Tson kha pa's lectures. Since our term does not occur in Tson kha pa's only *tshad ma*-work, the *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo*, its appearance in the *Tshad ma' brjed byan* can indeed be considered as the "earliest".

excellence and thus the final source and judge of any validity and use-
fulness in any kind of cognition.

It is also easy to show the original source of the c o n c e p t meant
by this term. This concept has been introduced by Dignāga in the first
words of the benedictory verse of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the verse which
contains the key ʻto the religious meaning of the whole Buddhist episte-
mological and logical tradition. The word used by Dignāga is the attrib-
ute *pramāṇabhūta*,[4] the technical meaning of which is somebody "who has
become a means of valid cognition".[5]

Both Tibetan translation of the verse and its commentary show *tshad
mar gyur pa* - a correct translation of *pramāṇabhūta*. And that the term
was only understood as an attributive adjective is also clear from vari-
ous commentarial notes on *-bhūta-*. Jinendrabuddhi, e.g., gives the syno-
nyms *utpanna* (*skyes pa*)[6] and *prādurbhūta* or *prajāta*[7] (for *byuṅ ba*), while
Devendrabuddhi-Śākyamati also give *-jāta* with a corresponding Tibetan
'*khruṅs pa*.[8]

Important as it is for fundamental Buddhist reasons, that the attrib-
ute includes the notion that the Buddha "has become" or "developed to be"
a *pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*, the essential meaning of the term definitely is,
that the Buddha i s a means of valid cognition.[9] Nowhere, however, is
the Buddha called a *tshad ma'i skyes bu* (Skt. *pramāṇapuruṣa*) in the rel-
evant Indian texts.[10] Neither do the Tibetans use that term when explain-
ing Dignāga's benedictory verse, but they keep to the correct form of the
attribute *tshad mar gyur pa*.

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[4] For an explanation of the verse, its meaning and the interpretation of the terms in-
volved cf. Hattori M.: Dignāga, *On Perception, being the Pratyakṣaparicchda of
Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 23f. and 74ff.

[5] Hattori, *loc.cit*. 74, explains: "'to have come into existence' (*bhūta*) as a 'means
of valid cognition' (*pramāṇa*)" and translates p.23: "who is the personification of
the means of cognition." The explanation of the compound as a kind of dvandva (*pra-
māṇañ cāsau bhūtaś ceti pramāṇabhūtaḥ*, E.Steinkellner, Some Sanskrit-Fragments of
Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī. *A Corpus of Indian Studies - Essays in Honour of
Professor Gaurinath Sastri*, Calcutta 1980, 100: fragment 1) has exegetical purpose
mainly.

[6] Fragment 1, E.Steinkellner, *loc.cit*., 100.

[7] Cf. E.Steinkellner, *loc.cit*., n.16.

[8] Devendrabuddhi's pratīka in Śākyamati's *PTV* II, fragment 4 (Cf. Steinkellner, Philo-
logical Remarks on Śākyamati's Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā. In *Studien zum Jainismus und
Buddhismus - Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, Wiesbaden 1980, 290) and PVT$_t$ 86b4.

[9] Cf. Dharmakīrti's *tadvat pramāṇaṃ bhagavān* (PV II, 9a).

[10] D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The Study of Indian and Tibetan Thought. Some Problems and Perspec-
tives*, 1967, 17 referring to Vetter's contribution mentioned below, gives the term
pramāṇapuruṣa in explanatory brackets, but only retranslates it from the Tibetan
(personal communication of Sept.14[th], 1981).

Should we then consider the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu* just to be a
sloppy and more or less unintentional substantivation of the original
adjective? Or is there more behind this seemingly clear and harmless term?
I think that its immediate context and a survey of the history of the
Buddhist attitude towards its own epistemological tradition clearly in-
dicate that this term has been created by somebody who was fully aware
of what he wanted to express by it.

At another occasion I dealt with the various modern misconceptions
regarding the problem of the development of a seemingly irreligious tra-
dition of epistemology and logic within the context of Buddhism.[10a] The
spiritual place of this tradition in Indian Buddhism has been clearly
identified by Vetter in his study of 1964, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dhar-
makīrti* (31ff.), and we need not deal with his results here in detail.
Suffice it to state, that the Buddhist philosophers and scholars whose
work represent about 700 years of the tradition in India, did certainly
not consider their work as a secular, non-religious occupation, but as
a necessary part of their kind of Buddhist belief, or - in traditional
words - as a part of the path.

This self-interpretation of the school centers around Dignāga's bene-
dictory verse mentioned above, and then particularly on the second chap-
ter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* which is a lengthy commentary on
just this verse and carries the title *pramāṇasiddhi* ("Establishment of
the means of valid cognition"). But although there has been a great em-
phasis on this chapter within the school itself until its final stage
in India, and when most of its works had already been translated into Ti-
betan, it seems that the Tibetans understood the import of that tradition
at its surface value only when in the 12th and 13th century they began
to incorporate the school's tenets and problems into their own spiritual
and cultural life. According to all that we know of this first strictly
speaking Tibetan period of the school's history - and we do not know
very much due to insufficient materials available and only a few studies
having been done so far[11] - the Tibetans seemed to consider the tradition
of epistemology and logic as a branch of the secular sciences, together
with grammar, poetics and others.

[10a] The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism. *Nanto Bukkyō 49*,
1982, 1-18.

[11] For some recent remarks of relevance cf. L.W.J.van der Kuijp, Introductory Notes to
the Pramanavarttika Based on Tibetan Sources. *The Tibet Journal 4:2*, 1979, 6-10. Cf.
also D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The Life of Buston rinpoche*, Roma 1966, 37f. (n.1).

This attitude towards the *pramāṇa*-tradition is reflected in the fact that the early Tibetan scholars who started to give their own interpretations and explanations of Dharmakīrti's works, evidently concentrated on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* – it may of course also be considered as the result of this fact. Before the Sa skya Paṇḍita's revision of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s translation in the beginning of the 13[th] century it is indeed difficult to imagine that the study of the then available Tibetan translation would make much decent sense, and van der Kuijp even thinks with good reasons, that Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge (1109-1169) did not know the *Pramāṇavārttika* at all.[12] But the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* does not deal with the religious aspects of the *pramāṇa*-theory, and it is quite uncertain whether on the basis of the study of such material, these early Tibetan scholars were in a position to be aware of the problem.[13]

According to a note in gźon nu dpal's (1392-1481) *Deb ther sṅon po* (*BA* 335), the spread of the *Pramāṇavārttika* was due to the Paṇchen and his pupil U yug pa Rigs pa'i seṅ ge (middle of the 13[th] cent.). And that the shift of interest from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* to the *Pramāṇavārttika* took place gradually, and was generally accepted only towards the beginning of the 15[th] century, can be taken from gźon nu dpal's words: "In my younger days the inmates of gSaṅ-phu used to study the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, but now-a-days they have changed over to the *Pramāṇavārttika*." (*BA* 335). Since the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is a perfectly clear and well-organized text, in fact a much maturer work of Dharmakīrti's than the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and as such quite sufficient to represent Dharmakīrti's teachings on epistemology and logic, the reason for the shift of interest to the *Pramāṇavārttika* can only lie in the latter text's, especially its second chapter's, substantial and essential discussion of the foundation of valid cognition, and thus of the Buddhist meaning of epistemology in general.

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[12] L.W.J.van der Kuijp, Phya-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory. *JIPh* 5, 1978, 357.

[13] L.W.J.van der Kuijp, who dealt with this question in his Introductory Notes ... (cf. n. 11), 6ff., mentions a number of scholars with a positive approach towards a possible religious significance of the *pramāṇa*-tradition: Sa skya mchog ldan (1428-1507), Bo doṅ pa chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1376-1451), bSod nams grags pa (1478-1554) and finally 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1721/22). There are differences among these scholars as to how the relation between the *tshad ma*-theory and the Buddhist path is accounted for, but for the very idea itself that there is such a relation, all these scholars are certainly indebted to the early dGe lugs pas and their possible predecessor(s).

It is Tson kha pa who still states in his *mDun legs ma*,[14] a kind of autobiography, that "there are many in Tibet, learned and unlearned in the *tshad ma*-texts, who unanimously say that in the Sūtra (i.e. the *PS*) and in all the Seven Treatises (of Dharmakīrti) there is no (spiritual) stage to internalize (*ñams len*) for proceeding towards enlightenment."[15] But he continues, claiming that there exists a decisive clue to the function of the *tshad ma*-tradition with regard to the Buddhist path.[16] For he says that "the meaning of the benedictory verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as an establishment of the means of valid cognition (*tshad ma grub par* = *pramāṇasiddhi*) is the establishment forwards and backwards (*lugs 'byuṅ lugs ldog*)[17] of the Venerable one as the means of valid cognition for those who strive for liberation!"[18]

Both Obermiller and Wayman, who previously referred to these lines, misunderstood the exact connotation particularly of the words "forwards and backwards" (*lugs 'byuṅ* = *anuloma*, *lugs ldog* = *pratiloma*). Tson kha pa's disciple rGyal tshab, however, gives in his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* (f.4b4-5a1 = p.14,15-16,5) a short sequence of four proofs that establish f o r w a r d s (*lugs 'byuṅ*) that the Venerable is a means of valid cognition. And then, f.5a1-4 (=p.16,5-17,3) he gives a sequence of three proofs that establish b a c k w a r d s (*lugs ldog*) how we can know that he is of such kind.[19]

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[14] Ed. and transl. by A.Wayman, Observations on Translations from the Classical Tibetan Language into European Languages. *IIJ 14*, 1972, 175-185.

[15] | *byaṅ phyogs 'di na tshad ma'i gźuṅ lugs la ||sbyaṅs daṅ ma sbyaṅs du ma mgrin gcig tu || mdo daṅ sde bdun kun la byaṅ chub tu | bgrod pa'i ñams len rim pa yod min zer ||* (Wayman, *loc.cit.* 180; also translated in Matsumoto Shirō, sTag tshaṅ pa no Tson kha pa hihan ni tsuite. *Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies 28*, 1982, 12).

[16] Wayman, *loc.cit.* 180f.: the same passage refering to the *pramāṇa*-tradition has already been interpreted by E.Obermiller, Tsoṅ-kha-pa le Pandit. *MCB 3*, 1934-35, 334f.

[17] This has been misunderstood by both, Obermiller and Wayman. The former thought that *lugs 'byuṅ lugs ldog gis* meant "par la méthode positive et négative (*anvayavyatireka*)", the latter translates "by the forward and the reverse order (of Dependent Origination), proving logically" and adds in a footnote that "Tsoṅ-kha-pa refers here to the contemplation of dependent origination as *idaṃpratyayatā*, 'state of having this as its condition (for arising)'."

[18] | *tshad ma kun las btus pa'i mchod brjod don ||tshad ma grub par lugs 'byuṅ lugs ldog gis || rnam grol don du gñer ba bcom ldan 'das || tshad mar bsgrub śiṅ ... ||* (Wayman, *loc.cit.* 181)

[19] Page-references are to the new Indian edition, Vāraṇāsi 1969. Also in Tson kha pa - rGyal tshab's *Tshad ma'i brjed byaṅ* 5b5ff. the two ways of explaining "forwards and backwards" are directly applied to the first half of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s benedictory verse, always of course with reference to Dharmakīrti's elaboration in the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Cf. also mKhas grub rje's *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* 3a3-5 and 3b6ff.

It is not necessary to show these two chains of proofs in detail. Suffice it to realize that these proofs are closely connected with the structure of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s second chapter - they are in fact a logical formulation of the essential ideas of this chapter. That such a concise formulation is possible only after a careful analysis and a scrupulous knowledge of the details of the basic text need hardly be pointed out. In other words, if Tsoṅ kha pa in his autobiography uses these methodological terms, he refers to a very complex summary of the essential arguments of the second chapter based on a careful analysis of this text. This, however, is not the result of his own work, it can only be attributed to scholars who worked on the *Pramāṇavārttika* before Tsoṅ kha pa and evidently found the latter's approval. The two methodological terms and the corresponding steps of the proofs are mentioned, in fact, already by an Indian exegetical school, since they appear in Vibhūticandra's "notes".[20]

Once the religious significance of the theory of valid cognition has been accepted - with all its corollaries, "down" to the art of disputation -, the question remains still why the dGe lugs pas talk of the Buddha as a *tshad ma'i skyes bu*.

The term itself suggests that it is related to the terminology of the "three (kinds of) persons" (*skyes bu gsum*) as it is known from the beginning of Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* (vv.3-5), and then in the whole *lam rim*-literature which later follows this text.

These three kinds of persons are: "the inferior or lesser" (*chuṅ nu, tha ma*), who pursues his own objectives in the pleasures of this world; "the mediocre or middling" (*'briṅ ba*), who turns away from worldly pleasures and sinful actions, pursuing his own quiescence; and finally "the superior" (*mchog pa*) who pursues the cessation of suffering for the other beings because of his own experience of suffering.[21]

Indeed in his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* rGyal tshab devotes a whole introductory division, the second (2b5-4a5), to - and these are the words of this heading (*sa bcad*) - "the way how the stages of the path of the three (kinds of) persons are indicated directly and indirectly"[22] in the Pramāṇa-Śāstra, particularly the *Pramāṇavārttika*. rGyal tshab takes pains in showing especially how the lowest kind of person has been referred to,

[20] *PVV*, Appendix, 521, 5-13. Cf. Kimura Toshihiko, Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi-sho ni tsuite. *Tōhoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshū 2*, 1970, 54-68 (64ff.)

[21] Cf. *Bodhipathapradīpa. Ein Lehrgedicht des Atiśa in der tibetischen Überlieferung.* Hrsg. v.H.Eimer, Wiesbaden 1978, 104ff.

[22] *skyes bu gsum gyi lam gyi rim pa dṅos śugs la ji ltar 'phaṅs pa'i tshul* (*Tshad ma'i lam khrid* 1b4 and 2b5).

since according to him it is the "middling" who is specially meant in
the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and "when reference is to the
person of authority (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*), who promotes this (middling
person), the stages of the path of the superior (person) are being taught."[23]

   In this chapter rGyal tshab, therefore, not only identifies the *tshad
ma'i skyes bu* with the *skyes bu chen po*, but clearly displays a keen in-
terest in showing that and how the teachings of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are
in accord with the religious "anthropology" of the *lam rim*-theory. He
even refers in the beginning[24] of this chapter to a discussion on whether
the inferior person was only implied by meaning (*don gyis 'phaṅs pa*) or
was actually taught (*dṅos su bstan par*) in the course of argumentation.

   There are also other indications that the purpose of this whole di-
vision is to reconcile the *tshad ma*-tradition with the *lam rim*-tradition.
E.g. when rGyal tshab feels that he has to deal with the question, where
in the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti teaches the "selflessness of the phe-
nomena" (*chos kyi bdag med*), and why he does not teach it in the second
chapter.[25] The general character of this whole division is not explana-
tory - as is the rest of the text -, but clearly apologetic. But why?
There is only one reason for such an attitude, and that is that the idea
brought forward is still a rather new one, and a not generally accepted
one.

   The apparent sign of the new system to combine the *tshad-ma*-tradition
with the path-theory seems to be the term *tshad ma'i skyes bu*. In its
unspectacular and seemingly traditional form it is the result of a flash
of genius. The simple compound word, indeed, symbolically combines two cul-
tural traditions inherited from India and separately dealt with for a
considerable period. Not only does it indicate thereby that the level of
understanding has been reached in Tibet too, on which the Indian *pramāṇa*-
tradition interpreted itself originally, it also shows that finally the
theoretical frame was found to give the strong rational tendencies in
Tibetan Buddhism a natural place within the practice of the path.

   As a final question we may ask whether it is possible to determine,
who first propounded this new theory of the *tshad ma*-teachings as being
a part of the path or - as we could call it in agreement with a title to
be found with rGyal tshab as well as with mKhas grub - this theory of a
"*tshad ma'i lam*"?

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[23] *de rjes su 'dzin pa'i tshad ma'i skyes bu'i dbaṅ du byas nas chen po'i lam rim bstan
   ciṅ ... (loc.cit. 2b6f.)*

[24] *loc.cit. 2b5f.*

[25] *loc.cit. 4a2-4.*

rGyal tshab in the postscript to his *Tshad ma'i lam khrid* mentions Red mda' ba, Blo bzań grags pa and Kun dga' dpal – in this sequence – as the ones he feels obliged to with regard to the tenets presented. Kun dga' dpal is known as one of rGyal tshab's teachers.[26] Whether he is the same as Ña dpon Kun dga' dpal,[27] who is mentioned as the author of a *Prajñā-pāramitā*-commentary and Red mda' ba's and Tsoń kha pa's teacher in this subject, I cannot say. I found no hint in the biographical literature that would relate this Kun dga' dpal to *tshad ma*-studies. Quite clear, however, seems to be that Red mda' ba gźon nu blo gros (1349–1412) played an important role in shaping the major theoretical ideas of Tsoń kha pa and his pupil rGyal tshab. Only eight years senior to Tsoń kha pa he is not only in high esteem as Tsoń kha pa's teacher in two subjects, dBu ma and Tshad ma,[28] he is also considered as one of his two most important (*gtso bo*) teachers.[29]

G.Tucci has already inferred from biographical statements and the allusions of Tsoń kha pa's disciples that "it appears that he developed and gave greater depth to ideas already elaborated by a great master, at whose school he had his training: gźon nu blo gros of Red mda'".[30] This assumption can only be corroborated by the possible conclusions from the context of the *tshad ma*-tradition. Tucci notes (*loc.cit.* 120) that the exegetical tradition which "acknowledges Logic as a fundamental part of Religion" begins with Kumāramati, i.e. gźon nu blo gros, but in his note he only refers to Stcherbatsky's meagre remarks on p.46 of his *Buddhist Logic I*. As far as I can see, no further sources of such knowledge are indicated – evidently the circle of scholars around Stcherbatsky, particularly Vostrikov and Baradijn, had access to oral or other information.

I have no reasons to doubt that this information is correct. My reasons are: It is evident that Tsoń kha pa is not the creator of the "*tshad ma'i lam*"-system. If Red mda' ba had no part in its development, Tsoń kha pa's disciples would not have acknowledged such a part. The shift from studying the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* to studying the *Pramāṇavārttika* is attested by the *Deb ther sńon po* for the first half of the 15[th] century. Red mda' ba wrote at least three works of relevance.[31] And finally – Tsoń kha pa

[26] R.Kaschewsky, *Das Leben des lamaistischen Heiligen Tsongkhapa Blo-bzań-grags-pa (1357-1419), dargestellt und erläutert anhand seiner Vita "Quellort allen Glücks".* 1.Teil, Wiesbaden 1971, 216.

[27] R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24, 83.; G.Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, Roma 1949, 119.

[28] R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24, 83f., 86, 88f.

[29] R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.* 24.

[30] Tucci, *loc.cit.* 118f.

also studied U yug pa's commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, with special emphasis on the second chapter, as noted by one biography.[32] U yug pa Rigs pa'i seṅ ge, the pupil of the Sa skya Paṇḍita, seems to have written the first Tibetan commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* in the middle of the 13[th] century, but there is nowhere a hint to be found, that Tsoṅ kha pa, besides studying it, has been particularly influenced by this explanation, which almost certainly must have been written in the secularistic mode generally attributed to the earlier Sa skya pas.

Of course, such cummulative evidence would be superflous if only we had access to one of Red mda' ba's *tshad ma*-works. It is one of the odd features of the Tibetan literary history that most of the works of one of their supposedly important and perhaps original minds are lost or forgotten, although he has been truly esteemed by the founder of the dGe lugs pa-tradition and his immediate disciples, and although as Tsoṅ kha pa's teacher and friend he has been always highly venerated – at least verbally – by this tradition until today.

The following three *tshad ma*-works of Red mda' ba are known from A khu Rinpoche's *Tho-yig*. Nr.11820: *rNam 'grel gyi spyi don* ("*The general meaning of the Pramāṇavārttika*"), Nr.11822: *rNam 'grel ṭikk, Rigs pa'i 'dod 'jo* ("*Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā, Wishing Cow of arguments*"), and Nr.11821: *rNam 'grel rgyan gyi 'grel bśad chen mo* ("*Great subcommentary on the Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra*"), i.e. Prajñākaragupta's commentary which is famous for its elaborate development of the theme of the second chapter.

None of these works seems to be extant nowadays, although not everything Red mda' ba wrote is lost. His commentaries on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, on the *Catuḥśataka*, and on the *Suhṛllekha* were recently published in India.[33] Could it be that other texts of this important Tibetan master and evidently original thinker have been kept in Sa skya pa circles? Let us hope that these works of Red mda' ba are not irretrievably lost, and will eventually be recovered and published.

Non est in verbo, quod non est in cogitatione!

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[31] The three are mentioned as rare works in the *Tho yig* of the A khu Rinpoche (Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature*, New Delhi 1963, Vol.3) as Nrs. 11820-22; Cf. below.

[32] R.Kaschewsky, *loc.cit.*, 86f.; the text mentioned there is a *rNam 'grel gyi rnam bśad rigs mdzod* which is probably no mistake as Kaschewsky thinks (note 102), but rather the same as A khu rin po che's Nr. 11814, *rNam 'grel rigs mdzod chen mo*.

[33] *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad de kho na ñid gsal ba'i sgron ma* reproduced from an example of the sDe-dge xylographic print by Ngawang Topgay, Delhi 1974. *dBu ma bźi brgya pa'i 'grel pa*. Sakya Student's Union, Sarnath 1974. *bśes pa'i spriṅs yig gi 'grel pa don gsal*. Tibetan Foundation Press, Darjeeling 1960.

Abbreviations

PV   *Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Ed. Yūsho Miyasaka. Acta Indologica 2, 1971-72, 1-206

PVT   *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (Śakyamati)

PVT$_t$ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā, Tibetan translation:* Peking Edition Nr.5718

PVV   *Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiḥ.* Ed. R.Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Patna 1938-1940

BA   George N.Roerich, *The Blue Annals.* Calcutta 1949, 1953

Postscript: János Szerb reminds me of the fact that Bu ston's teacher bSod nams mgon was also called Tshad ma'i skyes bu according to sGra tshad pa's biography which was completed in 1366 (cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, *The Life of Bu ston Rin po che.* Roma 1966, 70, 74, 146). This would qualify my attempt to pin down a first propounding of the new theory to Red mda' ba who was born only in 1349.

ON THE <u>MYAŃ 'DAS</u>

by

J.TAKASAKI (Tokyo)

1. The *Myań 'das*, i.e. *Yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo* (*Ma-hāparinirvāṇasūtra*) is an important Mahāyāna scripture famous with its doctrine of the Buddha's nature or the *tathāgatagarbha* and the eternity of the Buddha. There are two translations kept in the Tibetan Kanjur: one being of 13 *bampos* translated from a Sanskrit original, the other being of 56 *bampos* translated from Chinese materials, namely Dharmakṣema's translation of the same scripture in 40 fascicles combined with Jñāna-bhadra's translation in 2 fascicles as a kind of an annex to it.[1]

In the following I wish to give a survey on the latter, i.e. the *Myań 'das* in 56 *bampos*.

2. The *Myań 'das* in Tibetan Kanjur Catalogues

The *Myań 'das* is described in Tibetan Kanjur catalogues in the following ways:

1) *lDan dKar ma* (c.812/824 A.D.)

   (*Lalou*[2] no.249; *Yoshimura*[3] no.248)

   theg pa chen po'i mdo sde, rgya las bsgyur ba la |

   'Phags pa yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'das pa chen po, 12600 śls., 42 bps.

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[1] *Taisho Tripiṭaka*, No.374 & 377, respectively.

[2] M.Lalou, Les texts bouddhiques au temps de *Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan. JA 241*, 1953, 325.

[3] The Denkar-ma. An Oldest Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. *Indo-Daijobukkyo-shiso-kenkyu*. Kyoto 1974, vol.2, 99-199. (This article was originally published in 1950).

2) Bu ston, *Chos 'byuṅ chen mo* (IV. dKar chags) (c.1322 A.D.)
   (*Nishioka* no.368)[4]
   (VII) *theg pa chen po'i mdo sde sna tshogs la .....*
   Mya ṅan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo, rgya las bsgyur ba, 56 bps.

3) *sNar thaṅ bKa' 'gyur* (1730-32 A.D.)
   (*Takasaki* no.361, Cases.78-79)[5]
   Myaṅ 'das Ka pa (bps.1-28, le'us 1-9) & *Kha pa* (bps.29-56, le'us
   10-15)
   Myaṅ 'das chen po ..... rgya nag gi mkhan po Waṅ phab shun daṅ|
   dharma'i gźi 'dzin dGe ba'i blo gros | lo tsā ba rGya mtsho'i sde
   rnams kyis bsgyur ba .....

4) *lHa sa bKa' 'gyur*
   (*Takasaki* no.368, Cases.77-78)[6]
   Myaṅ 'das Ka pa & Kha pa.

5) *sDe dge bKa' 'gyur dKar chags*   (1733 A.D.)
   (*Tohoku* no.119)[7]   mDo, Ña & Ta.

6) *Peking Ed.*   (1724 A.D.)
   (*Otani* no.787)[8] mDò, Ju & Ñu.

7) *Co ne bKa' 'gyur*
   (*Mibu* no.790)[9]

[4] Soshū Nishioka, Index to the Catalogue Section of Bu ston's "History of Buddhism" (I). Annual Report of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Exchange, Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo, No.4, 1980, 61-92.

[5] J.Takasaki, *A Catalogue of the Lha sa Kanjur kept in the University of Tokyo* (facsimile edition), 1965 (Text number of the Narthaṅ Kanjur is given in the comparative table.) Also see, Shodo Nagashima, A catalogue of the Narthaṅ Kanjur kept in Taisho University, *Taisho Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 61*, 1975, 760-726.

[6] J.Takasaki, *ibid.*

[7] *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons*, ed. by H.Ui & others, Sendai 1934.

[8] *A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripitaka*, Otani Daigaku Library, Kyoto 1930-32.

[9] Taishun Mibu, A Comparative List of the Bkaḥ-ṅgyur Division in Co-ne, Peking, Sdedge, and Snar-thaṅ Editions. *Taisho Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 44*, Tokyo 1959, 1-69.
   In the Conference a kind information was given by Dr.G.Bethlenfalvy on the Urga Kanjur. This edition has a similar arrangement with the Derge Edition, and the *Myaṅ 'das* of 56 bps. is located in Mdo sde Na pa & Ta pa (No.119). G.Bethlenfalvy, *A Catalogue of the Urga Kanjur*, Śaka-piṭaka Series 246, New Delhi, 1980.

3. Date of Translation

There is no record on the date of translation of the *Myań 'das*. Pelliot in his article on the Catalogue of Kanjur (*JA* 1914),[10] referring to the transcription of the Chinese name of the translator Wań phab shun (Wang Fa-chouen),[a] said that the date may be before 1000 A.D. in the light of transcription *phab*, instead of *fa*, for the term signifying *dharma* or *chos*. While Sakurabe in the *Otani Catalogue*[11] indicates the identification of the name sGe ba'i blo gros with a co-translator of Atísa, who belongs to the 11th century A.D. The fact that the *Myań 'das* is mentioned in the *lDan dkar ma* may show an earlier date of its translation. Only difficulty of the identification of the *Myań 'das* in the *lDan dkar ma* with that preserved in the present Kanjur is the difference of the number of *bampos* given there. But we may construe that 42 is the number of fascicles in the original Chinese text (40+2) and that at the beginning the Tibetan translation had the same division of fascicles as the Chinese texts.[12]

4. Characteristics of the Chinese original

The original of the *Myań 'das* is, as mentioned above, a combination of Dharmakṣema's text and Jñānabhadra's one. According to biographies of Dharmakṣema,[13] he brought at the beginning the first 10 fascicles with him from India in c.412-5 A.D., but in the thought of its being incomplete, he went back to India, when he met his mother's death, and on the way back to China, he obtained at Khotan the continued portion up to fascicle 20. Afterwards he sent a messenger again to Khotan to get the re-

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[10] P.Pelliot, Notes à propos d'un catalogue de Kanjur, *JA*, Juillet-Août 1914, 130-131.

[11] *Otani Catalogue* (n.8 above), 287.

[12] According to the information given by Dr.H.Eimer, Bonn, after the Velm conference, the *Myań 'das* among the hand-written manuscripts of the Kanjur kept in the British Library in London occupies vols.98-100, and consists of 42 *bampo* (vol.98, bps.1-14, 315 folios, vol.99, bps.15-28, 318 folios; vol.100, bps.29-42, 309 folios). So the identification is mostly made sure.
   As an example of the Tibetan text translated from Chinese source which has the same fascule division with the original, we have the *rDo rje tiń ńe 'dzin gyi chos kyi yi ge*. It is however curious enough that the *Denkar ma* records this sūtra as of 6 *bampo*. (*Lalou*, No.254, in the same section as the *Myań 'das*).

[13] e.g. *Kao sêng chuan*[b], fasc.2 (*Taisho* No.2059, vol.50, 335c-337b. See Fuse Kogaku[c], *Nehan-shu no Kenkyu*[d], (Studies on the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* Sect in China), Tokyo 1942 (Reprint 1973), Vol.1, 100-138.

maining parts and finally completed the translation in 40 fascicles in
421 A.D. Later on, however, a monk come from Central Asia told him the
incompleteness of the text (probably because his translation has no scene
of the Preceptor's funeral and distributions of his relics as told
in the Hīnayāna *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*.). So he asked his sponsor Tsü
ch'ü Mêng sun,[e] the Lord of Pei leang,[f] for permission to go abroad in
search of the remaining text, but soon after started, he was killed by
subordinates of the lord who was afraid of his venerated great master's
being carried off by the strong Pei Wei power. Thus in China people be-
gan to make their efforts of seeking for this illusory text and contin-
ued until finally they were satisfied with getting Jñānabhadra's trans-
lation in two fascicles, which was brought by his disciple to the then
capital Ch'ang an[g] in c.676 A.D. and permitted by the Empress Tsê t'ien
wu hou[h] for its propagation in 695. The text was regarded as the contin-
uation of Dharmakṣema's text and was called "the latter part (hou fen)"[i]
of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*.[14]

There are however some doubts about the origin of this new text. The
text was originally found at Java where Jñānabhadra lived. Its main part
is mostly a description of the facts around the Buddha's *mahāparinirvāṇa*
as in the Pāli Canon and few Mahāyānistic ideas such as the eternity of
the Buddha's body scattered between lines. Textual continuation from the
final portion of Dharmakṣetra's text is technically not perfect. Namely
Dharmakṣema's text ends with Subhadra's attainment of arhatship, while
the beginning of the "Latter Part" starts with his getting the pure dhar-
ma eyes after attending Preceptor's teaching.[15] Tibetan translation is
quite true to follow the Chinese idea of combination of the both texts
and seems not to have noticed of this contradiction.[16]

4.2.

Furthermore another kind of mistery exists concerning Dharmakṣema's
text. Almost the same year as his completion of translation, Fa hien fin-
ished his own translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* in 6 fascicles at Chien

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[14] Fuse, *op.cit.*, 139-146.

[15] Fuse, *op.cit.*, 148-149.

[16] ... *śin tu bzaṅ po ni dgra bcom pa'i 'bras bu thob par gyur to* ‖ *de'i tse śin tu
bźan pos bcom ldan 'das las yoṅs su mya ṅan las 'das pa chen po'i chos śin tu zab
mo thos nas chos la chos kyi mig rnam par dag par gyur to* ‖ ... *de bźin gśegs pa
las rab tu 'byuṅ bar gsol to* ‖ (Peking Ed., Mdo, Nu 319a2-4).

k'ang[j] (418 A.D.)[17] This text is equivalent to the first ten fascicles of Dharmakṣema's text. Its authority was lost and replaced by the latter when the latter was brought to the Southern China in c.436 probably in the thought of the latter's being more exhaustive and having a deeper consideration on the problem of *icchantikas*. Monks in Chien k'ang made revisions of Dharmakṣema's translation and arranged the text in 36 fascicles[18] in which is utilized the detailed chapter division of Fa hien's translation.

Fa hien brought the original text directly from India, the text having been found in a house of a Brahmin at Pāṭaliputra between 404-409 A.D. Though being short, this text seems to show the original form of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* of Mahāyāna and is completed by itself. The reason for this hypothesis is that the Mahāyāna scriptures are composed not for describing the death of the Buddha, but, borrowing its scene, to express its significance in the light of the Mahāyāna doctrines, and that this purpose is enough fulfilled in Fa hien's text. At the same time, however, the expression of such ideas has no literal limitation unless it contradicts against the facts believed by the followers. In other words, there are rooms for fantasy and any continuation is possible and thus the text is open to a further expansion, but is not necessarily given an end by the death of the Buddha. In this way Dharmakṣema's text also shows a kind of completeness.

Then where was this extension of the text done? It was at least not in India proper, because another Tibetan translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* in 13 *bampo*s, which was brought to Tibet directly from India before the beginning of the 9[th] century, has the equivalent portion to Fa hien's text and is nearer to it in the contents than to Dharmakṣema's one which has a certain amount of enlargement between lines even in the first 10 fascicles. Another material to prove this fact is the fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* in the collection of Hoernle found in the Eastern Turkistan and identified by K.Watanabe. (Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature*, 93-97) It is equivalent to the passage towards the end of fasc.9 and the beginning of fasc.10 of Dharmakṣema's text,[19] where an important insertion is made by the latter

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[17] *Taisho* No.376. See Fuse, *op.cit.*, 72-81.

[18] *Taisho* No.375. See Fuse, *op.cit.*, 156-176.

[19] Equivalent to *Myan 'das*, Peking Ed. Mdo Ju 160b4-162a1.

text[20] that plays a role of the link between the former 10 fascicles and the latter 30 fascicles. (See below)

5. Characteristics of Tibetan Translation

The technical terms used in the *Myan 'das* are mostly following to the *skad gsar bcad* method. Some important terms different from those used in the text of Indian origin are as follows:

1) *sans rgyas kyi ran bźin*, for the Buddha's nature, *fu sing*[k] in the Chinese original, which is usually used for the translation of skt. *buddhadhātu*. This is suggested by the term *sans rgyas kyi khams* used in the equivalent passage in the other version.

2) *log sred can* for *icchantika*, which is usually translated into *'dod chen po*.

3) The term *tathāgatagarbha* is translated into *de bźin gśegs pa'i sñin po* as usually found in the texts of Indian origin when Dharmakṣema uses the word *ju lai ts'ang*[l] or *ju lai pi ts'ang*[m], while it is translated into *de bźin gśegs pa'i gsan ba'i sñin po* when he uses terms *ju lai wei mi ts'ang*[n] or *ju lai pi mi ts'ang*[o].

4) *rtag pa gnas pa mi 'gyur mi 'pho ba* for *ch'ang chu wu you pien i*[p], which is sometimes for *nitya*, *rtag pa*, and sometimes for *nitya-dhruva-śāśvata*, *rtag pa brtan pa ther gsug pa*.

5) *bkri ba'i don* for *neyārtha*, which is usually translated into *dran don*.

6) The following case is an example of incorrect translation.

|*thog ma yod la da ltar med* || *thog ma med la da ltar yod* |

|*dus gsum srid pa'i chos thams cad* || *de ltar bu ni ma yin no* |[21]

(*ben you jin wu   ben wu jin you*

san shin you fa   wu you shih ch'u)[q]

This verse appears in the inserted passage of Dharmakṣema's text at the beginning of fasc.10 equivalent to the Sanskrit fragment referred to a-bove. Of this the third *pada* should mean: existence of *dharma* in the three modes of time, and is to be translated into *dus gsum la ni chos yod pa*. Also in the fourth *pada*, *mi run no* would be better than *ma yin*

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[20] Equivalent to the same, Ju 161a6-161b6 (*de nas 'jam dpal gźon nur gyur pas bcom ldan 'das la 'di skad ces gsol to* || ...*tha dad pa yan ma lags par 'tshal to* ||)

[21] This verse is what I regard as the link. The same verse appears again in facs.17, 27 and 28 in Dharmakṣema's Text.

no. Chinese term *wu you shih ch'u*[r] is usually for skt. *naitad sthānam*.

6. In my first thought, I wished to make clear the reason why the *Myah 'das* of 56 *bampos* alone is separated from the other version and is treated as in independent section in some editions of Tibetan Kanjur.[22] But due to my laziness I could not find any material which answers to the question. Only Bu ston's treatment of the *Myah 'das* gives us some hint. He puts the *Myah 'das* of 56 *bampos* at the end of the group of Mahāyāna sūtras and before the *Pāli Pārittas* which was newly translated by his teacher.

In sNar than Kanjur these latter were put at the end of the *mDo pa*, that is to say, just before the *Myah 'das pa*.

Also I did not make any effort to find out how far the *Myah 'das* was used or referred to by Tibetan authors.[23] If we examine these points, we make much clear the position of the *Myah 'das* in Tibetan Buddhism.

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[22] According to the information given by Dr.H.Eimer at the Velm Conference, the *dKar chags* of the London manuscript (mentioned above n.12) makes the *Myah 'das* as an independent section (in three volumes) and puts it after the *rGyud 'bum* and *mDo* and before *Śer phyin* and others. In his opinion, another manuscript Kanjur kept in the Toyo Bunko Library (Kawaguchi Collection), Tokyo, is also to be brought into the same order because it has the same division of sections and the same number of volumes in respective section, and this arrangement of the Kanjur represents an old West Tibetan tradition. sNar than and lHa sa Editions, both having the *Myah 'das* as an independent section, seem to belong to this Western group.
On the Toyo Bunko manuscript Kanjur, see Kojun Saito, Kawaguchi Ekai-shi Shorai Toyo Bunko shozo Shahon Chibetto Daizokyo Chosa Bibo. *Taisho Daigaku Kenkyu Kiyo 63*, 1977, 406-345.

[23] Prof.D.Seyfort Ruegg informed me at the Velm Conference of the cases with Bu ston who quotes the both versions of the *Myah 'das* side by side. Cf. D.Seyfort Ruegg, *Le Traité du tathāgatagarbha de Bu ston rin chen grub*, Paris 1973.

Chinese and Japanese Characters

a   Wang Fa-chouen   王法順 or 王法淳

b   *Kao sêng chuan*   《高僧傳》

c   Fuse Kogaku   布施浩岳

d   *Nehan-shu no Kenkyu*   涅槃宗の研究

e   Tsü ch'ü Mêng sun   沮渠蒙遜

f   Pei leang   北凉

g   Ch'ang an   長安

h   Tsê t'ien wu hou   則天武后

i   *hou fen*   後分

j   Chien k'ang   建康

k   *fu sing*   佛性

l   *ju lai ts'ang*   如來藏

m   *ju lai pi ts'ang*   如來秘藏

n   *ju lai wei mi ts'ang*   如來微密藏

o   *ju lai pi mi ts'ang*   如來秘密藏

p   *ch'ang chu wu you pien i* 常住無有變易

q   *ben you jin wu   ben wu jin you   san shin you fa   wu you shih ch'u*

    本 有 今 無   本 無 今 有   三 世 有 法   無 有 是 處

r   *wu you shih ch'u*   無有是處

SOME PROBLEMS OF TEXTUAL HISTORY IN CONNECTION WITH THE TIBETAN TRANSLATIONS OF THE MADHYAMAKĀVATĀRAḤ AND ITS COMMENTARY

by

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I am afraid I am going to stick to the title of my paper very liter-
ally, and offer problems rather than solutions, problems that occured
during the translation of *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* VI,166-226. Thus the actual
instances I deal with will be restricted to chapter VI, but there is no
reason to assume that with the other chapters the situation is different.

Anybody who has ever worked with any Tibetan canonical text - I dare
say - would have very much appreciated a critical edition, but such edi-
tions exist only for rather few texts. In the case of Candrakīrti's *Ma-
dhyamakāvatāraḥ* and its *bhāṣyam* we do have the one of L. de La Vallée
Poussin (furtheron refered to as *MAv*), which is based on the Tibetan ca-
nonical edition of P to which N has been compared, as well as a non-ca-
nonical edition which he got from Stcherbatsky, and occasionally J. But
in many cases it is not clear which sources the variant readings given
by La Vallée Poussin originate from, and more material - especially D -
is available now than it was then. So, in order to constitute a somewhat
"correct" Tibetan text, even in this case one can hardly avoid using ad-
ditional sources, not only the canonical editions of N, P and D, but al-
so non-canonical editions.

Texts of great importance for the Buddhist tradition, like e.g. the
Madhyamakāvatāraḥ, have been handed down separately to the big canonical
collections from early times onward, and - D.S.Ruegg in his paper pre-
sented at the 1[st] Csoma de Körös Symposium at Mátrafüred in 1976[1] has
dealt with this matter in detail - since none of the available editions

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[1] D.S.Ruegg, The Study of Tibetan Philosophy and its Indian Sources. Notes on its His-
tory and Methods. *Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Memorial Symposium, held at Má-
trafüred, Hungary, 24-30 September 1976*. Ed. L.Ligeti, Budapest 1978, 377-391.

of the canon reach beyond the 18[th] century, these non-canonical traditions may represent a much older state of the text, and one cannot afford to neglect such editions whenever one is able to get hold of them.

What has been said for the non-canonical editions is also true for quotations within other texts, mainly in the various commentaries, especially those of early times.

Among these *Ts* offers some information beyond mere explanation of the text and variant readings: In some cases - I counted seven in chap. VI[2] - he quotes another Tibetan translation, written by Nag Tsho, sometimes clearly stating that he considers it better than the one by Pa tshab, which is extant in the canon.[3] This translation by Nag tsho is not otherwise completely unknown; the one of the *kārikā* is extant in P[4] (and most probably also in N), but not in D and C, the translation of the *bhāṣyam* has not come down to us at all.

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[2] 1. *Ts* 128a3f. *lo rnams phuṅ por spuṅs pa ni | med pa de bźin yaṅ dag par | tshogs pa 'di yaṅ blta bar bya | -* "The years do not pile up in a heap. In the same way this accumulation (of good and bad deeds?) has to be seen (in reality?)"
for *MAv* 127,6f. *lo la phuṅ spuṅs pa med | sgrub pa de yaṅ de daṅ mtshuṅs | -* "On peut parler ainsi; mais les années ne s'accumulent pas en tas: chacun l'admet. Ceci aussi est semblable à cela." (Translation of *MAv_L*, *Le Muséon 8*, 1908, 318).
   This is a quotation from a yet unidentified *sūtram* (cf. *MAv_L*, *loc.cit.* n.2), illustrating that destruction exists only as worldly convention. As no Skt. version of this verse has been found yet, *R* does not quote it at all, and the other sources give the version of *MAv*, it is only from the context that we can assume Nag tsho's translation to be better. Taking this version into consideration, La Vallée Poussin's French translation seems problematic as well as his re-translation into Skt., *siddham* for *sgrub pa*. I would suggest to assume *samudāya, samudānana* (acquisition, especially of *kuśalamūla* - cf. *BHSD*) or a similar expression for *tshogs pa*, even more so as also *yaṅ dag par sgrub pa* is recorded as a translation of *samudānana* (cf. *L.Ch.: samādānana* being an error for *samudānana* - cf. *BHSD*).
   2. *Ts* 188b3 for *MAv* 208,20 - cf. n.17.
   3. *Ts* 215b3 for *MAv* 262,15f. - cf. n.18.
   4. *Ts* 236a3ff. for *MAv* 305,4ff. - cf. p.295
   5. *Ts* 237b5 for *MAv* 306,18f. - cf. p.296
   6. *Ts* 238b6f. *... de la 'di ltar mchog tu 'dzin pa ñid med pa'i phyir daṅ | kun rdzob tu don ji lta ba bźin du bsgrubs pa'i phyir ro | -* "... because they (fire, heat etc.) are not viewed in this way (i.e. as existent) and becuase the object (of our argumentation) is duly proved according to the relative reality" for *MAv* 308,14ff. *... de la źes bya ba 'dis mchog tu 'dzin pa'i dṅos po med pa'i phyir la | kun rdzob tu rnam pa de lta bu'i don bstan pa'i phyir te | -* "... because by (the expression) 'with them' a judgment (of them as existent) is note (made) and because an object of that kind has been taught according to the relative reality." - cf. *WSTB 5*, Anm.163.
   7. *Ts* 245a6 for *MAv* 339,19 and 340,1 (VI, 222 b,d) - cf. n.17.

[3] P 5263 (vol.98), D 3862 (vol. Dbu ma 7), N dBu ma 'a 226a5-415a2, C dBu ma 'a 217a1-349b2.

[4] P 5261 (vol.98).

For constituting the canonical text of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* this translation by Nag tsho seems to be irrelevant, since from a strictly tibetological point of view it could be considered a different text. It is true, its importance is mainly in order to understand Candrakīrti's original, as in some cases it really does - as stated by bTsoṅ kha pa - offer a better version.

But this does not necessarily mean that Pa tshab's translation had been incorrect in its original form. It could also hint at some fault in the tradition of the text, and although it does not help directly to reconstruct it, at least it can show that originally Pa tshab's translation must have been different, even if none of the sources based upon this version show any essential divergence.

The most striking of these cases is the *bhāṣyam* to VI,182ab: *ther zug gnas pa ma yin daṅ | 'jig pa ma yin ñid kyi phyir*, said as reason for emptiness. This is the usual formulation to be found in the Prajñāpāramitā-texts. In Pa tshab's translation this is explained as follows: *ther zug tu gnas pa ma yin pa ñid ni raṅ bźin mi 'dor ba la bya'o* (*MAv* 305, 4f.) - "Unchangeability is called a nature that does not alter", taking *ther zug tu gnas pa* as "changeable". And for pāda b: *de yaṅ dus cuṅ zad cig gnas nas ldog par yaṅ 'gyur bas 'jig pa ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir źes gzuṅs so* (*MAv* 305,5ff.) - "Because even these (senses) change again after having stayed a little while, it is said: 'because of the not being destroyed'."

Not counting the fact that this explanation of pāda b does not make any sense at all, according to this version the dharmas would be empty because they do not change and are not destroyed - i.e. they are eternal.

Nag tsho, on the other hand, explains *ther zug tu gnas pa* as "unchangeable" (*ther zug ni ñams pa med pa'i ṅo bo la brjod la ... Ts 263a3f.*). And the commentary on pāda b reads in his version: *... mig sogs de yaṅ dus su cuṅ zad gnas nas | de'i 'og tu ldog pa'i 'jig par bden nam sñam pa 'gog pa la 'jig pa ma yin kyi phyir | źes gsuṅs so* (*Ts* 236a4f.) - "... he negates the question: 'Is it true that even sight etc., after having stayed a little in (their) time, are destroyed later by way of contrast (?) ?' and says: 'because of the not being destroyed'."

According to this version the reason for emptiness is the "being neither unchanged nor destroyed", which actually makes much more sense.

In fact the term *ther zug to gnas (kūṭastha)* is used in both meanings in the literature, (a) as unchangeable, eternal, and (b) as changeable, bound to causality, due to the double meaning of *kūṭa* - mountain, summit, and heap, accumulation. Candrakīrti himself uses the term in the

first meaning, and Pa tshab's translation - at least in the form it has come down to us - is wrong in this case.[5]

But if one takes into consideration that Pa tshab is famous not only as a translator, but also as a teacher of Madhyamaka, who made the works of Candrakīrti known in Tibet and taught Madhyamaka primarly by means of these works,[6] it is hardly believable that he misunderstood Candrakīrti that essentially, misunderstanding even the concept of emptiness. I would rather assume that this part of the version handed down in the canon was totally corrupt even at bTson kha pa's time.

Another example: *MAv* 306,18f., within a quotation from the *Ratnameghasūtram*[7], reads: ... *don dam pa ni de bźin gśegs pa rnams byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ ma byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ ste*. This sentence looks a little strange and does not quite correspond to the sūtram, but could nevertheless be translated by "... the absolute reality is the Tathāgatas, regardless whether they have appeared or not." But bTson kha pa quotes, as a better version, the translation of Nag tsho, which corresponds to the sūtram not literally, but in meaning.[8] Thus one could conclude that the text of *MAv* can simply be replaced by that of the sūtram, which reads: *don dam pa ni ... mi 'jigs pa ste* - "The absolute reality is not destroyed, regardless ..." and that here, too, we have an old fault of tradition rather than a diverging quotation of the sūtram by Candrakīrti or a faulty translation by Pa tshab.

But this second translation also poses a number of questions. With regard to this translation of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*, which Nag tsho did together with the Indian *paṇḍit* Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita, some facts have to be noted:
a) The translation of the *kārikā* is extant in P and (most probably) N.
b) It was revised by Pa tshab Ñi ma grags and Tilakakalaśa, i.e. by the authors of the translation of the canonical version.
c) It is the basis for *R*.
d) Occasionally it is quoted in *Ts*.

Now let us take closer look at these facts. La Vallée Poussin has stated in the preface to his edition that Nag tsho's translation of the *kārikā* differs from that of Pa tshab by the number of syllables. At least

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[5] cf. *WSTB* 5, Anm.133.

[6] cf. *Blue Annals* I, 341ff.

[7] P 897, 105b3-7.

[8] *Ts* 237b5 ... *ma byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ don dam pa ni ñams pa med pa yin pas* ...

for chap.VI this is not true of all the verses. A great number of them
are practically identical in both translations, except for minor vari-
ants; others differ either in the number of syllables or - to varying
degrees - in substance,[9] and some of them do so in both respects. Five
verses show a different number of pādas. But this could be explained as
mistake of some writer or wood-carver, even more so as only once is the
divergence confirmed by *R*. Dropping a pāda, taking in a prose-sentence
or the quotation of a previous verse from the *bhāṣyam* or repeating a
line from the preceding verse does not seem very extraordinary.[10]

Now it is striking that the more or less identical verses and the
diverging ones are not irregularly distributed. Substantially important
passages, e.g. the discussion of the two truths, the refutation of the
Yogācāra-doctrine of perception without exteriour object, the discussion
of *pratītyasamutpāda* or the various kinds of emptiness, show relatively
few differences, the most and the strongest being in introductory pas-
sages, summaries or elaborate examples, even though the change from iden-
tical to differing verses does not correspond exactly to the systematic
divisions.

As Nag tsho's translation was revised by Pa tshab, the presumption
lies at hand that the identity of some verses in both versions is due to

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[9] The following examples I have picked rather at random. The versions of Pa tshab are
quoted according to *MAv*, regardless of any possible variant readings.
v.16b-d
Pa tshab: *sa lu'i myu gu skyed par byed par 'dod min nus ldan min |*
           | rgyud gcig khoṅs su gtogs min 'dra ba ma yin ñid de bźin |
           | sa lu'i sa bon yaṅ ni de yi min te gźan ñid phyir |
Nag tsho: *nub (R: nus) pa med daṅ rgyud gcig min daṅ 'dra ba min pa dag |*
           | sa (R: sā) lu'i myu gu (R: gu'i) skyed byed min par 'dod pas (R: pa) de
           *   bźin du |*
           | sa (R: sā) lu'i sa bon ñid kyaṅ de bźin ñid gźan ñid phyir |
v.143a-c
Pa tshab: *bdag ni gzugs ldan mi 'dod gaṅ phyir bdag |*
           | yod min de phyir ldan don sbyor ba med |
           | gźan na gnag ldan gźan min gzugs ldan na |
Nag tsho: *bdag ni gzugs daṅ ldan min med ba'i phyir |*
           | de phyir (R: om) ldan don sbyor ba med pa can (R: med de ba can daṅ) |
           | gzugs can tha dad tha dad min brjod la |

[10] v.42: 5 pādas; d (according to *K*) *mthoṅ gi dṅos gźan rnam par ma yin thar* is a re-
    petition of v.41c;
v.171: 5 pādas; c *gñis po spaṅs nas rtog pa gźan yaṅ yod ma yin* is the quotation of
    v.169d (*MAv* 293,2f.); this divergence is confirmed by *R*;
v.185: 3 pādas; c (according to *MAv*) is missing;
v.186: 3 pādas; d is missing;
v.206: 6 pādas; cd *mya ñan 'das par 'gro phyir ro || 'ga' la'aṅ chags pa med phyir ro*
    correspond roughly to the prose-sentence *MAv* 318,1f. *mya ñan las 'das par*
    bgrod pa'i phyir 'ga' la yaṅ chags pa med pa'i phyir ro.

Pa tshab's corrections. This again could mean that he did not go through
the whole of Nag tsho's translation carefully, but merely chose those
parts he considered to be most important. If this assumption is true at
all, could it be a hint towards the way a Tibetan revisor usually worked?

Comparing *K* with the verses quoted in *R* it becomes obvious that Red
mda' ba used this translation as a basis for his commentary. But still
there are some instances where he clearly follows Pa tshab. Only once
does he take a whole verse from this translation,[11] but several times he
uses a certain phrasing or wording that is obviously Pa tshab's.[12] This
shows that he knows both versions very well, and in verses that do not
show too great divergences, Red mda' ba's occasionally quoting parts from
Pa tshab could be explained easily as an involuntary contamination of the
two traditions. But there are cases where this is hard to believe - trust-
ing that a scholar like Red mda' ba knows his texts by heart well enough.
In v.137 e.g. he takes half of the verse from Nag tsho and the other
half from Pa tshab.[13] In cases like this I would assume - although I am
aware of the fact that this is highly hypothetical - that he tacitly
takes from Pa tshab those parts he considered a better translation than
Nag tsho's, whose version he prefers as a whole.

[11] v.111
   Pa tshab, R: *mo gśam bu la raṅ gi bdag ñid kyis |*
                  | skye ba de ñid du med 'jig rten du'aṅ |
                  | yod min de bźin dṅos 'di (R:'dir) kun ṅo bo |
                  | ñid kyis 'jig rten de ñid du ma skyes |
   Nag tsho: *mo gśam bu la raṅ bźin skye ba ni |*
                  | de ñid du med 'jig rten du yaṅ med |
                  | de bźin dṅos kun raṅ bźin gyis skye ba |
                  | de ñid du med 'jig rten du yaṅ med |

[12] E.g.: v.113a *bum ... de ñid du med ciṅ | : ji ltar bum ... de ñid du |*
           b *'jig rten ... yod ji bźin | : med ciṅ 'jig rten ... yod |*
      v.124d *rig min : mi śes*
      v.217c *ther zug gnas min 'jig min pas | : ther zug gnas daṅ 'jig min pas |*
      v.220a *mdor bsdus na ni dṅos med par (MAv: pa) | : mdor na dṅos po med pa ni |*

[13] Pa tshab: *len po raṅ ñer len gcig rigs dṅos min |*
               | de lta na las byed po gcig ñid 'gyur |
               | byed po med las yod sñam blo yin na |
               | ma yin gaṅ phyir byed po med las med |
   Nag tsho: *ñe bar len po blaṅs bya dṅos gcig tu |*
               | mi rigs las daṅ byed po gcig 'gyur phyir |
               | byed po med la las ni yod ce na |
               | ma yin byed pa med las min phyir ro |
   R: *ñe bar len po blaṅs bya dṅos gcig tu |*
               | mi rigs las daṅ byed po gcig 'gyur phyir |
               | byed po med las yod sñam blo yin na |
               | ma yin gaṅ phyir byed po med las med |

So far my observations are based upon the *kārikā* only. I am unable to decide tho what extent the same is true also for the *bhāṣyam*, as it is characteristic for *R*, our only source for Nag tsho's translation of the *bhāṣyam*, that it often only paraphrases the text, and even where it gives quotations, they are not always indicated as such, which makes it almost impossible to recognize passages strongly diverging from Pa tshab. Furthermore Red mda' ba usually does not comment upon texts quoted in the *bhāṣyam* or upon parts of the *bhāṣyam* he seemingly thinks to be selfevident.

bTsoṅ kha pa, too, uses both translations for his commentary, but he prefers Pa tshab's version in general and quotes Nag tsho only occasionally as the better translation, and he is kind enough to indicate these passages clearly.

But these quotations do not only occasionally offer better versions of the text,[14] they also cause some problems. First of all it is very disappointing that in none of the seven cases where bTsoṅ kha pa quotes Nag tsho in chap.VI, is this version confirmed by *R*. Either the divergencies are within texts quoted in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam* – they are either completely missing in *R*, or, at one occasion, they correspond to Pa tshab's version; or they are within parts of the *bhāṣyam* either not explained in *R* at all or only paraphrased.[15] bTsoṅ kha pa only once quotes part of a verse from Nag tsho's translation. This is the most mysterious case, as the version given by bTsoṅ kha pa is confirmed neither by *R* nor by Nag tsho's translation of the *kārikā* extant in the canon, which both correspond - except for minor variants - to Pa tshab's version.[16]

Secondly it is not always clear for what reason bTsoṅ kha pa quotes Nag tsho, as occasionally his version is obviously not to be preferred. E.g. within the quotation of Haribhadra's *ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaḥ* v.82 (*MAv* 208,17ff.) Nag thso's version does not only make no sense in the given

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[14] E.g. *Ts* 236a3ff. for *MAv* 305,4ff.; *Ts* 237b5 for *MAv* 306,18f. - cf. pp.295 and 296.

[15] cf. n.3.

[16] v.222

Pa tshab; *R*; *K*:   saṅs rgyas rnams ni byuṅ (*K*: 'byuṅ) ba 'am |
              | ma byuṅ yaṅ ruṅ (*K*, *R*: ruṅ ste) dṅos su na |
              | dṅos po kun gyi (*R*: gyis) stoṅ pa ñid |
              | gźan gyi dṅos por rab tu bsgrags |

Nag tsho (according to *Ts* 245a6):
              saṅs rgyas rnams ni byuṅ ba 'am |
              | ma byuṅ yaṅ ni raṅ bźin ñid |
              | dṅos po kun gyi stoṅ ba ñid |
              | gźan gyi ṅo bo stoṅ par bsgrags |
cf. *WSTB* 5, Anm.494.

context, it also contradicts the Skt. version of the quoted text.[17] In
this case it is not even clear whether bTson kha pa thinks Nag tsho's
translation to be better, as the usual *zes bsgyur ba legs so* or a simi-
lar expression is missing. - So, if he does not, why does he quote it at
all, and if he does, for what reason?

Regarding a quotation from the *Pitāputrasamāgama-Sūtram* (*MAv* 262,15f.)
bTson kha pa explicitly states that he thinks Nag tsho's translation to
be preferable, but for obscure reasons. Red mda' ba quotes this passage
according to Pa tshab's version, the sūtram itself as well as the quo-
tation of the same passage in *BCAP* and *Śikṣ* - both texts as well in Skt.
as in Tib. - and a parallel passage in *MN*, they all back Pa tshab's ver-
sion in general. Only a minor variant - though not really necessary -
could be justified.[18] The questions remain unanswered: Why does bTson
kha pa prefer this translation? And: Where is it from? Is it possible
that he could have used a completely different version of Nag tsho's
translation than Red mda' ba, his teacher? Or is it one of those (hypo-
thetical) cases, where Red mda' ba tacitly adopts Pa tshab's version,

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[17] Pa tshab: *mdzes ma legs par spyod ciṅ bza' bar gyis* |
      | *lus mchog 'das gaṅ de khyod la mi 'byuṅ* |
      | *lus 'di tshogs par gyur pa tsam źig ste* |
      | *'jigs ma soṅ ba ldog par mi 'gyur ro* |

"Oh beautiful one, eat and drink!
Oh fairlimbed one *(varagātri)*, what has passed is not yours (any longer).
This body is nothing but an aggregate;
oh faint-hearted one, what has passed does not return."
According to *Ts* 188b3 Nag tsho translates pāda d as follows:
'das pa'i 'jig pa 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ma yin - "a gone fear does not arise (again)".
But the Skt. version (*ŚDS* v.82c) leaves no doubt that this translation is wrong:
na hi bhīru gataṃ nivartate - *bhīru* being clearly a vocative singular of *bhīruḥ*
(a fearful female).

[18] Pa tshab (*MAv* 262,15f.); *R* 220,2: ... *khams drug daṅ* | *reg pa'i skye mced drug daṅ*
yid kyi ñe bar rgyu ba bco brgyad do - "(A person consists of) the six elements
(dhātu), the six spheres of contact *(sparśāyatana)* and the 18 spheres of mental acti-
vity *(manopavicāra)*." Nag tsho (*TS* 215b3): *khams drug 'dus pa* | *reg pa'i gźi drug
pa* | *yid kyi ñe bar spyod pa bco brgyad pa'o*.
The expression *khams drug 'dus pa* is unclear. Even if one reads *'dus te reg pa*
(saṃsparśa) instead of *'dus pa* | *reg pa*, I cannot see any reason for preferring this
version:
PPS 145b8f: ... *khams drug pa* | *reg pa'i skye mced drug pa* | *yid kyi ñe bar spyod pa*
bco brgyad ste;
BCAP 508,7ff.; *Śikṣ* 244.11f.: *ṣaḍdhātur* ... *ṣaṭsparśāyatanaḥ aṣṭādaśamanovicāraḥ*;
*BCAP*ₜᵢᵦ 279b8f.; *Śikṣ*ₜᵢᵦ 157b1 give the version of *MAv* with the following variant
reading: *BCAP*ₜᵢᵦ *ñe bar 'khor ba*, *Śikṣ*ₜᵢᵦ *ñe bar spyod pa*: *ñe bar rgyu ba*; *MN* III.
239,10f.: *chadhāturo* ... *chaphassāyatano aṭṭhādasamanopavicāro* ...
Only the change from *ñe bar rgyu bar* into *ñe bar spyod pa* could be justified.
Although both terms are possible translations for *upavicāra*, *ñe bar spyod pa* seems
to be the more common one. It is confirmed by *PPS* and *Śikṣ*ₜᵢᵦ and to some extent also
by *J* 307a5, although the expression has obviously been misunderstood and changed into
ñe bar loṅs pa (*upayabhoga*).

and bTsoṅ kha pa simply does not share his opinion concerning the correctness of the two versions?

I am unable to answer these questions, and I doubt whether it will be possible to answer them in the future. And - I would like to add - although it might be very interesting to find all these answers, it is not really important in this particular case.

In general the importance of bTsoṅ kha pa's quotation of Nag tsho's version as well as Red mda' ba's deviations from it lies rather in the fact t h a t t h e y d o e x i s t , not so much in the reason for their existence. They have to serve as a sign of warning.

a)   Within bTsoṅ kha pa's vast literature on Madhyamaka and his frequent quotations from the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ*, divergencies from the canonical text need not necessarily be due to slips in memory, mishearings or similar shortcomings, but might also have their origin in this second Tibetan translation.

b)   After bTsoṅ kha pa, Nag tsho's translation seems to have been forgotten. At least to my knowledge it has not been used any more in later times. All the same the possibility cannot be excluded altogether that also in later quotations from the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* there occur variant readings that originate from the use of this different tradition, maybe not in its pure form, but contaminated with others, based e.g. on texts of bTsoṅ kha pa or Red mda' ba, where the two traditions are already mixed.

Although the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* is doubtlessly a text of great importance for the Buddhist tradition, as such it is by no means unique. What is true for the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* might very well be true for other texts of similar importance and with a similar textual situation as well, and with them, too, we have to consider the possibility of two or even more Tibetan translations - in some cases we know about them, regardless of whether we know the translations themselves or not - which occasionally were contaminated in later times.

Even if one is unable to decide where certain variants originate from and which one is to be preferred and is closer to the original in a particular instance, at least one might be able to recognize that one d o e s n o t k n o w, and not mistake a possible different tradition for a faulty one.

I said in the beginning that I am going to offer questions rather than answers; so, for the time being, this possibility - which might turn out to be a necessity in some cases - of asking more questions will have to serve as an answer. Maybe it really can do so, as to questions not put forward there will never an answer be found.

Abbreviations

BCAP   *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā.- Bodhicaryāvatara by Śāntideva with*
            the Commentary of Prajñākaramati. Ed. by L. de La Vallée Pous-
            sin, Calcutta 1901-1914

BCAP$_{tib}$ *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (Prajñākaramati). P 5273 (vol.100)

BHSD   *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary,* by F.Edgerton.
            Vol.II: Dictionary. New Haven 1953

Blue Annals   *The Blue Annals,* by G.N.Roerich. 2 vols., Calcutta 1949
            und 1953

C   Edition of Cone

D   Edition of Derge = *Sde dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Bstan ḥgyur -*
            preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Ed.
            J.Takasaki, Z.Yamaguchi, Y.Ejima, Tokyo 1977 -

J   Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā.* P 5271 (vol.99)

K   *Madhyamakāvatārakārikā* (Candrakīrti). Translated by Kṛṣṇapaṇḍi-
            ta and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba. P 5261 (vol.98)

L.Ch.   Lokesh Chandra, *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, based on a close*
            comparative study of Sanskrit originals and Tibetan translations
            of several texts. 2 vols., Reprinted from the First Edition,
            New Delhi 1961. Kyoto 1976

MAv   *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ.- Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traducti-*
            on Tibétaine. Ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, St.-Pétersbourg 1907-
            1912

MAv$_L$ L. de La Vallée Poussin, Madhyamakāvatāra. Introduction au
            Traité du Milieu de l'Ācārya Candrakīrti avec le Commentaire
            de l'Auteur, traduit d'après la version tibétaine. *Le Muséon*
            N.S.8, 1907, 249-317; *10,* 1911, 271-358; *11,* 1912, 236-328

MN   *Majjhimanikāya.- The Majjhima Nikāya.* Ed. V.Trenckner (vol.I),
            R.Chalmers (vols.II, III), London (Pali Text Society) Reprint
            1948 and 1951

N   Edition of Narthang

P   Edition of Peking = *The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Re-*
            printed under the supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto.
            Ed. D.T.Suzuki, 168 vols, Tokyo and Kyoto 1955-1961

PPS   *Pitāputrasamāgama-Sūtram.* P 760(16)   (vol.23)

R   Red mda' ba gźon nu blo gros, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rnam bśad,*
           De kho na ñid gsal ba'i sgron ma. Ed. by Ngawang Topgay, Del-
           hi 1974

ṢDS   *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaḥ.- Shaḍdarśana-Samuchchaya by Haribhadra*
           with Guṇaratna's Commentary Tarkarahasya-Dīpikā. Ed. L.Suali,
           Calcutta 1905

Śikṣ   *Śikṣāmuccayaḥ.- Çikshāsamuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist*
           Teachings, Compiled by Çāntideva chiefly from earlier Mahā-
           yāna Sūtras. Ed. C.Bendall, St.-Pétersbourg (1897-)1902

Śikṣ_{tib} *Śikṣāmuccayaḥ* (Śāntideva). P 5336 (vol.102)

Ts   bTsoṅ kha pa, *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i rgya cher bśad pa, dGoṅs pa*
           rab gsal. P 6143 (vol.154)

WSTB 5   H.Tauscher, *Candrakīrti - Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāva-*
           tārabhāṣyam (Kapitel VI, Vers 166-226). Wien (Wiener Studien
           zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 5) 1981

THE "NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" ARGUMENT FOR ŚŪNYATĀ, AND ITS TIBETAN INTERPRETATIONS

by

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Opening remarks

Arguments as to whether the self is one with or different from the aggregates (*skandha*) abound in such Mādhyamika literature as the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and numerous other texts.[1] They do constitute a variety of the "neither one nor many" argument (*ekānekaviyoga-hetu; gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs*), but one which will not be my primary focus of interest in this paper. What I shall mainly deal with is rather the type of argument which Tsoṅ kha pa, rGyal tshab rje and Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan term "the neither one nor many argument", and which finds its classic exposition in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*.[2]

Śāntarakṣita's version of the argument differs from the first variety in that it uses "oneness" (*ekatva; gcig*) and "manyness" (*anekatva; du ma* or *tha dad*) in what a modern logician would term a one-place or monadic sense of the form Fx, whereas the first sort involves a two-place or dyadic relation Fxy.[3] Less technically, Śāntarakṣita is asking whether a certain phenomenon is one thing or many different things, where these predicates simply show a quality. The self-aggregate arguments speak about "... is one (identical) with..." or "...is different from...", thus involving a relation. (Note that in what follows I will often follow Ka-

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[1] cf. *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 124 and 127, also VI, 150: *phuṅ las gźan min phuṅ po'i ṅo bo min* "[The self] is not other than the aggregates, nor is it of the nature of the aggregates".

[2] It would be a mistake however, to think that this form of the argument was confined to Mādhyamika-svātantrikas. Prāsaṅgikas like Atīśa and others also made use of it. cf. *Bodhipathapradīpa* 276b7: *yaṅ ni chos rnams thams cad dag | gcig daṅ du mas rnam dpyad na | ṅo bo ñid ni mi dmigs pas | raṅ bźin med pa ñid du ṅes |*

[3] cf. for example A.Grzegorczyk, *Outline of Mathematical Logic*, 3-5, or B.Mates, *Elementary Logic*, 36-37.

malaśīla's advice and use "difference" (*tha dad*) instead of "manyness" (*du ma*).[4] Similarly, context will often dictate that I use "identity" instead of the clumsy "oneness", although here the Tibetan correspondent simply remains *gcig*. In the dyadic relational sense I shall use "...is different from..." (...*daṅ tha dad*) and "...is identical with...". The important thing to remember is that the switch from "manyness" to "difference" is one which Indian and Tibetan authors found perfectly natural).

The heart of the paper consists in a quote from Tsoṅ kha pa which is an attempt to summarize Śāntarakṣita's argumentation. Tsoṅ kha pa explains the impossibility of oneness (i.e. the monadic sense) by showing that all phenomena must have parts (*cha śas*), and that the parts cannot be one with their part-holders (*cha can*), nor different from them. Thus on Tsoṅ kha pa's account, Śāntarakṣita's argument works only if it makes use of considerations involving the dyadic relational sense, in particular those which I have numbered points (3) and (4) below.

Tsoṅ kha pa's account is taken up by rGyal tshab rje in *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* and by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his textbook (*yig cha*) on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, the *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don*;[5] it can be said to constitute a major strand in the prevailing dGe lugs pa interpretation. I shall argue that it seems to be a fair resume of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views. The last half of the paper will consist of a point by point analysis of Tsoṅ kha pa's arguments concerning parts and part-holders, and will necessitate a brief excursion into *Pramāṇa* texts to better understand the concepts of identity and relatedness involved in these arguments.

The Indian and Tibetan Formulations of the Argument Compared

Here, then, is *kārikā* No.1 of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*:

> Entities as asserted by ourselves and others, in reality have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness. Thus, they are without own-being (*svabhāva; raṅ bźin*), like a reflection.[6]

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[4] *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, 89a: *cig śos źes bya ba ni du ma ñid de tha dad ñid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go*

[5] *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* 13a-14a; *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* 24a-27a.

[6] *niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat* cited in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 173, 17-18. The Peking bsTan'gyur 5284, 48b gives:

rGyal tshab rje transforms *kārikā* N.1 into the following *parārthānumāna* (*gźan don rjes dpag*):

> Whatever is not established as being truly (*bden pa*) one or
> many is not truly existent (*bden par med*), like a reflection.
> The bases (*gźi*), paths (*lam*), and aspects (*rnam pa*) are not
> established as being truly one or many.[7]

Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan follows rGyal-tshab-rje's formulation, but gives a *hetu*-argument (*rtags sbyor*):

> Let the subject (*chos can*) be the bases, paths, and aspects;
> they are not truly existent because they are neither truly
> one nor truly many.[8]

The major difference between Śāntarakṣita's and the Tibetan formulations – apart from differing logical forms – is that the subject (*dharmin*; *chos can*) is no longer entities as asserted by ourselves and others, but rather the bases, paths, and aspects, or in other words, persons, the *śrāvaka*, *pratyeka*, and *bodhisattva* paths, and all *dharmas*. rGyal tshab and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan are commenting on the hommage (*mchod rjod*) of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*; in particular, they are expanding on a line in the *Sphuṭārthā* in which Haribhadra describes the difference between the dull (*dbaṅ po rtul po*) and the intelligent approach to understanding the three wisdoms (*mkhyen pa gsum*) mentioned in *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*'s hommage, viz. the knowledge of the bases (*vastujñāna*; *gźi śes*), the knowledge of the paths (*mārgajñāna*; *lam śes*), and omniscience (*sarvā-*

> bdag daṅ gźan smra'i dṅos 'di dag
> yaṅ dag tu na gcig pa daṅ
> du ma'i raṅ bźin bral ba'i phyir
> raṅ bźin med de gzugs brñan bźin

A curious discrepancy is that *raṅ bźin med* (*niḥsvabhāva*) in the last line of *kārikā* 1, is changed to *bden par med* by both rGyal tshab rje and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in their formulations of the argument; Chos kyi rgyal mtshan even misquotes Śāntarakṣita and substitutes '*bden par med* for *raṅ bźin med* in *kārikā* 1. Tsoṅ kha pa, in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, does not usually employ *bden par med*, but rather *don dam par raṅ bźin med* ("ultimately without own-being"). It may very well be that rGyal tshab rje wished to avoid jeopardizing the view *tha sñad du raṅ bźin yod pa* ("conventionally, there is ownbeing") – a position which dGe lugs pa attribute to the Svātantrikas. As a result he chose a completely different term, *bden par med* instead of *don dam par raṅ bźin med pa*.

[7] *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan*, 13a

[8] *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don*, 25a

kārajñatā; rnam mkhyen).[9] The intelligent disciple uses the "neither one nor many" argument to arrive at the conclusion that these three wisdoms, which perceive the voidness of the bases etc., are justified and attainable because the objects of these wisdoms do in fact lack any true existence.

Tsoṅ kha pa on Śāntarakṣita

In the *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po* we find the following summary of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* argumentation:

> He first shows that those entities as accepted by ourselves and others cannot be partless (*cha med*) in the sense of not having many parts, whether these parts consist in temporal stages, [physical] parts of an object, or aspects (*rnam pa*) of the object of consciousness. Now suppose something is established as having many parts. Conventionally, it is certainly not contradictory for one phenomenon (*dharma*) to be of the nature (*bdag ñid*) of many parts. But in terms of ultimate establishment, if the parts (*cha*) and part-holder (*cha can*) were essentially different (*ṅo bo tha dad*), then they would be unrelated other objects (*'brel med don gźan*). Moreover, if they were essentially identical (*ṅo bo gcig*), then the various parts would have to be identical, and the part-holders would have to be many. Thus having shown these absurdities, he [i.e. Śāntarakṣita] refutes ultimate phenomena.[10]

We can sum up Tsoṅ kha pa's presentation as follows:

(1) all entities have parts, be they temporal parts, physical parts or aspects.

(2) if an entity is ultimately established (truly existent), its parts are either truly essentially identical with, or essentially different

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[9] Haribhadra, *Spuṭārthā*, 94a:
Chos kyi rjes su 'braṅ ba rnams kyaṅ gcig daṅ du ma'i ṅo bo
ñid daṅ bral ba'i phyir źes bya ba la sogs pa'i tshad mas
gźi daṅ lam daṅ rnam pa skye ba med pa yoṅs su śes pa...
"Followers of the *Dharma*, however, understand that the bases, paths, and aspects are unignorated. They understand this by means of various *pramāṇas* to the effect that these [bases etc.] have neither the nature of oneness nor that of manyness." Cf. also *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don*, 20b. For the definitions of the three wisdoms, see *Don bdun cu*, 1b-2a.

[10] *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po*, 137.

from their part-holders.[11]

(3) if the parts were truly essentially one with their part-holder, then either the parts would all be identical or there would be many part-holders. Thus, this alternative is absurd.

(4) if the parts were truly essentially different from the part-holder, then they would be unrelated with the part-holder. Also absurd.

(5) therefore, entities are not ultimately established (truly existent).

How well does Tsoṅ kha pa account for the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*'s arguments? Methodological considerations

Let us first examine points (1) - (4) in more detail.

(1) It seems to be a fair characterization of Śāntarakṣita's enterprise to say that much of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* argumentation is simply to show that entities have parts, where "parts" is understood as temporal stages, physical parts or aspects. lCaṅ skya rol pa'i rdc rje explains that pointing out the existence of temporal stages is used to refute "*prakṛti, puruṣa, Īśvara* and the permanent *ātman* etc., as well as the Vaibhāṣikas' three unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) permanent entities". These were all accepted by their proponents as being partlessly single entities (*cha med pa'i gcig pa*). Showing physical parts is directed against "gross (*rags pa*) physical objects such as vases etc., as well as partless subtle atoms". Pointing out aspects of the objects of consciousness is directed against "consciousness as asserted by the five Outsider traditions, the two Buddhist traditions which assert objects [i.e. Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika], and the two Cittamātra schools [Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda]."[12] One can consult M.Ichigō's *Synopses of the Madhyamakā-laṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita*, as well as rGyal tshab rje's *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ* to verify which *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* verses refute which traditions; suffice to say here that Tsoṅ kha pa as viewed through lCaṅ skya seems to give an elegantly simple and accurate classificational scheme in speaking of temporal stages, physical parts and aspects.

A more difficult point is to what degree the various traditions under attack by Śāntarakṣita understood "one" to mean "partlessly one"

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[11] Tsoṅ kha pa in *Draṅ ṅes legs bśad sñiṅ po* and other texts, such as *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, repeatedly stresses that conventionally, one can and should say that parts and part-holders are essentially identical. It is from the point of view of ultimate truth that the problems would arise. Cf. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* 40.

[12] *Grub mtha' thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan* 390-391.

(*cha med pa'i gcig pa*). Kamalaśīla, in the *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*,
makes the blanket statement that the word "oneness" in *kārikā* 1 means
"partlessness" (*cha med pa ñid*).[13] While it seems true that many Hindu
and Buddhist schools held partlessness as a necessary property of cer-
tain entites, it seems farfetched to think that all the traditions under
Śāntarakṣita's scrutiny, themselves, m e a n t "partlessness" by the word
"oneness". If that were the case, then all refutations of oneness would
simply consist in pointing out that a thing had parts. There would be
no need to establish an entailment (*khyab pa*) between "having parts"
(*cha bcas*) and "not being truly one", a point which Chos kyi rgyal mtshan
and rGyal tshab rje find necessary to justify and difficult to under-
stand.[14] Ultimately, the explanation may be that Kamalaśīla just presup-
posed the absurdity of the part-whole relation, and thus thought that
"in reality one" could only mean partlessness.

(2) Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla both stress that oneness and many-
ness are mutually exclusive (*phan tsun spaṅ 'gal*), with no third alter-
native (*phuṅ gsum*);[15] in other words, if x is not one, it is many, and
vice versa. Tsoṅ kha pa, however, has introduced the terms "essential
oneness" and "essential difference", terms which play a very small role
in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, but about which we shall have more to
say below. At any rate, it seems that Tsoṅ kha pa is transposing the
same mutual exclusivity onto essential identity and essential difference.

(3) Śāntarakṣita relies on principle (3) at many points, notably the
refutation of the single nature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's "all-pervasive
space" (*vyāpakākāśa; khyab pa'i nam mkha'*; cf. *kārikā* 10), as well as in
the various arguments against Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Outsider's view
of consciousness. For example, in *kārikā* 22, he describes a Sautrāntika
Sākāravādin school (*sna tshogs gñis med pa*) which held that the manifold
of aspects produced from a multicoloured painting, were not distinct (*tha
dad*) from consciousness. In such a case "it is not logical that there be
a manifold (*sna tshogs*) of aspects. As these aspects are not different

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[13] *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, 89a: *gcig żes bya ba cha med pa ñid do.*

[14] *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan*, 13a: *rtags daṅ dgag bya'i chos kyi gżi mthun 'gog pa rtogs
par dka' bas de rjod na...*
"Since it is difficult to understand how to refute a common point between the reason
["having parts"] and the property to be denied ["being truly one thing"], I shall
speak on this..."

[15] *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, 66b:
*gcig pu'i bdag ñid daṅ du ma'i bdag ñid ni phan tsun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid
yin pas phuṅ po gźan sel to.*

(*tha dad*) from one consciousness, they would share its single nature."
Further on he argues,"if consciousness were not something different from
the many aspects, then like the varieties of aspects, it too would be-
come many".[16] There are numerous other examples which could be cited,
but in general, it is sufficient to say that it is principle (3) which
establishes the key entailment: given that x has many parts, and that
the parts are essentially identical with x, principle (3) establishes
that x cannot be truly one thing.

(4) In Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's texts principle (4) is little
invoked. This might be explained by the fact that most traditions which
Śāntarakṣita is seeking to refute, hold that the part-holder – be it
consciousness, the atom etc. – is in some way one with its parts. An ex-
ample where something vaguely like (4) is used, however, is the refu-
tation of the Nirākāravādins (*kārikā* 47-57). Śāntarakṣita argues that
consciousness would not experience many aspects because, according to
the Nirākāravādins, these aspects are not real entities (*abhāva; dṅos
med*). Thus, the aspects would be unrelated with consciousness; they would
neither have a one nature relation (*tādātmya; bdag gcig tu 'brel*), nor
a causal relation (*tadutpatti; de byuṅ 'brel*) with consciousness.

I should, however, explain my hesitations about the Nirākāravādin
example, and the introduction of the terms "essential identity" and "es-
sential difference"; this will in turn lead to a question of methodology.

In general, Tibetans speak of "unrelated other objects" (*'brel med
don gźan*) in cases where b o t h objects exist; e.g. the pillar and the
vase, or the yoghurt and the basin (*'khar gźoṅ*). In that sense, as the
Nirākāravādins do not consider aspects as being real entities, one could
only consider the above example as a bona fide case of principle (4) if
one loosened the strictures on the notion of "unrelated other objects".
If Tsoṅ kha pa did have any actual *kārikā* in mind as being examples of
principle (4), it seems that 47-57 would be the only candidates. But it
may well be that Tsoṅ kha pa was not thinking of any particular *kārikā*
at all.

In fact, this latter approach seems the most plausible. "Unrelated
other objects" is a notion that was successfully used in Tibetan discus-
sions of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, while "essential identity" is a key term

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[16] *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, 57b and 58b:
rnam pa de dag sna tshog pa 'di ni rigs pa ma yin te rnam par śes pa gcig daṅ tha
dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir śes pa de'i raṅ gyi ṅo bo bźin no.
rnam par śes pa de rnam pa du ma daṅ tha dad pa ma yin pa'i lus yin na ni rnam pa
de dag gi bye brag bźin du du mar 'gyur ro.

in *Pramāṇa* philosophy. Their introduction here serves to create a r a p-
p r o c h e m e n t, a continuity between three otherwise distinct problem-
situations.

Now, I think it is fair to say that Tsoṅ kha pa was less concerned
with what Śāntarakṣita and others s a i d, than with rationally recon-
structing the logical situations they faced. We follow Imre Lakatos and
make a distinction between internal and external history, the former be-
ing primarily l o g i c a l d e d u c t i o n s of what c o u l d have been
said, given the key ideas of the philosopher in question, the latter be-
ing what was actually said, what actually took place.[17] In this light,
there is no doubt that Tsoṅ kha pa, the great debater, was a specialist
at internal history; as such his stretching of terminology, his imposi-
tion of concepts which have no obvious textual justification, should
not be judged by the severe criterion of the external historian. Bearing
this distinction in mind, we deprive neither Tsoṅ kha pa, n o r f o r
t h a t m a t t e r, o u r s e l v e s, of the possibility of using fertile but
foreign concepts.

Essential identity and difference

To resume the discussion, obviously the key concepts in Tsoṅ kha pa's
version of the "neither one nor many" argument are essential identity
(*ṅo bo gcig*) and essential difference (*ṅo bo tha dad*). Let us first try
to clarify these concepts, in order to be able to meaningfully ask the
following questions: why does it follow that, if x is essentially iden-
tical with y, and y has many parts, then x must also have many parts?
Why is it that, if x and y are essentially different, x and y must be
unrelated?

Chos kyi rgyal mtshan speaks of six types of identity and difference
in Buddhist philosophy: substantial identity (*rdzas gcig*); co-extensive-
ness (*don gcig*); identity of own-being (*raṅ bźin gcig*); identity of na-
ture (*bdag ñid gcig*); essential identity (*ṅo bo gcig*); identity of ne-
gatives (*ldog pa gcig*).[18] A full study of all these notions is, of course
impossible here. But fortunately we can simplify a bit by noting that
three of the six (viz. identity of own-being, identity of nature and es-
sential identity) are the same relation, and are used interchangeably.

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[17] Cf. his *History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions*, 102-105, 118-121.

[18] *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don*, 102b.

Substantial identity - in the Tibetan tradition at least - is a subset
of essential identity, applying to cases of impermanent phenomena, or
what is the same thing, phenomena which have substance (rdzas yod).[19]
In particular, x and y are substantially identical if they "appear non-
distinct (so sor mi snaṅ ba) to a direct perception (pratyakṣa; mṅon
sum)".[20] A persual of rGyal tshab rje's dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byaṅ re-
veals that most of rGyal tshab's paraphrasing of Śāntarakṣita's argu-
ments is in terms of substantial identity and difference. The difference
between substantial and essential identity can for all intents and pur-
poses be overlooked in this discussion - it is often overlooked in oth-
er contexts.

Take some examples of substantial or essential identity:
(a) product-hood (byas pa) and impermanence (mi rtag pa); (b) subjects
(chos can) and their qualities (chos); (c) particulars (spyi ldan) and
universals (spyi); (d) activity (bya ba) and the agent (bya ldan); (e)
the two truths; (f) parts and part-holders (at least conventionally,
they are said to be essentially identical).[21]

Clearly the notion of identity here is a strange one, and can not
be reduced to a standard logic textbook definition of identity, as in
first order predicate calculus with identity. Take (b) above. Let the
subject be a vase, and the properties be impermanence, and "being bulbous
and able to carry water." By the normal criteria of "=" (viz. transiti-
vity, symmetry and reflexiveness),[22] if vase = what is impermanent, and
vase = what is bulbous and able to carry water, then it would follow
that what is impermanent = what is bulbous and able to carry water.
Absurd. However, I think that there is a clear notion here, one which
can be understood with the aid of Pramāṇa texts. The Pramāṇavārttika
states:

> In all cases, there is only a difference between the words
> which describe substances [i.e. subjects] and entities [i.e.

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[19] cf. Yoṅs 'dzin phur bu lcog byams pa, bsDus grwa 'briṅ, 9a for a brief discussion of
btags yod and rdzas yod.

[20] An .example of this definition in use is found in rGyal-tshab-rje's rNam 'grel thar
lam gsal byed, Vol.I, 101:
rdzas tha dad du thal | blo ma khrul ba'i gzuṅ ṅor so sor snaṅ ba'i phyir. Here blo
ma khrul ba means direct perception (mṅon sum).

[21] For (b), (c), (d) cf. rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed, 97. In sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don,
102b it is said that "the two truths are essentially identical (ṅo bo gcig), but
have different double negatives (ldog pa tha dad)".

[22] cf. Grzegorczyck, op.cit. 3-8. As for "bulbous and able to carry water", this the
usual definition (mtshan ñid) of a vase (bum pa); cf. bsDus grwa chuṅ, 7a.

qualities]. Their denotations admit of no difference what-
soever.[23]

In *Thar lam gsal byed*, rGyal tshab rje explains this *kārikā* as follows:

"Take as the subject of debate all cases of words describing
substances or subjects, and entities or qualities. Although
one grasps them [i.e. subjects and qualities] as being sub-
stantially different, there is in fact no substantial dif-
ference with regard to their denotations (*brjod bya*) as the
difference is confined (*zad pa*) to one of understanding one
object (*don gcig ñid*) by means of different symbols. Although
one might speak about qualities (*yon tan*) and quality posses-
sors (*yon tan can*), actions and agents, universals and par-
ticulars, and although one might grasp them as substantially
different, this is merely a difference imputed by the con-
ceptual mind (*rtog pas btags pa'i tha dad tsam du zad pa*);
nonetheless these notions are intelligible (*go bar byed*)."[24]

The picture begins to gradually emerge. Essential identity, or more par-
ticularly substantial identity, is identity for a direct perception -
what looks the same to someone who is non-deluded. Based on the speaker's
intentions, there is a separation made between subjects, qualities, uni-
versals, etc., but these are only mind-invented differences; the actual
denoted object (*vācya; brjod bya*) is as it appears to direct perception,
and admits no such differences. In the above-cited examples it is possi-
ble that x ≠ y, but these differences will be mind-invented; the actual
denotation of "x" = the actual denotation of "y". We can frame the fol-
lowing bi-conditional using "=" in its usual sense: x and y are essenti-
ally identical, if and only if, the actual denotation of "x" = the actu-
al denotation of "y", where "actual denotation" is understood to mean
the object free of mind or language invented differences.

Now suppose that the actual denotation of "part" = the actual deno-
tation of "part-holder", as follows from the hypothesis of principle (3)
that parts and part-holder are essentially identical. Then given the usu-
al understanding of "=", and the premise that the actual denotation of
"part" has the property of manyness, it would follow that the actual de-

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[23] Svārthānumānapariccheda, *Kārikā* 62:
 Bhedo 'yam eva sarvatra dravyabhāvābhedhāyinoḥ | śabdayor na tayor vācye viśeṣas tena kaś cana ||

[24] *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, vol.I, 97.

notation of "part-holder" should also have the property of manyness.[25]
Mutatis mutandis, the singleness of the partholder would also transfer
to the parts, and the parts would all have to be identical. Thus, the
two absurdities mentioned in principle (3) can be derived.

A possible objection at this point might be to ask if it is at all
meaningful to say "the actual denotation of 'parts' or 'part-holder'
is many." Syntactically, it is anomalous to predicate "manyness" of a
singular noun. There are two problems here: one is linguistic, and stems
from the fact that *"cha śas"* and *"cha can"*, and such nouns do not show
a singular-plural difference; the other is logical, and stems from the
fact that neither Śāntarakṣita nor Tsoṅ kha pa rely on set theory.

Be all this as it may, the problems are relatively easily surmounted
if w e take the responsibility for introducing some elementary set the-
ory and speak about the cardinality of a set of objects X (i.e. CN (X)).
The basic move is to say that t h e s e t of objets actually denoted by
"parts" h a s many members while t h e s e t of objects actually denoted
by "part-holder" h a s only one member. Let us call the first set "p"
and the second "PH". Thus CN(P) > 1 and CN(PH) = 1 (What we have just
done is a typical internal history move. We have placed Śāntarakṣita in
a problem situation which he himself was, of course, never confronted
with. But such a reconstruction is, I think, justified given the syntac-
tic demands of our language, and the high level of familiarity and cla-
rity which set theory has in our logic.) If we wish, we can reconstruct
the preceding paragraph's arguments as follows:

(1) P = PH		Premise
(2) For all sets, X,Y: if X = Y, then CN(X) = CN(Y)		Theorem
(3) CN(P) = CN(PH)		From 1 and 2
(4) CN(P) > 1 and CN(PH) = 1		Premise
(5) CN(P) = 1 and CN(PH) > 1		From 3, 4, and Leibniz' law

The contradiction, CN(P) = 1 and CN(P) ≠ 1, follows from (4) and
(5), and can be used to infer P ≠ PH by *modus tollens*. Lines (1) – (5)
constitute a reconstruction of Tsoṅ kha pa's argument up until his con-
clusion that the parts must be one or the part-holder must be many; the
inference that the parts can not be truly essentially one with their

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[25] Frege's formulation was: for all properties F: if x = y, then if x is F, then y is F.
(F) (x = y → (Fx → Fy)).
Russell's was basically similar, apart from provisions for the theory of types. Cf.
M. and W.Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 619. For different formulations of iden-
tity, cf. P.Weingartner, *A Predicate Calculus for Intensional Logic*.

part-holder (i.e. P ≠ PH) is left implicit in Tsoṅ kha pa.

What about the second question which I posed? Why is it that if x and y are essentially different, x and y must be unrelated ('brel med)? There are according to *Pramāṇa* texts, two and only two types of relatedness: one nature relation (*tādātmya; bdag gcig tu 'brel*) and causal relation (*tadutpatti; de byuṅ 'brel*). To postulate a third type would, according to Dharmakīrti, destroy the necessity for there being only three types of valid reasons, and would hence bring about an enormous rupture in the *Pramāṇavārttika* system.

lCaṅ skya, in discussing the *Madhyamakāvatāra*'s seven-fold reasoning (*rnam bdun gyi rigs pa*), states the following concerning the chariot and its parts:

> Take the chariot as subject; it is not by nature different from its various parts; because otherwise if it were, the parts and the chariot would be essentially different, and if two things are simultaneous (*dus mñam*) and essentially different, then they would have to be unrelated other objects ('brel med don gźan*). Thus, the chariot and its parts would have to be separately apprehended (*dmigs pa*), just as a horse and a ox are separately apprehended. But such is not the case.[26]

Now in general, if two phenomena are essentially different, it does not follow that they are unrelated. A causal relation, as it involves substantial difference (*rdzas tha dad*) of the relata, implies that these relata are essentially different.[27] But this substantial, and hence essential difference, is due to the fact that cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. However, in the case of parts and part-holder, it is not a causal relation that is involved. The part-possessor must exist at the same time as its parts (the key words in lCaṅ skya are *ṅo bo tha dad dus mñam*). As a result only a one-nature relation would be possible. But since by hypothesis parts and part-holders are essentially different,

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[26] *Grub mtha' thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*, 432.
   It should be clear that Tsoṅ kha pa's principles (3) and (4) are not just restricted to Mādhyamika-Svātantrika argumentation, but also play a major role in Prāsaṅgika texts - for example, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*'s arguments concerning the self and the aggregates, as well as the arguments known as "the seven-fold reasoning" VI, 127: *gal te phuṅ po bdag na de phyir de | maṅ bas bdag de dag kyaṅ maṅ por 'gyur*; VI, 124: *de'i phyir phuṅ po las gźan bdag med de | phuṅ po ma gtogs de 'dzin ma grub phyir*.

[27] cf. *bsDus grwa 'briṅ*. 5b: *chos de daṅ rdzas tha dad pa'i sgo nas chos de'i 'bras bu'i rigs su gnas pa chos de daṅ de byuṅ 'brel gyi mtshan ñid...*

and hence not of one nature (*bdag ñid gcig*), they would be completely unrelated. Nor can one sanguinely accept this conclusion; unrelatedness would imply that they could be perceived separately, and moreover, that one could exist without the other - the part-holder ought to be able to exist without parts.

There is one last point to be mentioned, and I shall give it as short shrift as does Śāntarakṣita himself. The paper so far has dealt with arguments against oneness, and has left manyness untouched. Śāntarakṣita devotes only two *kārikā* (61, 62) to arguments against manyness, but the reasoning is cogent and easily laid out: if there is no phenomenon of which we can say that it is one individual thing, then we also can not meaningfully speak of "many phenomena". Manyness is a collection (*bsags pa*) of individuals, a collection of ones. If we prefer a set-theoretic formulation, we may simply say "sets with many members are impossible if there are no unit sets".

Summary and conclusions

(a) We began by making a distinction between two sorts of "neither one, nor many" arguments, those which simply spoke of the qualities oneness and manyness, and those which were phrased in terms of "... is one with ...". Śāntarakṣita's version was of the former variety, although seen through Tsoṅ kha pa's interpretation, it ultimately depended on arguments involving "... is one with ...".

(b) Tsoṅ kha pa's account of Śāntarakṣita is in many places an accurate reflection of the latter's text. But it is also more than that. It is an attempt at internal history, a rational reconstruction of Śāntarakṣita's thought, first of all placing it in a conceptual frame-·k common to *Pramāṇa* and *Mādhyamika* philosophy, and then imagining how the discussion could reasonably proceed in such a context.

(c) The notions of essential identity and difference, so important to Tsoṅ kha pa's and hence Śāntarakṣita's argumentation, can be rationalized by recourse to *Pramāṇavārttika*'s theory of meaning, plus some modern logic. Given this account of these key terms, as well as *Pramāṇavārttika*'s notion of relatedness, Tsoṅ kha pa's principles (3) and (4) seem to follow.

Finally, although I have only touched on a few aspects of this key argument for *śūnyatā*,[28] I hoped, above all, to show that the arguments need to be understood in terms of a whole background network of l o g i - c a l notions. As is so often the case in the history of philosophy, sophisticated argumentation ultimately seems to rest on philosophies of language and logic.

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[28] Various important points remain undiscussed so far, but I shall only mention one of them here:

In *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal* (135-136) Tsoṅ kha pa presents another line of reasoning, which he claims – with non-obvious justification – to be the position of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (*źi ba 'tsho yab sras*). The argument is also used in *rNam bśad sñiṅ po rgyan* and *sKabs daṅ po'i spyi don* as well as other texts, and represents the other major strand in the dGe lugs pa view of the "neither one nor many" argument. It can be summarized as follows:

(i)   Parts and part-holders are conventionally essentially identical.

(ii)   Parts and part-holders appear as being essentially different to the conceptual mind which thinks about them (*rtog pa la ṅo bo tha dad du snaṅ ba*).

(iii) Therefore, the way in which parts and part-holders appear (*snaṅ tshul*), and the way they are (*gnas tshul*) are not in accord (*mi mthun pa*); thus, they are like an illusion, and are deceptive (*bdzun pa*).

(iv)   Whatever is truly established (*bden par grub*) can not be deceptive in any way (*rnam par thams cad du bdzun pa spaṅs te*).

(v)   Thus, parts and part-holders are not truly established.
       I hope to say more about this argument and other aspects of the "neither one nor many" argument at a later date.

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ON RANG RIG

by

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It is well known that Candrakīrti, in his discussion of the two
satyas in the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya*, placed under *mithyāsaṃvṛtisatya*
the philosophical views of his opponents. That is, all the philosophical
activity of those thinkers who aren't Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika is incorrect
even from the conventional everyday point of view, without beginning to
consider its pretensions to revealing ultimate truth.[1]

In his commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (the *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i
shing rta*), however, Mi bskyod rdo rje, the eighth Karma pa, tells us
that there were many earlier commentators who understood Candrakīrti's
refutation of the substratum consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), self-refer-
ring consciousness (*svasaṃvitti*), the external object and the person
(*pudgala*) to be only a refutation from the ultimate point of view, and
not conventionally (*tha snyad du*).[2] Tsong kha pa certainly held that the
Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka accepts conventionally the external object and the
person, when these are understood correctly.[3] But Mi bskyod rdo rje sin-
gles out for particular mention the Sa skya lamas Go ram pa bSod nams
seng ge and Shā kya mChog ldan, and I want to look briefly at two things:
First, the issues involved in urging the acceptance or otherwise of self-
referring, reflexive consciousness; and second, some philosophical di-
mensions of the dispute between Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge and Mi bskyod
rdo rje.

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[1] See Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* on *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 26. See also Atīśa's
Satyadvayāvatāra 70a: *dang po gnyis te chu zla dang | grub mtha' ngan pa'i rtog pa'o |*

[2] *Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta* 457: *go shāk sogs bod kyi 'jug 'grel byed pa mang pos
slob dpon zla grags kyi bzhed par gzhung 'dis tha snyad du rang lugs la rang rig yod
pa yin par sgrub po | zhes dang | de bzhin kun gzhi rang rig phyi don gang zag rnams
lugs 'dis tha snyad du 'gog pa min kyi | dpyad bzod du grub pa'i kun gzhi sogs 'gog
par byed pa yin lo |*

[3] For Tsong kha pa's acceptance of the conventional existence of the external object
see, for example, his *rTsa ba shes rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad kyi bshad pa*
15ff. On the status of the person see the same text, 40ff.

Mi pham, in his lucid commentary on Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, explains that for Śāntarakṣita consciousness in its occurrence is in all important respects the exact reverse of insentient phenomena. Consciousness has as its nature luminosity and awareness, "whatever is by nature not dead, not insentient, is conscious of its very self, self-aware, self-luminous".[4] Self-consciousness is what distinguishes sentience from insentience, in the case of consciousness, and uniquely in the case of consciousness, there is self-reference, self-consciousness in the very same act. By "self-consciousness", Mi pham explains, is meant that in one nature (*ngo bo gcig*) there is both awareness of object and of subject.[5] Śāntarakṣita and his commentators assert emphatically that consciousness is unitary and partless, and cannot be judged on the model of unconscious beings, "chariots, a wall and so on".[6] It is pointless to argue in the case of self-consciousness that an act cannot be directed towards itself. Act, agent, object, knowing, knower, knowable - none of these categories applies in the case of a partless consciousness which is in its very nature, and not as an additional act, self-conscious.[7]

There is an argument, familiar in the West from Aristotle's *De Anima* and, more recently, the work of Franz Brentano and Jean-Paul Sartre, to the effect that if consciousness isn't conscious, that is, conscious of

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[4] See Mi pham's *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung* 141ff. *de ltar bem po min pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa de lta bu 'di ni bdag rang nyid shes pa'am rang rig rang gsal zhes pa yin no* | This is an expansion of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v.16bc: *bem min rang bzhin gang yin pa* | *de 'di bdag nyid shes pa yin* ||, given in the Sanskrit text of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, v.1999b: *iyam evātma-saṃvittir asya yā'jaḍarūpatā* || and also quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* on BCA IX, 20.

[5] *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad* 141-142: *de'ang gzung char snang ba'i rnam pa de'ang shes pa yin* | *de 'dzin pa'ang shes pa yin cing de gnyis ngo bo gcig yin* ... An opponent is here raising an objection that if this were the case then act and agent would be the same thing. Śāntarakṣita, and Mi pham, go on to explain that this in fact doesn't follow.

[6] *Ibid.* 142: *'di ltar gzhal bya sna tshogs pa snang ba'i yul dang* | *de 'dzin pa'i yul can so sor yod pa lta bu'i snang tshul gyi dbang du byas te gzung rnam dang 'dzin rnam zhes bzhag kyang don la rnam par shes pa gang zhig shing rta dang rtsig pa la sogs pa bem po'i rang bzhin gsal rig dang bral ba dag las bzlog pa gsal zhing rig pa'i mtshan nyid can du rab tu skye ba ste* | I am grateful to Tom Tillemans and Achok Rinpoche for correcting a misreading of this verse. This incorporates *Madhya-makālaṃkāra* v.16ab: *rnam shes bem po'i rang bzhin las* | *bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste* ||, which equals *Tattvasaṃgraha* v.1999a: *vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate* |, and is also quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* on IX, 20.

[7] See the *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad* 142-143 on *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* v.17: *gcig pu cha med rang bzhin la* | *gsum gyi rang bzhin mi 'thad phyir* | *de yi rang gis rig pa ni* | *bya dang byed pa'i dngos por min* ||. This equals *Tattvasaṃgraha* v.2000: *kriyākāra-kabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu* | *ekasyānaṃśarūpasya trairūpyānupapattitaḥ* ||, and this verse is also quoted in *BCAP* on BCA IX, 20.

itself as well as conscious of the object, then, being unconscious, there could be no conscious awareness.[8] Thus far Śāntarakṣita. Self-consciousness is the very nature of consciousness, if consciouness isn't self-conscious then it is *bem po, jaḍa*, dead. If luminosity isn't luminous, says Kamalaśīla in his *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā*, then it cannot apprehend other objects.[9] It is worth noting that the (misleading) metaphor of light for consciousness, a metaphor which reoccurs here in the example of light illuminating itself in the very same act of illuminating others, has been traced by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle to the Protestant need to know the state of his soul without recourse to confessors and scholars – thus the God-given "light" of conscience.[10] Whether there is any conceptual similarity here with Buddhism I leave to a different occasion, but it is clear that the image of light for consciousness was very old in India and had no need of Protestants for its revelation!

If consciousness is known in another, reflective rather than reflexive, act of consciousness then we face an infinite regress, since the second act would have to be known in the same way as the first, and so on. Or, Tsong kha pa points out in his commentary on *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 73a (the *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*), representing the *pūrvapakṣa*, if the second act doesn't require to be itself illuminated by another act, then why is it necessary for the first to be so illuminated?[11] But what is wrong with an infinite regress? The problem, Tsong kha pa notes, is that in the case of an infinite regress the initial perception of, say, blue, is never founded, never established.[12] Moreover if an infinite regress of consciousness were required in order to found one consciousness then there could be no progression beyond the first attempt at objective knowledge. For Tsong kha pa, clearly, to complete an infinite series requires an infinite time. There could be no delimitation of other objects,

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[8] See Aristotle, *De Anima* III:2, Franz Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (English trans.), 121ff, and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, lix-lxvii (English trans.) and *The Transcendence of the Ego, passim*. For an influential criticism of consciousness, self-consciousness and this argument in particular, see Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 148-189, especially 150-156.

[9] *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* 98b: *gsal ba yang gsal ba ma yin na ni gsal ba gsal ba ma yin pa'i phyir mi gzhan gyi mngon sum bzhin du mdun na rnam par gnas pa'i don kyang mngon sum du mi 'gyur ro* |

[10] See *The Concept of Mind* 152-153.

[11] *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* 285: *de la de 'jal byed kyi shes pa don gzhan dgos sam mi dgos | mi dgos na shes pa snga la yang mi dgos par 'gyur la* |

[12] *Ibid.*: *thug med du song na ni sngo 'dzin dang po la myong ba mi 'grub pa'i skyon yod do* |

forms, sounds and so on.[13] Thus, to quote Brentano, "The presentation of
the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a
single mental phenomenon." [14]

Now, it's not clear to me this train of argument is valid or even
coherent. To deny that consciousness is conscious of itself at the same
time as it is conscious of objects is not necessarily to claim that it
is unconscious, anymore than to deny that whiteness is itself white is
thereby to claim that whiteness is black, or indeed any other colour.
It is to deny that a category is necessarily applicable to itself. The
negation of "conscious" is not "unconscious" but rather "not conscious".
If I claim to be conscious of blue but not conscious of being conscious
of blue I am not thereby claiming that I am unconscious. Moreover we
might anyway choose to deny, with Tsong kha pa, that saying "I am con-
scious of seeing blue" adds anything to saying "I see blue". Whether some-
thing is nevertheless lost in this analysis, a distinction perhaps be-
tween being of x and conscious that x is, is, of course, a different
issue.[15]

There is another argument used by Buddhists in support of self-refer-
ring, reflexive consciousness which I am not familiar with from any Wes-
tern context. This is the argument from memory. Put by Tsong kha pa in
its simplest form, the argument runs as follows: When I remember that I
sensed blue at a former time the sensation is a cause, although not the
only cause, of the memory. In remembering - and in the Buddhist discussion
of memory I think we can see an example of a particular case of r e f l e c-
t i v e awareness, awareness taking as its object another awareness which
has occurred previously - the awareness which serves as the referent of
the memory act is seen to have both subjective and objective elements.
That is, Tsong kha pa explains, when we remember, the memory image is seen

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[13] *Ibid.: gnyis pa yul gzhan yongs su mi gcod par thal ba ni | shes pa snga ma phyi mas
gcod na ni gzugs sgra la sogs pa'i yul gzhan mi gcod pa dang | de la mi 'pho bar
'gyur te |*

[14] *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* 127.

[15] See Tsong kha pa's *dKa' gnas chen po brgyad* 26-27: *sngon po myong ba'i rtags las
sngon po rig pa sngon du song bar grub la | sngon po rig par grub pa nyid kyis rig
pa tsam du grub zin pa'i phyir | rang rig la sogs pa'i sgrub byed gzhan rtog pa don
med do |* This argument is used by Tsong kha pa in the context of the "memory ar-
gument" which will be dealt with subsequently. Its generalization seems to be in
keeping with Tsong kha pa's overall position. A similar argument may be indicated
by Wittgenstein's treatment of pain in his *Philosophical Investigations*, paras.
416ff. That self-consciousness is indicated in the distinction between being con-
scious of x and conscious that x is persuasively argued by Pratima Bowes in her
book *Consciousness and Freedom*. Among the views she treats in this book are two
Indian views, Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta.

to be composed of "formerly this was seen" and "it was seen by me".[16] Or, as Tsong kha pa expressed it elsewhere, when I remember that I truly saw blue there is a memory of blue and a memory of seeing blue. Thus in the original act there must have been the sensation of blue and also the sensation of seeing blue.[17] These two formulations of the same argument are worth noting, for they indicate that reference in the first formulation to perception by me is intended to indicate self-consciousness in the sense of reflexive consciousness of itself, not consciousness of a self, perception by a self. That these two issues are different is seldom sufficiently realised in Western philosophy, their confusion was fatal for Descartes, who concluded from the argument that consciousness in being conscious is conscious of being conscious, reflexive self-consciousness, to the existence of a substantial Self.[18]

But it is at least debatable whether a reflection on consciousness, introspection, can establish what is actually present to consciousness in lived experience. The presence of a number of elements in the verbal formulation of a reflective awareness "I saw blue" doesn't indicate that these elements correspond to epistemological elements in the original experience. As Kant pointed out, there is an "I think" which is capable of accompanying all my mental acts, but the only significance of this is that all my mental acts are mine.[19] It is not quite clear what it would be for me to have someone else's mental acts, and thus the "I saw blue" carries with it no implications as to the status of self-consciousness or a self. Tsong kha pa points out that one can infer simple sensation from memory, but one is unable to infer self-consciousness. On the basis

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[16] See Tsong kha pa's *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* 175: *de yang sngar 'di mthong ngo zhes yul dang ngas mthong ngo zhes yul can dran pa yod pas sngar gyi sngo 'dzin gyi shes pa lta bu de la myong ba yod do* |

[17] In his *dKa' gnas chen po brgyad* 25: *bye brag tu ngas sngon po yang dag par mthong ngo snyam du dran pa'i tse sngon po dran pa dang* | *sngon po'i mthong ba dran pa* | *dran pa'i 'dzin stangs la yod la* | *des dpag par bya ba'i sngon po nyams su myong byed dang* | *sngon po mthong ba myong byed gnyis yod par grub pas* |

[18] See, in particular, Descartes' *Discourse on Method* 4, where he concludes, from the fact of doubting, his own existence – "I think, therefore I am" – and sees this as equivalent to being "a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking". That this inference is problematic was noted at length by Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kemp-Smith transl.), 330ff.

[19] *Critique of Pure Reason* 152ff. Cf. Strawson's *The Bounds of Sense* 165: "It would make no sense to think or say: This inner experience is occurring, but it is occurring to me? ... Again, it would make no sense to think or say: I distinctly remember that inner experience occurring, but did it occur to me?" Tshong kha pa makes more or less the same point in his *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* 176: *rang lugs kyis rang rig med kyang dran pa skye ba mi 'gal ni* || *gang phyir gang gis yul myong gyur de las* | *dran pa 'di gzhan nga la yod min pa* |

of sensing blue one can conclude in memory that formerly there was the
awareness of blue, but this only allows the establishment of simple a-
wareness, not self-awareness. On the other hand if there is a memory of
simple awareness of blue it is unnecessary to postulate self-conscious-
ness.[20] That is, if I remember seeing blue, and I am remembering the ob-
jective part, "blue", this is sufficient for memory. It is possible, but
not necessary, to add on top of this an additional awareness that it was
me who saw blue but, apart from Kant's contentless "I think", the memory
of seeing blue itself doesn't require this additional awareness and there-
fore will not indicate a self-consciousness present in all consciousness.
If I remember seeing blue, through a memory of blue, Tsong kha pa wants
to claim, then if I am mistaken and I didn't see blue this is not a case
of memory but of imagination. And if I really did see blue then in re-
membering blue it would be absurd to say that there is for me a memory
of blue but not a memory of seeing blue or indeed that I saw blue. How
could my memory of blue pertain to anyone or anything else? And thus the
simple memory of blue is sufficient; to say "I saw blue" adds nothing to
this simple awareness, it doesn't allow us to infer self-consciousness as
an aspect of the initial experience.

I want now to look at some aspects of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's
portrayal of Candrakīrti's position in his critical summary commentary
on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (the *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa
dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel*). If the
claim is that self-consciousness is truly established based on the me-
mory argument then this is refuted by the refutation of the four sorts
of production - from self, other, both or neither. That is, there is no
way that memory could really be the result of sensation given the refu-
tation of causality.[21] But if the claim is that self-consciousness exists
conventionally in all mental acts then there is uncertainty of pervasion.
It is like when one establishes that there is fire in a certain place
and then, using the logical mark of smoke, wants to prove that there is
fire elsewhere. It has yet to be shown that wherever there is smoke there
is fire. Likewise it has yet to be shown that wherever there is memory
there was self-consciousness.[22] Candrakīrti gives as examples, in order

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[20] See the *dKa' gnas chen po brgyad*, quoted in n.15 above.

[21] *dBu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel* 62b.

[22] *Ibid.*: *rang rig bsgrub pa la khyab pa ma nges te | gzhi gzhan gyi steng du me gzhan sngar tshad mas grub na phyis du ba'i rtags las gzhi 'ga' zhig tu mi grub pa 'thad pa bzhin du | sngar spyir rang rig tshad mas grub na | dran pa'i rtags las de sgrub pa 'thad kyang | phyir rgol gyi ngor sngar rang rig spyi ldog nas ma grub pa da lta dran pa'i rtags kyis mi 'grub pa'i phyir ...*

to show uncertainty of pervasion, according to Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge, the fact that one cannot prove that a magnifying glass was used just because one sees fire, and so on.[23] Conventionally memory certainly occurs as a result of sensing the object previously, even without sensing the consciousness itself.

But Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's subsequent discussion shows how he failed to realise the distinction, implicit in Tsong kha pa's discussion, between reflexive consciousness of itself and reflective consciousness of self. For he takes Candrakīrti's analysis of how it is possible to say in everyday parlance "I saw blue" as a demonstration of how self-consciousness occurs conventionally. Conventionally self-consciousness does occur, he says, since there is memory directed to the object, arising from sensation of the object, and memory of oneself arising from sensation of oneself.[24] In other words, contrary to Tsong kha pa's position above, Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge wants to maintain that while we can't infer from memory self-consciousness, memory of the objective part "seeing blue" or "blue" is sufficient to establish memory without postulating its constant accompaniment by self-awareness, nevertheless in that it is possible for me to direct an additional awareness to the fact that "I saw blue", the subjective part, so self-consciousness is an everyday, conventional possibility. The fact that inference from memory to self-consciousness is uncertain doesn't necessitate that self-consciousness never occurs, or that memory may not serve to reveal it. Thus Candra-kīrti's choice of examples, the fact that fire c a n be produced by a magnifying glass, although it can also be produced by rubbing two sticks together, shows that he didn't want to refute the possibility of the conventional occurrence of self-consciousness. Otherwise he would have shown not uncertainty of pervasion but rather contradictory pervasion, examples where the occurrence of the one is never accompanied by the occurence of the other.[25]

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[23] *Ibid.*, continuation of above: *dang dran pa tha snyad pa'i rtags kyis rang rig sgrub pa'i khyab pa ma nges pa'i dpe ni chu tsam mthong ba las nor bu chu shel lam ¦ me tsam mthong ba las nor bu me shel mi 'grub pa bzhin zhes gsungs so ¦*

[24] *Ibid.* 62d: *gzhung 'dis rang lugs la myong dran gzhan du med pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis yul myong las yul dran skye ba dang ¦ rang myong las rang dran skye ba dran pas tha snyad du rang rig zhal gyis bzhes par grub bo ¦*

[25] *Ibid.* 62b, continuation of n.23 above: *de'i don yang dran pa tha snyad pa de yin na rang rig las byung bas ma khyab ste ¦ rang myong med par yul myong ba las kyang dran pa tha snyad pa skye ba yod pa'i phyir ¦ dper na chu shel med kyang char la sogs pa dang ¦ me shel med kyang gtsub shing sogs las chu dang me 'byung ba'i phyir zhes pa'i don te ¦ dpe 'dis kyang rang rig tha snyad du khas mi len pa ma yin te ¦ gzhan du na rang rig (62c) tha snyad pa sgrub pa la dran pa tha snyad pa rtags su bkod pa khyab*

But let us just note that Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's argument rests here on the ambiguity of "self-consciousness", for the very position of Śāntarakṣita, for example, requires that self-consciousness in the sense of reflexive awareness distinguishes consciousness from dead objects through its universal presence in consciousness. It is the very mode of being of consciousness, it is what consciousness must be, there is no question of its being present at some times and not at others. If consciousness isn't self-conscious then it is unconscious. It is known through memory because in memory we remember blue and we remember sensing blue, as Tsong kha pa explained. The example of remembering "I saw blue" is a misleading alternative variant of this, but it is a variant which led Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge into identifying the p o s s i b i - l i t y of a conventional awareness of self in memory with a m e r e p o s - s i b i l i t y of reflexive self-consciousness. But Śāntarakṣita could simply reply that the possibility of directing the attention to the subject in a reflective awareness p r e s u p p o s e s the constant occurrence of a reflexive self-consciousness, but is not the s a m e as this self-consciousness.

I want finally to indicate one aspect of Mi bskyod rdo rje's impatient critique of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge's position which raises broadly philosophical problems, without going so far as to suggest even an attempt at their solution.

Mi bskyod rdo rje points out, correctly, that for Candrakīrti reflexive self-consciousness represents a theoretical tenet of certain Sautrāntikas and Cittamātrins.[26] It isn't a matter of everyday, pre-critical, pre-reflexive concern, it isn't a tenet of what philosophers have sometimes rather vaguely called "commonsense",[27] and as such there is no question for Candrakīrti of the conventional existence of self-consciousness. It either really, truly, ultimately exists, or it is simply an erroneous tenet, it doesn't exist even conventionally. For Mi bskyod rdo rje Candrakīrti's conventional truth is simply, and only, what is held to be true in pre-critical, non-philosophical worldly commerce.[28]

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pa 'gal bar gsungs dgos pa las | khyab pa ma nges par gsungs pa'i phyir ro | dpe las kyang shes te | chu shel dang me shel las chu dang me skye ba srid kyang chu dang me yin na de gnyis las skye bas ma khyab pa dper bkod 'dug pa'i phyir ro |

[26] Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta 457: gzung 'dis rang rig ces mdo sems kyi bstan bcos la grags pa'i mtshon bya'i ming de 'jig rten spyi la tha snyad du ma grags pas |

[27] Ibid., continuation of above: de 'jig rten pas tha snyad du'ang byas pa min gyi |

[28] For Mi bskyod rdo rje on the two truths see the Dwags brgyud grub pa'i shing rta on Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 23-30, pp.274ff. This lengthy section includes an extensive critical discussion of various Tibetan views on the two satyas.

And in wordly commerce people consider themselves just to experience sensations, and then to remember them later.[29] It is sufficient conventionally to talk of sensation and memory as it is of act and effect,[30] but this is certainly not to be examined critically in order to seek for an explanation or founding of the world.[31] When examined critically it is simply the case that all conventions, all "commonsense" collapses and is seen to be ultimately unfounded.[32] For Mi bskyod rdo rje it is true in the strongest sense, and in a way that it is not true for Tsong kha pa, that the Madhyamaka holds no positions, it has no explanations.

Now, the problem for the philosopher which I want to suggest arises out of this part of Mi bskyod rdo rje's critique of Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge is this: To what extent is self-consciousness a philosophical e x p l a n a t i o n of everyday experience, and to what extent is it a p r e - s u p p o s i t i o n of such experience? This question cannot be disposed of by pointing to the fact that some philosophers deny self-consciousness and refute those who maintain its existence. For one can still ask of those philosophers who adhere to self-consciousness whether they consider themselves to be engaged in a project of revealing a presupposition of everyday experience, that is, a fundamental structure of experience such that experience i s experience, a phenomenological investigation, if you like, or whether they consider themselves to be explaining everyday experience, perhaps as some phenomenalists have explained that the everyday world is a construct out of sense data, which form the immediate given of experience. On the former model the philosopher is, in this instance, simply making clear dimensions of everyday experience which may not be clearly articulated by the "man in the street" but which the man in the street can willingly assent to as being a necessary dimension of, or prerequisite for, his everyday experience.

I'm not sure how one would settle which of these is the case as regards self-consciousness. One relevant point in deciding may rest on whether we can think of an everyday context where, in answer to the question

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[29] *Ibid.* 457, continuation of n.27 above: *rang rig ces pa'i mtshon bya ming de gang la gdags pa'i gzhi shes myong tsam de dang | de phyis dran tsam 'jig rten pas tha snyad du brjod pa yod pas |*

[30] *Ibid.* 458: *las 'bras dang myong dran tsam tha snyad kyi gzhir rung bas de dag ma dpyad pa'i tha snyad kyis tha snyad de dag 'jig rten na rnam par bzhag go zhes gsal bar bshad pa'i phyir |*

[31] *Ibid.* 457-458: *... rang rig rnams ma grub pas de dag 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du tha snyad byed ched du de ltar sgrub pa 'jig rten na'ang don med pa'i phyir ro |*

[32] *Ibid.* 457ff.

whether someone r e a l l y knows something or other he would reply, "Oh
yes, certainly I do, for I am conscious and even vividly conscious of
doing so. The case is from Gilbert Ryle, and Ryle maintains that this
in fact never occurs.[33] Self-consciousness is not part of everyday ex-
perience. But all this seems to indicate is that in normal, everyday
activity people don't operate on the level of sophistication which in-
volves uncovering the presuppositions of experience. The contemporary
Indian philosopher J.N.Mohanty has claimed that immediate self-conscious-
ness uniquely occupies neither a practical nor a theoretical mode, or,
in terms of the previous discussion, it is neither part of familiar,
everyday commonsense activity, nor is it simply deduced in reflection,
in this case philosophical reflection. Rather it transcends this dis-
tinction and yet it accompanies all our awarenesses.[34] If so, then it
doesn't follow, in spite of Mi bskyod rdo rje, that to claim that self-
consciousness exists is to make a purely theoretical, or, as I have put
it, explanatory claim. In postulating self-consciousness it is claimed
that it is undeniably present in everyday conscious acts, its postula-
tion uncovers descriptively a presupposition of all experience. For
those who deny self-consciousness its postulation is said to be unneces-
sary to experience, but in both cases the issue has an immediacy not
borne by abstract metaphysical e x p l a n a t i o n s of the world.

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